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IV. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A.

Joinderand Severance

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for joinder of more than one defendant in the same action, or of more than one
count against a single defendant.'... If either the defendant or the government is prejudiced by joinder, however, the trial court has discretion
to grant severance pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
14.1951

1. Joinder of defendants
In United States v. Gee,I952 defendant Gee was tried jointly with two
co-conspirators for conspiring to distribute cocaine. 1953 Gee's co-conspirators, also charged with several substantive offenses, pleaded guilty to
1950.

R. CRIM. P. 8 provides:
(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged,
whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are
based on the same act or transactions or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
(b) Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the
same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same
act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense
or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all the defendants need not be charged in each count.
1951. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides in pertinent part:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
FED.

1952. 695 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1983).
1953. Id. at 1166. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter [on drug abuse prevention] is punish-

able by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy."
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all charges at the close of the evidence. 19 54 On appeal, Gee contended
that the trial court had erroneously denied his motion to sever his trial
95
from the trial of his co-conspirators.1 1
The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant the defendant's motion to sever. 1 956 Applying
the test recently articulated in United States v. Escalante,195 7 the court
stated that Gee had failed to demonstrate that any of his substantive
rights were clearly prejudiced by the joint trial.1 95 8 Furthermore, the
court found that Gee had waived his right to severance because he had
failed to renew his motion to sever at any point subsequent to his initial

objection.

959

Finally, the Ninth Circuit stated that, even if any of Gee's

1954. 695 F.2d at 1166.
1955. Id. at 1169. Gee acknowledged, however, that the trial judge has the discretion to
determine whether severance is required to protect the defendant's rights. Id.
1956. Id. at 1170.
1957. 637 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980). Defendant Escalante made
a pretrial motion requesting the court to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants on the
ground that evidence of the organized crime connections of one of his co-defendants would be
highly prejudicial. Id. at 1200-01. The court denied the motion and Escalante was convicted
of conspiring to import heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 952(a) and 960(a)(1). 637 F.2d
at 1199.
The Escalante court noted that "[t]he test for determining abuse of discretion in denying
severance under Rule 14 is whether a joint trial would be so prejudicial that the trial judge
could exercise his discretion in only one way." Id. at 1201. The court further stated that the
defendant:
must show more than that a separate trial would have given him a better chance for
acquittal. . . . He must also show violation of one of his substantive rights by reason of the joint trial: unavailability of full cross-examination, lack of opportunity to
present an individual defense, denial of Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, lack
of separate counsel among defendants with conflicting interests, or failure properly to
instruct the jury on the admissibility of evidence as to each defendant. . . . [T]he
prejudice must have been of such magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair
trial.
Id. (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit found that Escalante had not sustained his burden
of proof, and the court therefore affirmed the conviction. Id. at 1202. The court noted that
reference to the organized crime connections of Escalante's co-defendants was undoubtedly
harmful; however, the trial judge had carefully instructed the jury that such evidence was not
to be considered in determining Escalante's guilt or innocence, thereby neutralizing its prejudicial effect. Id.
1958. 695 F.2d at 1170. The court commented that the cases cited by the defendant were
inapposite. The court distinguished the instant case from United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d
973, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1971), noting that in Mardian there was a vast difference in the amount of
evidence presented against each defendant. As a result, one of the defendants was exposed to
the danger that the guilt of his co-defendants would be attributed to him. No such disparity
existed in Gee. Distinguishing United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971),
the court stated that Gee was not a case in which the offense for which the defendant was tried
was only remotely related to those for which his co-defendants were simultaneously prosecuted. 695 F.2d at 1170.
1959. 695 F.2d at 1170 (citing United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.
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substantive rights had been prejudiced as a result of the joint trial, the
effect of that prejudice was dispelled by the trial judge's limiting

instruction. 196o
In United States v. Brooklier,19 61 the Ninth Circuit considered

whether the admission of pretrial statements made by a non-testifying codefendant, in which he admitted he was the acting boss of an organized
crime family, necessitated severance.1 962 Five members of La Cosa Nostra were indicted on charges of racketeering, 9 63 extortion, 1964 obstruc-

tion of justice,9 65 and aiding and abetting.19 66 Although co-defendant
Dragna did not testify, the jury learned that defendants Brooklier and
Sciortino were in prison at the time Dragna claimed to have been the

acting boss. Brooklier and Sciortino contended that severance of
Dragna's trial was necessary because Dragna's statements compelled the

1967
impermissible inference that he was acting as the boss in their place.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of Brooklier and

1972) (motion to sever must be renewed at close of all evidence in order to preserve objection
on appeal)).
1960. Id. (citing United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 856 (1980)). See supra note 1957 for a discussion of Escalante.
1961. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
1962. I. at 1218. Before the statements were admitted into evidence, the names of the four
other defendants were deleted and the jury was instructed that the statements could only be
considered when determining Dragna's guilt, not that of his co-defendants. Id.
1963. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976), a portion of the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
1964. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976), a portion of the Hobbs Act, provides in part:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both.
1965. 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (1976) provides in part that "[w]hoever injures any person in his
person or property on account of the giving by such person or by any other person of any such
information to any criminal investigator. . . [s]hall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
1966. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal.
1967. 685 F.2d at 1218. From 1969 through 1976, the co-defendant, Dragna, had several
conversations with an FBI agent during which the agent attempted to persuade Dragna to
become an informant. In 1976, Dragna was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury.
Dragna sought the aid of the FBI agent who informed him that their conversations might be
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Sciortino's motion to sever. 1968 The court noted that, even if the suggested inference could be drawn, it was not sufficiently incriminating to
require severance. 1969 The Ninth Circuit stated that severance is not required under Bruton v. United States9 7 ° unless the non-testifying defendant's statements "clearly inculpate" his co-defendants. 1971 Here,
however, the statements tended to implicate Brooklier and Sciortino only
1972
when combined with other evidence of their guilt.

The Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar question in United States
Defendant McCown and two co-defendants were indicted on various counts of a seventeen count indictment relating to a
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and firearms. McCown sought to sever
the trial of all the counts on which he was charged from those on which
his co-defendants were charged. The district court, however, granted his
9 74
request with respect to count seventeen only.1
v. McCown.1973

kept confidential if he cooperated. However, Dragna was not given immunity and his pretrial
statements to the FBI agent were admitted. Id. at 1217.
1968. Id.
1969. Id. Both parties stipulated and the jury was instructed that mere membership in La
Cosa Nostra was not illegal. Id.
1970. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, the defendants, Bruton and Evans, were tried jointly
for armed postal robbery. Evans did not take the stand. A postal inspector testified, however,
that Evans had confessed to him that he and Bruton had committed the robbery. The trial
court instructed the jury that the confession was competent evidence against Evans, but it was
inadmissible hearsay against Bruton and could not be considered when determining Bruton's
guilt or innocence. Both defendants were convicted. Id. at 124. The Eighth Circuit set aside
Evans' conviction, but affirmed Bruton's conviction because of the trial judge's careful limiting
instructions to the jury. Id.
The United States Supreme Court reversed Bruton's conviction, stating that the prejudice
which resulted from the admission of Evans' incriminating confession could not be dispelled
upon cross-examination because Evans did not testify. Id. at 137. Thus, the Court held that
Bruton's sixth amendment right to confrontation had been violated. Id. See infra note 1980.
The Court further stated that the instructions to the jury to disregard Evans' hearsay statements inculpating Bruton were not an adequate substitution for the defendant's sixth amendment rights. 391 U.S. at 137.
1971. 685 F.2d at 1218. E.g., United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir.) (severance not required where incriminating statement made by co-defendant neither mentioned
defendant by name nor gave physical description of him not "clearly inculpatory" when standing alone), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978).
1972. 685 F.2d at 1218 (citing United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 1975)
(tendency of co-defendant's written confession to inculpate defendant when combined with
additional evidence of defendant's guilt does not render confession inadmissible as long as it is
not "powerfully incriminating"), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976)).
1973. 711 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983).
1974. Id. at 1448. In count 17, McCown was charged with unlawfully possessing cocaine
with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). That statute provides in
pertinent part that "[iut shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."
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On appeal, McCown advanced two arguments in support of his contention that the trial court had erred in refusing to sever every count on
which he was indicted. 1975 McCown first argued that he was entitled to
severance under Bruton1 9 7 6 because the admission of inculpatory statements made by a co-defendant had prejudiced his case. 1977 The Ninth

Circuit responded that Bruton was inapplicable because the incriminating statements made by one of McCown's co-defendants were made in
furtherance of a conspiracy, not in a confession.1 978 Consequently, the
court found that the statements were admissible under the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule.' 97 9 In addition, the Ninth Circuit held
that McCown's sixth amendment right to confrontation' 98 0 had not been
jeopardized because the statements were sufficiently reliable to justify
1 98
their admission. '
McCown further contended that he had been unfairly prejudiced as

a result of being tried jointly with co-defendants who were depicted
throughout the trial as "'despicable individuals constantly and relent-

lessly engaging in their unlawful pursuits.'

",1982

Applying the test articu-

lated in United States v. Abushi, 9 s3 the court held that reversal was not
warranted because McCown had failed to demonstrate that the district
1975. 711 F.2d at 1448.
1976. See supra note 1970 for a discussion of Bruton.
1977. 711 F.2d at 1448.
1978. Id. There was independent evidence that a conspiracy existed, that the co-defendant's
statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that McCown knowingly participated in the conspiracy. Thus, the court ruled that the co-defendant's statements were admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 1448-49 (citations omitted).
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
1979. 711 F.2d at 1448-49.
1980. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to. . .be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. . .[and] to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."
1981. 711 F.2d at 1449 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (plurality opinion)). In Dutton, the United States Supreme Court articulated four factors that are indicative
of a statement's reliability: (1) the declaration contains no assertion of a past fact and consequently carries a warning to the jury against giving it undue weight; (2) the declarant has
personal knowledge of the identity and role of participants of the crime; (3) the possibility that
the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection is remote; and (4) the circumstances under
which the statement was made do not provide reason to believe the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime. If these factors are present, the unavailability
of the declarant for cross-examination does not violate the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment and the statement is admissible. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89.
1982. 711 F.2d at 1448. McCown contended that transference of his co-defendants' guilt
could only be prevented by severance. Id.
1983. 682 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982). In Abushi, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[tfhe test for
determining whether the district court abused its discretion is whether a joint trial was so
manifestly prejudicial as to require the trial judge to exercise his discretion in but one way, by
ordering a separate trial." Id. at 1296.
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court had abused its discretion in refusing to sever all of the counts
against McCown. 9 8 4 The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had
carefully advised the jury as to which defendants were charged in each
count, and that McCown had " 'failed to show an inability on the part of
1985
the jury to compartmentalize the evidence' as it related to him."
In United States v. Ramirez,1986 the Ninth Circuit again held that a
defendant had not been prejudiced as a result of a joint trial.198 7 Defendant Ramirez was indicted on charges that he instigated and financed a
scheme to import marijuana into the United States from Mexico.1 988 After the district court denied his severance motion, Ramirez was tried together with a co-conspirator, Reynolds, and found guilty on all
counts. 1989
On appeal, Ramirez contended that he was prejudiced by the joint
trial and, therefore, that the trial court had erred in denying his severance motion.1 990 Ramirez first argued that his defense was irreconcilable
with that of his co-defendant because Reynolds had admitted committing
the acts for which he was indicted, but claimed to have been acting as a
government informant. 9 9 1 Second, Ramirez alleged that the evidence
against Reynolds was so strong that it caused the jury to find Ramirez
1984. 711 F.2d at 1449.
1985. Id. (citations omitted).
1986. 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1983).
1987. Id. at 547.
1988. Id. at 537-38. Ramirez was convicted of conspiring to import and distribute marijuana, and to transport stolen aircraft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) which provides in
pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more that $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
In addition, Ramirez was convicted of transporting a stolen aircraft in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2312 (1976) and importing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) (1982). 18
U.S.C. § 2312 (1976) provides that "[w]hoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a
motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) (1982) provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who. . . knowingly or intentionally imports or
exports a controlled substance, . . . [or] brings or possesses on board a vessel, aircraft, or
vehicle a controlled substance. . . shall be imprisoned not more than five years, or be fined
not more than $15,000, or both." Moreover, Ramirez was convicted of possessing with intent
to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982) which provides in relevant
part that "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally. . . to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."
1989. 710 F.2d at 545.
1990. Id.
1991. Id. at 546.
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guilty by association. 1992 Finally, Ramirez contended that he was
prejudiced because testimony of two co-conspirators, admitted at the

joint trial,199would
not have been admissible had he been tried
3
separately.

The Ninth Circuit focused on "whether the jury [could] reasonably
be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relate[d] to [the] separate defendants" when it considered Ramirez' claim that he had been
prejudiced as a result of the joint trial.19 94 The Ninth Circuit ultimately
upheld the district court's denial of Ramirez' motion to sever, rejecting
each of Ramirez' arguments.1 995

The court first stated that a showing of conflicting defenses is not
enough to require severance.1 996 The defendant must also show that "ac-

ceptance of one party's defense will preclude the acquittal of 1998
the
' 1997
case.
this
in
existed
exclusivity
mutual
such
no
However,
other."
Acceptance of Reynolds' "informer" defense did not relieve the government of its burden of establishing Ramirez' participation in the criminal
enterprise, and Ramirez' guilt depended upon sufficient proof connecting
1999
him with the smuggling scheme.
The court further reasoned that, although the evidence against co-

defendant Reynolds was overwhelming, there was little chance that it
"spilled over" onto Ramirez. 2" Ramirez' guilt or innocence was depen-

dent upon the prosecution's success in convincing the jury that Ramirez
financed and directed the smuggling operation."

1

Proof on that issue

1992. Id. at 547 (relying on United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.) (appellate court
must be cautious of situations where jury may impute guilt of some defendants to others when
reviewing trial court's denial of severance motion), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 993, 1014 (1982)).
1993. Id
1994. Id. at 546 (quoting United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979)).
1995. ITd at 547.
1996. Id. at 546 (citing United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1978) (antagonism of defenses insufficient to justify reversal of trial court's decision not to sever even if
defendants seek to blame each other), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979)).
1997. Id. (citing United States v. Salomon, 609 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendant
failed to demonstrate co-defendant's reliance on an entrapment defense and defendant's own
theory of defense was "antagonistic to the point of being mutually exclusive"); United States v.
Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1979) (co-defendant's alleged nonparticipation in the
conspiracy did not preclude acquittal of other defendants who maintained no conspiracy existed), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980)).
1998. Id. at 546.
1999. Id.The court also noted that acceptance of Reynolds' defense would not guarantee the
prosecution's success in establishing Ramirez' guilt. Id.
2000. Id. at 547.
2001. Id.
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was distinct from proof of Reynolds' acts. 20 02

Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected Ramirez' argument that testimony of his co-conspirators would not have been admitted at a separate
trial because the existence of a conspiracy would not have been established. 2°°3 The Ninth Circuit noted that the record as a whole sufficiently established the existence of a conspiracy. 2
In addition, one of
the co-conspirators had testified that Reynolds had made statements
linking Ramirez to the conspiracy. 0 0 5 The court stated that this testi-

mony would have been admissible against Ramirez at a separate trial
because it related to statements of a co-conspirator in furtherance of the
conspiracy. 2006
2.

Joinder of counts

In United States v. Bennett,2°°7 defendant Bennett was convicted on
one count of conspiracy,20 08 forty-nine counts of making false statements
to the United States Department of Labor,20 0 9 seven counts of theft and
20 1 1
embezzlement, 2 10 and two counts of filing false income tax returns.
2002. Id.
2003. Id.
2004. Id. See United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1982) (statements of coconspirator made during course of and in furtherance of conspiracy admissible under FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) only if independent proof of conspiracy and of defendant's connection to
conspiracy exists), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983).
2005. 710 F.2d at 547.
2006. Id. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D) provides in pertinent part that "[a] statement is not
hearsay if. . . the statement is offered against a party and is. . . a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
2007. 702 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1983).
2008. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof. . . and one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
2009. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) provides in relevant part:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
2010. 18 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent, or employee of. . . any agency receiving financial assistance under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
of 1973 embezzles, willfully misapplies, steals, or obtains by fraud any of the moneys,
funds, assets, or property which are the subject of a grant or contract of assistance
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both.
2011. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (1976) provides:
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On appeal, Bennett contended that the trial court had committed reversible error in joining the fraud and tax evasion counts. 20 12 Applying Rule
8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 20 13 the Ninth Circuit
held that joinder was appropriate because the tax evasion and fraud
counts were offenses of the same character, and because the tax evasion
counts had resulted primarily from the need to conceal the illegal proceeds obtained through the defendant's fraud.20 14
In United States v. Nolan,201 5 the defendant, an ex-felon, was convicted on four counts of violating federal firearms statutes.0 1 6 Count
four involved the receipt of a gun subsequently used by Nolan in the
shooting death of a man outside a Tucson bar. Nolan's state trial for this
murder was still pending when the district court decided to proceed on
the firearms offenses.20 1 7
Citing United States v. Bronco,2 1 8 the defendant contended that the
Any person who. . . [w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other
document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under
the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to
every material matter. . . shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution.
2012. 702 F.2d at 835. Bennett was the secretary-treasurer of Teamsters Union Local 911.
The charges against him arose out of his participation in a plan to defraud the government out
of CETA funds. Bennett billed the CETA program for work purportedly performed by his codefendants. The CETA funds received from this scheme were then kicked back to Bennett,
who failed to report this income on his federal income tax returns. In addition, Bennett misrepresented facts to the government in order to collect the salaries of teamster employees for
work that had not, in fact, been performed. Id.
2013. See supra note 1950 and accompanying text.
2014. 702 F.2d at 835.
2015. 700 F.2d 479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3095 (1983).
2016. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person...
who has been convicted in any court of. . . a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year. . . to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976) provides in
part:
Any person who has been convicted by a court of the United States or of any State or
any political subdivision thereof of a felony . . . and who receives, possesses, or
transports in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
2017. 700 F.2d at 482. The district court had granted several continuances while awaiting
the outcome of the state murder trial. The state proceedings were postponed on numerous
occasions, however, and the federal court finally proceeded to trial on the firearms offenses,
denying the defendant's requests for additional continuances. In addition, the court refused
Nolan's request to sever count four. Id.
2018. 597 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1979). In Bronco, the defendant was charged with three counterfeiting charges: conspiracy, possession and passing counterfeit bills. The charges arose
from two separate and independent sets of events. Bronco moved to sever the conspiracy
count under FED. R. CRIM. P. 14, which provides for severance at the discretion of the trial
court if it appears that either the defendant or the government will be prejudiced by joinder.
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trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant his motion to
sever count four. 20

'

9

The court of appeals distinguished Bronco, how-

ever, noting that the overlap of proof on the several firearms offenses was
significant.20 20 Consequently, the court found that joinder was both economical and logical.20 21
Nolan further contended that the trial court's failure to sever count
four violated his fifth amendment "right to testify" because he was unable to give exculpatory testimony on count four for fear it would be used
against him in the state murder trial. 2

22

The Ninth Circuit stated that a

defendant "must show that he has important testimony to give on some
counts and a strong need to refrain from testifying on those he wants
severed," in order to justify severance.20 2 3 Although Nolan stated he
would give exculpatory testimony on all four counts, he wanted to refrain from testifying on count four merely because he was afraid the testimony would be used against him in the state murder trial. 2 2 4 The Ninth
Circuit stated that every defendant must consider the possibility that his
testimony will later be used against him when deciding whether to testify
The district court denied his motion, however, and Bronco was subsequently convicted on all
three counts. 597 F.2d at 1301.
On appeal, Bronco contended that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to sever. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the overlap of evidence at separate trials
would not have been significant, and evidence of the conspiracy would only have been admissible if clear, convincing, and more probative than prejudicial. Id. As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court had abused its discretion when it denied Bronco's motion for
severance because he was clearly prejudiced by the joint trial. Id. at 1303.
2019. 700 F.2d at 482-83.
2020. Id. at 483. The court pointed out that two witnesses testified with respect to counts
three and four, one of whom also testified on count one. Id.
2021. Id.
2022. Id.
2023. Id. (citing United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980)). In Armstrong, the defendant was charged with three armed robberies. Before trial, defendant Armstrong moved for severance of each of the counts against him. This motion was denied by the
trial court and Armstrong was convicted on all counts. United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d
951, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1980).
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court's denial of severance constituted
reversible error because he was unable to testify on his own behalf with regard to only two of
the robberies and was forced to testify on all three counts when his severance motion was
denied. Id. at 953. The court of appeals rejected his argument, stating "[n]o need for severance on self-incrimination grounds exists 'until the defendant makes a convincing showing that
he had both important testimony to give concerning one count and a strong need to refrain
from testifying on the other.'" Id. at 954 (quoting Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 977
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970)). The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's denial of Armstrong's motion to sever, stating that he had not made any
showing at all that he had important testimony to give. Id.
2024. 700 F.2d at 483.
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on his own behalf. 2 " Moreover, the defendant was never forced to testify in any way, nor did the government attempt to coerce Nolan's exercise of his fifth amendment rights.20 2 6 Thus, the court held that joinder
was proper because Nolan had not established a " 'strong need to refrain

from testifying.'

"2027

B.

Guilty Pleas

1. Voluntariness of plea
When a defendant pleads guilty to a criminal charge, the plea oper-

ates as a waiver of the constitutional right to a jury trial, the privilege
against self-incrimination, and the right to confront his accusers.20 28 Because of the waiver of constitutional rights involved, the court accepting
the guilty plea must show that the defendant "voluntarily and under20 29
standingly" entered his or her plea of guilty.
20 3 °
The United States Supreme Court ruled in Marshallv. Lonberger

that a guilty plea will be sustained where the record fairly supports the
conclusion that the defendant was aware of and understood the charges
against him. In a prior proceeding in an Illinois state court, the defend2025. Id. (citing Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968) (waiver of privilege
against self-incrimination by defendant who chooses to testify is no less effective even though
defendant may have been motivated to take witness stand only to refute evidence adduced
against him)).
2026. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
2027. 700 F.2d at 483.
2028. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
2029. Id. at 242 (citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (record must show that
defendant rejecting constitutional right to counsel did so "intelligently and understandingly")).
The Court in Boykin determined that this standard, as applied to waiver of the right to
counsel in Carnley, must also be applied in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea. Id.
In Boykin, the defendant pleaded guilty to five counts of robbery and was sentenced by a jury
to death. The Supreme Court determined that it was error for the trial judge to accept the
defendant's plea absent a showing that it was intelligently and understandingly made. Id. The
defendant was asked no questions by the judge at his arraignment, nor did the defendant address the court. The Court also pointed out that the defendant's appointed counsel conducted
"cursory" cross-examination of the state's witnesses and offered no evidence on the defendant's
character or background at his trial to mitigate his punishment. Id. at 239-40. Stressing that a
plea of guilty "is itself a conviction," id. at 242, constituting a waiver of important constitutional rights, the Court refused to presume such a waiver without an affirmative showing on
the record that the plea was intelligent and voluntary. Id. at 242-43.
2030. 459 U.S. 422 (1983) (5-4 decision).
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ant pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted murder. The prosecution
used the record of this conviction in a subsequent trial in Ohio to prove a
specification against the defendant for aggravated murder.2 3 1 The Ohio
trial court had conducted a pretrial hearing in which it found that the
defendant's guilty plea in the Illinois sentencing proceeding had been entered intelligently and voluntarily. 2 3 2 Documentary evidence of this
conviction was introduced at the defendant's trial. The jury was in-

structed that the Illinois conviction was to be considered only in connection with the issue of aggravated circumstances.2 3 3 After the Ohio jury
returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of aggravated murder, the defendant was sentenced to death.
The defendant contended that his guilty plea to the murder charge
in the Illinois court was not voluntary because he had no knowledge that
the charge against him was attempted murder.20 3 4 The Court reiterated

the principle that a guilty plea cannot be voluntary unless the accused
has received "'real notice of the true nature of the charge against
2031. Id. at 426. To impose the death sentence on the defendant for aggravated murder
under Ohio law, the prosecution had to allege a specification and prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the aggravating circumstances contained in it. Here, the prosecution alleged that the
defendant had been previously convicted of a crime of purposeful killing of another, or of
attempt to kill another. Id. at 426 n.2.
2032. Id. at 428-29.
2033. Id. See infra note 2034.
2034. 459 U.S. at 426-30. The state offered into evidence copies of the grand jury indictment, a certified copy of a "conviction statement," and the transcript of the Illinois sentencing
hearing in which the defendant pleaded guilty. Id. at 426. The indictment referred to one
count against the defendant of "intentionally and knowingly attempting to kill." At the sentencing hearing, the relevant exchanges between the defendant, the defendant's attorney, the
prosecuting attorney, and the sentencing judge show that all references to the charge of attempted murder consist simply of "attempt":
The Court: In other words, you are pleading guilty, that you did on August 25, 1968,
commit the offense of aggravated battery on one Dorothy Maxwell, and that you did
on the same date attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife, is that correct?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: And you did on the same date commit the offense of aggravated battery
on one Wendtian Maxwell, is that correct?
That is what you are pleading to, sir?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: And understand by pleading guilty to this indictment you are waiving
your right to a trial by this Court or trial by this Court and a jury?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Understand by pleading guilty I could sentence you from one to ten on
the aggravated battery and attempt one to twenty. So I could sentence you to the
penitentiary for a maximum of from one to forty years.
Understand that?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Id. at 427-28.
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him.' "2035 The Court found, however, that it could presume that the
defendant knew of the attempted murder charge against him.20 36 The
Court pointed out that the defendant, who was intelligent and experienced in the criminal justice system, would have understood that refer20 37
ences at the Illinois hearing to "attempt" meant "attempt to kill."
Because the defendant was presumed to have knowledge of the indictment containing the charge of attempt, the Court determined that his
plea of guilty in the Illinois proceedings was knowing and voluntary.
Therefore, it upheld as constitutional the defendant's conviction for ag2 38
gravated murder based on this prior conviction. 1
The Ninth Circuit considered two cases in which the defendants
contended that their guilty pleas had not been voluntary and intelligent.
In both cases the resulting conviction had been used as a predicate in a
subsequent criminal conviction.
In United States v. Goodheim,2 °3 9 the defendant contended that a
prior felony conviction could not be used as a predicate to charge him
with receipt and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the
guilty plea entered in the prior felony proceeding was not voluntary. On
remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district court held an evidentiary
2 0
hearing to determine whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent. 1
The lower court accepted the testimony as to the customs and practices
of the trial judge who accepted the defendant's guilty plea because the
witnesses had no specific recollection of the actual proceedings occurring
years earlier. 2 1 x The inference created from this testimony-that the
trial judge consistently followed a "painstaking probing" of the defend2035. Id. at 436 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941) (defendant who is
tricked into pleading guilty to serious offense, denied copy of the charge against him and assistance of counsel, is denied notice-the "first and most universally recognized requirement of
due process")).
2036. Id. (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1967) ("'[I]t may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in
sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.' ")).
2037. Id. The Court noted that the defendant was represented at the Illinois proceedings by
two competent lawyers, either of whom may have advised the defendant of the charge of attempted murder. Also, the indictment may have been read at any of several proceedings at
which the defendant appeared. Id. at 434 n.3, 437.
2038. Id. at 438.
2039. 686 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1982).
2040. Id. at 777.
2041. Id. Goodheim's guilty plea was entered in 1964. The Ninth Circuit stated that,
'[w]hen the prior conviction is a number of years old and the record of the taking of the plea
is silent, it may frequently occur that there will be no evidence available. . . other than the
defendant's testimony and the custom of the trial court in taking pleas.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417, 423 (1976)). The witnesses offering testimony as to the
practices of the trial judge had made numerous appearances before him. Id.

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY

ant's understanding of the meaning and consequences of entering a guilty
plea-was not rebutted by any credible testimony of the defendant. The
Ninth Circuit found this inferential evidence to be clear and convincing
and, thus, affirmed the district court's finding that the defendant's guilty
plea in the prior felony proceeding had been voluntary and intelligent.2 " 2
In a similar case, the court in United States v. Freed" 3 affirmed the
lower court's finding, based upon an evidentiary hearing, that the defendant's guilty plea had been constitutionally accepted. There, the defendant contended that he was not advised of his rights and hence was not
aware of them when he entered his plea. The Ninth Circuit stated that
the court is not required to specifically articulate the rights being waived
upon entry of a guilty plea. 2 " All that is required is that the record
show that the plea was made "understandingly and voluntarily."2 4 5 The
district court heard testimony from the defendant's former attorney regarding his practice in advising clients, and testimony as to the trial
court's practice in taking guilty pleas. In the absence of credible rebuttal
by the defendant, the evidence was found to clearly and convincingly
support the trial court's conclusion that the defendant's plea was voluntarily and intelligently made.2 04
In Gano v. United States,2 °47 the defendant contended that the judge
who accepted his plea coerced him into pleading guilty by suggesting
that the defendant would be found guilty on at least two counts.2 0 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that any emotional effect from the remark was attenuated by the five weeks which passed between the defendant's arraignment and entry of his plea. The court also
noted that subsequent to the alleged remark, the defendant had consented to a transfer to the district where the judge had been appointed so
that he could enter his plea before the judge. Accordingly, the court
found that these two events negated any claim by the defendant that his
plea was not voluntarily made.' °49
2042. Id. at 778.
2043. 703 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 131 (1983).
2044. Id. at 395 (citing Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974) ("whole
record" sufficient to show plea is voluntary and intelligent without specific articulation of
Boykin rights) (see supra notes 2028-29 and accompanying text)).
2045. Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974)); see Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
2046. 703 F.2d at 395.
2047. 705 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1983).
2048. Id. at 1137.
2049. Id. at 1137-38.
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Guilty plea constitutes a conviction

The United States Supreme Court in Dickerson v. New Banner Insti205
tute, Inc.,2050 held that firearms disabilities imposed by federal statute '
apply to a person who pleads guilty to a state felony offense even when
the record is subsequently expunged under state procedures.20 52 In Dickerson, the defendant corporation received a license as a dealer in firearms
and ammunitions, and as a manufacturer of ammunition. The Treasury
Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms subsequently
revoked the license after it learned that the company's director, shareholder and Chairman of the Board had previously pled guilty to a felony
in an Iowa state court. This fact had not been disclosed on the application for the license. In addition, the Bureau contended that the defendant was ineligible for the license because of the disabilities imposed by the
federal Gun Control Act.205 3
The Dickerson Court first looked at the issue of whether the director
of the defendant corporation, Kennison, had in fact been convicted
within the meaning of the gun control statute. After plea negotiations,
Kennison had pled guilty to an Iowa state crime of carrying a concealed
handgun in return fof dismissal of a charge of kidnapping his estranged
wife. Under Iowa law in effect at the time, and because of the "unusual
circumstances" of the case, the state court deferred entry of a formal
judgment against Kennison and placed him on probation. Upon completion of Kennison's term, the state court followed procedures then in effect and expunged Kennison's record with reference to the deferred
20 5 4
judgment.
The Court ruled that the question of whether one has been "convicted" is necessarily one of federal, not state, law. 2055 Because the term
"convicted" does not have the same meaning in every federal statute, 205 6
2050. 460 U.S. 103 (1983).
2051. Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, amended by the
Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976).
2052. 460 U.S. at 115.
2053. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1976) provides: "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person-(1) who
is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;. . . to ship or transport any firearm or ammunishall be
tion in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976) provides: "[i]t
unlawful for any person-(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any
court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;. . . to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce."
2054. 460 U.S. at 106-08.
2055. Id. at 111-12 (citing United States v. Benson, 605 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1979)).
2056. Id. at 112 n.6.

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

the majority looked at the intent of Congress in enacting Title IV. According to the Court, Congress sought "to keep firearms out of the hands
of presumptively risky people."2 " 57 The Court placed emphasis on the
language of Title IV which provides that disabilities be imposed on a
person convicted of "'a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.' ,,2O"S Therefore, the Court found it irrelevant that
the director did not actually receive a prison term, but was placed on
probation. For these reasons, the Court found that a guilty plea accepted
by a state court and followed by a sentence of probation is a conviction
within the meaning of federal gun control laws.2 °59
The Dickerson Court then determined whether Kennison's conviction was nullified, as the defendant contended, by the subsequent expunction of his record by the state court. The Court again examined the
language of the statute and Congress' intent in enacting Title IV, and
found nothing to indicate that the federal firearms disabilities would be
removed following expunction of a state conviction.20 60 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court lent great weight to its belief that a contrary decision would frustrate the purpose of the federal statute and hamper its
enforcement. 20 6 1 Because Kennison's conviction was not nullified by expunction of his record, the defendant corporation was ineligible for a
dealer's license under the firearms disability provision of the federal Gun
Control Act.
The dissent in Dickerson did not equate the notation by the Iowa
state court of Kennison's guilty plea and his probation with a conviction.20 62 After reviewing several congressional acts, the dissent determined that at the least the acceptance of a plea is needed, and at the most
2057. Id. The Court pointed out that Title IV applies not only to a person convicted of a
disqualifying offense, but also to a person "merely under indictment for such a crime." Id.
2058. Id. at 113 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1976)). The Court stated: "If the language is
unambiguous, ordinarily it is to be regarded as conclusive unless there is a 'clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary.'" Id. at 110 (quoting Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).

2059. Id. at 114.
2060. Id. at 115. The Court noted that the language of Title IV clearly indicates that ex-

punction "does not alter the historical fact of the conviction, and does not open the way to a
license despite the conviction." Id.
The statute does provide in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (1976) that consent by the Secretary of the
Treasury will act to relieve the disabilities on certain conditions. In Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55 (1980), the Court recognized the obvious exception to application of the disabilities provision of the federal gun control statute where a prior conviction has been vacated or
reversed on direct appeal. Id. at 60-61 & n.5.
2061. 460 U.S. at 121.
2062. Id. at 123 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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20 63
the entry of a formal judgment is required to constitute a conviction.

The Ninth Circuit followed the Dickerson decision to conclude in
United States v. Freed2°" 4 that a prior felony conviction resulting from

entry of a guilty plea could serve as a predicate conviction for possessing
firearms.20 65 After the defendant had satisfied the conditions of his probation, the state court set aside his conviction and released him from "all
penalties and disabilities" resulting from the state conviction. The defendant argued that this release constituted an expunction and, therefore,
the prior conviction could not serve as a predicate for purposes of the
federal firearms laws. The court reasoned that, even if the release was an
expunction as the defendant contended, under Dickerson an expunction
does not automatically remove any disabilities imposed by the federal

gun control statutes.20 6 6 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction for possessing firearms as a convicted felon.20 67
C. Jury Administration

A fair and impartial jury is a fundamental right guaranteed under
the sixth amendment. 0 68 Such a jury may consider only evidence produced at trial, unaffected by extrinsic facts. 20 69 A trial court has both
broad authority and great responsibility to effectuate this guarantee.20 70
1. Generally
In United States v. Halbert,2 0 7 1 the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial

court's refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing in light of accusations
2063. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist reviewed federal statutes in which
Congress has explicitly defined the term "conviction"; that term is not defined in Title IV of
the Gun Control Act.
2064. 703 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 131 (1983).
2065. Id. at 395.
2066. Id. (citing Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 115 (1983); see also
United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1979) (expunction of felony conviction
under state law does not change status of defendant as convicted felon for purposes of federal
gun control statute)).
2067. Id
2068. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73
(1965); United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977).
2069. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 472 (conviction reversed where deputies who had
custody of jurors were material witnesses); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)
(future jury foreman contacted by person who remarked that he could profit by acquitting
defendant).
2070. United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818
(1977). See infra note 2075.
2071. 712 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 997 (1984).
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of juror misconduct.2 °7 2 The defendant charged that a member of the
jury which convicted him of mail fraud2 73 had improperly considered a
2 0 74
newspaper article concerning Halbert's beach house and life style.
The court determined that the trial court's refusal to conduct an
evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion.2 °75 Although a hearing on such matters is "usually preferable," none was required in this
case because the court knew the exact scope and nature of the extraneous
information. The court gave substantial weight to the fact that the jury
had heard considerable evidence at trial concerning the matters in the
article, and to the district court's conclusion regarding the juror's
conduct.20 7 6
The defendant in United States v. Barrett20 77 claimed that the trial
court's refusal to excuse or to allow the interview of an allegedly sleeping
juror was reversible error.20 7 8 Before the jury retired for deliberations, a
juror had reported to the judge that he had been sleeping during the trial.
When counsel for the government refused to stipulate to the juror's re2072. Id. at 389.
2073. Id. Halbert was convicted on 21 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976), which provides in part: "Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme
or artifice to defraud . . . places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter
[any thing connected with the fraud] shall be fined. . . or imprisoned ..
2074. 712 F.2d at 389.
2075. Id. In applying this "abuse of discretion" standard, the court cited United States v.
Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977). In Hendrix, the
Ninth Circuit held that it was within the court's discretion to deny the defendant's motion for
a new trial in light of allegations by the defendant's relatives that a juror had uttered statements indicating prejudice before the trial. Id. at 1229.
In determining that the juror's misconduct did not require reversal, the Halbert court
applied the rule stated in United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 887 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981):
"The appellant is entitled to a new trial if there existed a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic material could have affected the verdict." Id. (quoting United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d
192, 193 (9th Cir. 1979)). The Bagnariol court reviewed several cases in which courts have

determined whether a juror's misconduct required reversal by the appellate court. Although
the court could perceive no "bright line" with which to test juror misconduct, it did discern
the following three similarities in cases where convictions were reversed: (1) the misconduct
related directly to a material aspect of the case, (2) a "direct and rational connection" existed
between the extrinsic material and a prejudicial jury conclusion; and (3) harsher treatment was
given to convictions where the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing than when
no hearing was held. Id. at 885.
2076. 712 F.2d at 389. The district court found that there was "no reasonable possibility"
that the verdict was colored by the juror's consideration of the article. Id.
2077. 703 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983).
2078. Barrett was convicted of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976),
which provides in part: "Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes. . . from
the person or presence of another any property or money. . . in the care, custody, control,
management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association.
[s]hall be fined. . . or imprisoned ....
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placement, the court refused to order a substitution. 20 79 After the jury
returned its verdict, the court denied the defendant's motion to interview
a juror, taking judicial notice that "there was no juror asleep during this
trial."20 80 The Ninth Circuit remanded, holding that when the juror was
sleeping during the trial, the court is required to investigate whether the
defendant had been prejudiced by the allegedly sleeping juror.20 8 '
In United States v. Rubio,20 82 the defendant contended that the trial
court had erred by retaining the alternate jurors after the jury had retired, in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 0 83 Because the defendant had failed to make a timely objection at trial, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the claim under a standard requiring reversal
only on a showing of plain error.20 84 The court held that under these
facts, the retention of alternate jurors was "certainly not plain error"
because "there [was] no reasonable possibility" that the error affected the
verdict. 208 5 The court observed that the alternates were sequestered separately from the main jury, separate marshals were assigned to each
group, and no contact was allowed between the two groups.

20 86

2079. 703 F.2d at 1082. The judge erroneously believed that he was without authority to
order the substitution himself. Id. at 1083 n.12. However, the Ninth Circuit noted that:
"Under rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial judge has independent
authority to order such a substitution." Id.
2080. Id. at 1082. The court noted that only misconduct that amounts to a deprivation of
the fifth amendment due process or sixth amendment impartial jury guarantees would warrant
a new trial. Therefore, a new trial might not be necessary even if juror misconduct was found
on remand. Id. at 1083 n.13.
2081. Id. at 1083. The court recognized that other circuits have allowed a trial court to find
that no juror was sleeping during trial without conducting any inquiry. See United States v.
Curry, 471 F.2d 419, 421-22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); United States v.
Carter, 433 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1970). However, the Ninth Circuit distinguished both
Curry and Carterbecause the "sleeping juror" allegation had come from defense counsel. The
courts in both those cases emphasized that counsel should have brought the sleeping juror to
the court's attention during the trial, and should not be allowed to benefit by failing to do so.
Curry, 471 F.2d at 422; Carter, 433 F.2d at 876.
2082. 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1984). The defendant was convicted of several narcotics and
firearms violations arising from his association with the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club. Id. at
790.
2083. Id. at 799. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) provides in part: "An alternate juror who does not
replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict."
2084. 727 F.2d at 799. Under the "plain error rule," in the absence of a timely objection by
the appellant at trial, a criminal conviction will be reversed only in situations where it appears
necessary "'to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and reputation of
the judicial process.'" United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 409 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979).
See FRED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Perez, 491 F.2d 167, 173 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 858 (1974).
2085. 727 F.2d at 799 & n.7.
2086. Id.
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In United States v. Daly,2 ° 87 the defendant challenged the trial
court's refusal to dismiss a juror for cause. The disputed juror had been
an inspector of police for the Dutch government. When asked during
voir dire whether he could be impartial, the prospective juror, Damwyk,
' 20 88
had indicated first "I will try," and later "O.K., I will do it.
Damwyk was ultimately excused on a peremptory challenge. On appeal,
the defendant contended that the court's refusal to excuse Damwyk for
cause was error because his responses demonstrated actual bias.20 89
The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant had failed to show actual
bias on the part of Damwyk and upheld the trial court's refusal to exclude him for cause.2 °90 The court stated that the mere fact that the
prospective juror was a former police officer did not necessarily indicate
he was inherently biased,20 9 ' particularly in view of the fact that he had
not been a police officer for twenty years.20 92 Furthermore, Damwyk
20 9 3
had ultimately stated that he could be impartial.
In United States v. Brooklier,2 °94 the defendants challenged their
racketeering convictions 20 95 on the grounds that the trial court failed to
excuse four allegedly biased jurors for cause. The jurors had stated dur2087. 716 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1456 (1984).
2088. Id. at 1509. Defendant Criswell was the ringleader of an interstate car smuggling
operation based in Southern California. Criswell was convicted of conspiracy, receiving and
transporting falsely made securities in interstate commerce, and causing the transportation of
stolen automobiles in interstate commerce. Id.
2089. Id. at 1507.
2090. Id. Citing Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit
went on to state that a trial court's failure to excuse a prospective juror after discovering actual
bias is reversible only if it results in "a prejudicial diminution or peremptory challenges." 716
F.2d at 1507. See United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusal to dismiss
jurors who worked at another branch of robbed bank held reversible error even when those
jurors were dismissed by peremptory challenge); United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1230
(5th Cir. 1976) (failure to dismiss juror who stated that he did not like unions held reversible
error).
2091. 716 F.2d at 1507 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 377 (6th Cir.) (failure
to excuse former police officer not error where court satisfied juror could be impartial), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977); Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1970) (failure
to excuse police officer not reversible error per se)).
2092. Id.
2093. Id.
2094. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
2095. Defendants were convicted of violating the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d)
(1976); extorting, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976) ("whoever. . . obstructs, delays, or affects commerce.

. .

by robbery or extortion.

. .

shall be fined.

. .

or imprisoned. . .

.");

obstructing

justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1976) ("whoever injures any person. . . on account of the giving of
such person . . any such information [relating to a violation of any United States criminal
statute] to any criminal investigator"); and aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) ("whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces
or procures its commission, is punishable as a principle. . . . Whoever willfully causes an act
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in the existence of a criminal organization
ing voir dire that they believed
2 96
known as La Cosa Nostra.

The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court had not abused its discretion by refusing to excuse the jurors.20 9 7 Quoting the Supreme Court in
Irvin v. Dowd,20 98 the court noted that because public attention is una-

voidable in many cases, it may be virtually impossible to obtain a panel of
qualified jurors totally without opinion as to the merits of the case.20 9 9
The court then held that the jurors were not impermissibly biased.
Each of the jurors stated that he or she had not formed an opinion as to

the defendants' guilt, would keep an open mind, and would listen to the
evidence and follow the court's instructions. They would only then de-

cide whether La Cosa Nostra existed as a criminal organization and
whether the defendants were members.2 1°
2.

Composition of a jury

The sixth amendment requires that grand and petit juries be drawn

"from a fair cross-section of the community in the district or division
wherein the court convenes.,

210

1

When a defendant is a member of a

to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense. . . is punishable as a principal.").
2096. 685 F.2d at 1223.
2097. Id.
2098. 366 U.S. 717 (1960). In Irvin, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to
grant defendant a second change of venue was reversible error. Because of extensive pretrial
publicity, venue in the defendant's murder trial had been changed from Evansville, the situs of
the crimes, to nearby Gibson County. However, the court refused the defendant's request for
another change to a more remote venue under a state statute precluding more than one venue
change in a case. Id. at 720. The Court held that the defendant had been denied a trial by an
impartial jury because of the "'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice'" within the community.
Id. at 727. The Court noted that during the time preceding his trial, "a barrage of newspaper
headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the defendant]." Id. at 725.
Although it held against the government, the Court noted in dictum that it would be impossible to guarantee a completely neutral jury to every criminal defendant. Id. at 722-23.
2099. 685 F.2d at 1223.
2100. Id. The court cited Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1949). In that case, the
Supreme Court upheld the denial of the defendant's motion for change of venue from the
District of Columbia. The defendant, a communist, had argued that a large portion of the
district was employed by the government, was bound by a loyalty oath and might be fearful of
reprisal for acquitting the defendant. Id. at 165.
2101. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 1978) (test for constitutionally
selected jury same under fifth and sixth amendments and under Jury Selection and Service
Act), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979); U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. The Jury Selection and
Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976), provides that "[i]t is the policy of the United States that
all litigants in Federal Court entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit
juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division
wherein the court convenes."
In Durenv. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), the Supreme Court enunciated a three-prong
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group in the community and that group has been systematically excluded
from his jury, that defendant may also challenge the jury under the equal
21 0 2
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
2" °3 the Ninth
In United States v. Herbert,
Circuit considered
whether the trial court's jury selection procedure had violated the sixth
amendment fair cross-section requirement by underrepresenting Native
Americans. 2 11 During the trial Herbert had moved for a transfer from
the Phoenix, Arizona Division to the Prescott Division, claiming that the
lower percentage of Native Americans in Phoenix caused members of
2 10 5
that race to be underrepresented in the jury pool.
Applying the test from Duren v. Missouri,2 1 °6 the court held that use
of the more predominately Anglo Phoenix Division jury pool did not
violate the sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement.2 10 7 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that, pursuant to the Jury Selection and Service
Act, 210 8 a petit jury may be selected from only one division.210 9 More-

over, the court ruled that Herbert had failed to show that Native Americans were systematically excluded from the Phoenix Division.2 110
Affirming the trial court, the Ninth Circuit found that venue was properly set in Phoenix because the crimes had occurred there, and it was the
most convenient location for all persons involved in the trial.2 1
test to determine whether the government has violated the sixth amendment fair cross-section
guarantee:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement,
the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive"
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such
persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.
Id. at 364. See also United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d at 1133 (no violation of fair cross-section
requirement absent showing of "systematic exclusion" or "substantial deviation" between
identifiable groups).
2102. See infra note 2106; Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
2103. 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 87 (1983). The defendant was convicted of various firearms violations.
2104. Id. at 983.
2105. Id. at 984. Herbert cited the trial court's failure to grant his motion to transfer as
evidence of the systematic exclusion of Native Americans from the Phoenix Division jury pool.
Id.
2106. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). In Duren, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Missouri
statute granting women automatic exemptions from jury service upon request. Id. at 370. See
supra note 2102.
2107. 698 F.2d at 984.
2108. See supra note 2102.
2109. 698 F.2d at 984.
2110. Id.
2111. Id. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 provides that venue is properly set "within the district with
due regard to the convenience of the defendant and the witnesses and the prompt administra-
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In Morgan v. United States, 2 112 the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had erred when it dismissed Morgan's second habeas corpus
petition without holding an evidentiary hearing into Morgan's claims

that the jury selection process was unconstitutional.2113 Morgan, who
was black, alleged that no members of his race had served as federal

jurors for over twenty years in the Spokane, Washington district where
he was tried, including the three years during which charges were pending against him.2 1 14

The Ninth Circuit agreed that Morgan had failed to establish a violation of the sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement.2 115 However, the court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was required
because, as a member of the allegedly excluded group, Morgan could
challenge the jury selection process under the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. 2 16 The court stated that under an equal protection analysis, complete exclusion of a racial group triggers concerns other than
whether the fair cross-section requirement is met. Complete exclusion of
tion of justice." The Herbert court observed that the advisory commission notes to the 1966
amendment to this rule indicate that it was intended to "'vest discretion in the court to fix the
place of trial at any place within the district.'" 698 F.2d at 984 (quoting FED. R. CalM. P. 18
advisory committee notes, 1966 Amendment). Since the crime in Herbert was committed
within the Phoenix Division, and almost all witnesses, defendants, and attorneys lived in the
Phoenix area, the court was easily able to uphold the trial court's refusal to grant a change of
venue.
2112. 696 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1983). Morgan was convicted by a federal jury of various
narcotics offenses in 1976. Id.
2113. Id at 1239-40. In his first petition, Morgan had alleged that no blacks had been on the
grand or petit jury panels, or the master jury wheel during the three years of his prosecution.
This motion was denied because Morgan had failed to allege information regarding the black
population in the district supporting his allegation that that race was underrepresented. Id. at
1240.
The district court dismissed Morgan's second petition on the basis that it alleged no new
or different grounds for relief. Id. As an alternative ground, the district court held that the
defendant had failed to establish a prima facie denial of his rights under the fair cross-section
requirement. Id. In making this determination, the court applied the test set out in Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-66 (1979). See supra note 2102.
2114. 696 F.2d at 1240.
2115. Id. at 1240-41. The court held that Morgan had failed to show that representation of
blacks in the district was not fair and reasonable in relation to the district's black population,
or that they were systematically excluded from the selection process. Id.
2116. Id. In order to determine whether the defendant's fourteenth amendment rights had
been violated in the grand jury process, the Ninth Circuit applied the three-part test used by
the Supreme Court in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). In order to make a
prima facie showing of such a violation, the defendant must first establish that his group was a
"distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied."
Next, he must prove the degree of underrepresentation of that class over a significant period of
time. And, finally, he must show that the method of selection chosen was not racially neutral
or was susceptible to abuse. When such a showing is made, the burden of proof shifts to the
government to rebut the allegation. Castaneda,430 U.S. at 494-95.
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a racial group can violate equal protection even when the number of that
group in the total population is small. 117 Comparing Morgan's allegations of complete exclusion with the less serious allegations of partial
exclusion made in Rose v. Mitchell2 1 18 and Guice v. Fortenberry,2 119 the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing to determine whether
blacks had been purposefully excluded from Spokane federal juries.2 12°
In Weathersby v. Morris,""z ' the Ninth Circuit found that the exclusion of all members of the defendant's race from his jury did not violate
Weathersby's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights.2 1 2 2 Weathersby
contended that the prosecutor had impermissibly used his peremptory
challenges to exclude all black members from the jury panel in his murder trial.2 123
In addressing the defendant's fourteenth amendment claim, the
Ninth Circuit first discussed the Supreme Court's holding in Swain v.
Alabama.2 12 4 In that case, the Court applied a heavy presumption that
peremptory challenges were exercised for permissible trial-related reasons.2 12 5 However, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Swain from the situation in this case where the prosecutor volunteered the reasons for the
exercise of its challenges.2 126 The prosecutor in Weathersby claimed that
2117. 696 F.2d at 1241. See Norris v. Alabama, 249 U.S. 587 (1935) (denial of equal protection where no black had served on jury in at least 24 years).
2118. 443 U.S. 545 (1979). The Court in Rose reaffirmed the long-standing rule that a criminal defendant's fourteenth amendment rights are violated when he is indicted by a grand jury
from which members of his class have been systematically excluded. Id. at 559. Such a violation requires reversal even when the selection of the petit jury which convicted the defendant
was not subject to such discrimination. Id. at 552-59.
2119. 661 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). In Guice, the Fifth Circuit applied the test
stated in Castaneda and Rose in light of defendant's contention that blacks are underrepresented as grand jury foremen. The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing, noting the
improbability that, in a 60% black population, none of the 31 grand jury foremen was black.
Id. at 505.
2120. 696 F.2d at 1241.
2121. 708 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 719 (1984).
2122. Id. at 1497.
2123. Id. at 1494.
2124. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The Swain Court had upheld a black defendant's conviction by a
jury from which all blacks had been excused through the use of peremptory challenges. The
prosecutor had given no reason for exercising the challenges. The Supreme Court applied a
strong presumption that, absent a lengthy record of systematic exclusion of a particular group,
peremptory challenges were exercised for permissible reasons. Id. at 222. The Court emphasized that peremptory challenges are often exercised upon "'sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another.'" Id.
at 220 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)).
2125. Id. at 222. The Ninth Circuit in Weathersby stated that the presumption may be rebutted by showing a "systematic exclusion of a particular group over a period of time in prior
prosecutions." 708 F.2d at 1496 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 227).
2126. 708 F.2d at 1496. In making this distinction, the court relied upon United Stateg v.
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one or two of the excused jurors had been represented by the defendant's
counsel, another had known the defendant's wife, and others had given
evasive answers to questions. In addition, the prosecutor felt that some
black jurors might be subject to intimidation by members of the Black
Guerrilla Family, a prison gang. 2127 Under these circumstances, the
court concluded, the prosecutor is no longer protected by the Swain presumption. Accordingly, the court may review the prosecutor's reasons to

determine whether an identifiable group was excluded for reasons unrelated to obtaining a fair and impartial jury.2 12 8
The Ninth Circuit determined that the prosecutor's stated motives

for using his challenges were "well within the broad range of discretion
for exercising peremptory challenges. ' 2129 The court thus found no violation of the defendant's fourteenth amendment rights.21 30
The court also dismissed the defendant's contention that the prose-

cutor's use of peremptory challenges violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury composed of a fair cross-section of
the community. 213 I The court ruled that the fair cross-section requirement, as applied by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana,2 13 2 required only that petit juries be selectedfrom a representative source, and
33
21
not that the jury itself be representative.

3.

The Allen charge

The practice of instructing a deadlocked jury that its duty is to return a verdict if possible, in good conscience, and to listen to the argu-

ments of other jurors in reexamining their own positions has been a
matter of vigorous and sometimes colorful debate.2 134 In the Ninth CirGreene, 626 F.2d 75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876 (1980), where a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to excuse all black jurors was presumed proper in the absence of an
indication that the challenges were exercised for impermissible reasons. Id. at 76.
2127. 708 F.2d at 1496-97.
2128. Id
2129. Id at 1497. The Ninth Circuit found that the prosecutor's stated reasons for excusing
the jurors would justify a peremptory challenge. In this connection, the court noted that "a
'prosecutor may have the strongest reasons to distrust the character of ajuror offered, from his
habits and associations, and yet find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection to
him. In such cases, the peremptory challenge is a protection against his being accepted.' "Id.
at 1496-97 (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
2130. Id. at 1497.
2131. Id.
2132. 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
2133. 708 F.2d at 1497 ("[a defendant] is not entitled to a jury of any particular
composition").
2134. "Since its approval over seventy years ago, the Allen charge has persisted through the
years, not so much an object of commendation as it is a product of toleration." United States
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cuit, use of such an instruction is permissible when the charge contains
all the elements sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in Allen
v. United States.2 13 5 In addition, the period of deliberation after the
charge must be sufficient for the jury to reach a reasoned decision; the
entire period of deliberation cannot be so long as to indicate that the
charge produced a verdict by coercion; and there must not be any other
indication of jury coercion in the record.2 13 6
In United States v. Foster,2 137 the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial
judge's use of an Allen charge. After five days of deliberation in the defendants' narcotics offense trial, a member of the jury sent the judge a
note requesting release from duty because of the strain on the juror's
family and job. The judge conferred with counsel and instructed the jury

to continue its deliberations. When he received a second note indicating
that another juror asked to be released and that the jury was at a "standoff," the judge "reminded the jurors of the importance of the case and
v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 415 (3d Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
The charge has been severely criticized because of its inherently coercive nature, see Salemme
v. Ristaino, 587 F.2d 81, 89 (lst Cir. 1978), and because it tends to complicate cases on appeal,
see Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962) ("Like Banquo's ghost it will
not remain at rest."), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963). Three circuits have approved the use
of the Allen charge only in a modified form. See STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY
§ 5.4 (1968); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 420; United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1017 (1970). Other circuits have modified the charge to include "balancing" elements.
See Burrup v. United States, 371 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir.) (charge permissible provided jury is
given to understand they are not required to give up their conscientiously held convictions),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1034 (1967). Still others, including the Ninth Circuit, have allowed the
charge only when given in a strict form, not alterable by the trial court. See United States v.
Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 765-66 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v.
Pope, 415 F.2d 685, 691 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950 (1970); United States v.
Harris, 391 F.2d 348, 355 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968); United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780, 782-84 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
2135. 164 U.S. 492 (1896). The original charge as summarized by the Court is as follows:
[I]n a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that
although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question
submitted with candor, and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of
each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do
so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should
consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the
minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the
other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves
whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was
not concurred in by the majority.
Id. at 501.
2136. United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 765-66 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 982
(1980).
2137. 711 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S.Ct. 1602 (1984).
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thanked them for their work."2 13 8 The jury was then asked to consider
whether it would like a day off. The jury indicated that it did not, but

that some jurors thought that " 'discussions [were] hopelessly dead2 140
locked.' "2139 The judge then gave the jury a modified Allen charge.

Three days later, the jury returned guilty verdicts against three
defendants.2 14 '
The defendants appealed their drug offense convictions, 2 142 contending that the Allen charge had coerced the jury.2143 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the convictions, finding that the judge's Allen charge and the sur-

rounding circumstances did not have a coercive effect upon the jury.214
The court also found that the jury's eight and one-half day deliberation
was not out of proportion to the complexity of the questions to be decided. 214 5 The court noted that the fact that the jury acquitted three
defendants after the Allen charge had been given undermined the defend2138. Id. at 883. The Ninth Circuit held that this earlier admonition did not constitute
another Allen charge. Id. at 884 n.8. The Ninth Circuit requires reversal when a trial judge
gives two Allen charges during the course of a jury's deliberations. Id. See United States v.
Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978).
2139. 711 F.2d at 883.
2140. The charge given to the jury was as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen, I am going to ask that you resume your deliberations for
a further period of time in an attempt to return a verdict. As I have told you, each of
you must agree in order to return a verdict. You have the duty to consult with one
another and to deliberate with a view of reaching an agreement if this can be done
without violence to individual judgment.
Each juror must decide the case for himself or herself, but only after impartial
consideration of the evidence with his or her fellow jurors. During the course of your
deliberations, each of you should not hesitate to reexamine your own views and
change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. No juror, however, should surrender his or her honest conviction as to the weight and effect of evidence solely because
of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
Id. at 883-84 n.7.
2141. Id. at 884. A fourth defendant had been acquitted after the first three days of deliberation. Id. at 883.
2142. See supra note 265.
2143. 711 F.2d at 884.
2144. Id. (citing United States v. Hooton, 662 F.2d 628, 636 (9th Cir. 1981) (propriety of an
Allen charge must be judged by its coercive effect, and that of its surrounding circumstances),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1982)).
2145. Id. The Hooton court cited United States v. Contreras, 463 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir.
1972) (per curiam), where the Ninth Circuit disapproved of the use of an Allen charge given to
the jury after eight hours of deliberation and where the jury had not indicated that it was
deadlocked. United States v. Hooton, 662 F.2d 628, 636 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1004 (1982). The Ninth Circuit, however, found United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 76566 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,446 U.S. 982 (1980) to be more applicable to the facts in Foster. 711
F.2d at 884. In Battie, the trial court gave an Allen charge to the jury when it indicated that it
was deadlocked after eight hours of deliberation. 613 F.2d at 764. The jury returned a guilty
verdict five hours later. Id. at 763. The court found that the trial court's instructions were not
coercive, and affirmed the convictions. Id. at 766.
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ants' claim that the charge was coercive. Moreover, there was no indication that the judge or jury had expressed frustration at the failure of the
jury to reach a verdict.'1 4 6 Finally, the court ruled that since the trial
judge was unaware of which jurors were in the minority, there was no

way that the Allen charge could
imply to those jurors that the judge was
2 147

speaking directly to them.
In United States v. Ramirez, 14 8 the Ninth Circuit found that a trial
court's admonition to a deadlocked jury was not coercive. 21 49 After
twelve hours of deliberation, the jury returned verdicts as to two defendants, but were unable to agree as to a third defendant. Instead, they
presented a completed "verdict form," indicating that they were unable
to agree on a verdict for every count concerning that defendant.2 15 ° The
trial court stated that the form presented was "unacceptable" and ordered the jury to continue its deliberations. 2 15 The jury subsequently
found the third defendant guilty on two counts of a seven count
indictment.2 5 2
Relying upon Jenkins v. United States,21 53 the defendant contended
that his conviction for conspiring to transport stolen aircraft and mari-

juana importation and distribution2

54

was the result of the coercive ef-

fect of the court's statements to the jury.21 55 In Jenkins, the Supreme
Court held that a judge's statement, to a jury deadlocked after only two
hours, that "[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case" was revers2146. 711 F.2d at 884 (citing United States v. Moore, 653 F.2d 384, 390 (9th Cir.) (jury
given charge after a day and a half of deliberations), cert. denied,454 U.S. 1102 (1981); United
States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980)).
2147. 711 F.2d at 884 (citing United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980)).
2148. 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1983).
2149. Id. at 544.
2150. Id.
2151. Id.
2152. Id.
2153. 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (per curiam).
2154. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) states in pertinent part: "If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United States. . . and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1982) states: "Whoever
transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to
have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982) states in part: "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally (1) to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) (1976) states: "Any person who-(1) contrary
to section 952, 953, or 957 of this title, knowingly or intentionally imports or exports a controlled substance.

. .

shall be punished . ..

2155. 710 F.2d at 544.

.
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ible error.2 15 6
The Ninth Circuit held that the court's statement to the Ramirez
jury did not have the same coercive effect as the statement made in Jenkins. 2 157 The court found that the trial court did not instruct the jury
that it had to reach a verdict. 21 58 It further determined that the jury did
not understand the court's statements to require such a decision.2 159
More importantly, the court found that the fact that the jury reached
guilty verdicts on only two of the seven counts against the defendant
indicated that the court's statements had no coercive effect on the
jury.2160

D. ProsecutorialMisconduct
The prosecutor enjoys the special and sometimes unenviable position of reconciling professional responsibilities. He or she has obligations
to the state, the judicial system, and the defendant. 2 161 The prosecutor's
2156. 380 U.S. at 446.
2157. 710 F.2d at 544.
2158. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon Walsh v. United States, 371 F.2d
135, 136 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 9 (1967). In that case, the jury had indicated to the
judge that "[w]e the jury find it impossible to reach a verdict in this case." Id. at 137. The
trial court responded:
I don't know just exactly what that message means.
If there is any reasonable doubt in your mind, that man is entitled to your verdict of not guilty. He is entitled not to have to run the gauntlet twice.
But if there isn't any reasonable doubt, from the evidence-I heard the testimony but I haven't looked at any of the documentary evidence, so I can say I don't
know what the evidence in the case is.
If there is no reasonable doubt, the Government is entitled to a verdict of
conviction.
Id.
The jury returned a guilty verdict later that evening. The Walsh court found these comments to be coercive because they implied that the jury must reach a verdict for either the
defendant or the government. Id. at 138.
2159. 710 F.2d at 544. In making this finding, the court compared United States v. Beattie,
613 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980), supra note 2145, where the jury
had deliberated for three and one half hours after receiving an Allen charge, with United States
v. Contreras, 463 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1972), supra note 2145, where the jury found the
defendant guilty only 35 minutes after the Allen charge was given.
2160. 710 F.2d at 544.
2161. The Ninth Circuit established standards for appropriate prosecutorial conduct in
United States v. Ellsworth, 647 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
The court quoted at length Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935):
The United States attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
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absolute discretion to determine whether or not to file charges is merely
one indication of his or her crucial position in the law enforcement process. 162 The prosecutor's motivation for bringing a particular action is
not subject to review in the courts.2 163 He or she decides whether to press
a case or dismiss it, determines the specific charges against a defendant,
and is usually responsible for reducing a charge. 2 1 "
Concomitant with the wide range of prosecutorial duties,
prosecutorial misconduct may manifest itself in various ways.
Prosecutorial misconduct includes vindictive prosecution, impermissible
vouching for the credibility of witnesses, improper references to matters
not in evidence, improper comments on a defendant's silence, and prejudicial remarks in closing argument.
Although all prosecutors, as members of the legal community, are
subject to controls on their professional conduct, they are usually immune from judicial review pursuant to the constitutional separation of
powers.2 16 5 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that the prosecutor's
and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.
647 F.2d at 961 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
2162. The United States Attorney has broad discretion in deciding which cases to prosecute.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("[e]xecutive [b]ranch has exclusive authority
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case"); see also United States v.
Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976) (vindictive reindictment is improper,
but prosecutor has discretion in choosing which charges to bring).
In recognition of the prosecutor's dominant role in the American legal system, the Wickersham Commission acknowledged over 50 years ago that the prosecutor's office "is the pivot
on which the administration of criminal justice in the States turns." I NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 11 (1931). For
a discussion of the powers of the prosecutor, see Vlasinin, The Prosecutorin American Criminal Procedure: Observationsof a Foreign Student, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REv 833, 833-50 (1979).
2163. Spillman v. United States, 413 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930
(1969). The courts may, however, grant relief if the prosecutor uses his or her constitutionally
derived powers as a device to deny the defendant's constitutional rights. Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
2164. The prosecutor must, however, avoid selective prosecution, which entails the filing of a
charge against a defendant, motivated by a purpose other than good faith enforcement of the
law. The Ninth Circuit established the test for selective prosecution in United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.) (defendant must establish a prima facie case: "(1) that
others are generally not prosecuted for the same conduct; and (2) that the decision to prosecute
this defendant was based on such impermissible grounds as race, religion, or the exercise of
constitutional rights") (citing United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)
(mere conscious use of selectivity in enforcement of law is not in itself a constitutional violation)), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978). See also United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th
Cir.) (member of Tax Rebellion Committee claimed that he was being prosecuted for his vocal
opposition to income tax laws), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976).
2165. United States v. Olson, 504 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing United States v.
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conduct is not subject to direct judicial review absent gross abuse of discretion.2 16 6 In reviewing appeals alleging prosecutorial misconduct, the

Ninth Circuit accords great deference to the trial judge's decision and
exercises extreme caution. The appellate court will overturn the lower
court verdict only if it was more probable than not that the misconduct
substantially affected the judgment. 2167 The Ninth Circuit has recently
considered claims of prosecutorial misconduct pertaining to all of the
above categories.
1. Dismissal for vindictive prosecution

Presumed vindictiveness applies when the government escalates the
harshness of its charges against a defendant due to animosity toward the
defendant for asserting his or her legal rights.2 16 8 It usually involves a
Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965)). See also Spillman v.
United States, 413 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.) (court could not inquire into United States Attorney's motives for prosecution), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 (1969).
2166. See, e.g., United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir.) (indictment would
not be overturned unless prosecutorial misconduct created intrusion into defendant's constitutional rights), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). The Ninth Circuit has stated that it will not
interfere with prosecutorial discretion "unless it is abused to such an extent as to be arbitrary
and capricious and violative of due process." United States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359, 1360
(9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978). For a discussion of the prosecutor's
broad discretion in exercising the powers given to him, see K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-214 (1969); Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1971).
2167. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1977).
2168. United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v.
Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1982) (to establish vindictiveness, absent
direct evidence of hostility or threat, defendant must make initial showing that charges of
increased harshness were due to his or her exercise of a right), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206
(1983)).
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the Court observed that a defendant
may not be punished for successfully challenging his or her conviction. Id. at 723-24. The
Court introduced the doctrine of presumed vindictiveness in order to address the consideration
that "Etihe existence of a retaliatory motivation would, of course, be extremely difficult to
prove in any individual case." Id. at 725 n.20. The Court held that whenever a judge increases
the defendant's sentence after a new trial, the judge must provide the reasons for doing so. Id.
at 726. Vindictiveness can be presumed, if the judge provides no objective reasons. The Ninth
Circuit considers it "inherently suspect" if the prosecutor attempts to impose higher charges
upon retrial for the same offense as originally charged. United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529
F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976).
The defendant has the initial burden of demonstrating facts sufficient to give rise to a
presumption of vindictiveness. United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980). See also United States v. Robinson, 644 F.2d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir.
1981) (mere fact that new charges followed defendant's exercise of procedural rights was insufficient to raise presumption of vindictiveness, where there were no grounds to inquire into
prosecutor's motives).
The burden then shifts to the prosecutor, who must show that "independent reasons or
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defendant who has successfully challenged an indictment or conviction
and is later reindicted for either a higher crime or other crimes arising
from the same set of facts. The result of the reindictment is that a defendant may receive a stricter sentence than if he or she had not challenged the original proceeding. The Supreme Court has held that
vindictive prosecution constitutes a "due process violation of the most
basic sort," because it punishes a defendant for doing that which the law
clearly permits.21 6 9 "[F]or an agent of the State to pursue a course of
action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights
is 'patently unconstitutional.' "2170
intervening circumstances" support his or her decision, thus dispelling the appearance of vindictiveness. Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1347. See also United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d
1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976) (prosecution bears heavy burden of proving that any increase in the
severity of the charges was not motivated by vindictiveness). The prosecutor must identify
either specific new conduct of the defendant since the time of the original proceeding justifying
the increased penalty sought, or other circumstances serving as an "adequate substitute."
United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953
(1976) (citing United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1974)). In PreciadoGomez, upon reindictment, the prosecutor added two extra counts arising from the facts. The
prosecutor could not identify any specific conduct by the defendant since the time of the original proceeding. The court, however, found an "adequate substitute," because in the interim
new evidence justifying the new counts had been uncovered. Id. at 941.
In United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980), a
seminal case on vindictive prosecution, the Ninth Circuit held that "the presumption of vindictiveness may be inferred even in the absence of evidence that the prosecution in fact acted with
a malicious or retaliatory motive in seeking the . . . indictment." Id. at 1346 (citing
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974) (convicted defendant is entitled to pursue his
statutory right to trial de novo without fear of state retaliation with increased charges)). See
also United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978) ("it is the appearanceof vindictiveness, rather than vindictiveness in fact, which controls") (emphasis in original) (citing
United States v. De Marco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.) (apprehension and appearance of vindictiveness are adequate to create heavy burden for prosecutor), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827
(1977)).
Nonetheless, "[tihe presumption applies only to the extent it reflects the very real likelihood of actual vindictiveness." United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir.
1982). Even in cases where action detrimental to a defendant has been taken after the exercise
of a legal right, the presumption of vindictiveness attaches only where a reasonable likelihood
of improper motive exists. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372-80 (1982). See also
United States v. Thurnhuber, 572 F.2d 1307, 1310-11 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977), where the court
noted that the presumption of vindictiveness "arises only as a shield against the possibility of
actualvindictiveness and not against those situations which simply appear to the defendant to
be vindictively motivated." In Thurnhuber,the defendant was originally indicted on one count
of fraud. The district court declared a mistrial, and the government filed a superseding indictment charging the defendant with three counts of fraud, on which he was convicted. The
Ninth Circuit held that the presumption of vindictiveness was invalid, because the district
court declared a mistrial on its own initiative, not in response to a defense motion. Id. at 1310.
2169. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
2170. Id. at 363 (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 n.20 (1973)).
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In United States v. Brooklier,z17 ' the Ninth Circuit held that vindictiveness could not be presumed, even if the addition of an extortion
charge subjected the defendants to a greater risk of punishment.2 17 2

When the prosecutor increases the charges before trial, no reasonable
probability of vindictiveness arises, because he or she may discover additional information that creates a basis for more prosecution, or may realize that state information has greater significance than originally
2 173
anticipated.
The defendants, members of a secret national racketeering organization, appealed their convictions for racketeering. 2174 They contended
that the addition of an extortion charge in subsequent indictments violated the vindictiveness doctrine. 2 175 The court ruled that where the earlier indictment was replaced by one containing fewer charges and lighter
penalties, the doctrine did not apply. 2 176 Before trial the government

may reconsider societal interest in prosecution, 217 7 particularly when, as
here, a court order requires the prosecutor to obtain a new indictment, so
that he or she must review the evidence and which charges to submit to
2
the grand jury.

178

Defendant Brooklier objected to the government's application for
electronic surveillance of his conversation concerning an extortion
plan.2179 Brooklier contended that the court order authorizing the surveillance was based on an affidavit which did not give a "full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures [had]
been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear[ed] to be unlikely to
2171. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
2172. Id. at 1215.
2173. Id. (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381 (1982) (presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted where initial charges may not reflect extent to which defendant is
legitimately subject to prosecution)).
2174. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any
person who has received any income derived. . . from. . . racketeering. . . to use or invest
. . .any part of such income. . .[in] activities . . . which affect . . . interstate or foreign
commerce."
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever in any way . . . obstructs. . . commerce. . . by. . .extortion. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1976) provides: "The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
2175. 685 F.2d at 1215.
2176. Id.
2177. Id. at 1216 (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 (1982)).
2178. Id. (citing United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 1982)).
2179. Id. at 1221.
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succeed, 2 180 as required by statute.2 1 81
The court held that the government should have included the information required by the wiretap statute. 2182 Nonetheless, there was no
evidence of the government's intentional omission of the information.
Thus, in admitting the recording of Brooklier's conversation, the district
court did not commit error.2 183 The defendant had the burden of proving a deliberate omission or bad faith, and he showed only negligence.
Mere negligence in preparing the affidavit for21a84wiretap order will not
result in suppression of the obtained evidence.
2.

Impermissible vouching for the credibility of witnesses

Since the prosecution, in representing the government, may command the respect of the jury, it must avoid improper assertion of personal or professional integrity, such as using the prestige of its office to
bolster its arguments. Whenever the prosecution asserts its opinions concerning the trial in the jury's presence, the defendant may suffer a violation of his or her fifth amendment right to a fair trial. The prosecution
oversteps a fine line if it conveys a personal belief, presumably based on
matters known only to it, or places the prestige of its office behind the
2 185
credibility of its witnesses.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the prosecutor has particular responsibility to "avoid improper suggestions, insinuations, and, espeThe Court
cially, assertions of personal knowledge .... ,2186
subsequently extended this rule in order to prohibit prosecutorial vouching for the credibility of a government witness. 2 187 The Court observed
that vouching occurs in two ways. The prosecution may place the prestige of its office behind the witness, or may suggest that information not
presented to the jury supports the witness' testimony.2 1 88
2180. Id.
2181. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1976).
2182. 685 F.2d at 1221-22.
2183. Id. at 1222.
2184. Id. at 1221 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (defendant is entitled
to hearing after making substantial preliminary showing that false statement was knowingly
and intentionally, or recklessly, included in warrant affidavit)).
2185. "It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant."
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE-THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 5.8(b) (1974).

2186. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (prosecutor's argument, which contained improper insinuations calculated to mislead the jury, created incurable prejudice).
2187. Lawn v. United States, 335 U.S. 339 (1958).
2188. Id. at 359-60 n.15.
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The defendants in United States v. Brooklier21 8 9 contended that the
government improperly vouched for the credibility of a government witness. a1 90 During the trial, defense counsel described government witness
Fratianno as a perjurer, paid informant, and murderer who avoided a
death sentence by cooperating with the FBI. In rebuttal, the government
introduced Fratianno's plea agreement, which required him to testify
truthfully.2 19 1
The Ninth Circuit noted that whenever the government mentioned
the plea agreement during trial, the court cautioned the jury that the
agreement did not imply that the testimony was necessarily truthful.2 92
The jurors made the exclusive determination of the credibility of all witnesses, thus precluding government vouching when introducing the plea
agreement.2 19 3
In United States v. Rohrer,21 9 4 the Ninth Circuit again held that no
improper vouching for a government witness occurred, where a witness'
cooperation agreement was admitted. The court found that the government did not put its prestige behind the witness or refer implicitly to
evidence outside the record, and that the agreement pertained to material
facts at issue.2 195
The defendants, appealing various drug convictions, 2 96 argued that
the admission of a government witness' agreement with the government
and the latter's references to it at trial created impermissible vouching,
implying that the testimony had to be truthful.2 1 97 Citing Brooklier,2 198
the Ninth Circuit held that the government could refer to the cooperation agreement as a factor bearing on the witness' credibility.21 99 The
government made certain to ask the jury to consider the agreement in
2189.
2190.
2191.
2192.
2193.
2194.

685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
Id. at 1218.
Id.
Id. at 1218-19.
Id. at 1219.
708 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1983).

2195. Id. at 433. See United States v. Rubier, 651 F.2d 628, 630 (9th Cir.) (per curiam)
(letters containing immunity for testimony agreement were relevant and admissible), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 875 (1981).
2196. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Except as authorized by this
subehapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to. . .possess with
intent to

. .

.distribute

. . .

a controlled substance."

21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who. . . conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subehapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both
2197. 708 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1983).
2198. 685 F.2d 1208, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
2199. 708 F.2d at 433.
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determining the witness' motives. In addition, the court did not receive
the full transcript of the cooperation agreement into evidence until after
the defendant's impeachment of the witness' motives in crossexamination.22c °
2200. Id. In United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944
(1982), defendant Tham similarly claimed that the prosecutor had improperly vouched for a
witness' credibility by suggesting that the witness had testified truthfully because his plea
agreement with the government required truthful testimony. Id. at 861. For support, Tham
cited United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981),
where a conviction was reversed based on the impropriety of a similar closing argument. 665
F.2d at 862. Roberts was also the basis of the defendants' arguments in United States v.
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983), and United
States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1983).
In Roberts, the prosecutor mentioned that a detective had been monitoring the testimony
of a government witness. This implied that the government possessed information with which
to determine the truthfulness of the witness. The prosecutor argued to the jury that the witness had testified truthfully because he was afraid of violating his plea agreement, which would
be nullified if he lied. The court found that the implication amounted to improper vouching.
618 F.2d at 533-34. Following reversal of the conviction on grounds of improper vouching,
the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Roberts, 640 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 942 (1981), that retrial was not barred on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 227-28. The
court reasoned that there was no showing that the prosecutor made the comments in order to
provoke a mistrial. Id. at 228.
The Ninth Circuit nonetheless found no vouching present in Tham, Brooklier, or Rohrer.
In each case, the court held that the defendants' reliance on Roberts was misplaced.
The Tham court distinguished Roberts on the basis that there was no contention in Tham
that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence. 665 F.2d at 862. In Brooklier, the court
similarly held that "[w]e reversed the conviction [in Roberts] primarily because the statement
that the detective was monitoring the witness improperly referred to facts outside the record.
Here, no such argument was made." 684 F.2d at 1218. The Rohrer court stressed that in
Roberts, the government put its prestige behind the witness, which was a distinguishing factor.
708 F.2d at 433.
Both Tham and Rohrer emphasized the importance of curative instructions. The Tham
court held that the prosecutor acted properly, partially because the district judge instructed the
jury to regard the testimony of a witness granted immunity "with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness." 665 F.2d at 862. The Rohrer court similarly stressed that the
government had carefully asked the jury to look to the plea agreement to consider the witness'
motives. 708 F.2d at 433.
In United States v. West, 680 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982), the defendant similarly claimed
that during closing argument, the government improperly vouched for the credibility of a
witness. The prosecutor had enhanced the witness' credibility by stressing that the witness was
an officer of the court and a member of the United States Attorney's Office:
If you are willing to believe that an officer of this Court and a member of the
U.S. Attorney's Office is going to commit perjury, which is what she would have had
to do,. . . then I would think that. . . you would have doubt about the whole case,
and that you would have to acquit the Defendant if you are willing to believe that;
that this conviction is so important to the Government. . . that an officer of the U.S.
Attorney's Office would take that stand and commit perjury.
Id. at 655.
The Ninth Circuit found that there was sufficient error to merit reversal. Id. at 657. The
court used the "more probable than not" harmless error standard, see United States v. ValleValdez, 554 F.2d 911, 914-16 (9th Cir. 1977), stating that it was compelled to reverse the
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In United States v. Gibson,22 " the court held that a prosecutor may
distinguish direct from circumstantial evidence without violating the
vouching rule, and he or she may help the jury to remember a witness'
testimony by referring to the witness' age, occupation, or other distinguishing characteristics.2 2 2
The defendant appealed a conviction for mail fraud, wire fraud, and
inducing others to travel in interstate commerce for purposes of
fraud.22 3 He objected to the prosecutor's statements that there would be
"direct evidence, in my view, in the view of the government, . . . that
shows that. . . [the defendant] intended all along to take this money for
himself, . . . not to tell the truth about what was going on, and [to]
intentionally [defraud] these people for . . . his own personal gain."22 4
The prosecutor also referred to one government witness as an "actor who
05
was also a disabled veteran.

'22

The Ninth Circuit found the defendant's objections without merit.
The court held that the prosecutor properly distinguished between direct
and circumstantial evidence and was merely helping the jury to remember the "disabled veteran," since there were many witnesses.2 20 6 Thus
the court found that the prosecutor's statements did not violate the
vouching rule.22 °v
conviction if it was more probable than not that the error substantially influenced the verdict.
680 F.2d at 656-57.
2201. 690 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1046 (1983).
2202. Id. at 703.
2203. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, . . . places in any post office . . . any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, .
shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
. . . transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire. . . any writings, signs,
signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever. . . induces any person to
travel in, or to be transported in interstate commerce in the execution or concealment of a
scheme or artifice to defraud. . . [s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both."
2204. 690 F.2d 697, 702 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1046 (1983).
2205. Id. at 703 n.6.
2206. Id. at 703.
2207. Id. As in United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1206 (1983), and United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1983), the court in
Gibson found no merit in the defendant's argument that the prosecutor vouched for evidence in
violation of the rule of United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980) (conviction
reversed where government's case was not compelling and court could not deem prosecutor's
remarks harmless), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981). See supra note 2200.
The Gibson court also disagreed with the defendant's other objections of prosecutorial
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3. Improper references to matters not in evidence
The prosecutor's conduct during trial is an important element of the
defendant's due process rights. Thus the prosecutor must avoid conduct
which improperly prejudices the defendant's case. The prosecutor must
confine his or her comments to the facts in evidence and reasonable conclusions drawn from them.22 0 8 In determining whether the prosecutor's
conduct requires reversal of the conviction, the Ninth Circuit will conmisconduct, considering them under a "plain error" standard of review because the defendant
neglected to preserve the issues for appeal by objecting at trial. 690 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1046 (1983),
Under the plain error doctrine, the court has discretion to grant or deny review when the
defendant neglects to preserve an issue with a proper objection. United States v. Lopez, 575
F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1978). The plain error doctrine emanates from the rule that if the
defendant does not object at trial, appellate relief is normally precluded. United States v.
Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1977) (failure to object at trial necessitates proof of plain
error to warrant reversal), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978); accord United States v. Garcia,
555 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). The Ninth Circuit will reverse a criminal
conviction on the basis of plain error only under exceptional circumstances. United States v.
Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); United States v.
Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's remark improperly shifting burden of
proof to defendant constituted plain error).
The court in Gibson held that there was no indication that a "'clear miscarriage of justice' " existed or that " 'the integrity and reputation of the judicial process'" might be at stake.
690 F.2d at 703 (quoting United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1980) (under plain
error standard, court must determine if error was highly prejudicial and if defendant preserved
the issue for appeal), cert. denied,449 U.S. 1113 (1981)). Even if the prosecutor's actions were
in error, they could not be described as "'highly prejudicial error affecting substantial
rights,'" and thus, the prosecutor's conduct did not qualify as plain error. 690 F.2d at 703
(quoting United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1198-1200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,444 U.S. 979
(1979)).
Relying on Gibson, the court in United States v. Lane, 708 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), held
that the prosecutor's statements during closing argument did not require reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id. at 1399. The defendant challenged the district court's refusal to
grant a mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct. Id. The district court lacked the opportunity to
remedy any error since the defendant had neglected to object to the remarks when made. Thus
the court considered the prosecutor's remarks under the plain error doctrine, holding that the
remarks, even if erroneous, did not require reversal. Id. (citing United States v. Giese, 597
F.2d 1170, 1198-1200 (9th Cir.) (conviction upheld where evidence was compelling, and prosecutor's improper remarks would not have affected outcome of trial), cert denied, 444 U.S. 979
(1979)). The court used substantially the same plain error analysis as in Gibson, holding that
the defendants were not deprived of a fair trial; there was no "'clear miscarriage of justice'"
or risk that "'the integrity of the judicial process might be affected.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Gibson, 690 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1046 (1983)).
2208. United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 658 (9th Cir. 1977) (closing remarks about defendant's drug-related profits were not improperly prejudicial because record supported them),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1978). See also United States v. Esquer-Gomez, 550 F.2d 1231,
1234 (9th Cir. 1977) (court allowed statement that prosecutor was "trying to avoid bringing
out some other matters that should not come out"); Tenorio v. United States, 390 F.2d 96, 9899 (9th Cir.) (court allowed closing remark concerning heroin-induced destruction, as within
common knowledge of reasonable people), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968); United States v.
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sider whether a jury instruction can counteract the prejudice,2 2 9 and
whether the error was harmless. 2 1 0
In United States v. Nadler,2 11 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the dis-

trict court properly denied motions for a mistrial, where it was more
probable than not that several evidentiary errors did not substantially
affect the jury's verdict.2 2 1 2 The defendants appealed their convictions
for conspiring to print, possess, and transfer counterfeit federal reserve
2214
notes22 13 and for counterfeiting and possessing counterfeit plates.
Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1977) (court allowed closing remark that defendant was
a "big dope peddler" since it was reasonable inference from evidence).
2209. United States v. Pratt, 531 F.2d 395, 401 (9th Cir. 1976) (where prosecutor openly
displayed gun to jury, despite prior inadmissibility ruling, trial judge's instruction could not
cure prejudice).
2210. The Supreme Court has likewise established that a prosecutor may not attest to facts
within his or her personal knowledge that are not in evidence, unless he or she testifies as a
witness. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935) (prosecutor improperly commented
that he "knew" that witness was actually acquainted with defendant, even though witness
testified to the contrary); Hall v. United States, 150 U.S. 76, 80-81 (1893) (prosecutor committed reversible error by remarking that "we know" that Mississippi trials of white men for
killing blacks are farces).
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE-THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 5.8(b) (1974), provides that a prosecu-

tor acts unprofessionally if he or she expresses a personal belief regarding the defendant's guilt.
See supra note 2185. This standard has been upheld in several circuits. See, e.g., United States
v. Gonzalez-Vargas, 558 F.2d 631, 633 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113,
1116 (lst Cir. 1976); United States v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450, 453 (Ist Cir. 1970); Patriarca v.
United States, 402 F.2d 314, 321 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1022 (1969); Greenberg
v. United States, 280 F.2d 472, 475 (Ist Cir. 1960); United States v. Benson, 487 F.2d 978, 981
(3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470, 477 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 991 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v.
Splain, 545 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1976); Sanchez v. Heggie, 531 F.2d 964, 966 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 948 (1976). The Fifth Circuit has noted:
The purpose of summations is for the attorneys to assist the jury in analyzing, evaluating, and applying the evidence. It is not for the purpose of permitting counsel to
"testify" as an "expert witness". . . . Therefore, an attorney's statements that indicate his opinion or knowledge of the case as theretofore presented before the court
and jury are permissible if the attorney makes it clear that the conclusions he is
urging are conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.
United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original).
2211. 698 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1983).
2212. Id. at 1001.
2213. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States. . . , and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
2214. 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1976) provides: "Whoever, with intent to defraud, falsely makes,
forges, counterfeits, or alters any obligation or other security of the United States, shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 474 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having control, custody, or possession of any plate. . . from which has
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During the trial, the United States Attorney made a motion in front
of the jury to admit a document previously ruled inadmissible. Defense
counsel referred twice to the document during cross-examination. The
22 15
district court denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial.
During a Secret Service agent's testimony, he referred twice to a
search warrant which the court had held invalid, and to counterfeit
money which had been suppressed. The court struck the improper testimony and held an off-the-record discussion with the United States Attorney to ensure that the agent would not mention the suppressed evidence
again. However, the agent referred again to the search warrant and the
counterfeit bills. The court immediately suspended further testimony by
2 2 16
the agent.
The court again denied the defendants' motion for a mistrial, concluding that the jury could easily have determined from the witness' testimony that the agents did not discover anything when they searched the
counterfeit printing shop. Thus the court held that any prejudice to the
2 2 17
defendants was speculative.
The defendants nontheless claimed that misconduct by the prosecutor and witness deprived the defendants of a fair trial. They argued that
the prosecutor's statement before the jury, and the agent's references to
suppressed evidence, implied to the jury that other evidence of guilt was
being withheld. The defendants were not satisfied with the court's jury
instruction to draw no inferences about why the seized items were not
admitted into evidence. u 1 8
The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants incurred no prejudice
from the prosecutor's and witness' remarks regarding inadmissible evidence.22z 9 The court of appeals will reverse only if it appears more probable than not that the misconduct significantly affected the jury's
decision. 2 Since the district court is better equipped to understand the
been printed
plate.

. .

. . .

any obligation or other security of the United States, uses such

for the purpose of printing any such or similar obligation

.

..

[s]hall be

fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both.
2215. 698 F.2d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 1983).
2216. Ad.

2217. Id.
2218. Id.

2219. Id.
2220. Id. (citing United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 942 (1982); United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 201 (9th Cir. 1980) (conviction will be
affirmed if non-constitutional error is more probably harmless than not), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981)). See also United States v. Sanford, 673 F.2d 1070, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 1982) (absent substantial prejucide to defendant, trial court's discretion regarding prosecutorial misconduct will not be disturbed); United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977)
(given timely objection, incomplete jury instruction which may have substantially affected de-
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circumstances surrounding the incident and to evaluate its impact, the
appellate court must defer to the district court's handling of the alleged
2 21
misconduct during trial.
The Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of the district court's
jury instruction to draw no adverse inferences from the comments. The
court stressed that proper jury instructions may cure prosecutorial error.2222 Moreover, before the agent's improper remarks, the jury had
already learned about the presence of the counterfeit money at the print
shop. This issue surfaced during questioning by the defense. Thus the
defendants suffered no prejudice from the agent's comments.2 22 3
The Ninth Circuit also observed that the agent stated that his references to the inadmissible evidence were inadvertent. 2 2 4 The district
cision required reversal); United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 232 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant
was probably "seriously prejudiced" when decision was "materially affected" by prosecutor's
erroneous and misleading statements of law).
2221. 698 F.2d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855, 860
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 942 (1982)).
2222. Id. (citing United States v. Vargas-Rios, 607 F.2d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor's misstatements of fact and suggestion not supported by evidence were harmless error,
since jury was advised that opening statements are not evidence)). The Court in Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), similarly stated:
Even if it is unreasonable to assume that a jury can disregard a coconspirator's statement when introduced against one of two joint defendants, it does not seem at all
remarkable to assume that the jury will ordinarily be able to limit its consideration to
the evidence introduced during the trial .
"[I]t
[. is hard for us to imagine that the
minds of the jurors would be so influenced by such incidental statements during this
long trial that they would not appraise the evidence objectively and dispassionately."
Id. at 736 (quoting United States v. Sacony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 239 (1940)).
The Ninth Circuit has often held that curative instructions by the trial judge may neutralize the prejudicial effect of inappropriate prosecutorial comments. See, e.g., United States v.
Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir.) (court allowed factual statements not completely
supported by record, where misstatement of evidence was not substantial and cautionary instruction was given), cert. denied,430 U.S. 971 (1977); United States v. Bodey, 547 F.2d 1383,
1388 (9th Cir.) (court allowed comment that defendant was "faking" lack of recall during
cross-examination where jury probably did not accord significant weight to comment and received cautionary instruction), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).
Other circuits have likewise held that the trial judge's warning to the jury or prosecutor
may affect the prejudicial weight of a prosecutor's improper remark. See, e.g., United States v.
Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant's rights protected by trial judge's repeated instructions that jury must not consider attorney's arguments as evidence). United
States v. Gonzalez-Vargas, 558 F.2d 631, 633 (1st Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's error in stating his
personal belief at least four times could not be cured by jury instruction that counsel's arguments were not evidence); United States v. Benson, 487 F.2d 978, 982 (3d Cir. 1973) (where
prosecutor stated that jury must return guilty verdict in the name of justice, no prejudicial
error, since judge instructed jury to consider only evidence).
2223. 698 F.2d 995, 1002 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Stoppelli v. United States, 183 F.2d 391, 395
(9th Cir.) (test of prejudice is whether error had a "substantial adverse effect upon the fairness
of the trial"), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 864 (1950)).
2224. Id.
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court acted quickly to suspend further testimony by the agent, and care-

fully reviewed the circumstances surrounding the incident before denying
the defendants' motion for a mistrial. The Ninth Circuit found no abuse
of discretion in the district court's denial of the defendants' motion.222 5
The court decided that the cumulative effect of the misconduct, if
any, created no prejudice to the defendants. Citing United States v.
Berry,2226 the court acknowledged the requirement of examining the cumulative effect of several errors when assessing prejudicial impact.2 2 27
The stronger the prosecutor's case, the less likely that the defendant will
be prejudiced by error or misconduct.22 2 8 In reaching its decision, the
court considered that evidence of the defendants' guilt was strong, and
that in each instance defense counsel was the first to bring the existence
of the inadmissible evidence to the jury's attention. 2 29
In United States v. Crenshaw, 223 ° the court held that improper
prosecutorial comments require a mistrial only when the comments are
so severe that they prejudice the defendant, and the prejudice is not
counteracted by the trial court's instructions.2 23 1
The defendants in Crenshaw were convicted of bank robbery.2 23 2
Shortly after the robbery and again one week before trial, two witnesses
2225. Id. (citing Stoppelli v. United States, 183 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 864 (1950)). As the Court noted in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968),
"[n]ot every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial
where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently."
2226. 627 F.2d 193, 201 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
2227. 698 F.2d at 1002. This same standard has been followed in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ramsey, 493 F.2d 457, 459 (5th Cir.) (any claim of trial judge's impropriety
must be considered in light of record in its totality), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 994 (1974).
2228. 698 F.2d 1002 (citing United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 210 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1972) (Ninth
Circuit has special obligation to examine allegations of prejudice when government's evidence
is based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony)).
2229. 698 F.2d 1002.
2230. 698 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1983).
2231. Id. at 1063 (citing United States v. Potter, 616 F.2d 384, 391-92 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor's impropriety during closing summation in intejecting his personal belief about witnesses' guilt and credibility did not require reversal of conviction), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832
(1980)).
2232. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, by force and violence, . . . takes. . . from the person or presence of another any property or money or any
other thing of value belonging to. . . any bank. . . [s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, in committing, or attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any
person, . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five
years, or both."
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selected the defendants' pictures from a photographic lineup. The prosecutor notified these witnesses on the morning of the trial that the two
persons they had identified would be present in the courtroom at the
defendants' table. 2 33 The trial court made a pretrial ruling that the
prosecutor's comments destroyed the reliability of later identifications
and rendered inadmissible any in-court identification. 2 3 a During the
trial, however, the witnesses were requested to pick again the pictures of
the robbers they had previously selected from the photographic lineup.
One defendant contended that this procedure constituted an incourt identification, which was so tainted by impermissibly suggestive
22 35
pretrial identification procedures that he was denied due process.

Both defendants argued that the district court should have declared a
mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct because of statements made by the
prosecutor during trial and admission of the photographic
identifications.2 2 36
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that because the subsequent
prosecutorial misconduct did not influence the initial identifications, the
court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a repeat of the photographic identifications at trial.2 2 37 The court held that the prejudicial
effect of the prosecutor's statements to the witnesses was minimal and
was neutralized by the court's limiting instructions.2 2 38
One defendant also contended that evidentiary errors and instances
of prosecutorial misconduct were cumulatively so prejudicial that he was
denied a fair trial.2 239 Considering the case in its entirety, the court held
that the defendant was not significantly deprived of a fair trial by any
cumulative prejudice from purported errors and prosecutorial misconduct.2 24 0 The court noted that when evidentiary errors and prosecutorial

misconduct are "'more probably harmless than not,'" there is no need
for reversal.2 2 4a Thus, in light of the overwhelming evidence against the
defendant, including fingerprints, the total effect of any errors concerning
admission of illegally seized evidence and the prosecutor's remarks did
2233. 698 F.2d at 1063.
2234. Id.

2235. Id. at 1062.
2236. Id. at 1063.
2237. Id.
2238. Id.
2239. Id.
2240. Id. at 1063-64.
2241. Id. at 1063 (citing United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 201 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied,449 U.S. 1113 (1981)). This same standard of "more probably harmless than not" was
used in United States v. Nadler, 698 F.2d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra note 2220.
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not necessitate overturning the decision. 2242
In United States v. Kahan & Lessin Co.,2243 the court ruled that government misconduct did not require dismissal of an indictment, where
the trial judge gave appropriate cautionary instructions after improper
questions were asked by counsel. 2 2 "
The defendants were indicted for conspiring to restrain trade by

agreeing to fix prices, terms, and conditions of the sale of health

foods.224 5 They contended that questions posed by government counsel

should have resulted in a mistrial.2246 Counsel asked one witness if he
was a co-defendant with Kahan and Lessin in a related action. Counsel
also asked several witnesses about meetings held before the start of the
conspiracy as alleged in the indictment. The court held that on both
occasions the trial judge cured the evidentiary errors with cautionary
jury instructions and by disallowing the questions.2 24 7 The Ninth Circuit
held that the defendants had a fair trial, and that whatever acts of
prosecutorial misconduct occurred, considered alone or together, did not
require reversal.2 24 8
4. Improper comments on a defendant's silence
In United States v. Miller,2 24 9 the Ninth Circuit considered the pros-

ecutor's comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent
2242. 698 F.2d at 1063-64.
2243. 695 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1982).
2244. Id. at 1124-25.
2245. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony. .. .
2246. 695 F.2d at 1124.
2247. Id. at 1124-25 (citing United States v. Sanford, 673 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1982) (on
motions for mistrial, trial court retains wide discretion, but cannot unfairly prejudice
defendants)).
2248. 695 F.2d at 1125 (citing United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez, 676 F.2d 1283, 1289 (9th
Cir.) (improper question in context of total trial did not necessitate reversal), cert denied, 459
U.S. 911 (1982)).
The defendants also claimed that they were denied necessary testimony because the government did not extend immunity to several of their witnesses. Id. at 1124. The court held
that there was no error, since the defendants neglected to prove that the testimony would have
benefitted them. Id. (citing United States v. Garner, 663 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 1981) (when
government fails to extend immunity, there is no error, in absence of evidence that witnesses
would have testified favorably), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982)).
The defendants also argued that they were denied several witnesses due to prosecutorial
coercion. Id. The court disagreed, noting that the defendants failed to substantiate their assertions. Id. at 1125. Even though the defendants asserted that the government actively discouraged witnesses from cooperating, they did not show that they were denied access to witnesses.
Id. at 1124.
2249. 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
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at trial. Without deciding whether the comment was improper, the court
held that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2 "
The defendant was indicted for receiving stolen property, based on
his possession of a stolen trailer. 225 1 The court allowed the prosecutor's
remark during closing argument concerning the defendant's explanation
of what had happened to the trailer. 22 5 2 The court reasoned that the
comment merely preceded reiteration of testimony concerning the defendant's preindictment statement that he no longer had the property.
2250. Id. at 661. The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's
refusal to testify violates the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965). The Ninth Circuit has also ruled on this issue. See,
ag., United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir.) (comment on defendant's silence
was improper, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977);
United States v. Helina, 549 F.2d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor may not comment on
accused's pretrial silence for purposes of impeaching his trial testimony).
The Ninth Circuit recently considered allegations of improper prosecutorial comment in
United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
The prosecutor had indirectly commented on the defendant's failure to testify by asking the
jury, "Did you hear him deny the misrepresentations, Ladies and Gentlemen?" Id. at 1336
n.6.
The court acknowledged that the comment was prohibited, but held that it was "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1336-37 (citing United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 945
(9th Cir. 1980) (plain error not ground for reversal if court is convinced it was harmless beyond reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981)). The conviction was affirmed
because the court decided that the remark was an isolated comment not stressing any inference
of guilt. Moreover, the trial judge added a curative instruction. Id.
In United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044
(1982), the court again considered allegations of improper prosecutorial comments on the defendants' failure to testify. Id. at 1343. The court held that the test should be "whether the
language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify." Id. (citing United States
v. Wasserteil, 641 F.2d 704, 709 (9th Cir. 1981) (prosecutor's reference to failure of defense to
provide certain explanation did not infringe on defendants' fifth amendment rights)). As in
United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1157 (1982), the court in Fleishman noted that the trial court's jury instructions cured any
possible prejudice. Id. at 1344. Cf. United States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (prosecutor's remarks were appropriate because "the jury would [not] naturally and necessarily take them to be comments on the failure of the accused to testify"), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
2251. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever receives. . . any goods
. . . of the value of $5,000 or more. . . , moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen. . . [s]hall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
2252. 688 F.2d 652, 661 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc). The prosecutor stated:
When you get to the jury room, there is one question I want. . . all of you [to] ask
each other. . . . T]he evidence is uncontradicted [that] the trailer that was found
abandon[ed] in the woods [had been] in Howard Miller's possession.. . sometime in
the fall of 1980. I want you to ask yourselves, if that is so, what happened to it?
What was Mr. Miller's explanation of what happened to that trailer?
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Thus the prosecutor referred not to the defendant's failure to testify, but
to one of his pretrial declarations.2 25 3 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
deemed it significant that the court promptly instructed the jury to disre-

gard any implication of guilt, that the prosecutor's comment was not
extensive, and that he did not emphasize any inference of guilt from the
defendant's silence.225 4
5. Prejudicial remarks in closing arguments
The Ninth Circuit-recently considered several cases concerning allegations of improper prosecutorial statements in closing argument. In
each case, the court rejected the defendants' claims of prosecutorial mis-

conduct. The Ninth Circuit places much faith in corrective measures
which may neutralize any improper remark, and requires reversal only
upon proof of gross behavior.2 2 5 "'Counsel are necessarily permitted a
degree of latitude in the presentation of their closing summations.' "2256
In United States v. Foster,22 57 the Ninth Circuit held that any prejudice from the prosecutor's misstatements during closing argument was
neutralized by a corrective statement. 225 8 At trial the defendants were
2253. Id.
2254. Id. See also Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523, 523-24 (1968) (per curiam) (comment
on defendant's failure to testify is not harmless error where comment is extensive, inference of
guilt is emphasized, and there is evidence that could have supported acquittal); United States
v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978) (error was harmless where comment was not
extensive, there was marginal emphasis on any inference of guilt, and there was no substantial
evidence supporting an acquittal).
2255. In United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,430 U.S. 971 (1977),
the defendant contended that the prosecutor created prejudice through improper statements
during closing argument. The Ninth Circuit held that statements require reversal only where
"they are so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant, and the prejudice has not been
neutralized by the trial judge." Id. at 1222 (citing United States v. Benson, 487 F.2d 978, 981
(3d Cir. 1973)).
Curative measures were also grounds for the decision in United States v. Harvey, 701
F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1983), where the defendant contended that the prosecutor's improper remark in closing argument tainted her conviction. The court immediately rejected this claim,
holding that the trial judge's timely cautionary instruction to the jury cured the improper
remark. Id. at 806 (citing United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 200"(9th Cir. 1980) (prejudice
resulting from prosecutor's rebuttal argument'was adequately cured by trial court's instructions), cert. denied,449 U.S. 1113 (1981)). Nonetheless, the court in Harvey emphasized that a
prosecutor may not expound in closing argument on what a witness would have testified to if
questioned. Id. at 806.
2256. United States v. Potter, 616 F.2d 384,392 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v
Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 936 (9th Cir.) (court allowed prosecutor's expression of his personal belief
about credibility of witnesses and his invitation to jury to compare for itself the handwriting of
two exhibits), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978)).
2257. 711 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied,.104 S. Ct. 1602 (1984).
2258. Id. at 883.
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convicted of various drug-related offenses.22 59 During closing argument,
the prosecutor implied that defense counsel was part of a conspiracy to

distribute heroin. 226" Defense counsel objected to this line of argument.
The trial court allowed defense counsel to request that the prosecutor correct his statement. The court held that the prosecutor's corrective
statement neutralized any prejudice. The prosecutor told the jury that he
had been referring to the defendants only, and had not intended to suggest that defense counsel was part of the conspiracy.2 2 6 '
The appellate court held that the prosecutor's remarks may have
been improper, exceeding the liberal scope permitted counsel in closing
argument.2 26 2 Nonetheless, the court stated that the comments were not
so severe that they prejudiced the defendants, and that they could be
neutralized by the trial judge. These two criteria constitute the court's

test for determining if there is reversible error.2 263 Thus, the Ninth Circuit will tolerate a significant level of impropriety before ordering a
reversal.

In United States v. Mehrmanesh,22 1 the Ninth Circuit again denied
an appeal, holding that a timely cautionary instruction balanced an improper comment. 2265 The defendant appealed a conviction for importing
heroin and attempting to possess with intent to distribute heroin.22 66 He
2259. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Except as authorized by this
subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to. . . possess with
intent to.

.

. distribute.

. .

a controlled substance."

21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who. . . conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both."
2260. 711 F.2d at 883. The prosecutor reminded the jury that an agent had testified that one
of the defendants had given the government information to support a warrant for the search of
a witness' home. The prosecutor argued that defense counsel did not ask the agent whether
the defendant had supplied the information. The prosecutor then suggested that the defendants were "hanging together" to hide their guilt, and that defense counsel supported the conspiracy. Id.
2261. Id.
2262. Id. See also United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir.) (prosecutor's
comments, although inferential, were within latitude permitted counsel in closing argument,
since he did not misstate or exceed evidence in any significant respect), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
971 (1977).
2263. 711 F.2d at 883.
2264. 689 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1982).
2265. Id. at 835.
2266. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Except as authorized by this
subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to. . . possess with
intent to

. .

. distribute

. . .

a controlled substance."

21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who. . . conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both."
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever commits an offense against
the United States. . . is punishable as a principal."
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argued that in closing argument, the prosecutor caused him incurable

prejudice by making improper remarks regarding Rule 404(b) prior acts
evidence.22 67 The court agreed with the defendant's claim that the prose-

cutor had commented improperly on the absence of certain explanations
by the defendant after his arrest.22 68 Nonetheless, the court summarily
found the error cured by the district court's cautionary jury instruction
and order to strike the comment.2 26 9
Thus, even though the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the likely pres-

ence of prosecutorial error, it summarily held that a curative measure
counteracted the improper conduct. Error alone is not sufficient for reversal under Ninth Circuit standards.22 70
The court in United States v. Candelaria227 1 held that the prosecutor
is entitled to latitude in closing argument, including making comments

2272
on matters within the common knowledge of all reasonable people.

This discretion permits references such as the prosecutor's remark that
people should not joke about acts such as bomb threats.22 73
2267. 689 F.2d 822, 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
2268. Id. (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (violation of due process if defendant's silence, either at time of arrest or after receiving Miranda warnings, is used to impeach
explanation subsequently offered at trial)). In Doyle, the petitioners took the stand during
their criminal trials and gave an exculpatory explanation. Over their counsel's objection, they
were cross-examined as to why they had not given the arresting officer the exculpatory story.
They were subsequently convicted, and the convictions were affirmed. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610, 615-16 (1976). The Court held that post-arrest silence following Miranda warnings is
ambiguous, and that it would be unjust to allow a defendant's silence to be used to impeach an
explanation later given at trial. Id. at 619.
2269. 689 F.2d 822, 835 (9th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242,
1247 (9th Cir. 1978) (error in admission of evidence can normally be cured by instructing jury
to disregard it), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d 679, 682
(9th Cir. 1976) (allowing government to show defendant had exercised his right to remain
silent was harmless error, where trial court promptly and forcefully instructed jury to disregard testimony), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105 (1977).
2270. See DeFoor, ProsecutorialMisconduct in ClosingArgument, 7 NOVA L.J. 443, 456-57
(1983) which states:
Other than the special rules concerning comment upon the defendant's failure to
testify, the rules concerning a prosecutor's argument are fairly broad. . . . The
prosecutor is allowed to advance all legitimate arguments, and is free to make logical
inferences based upon the evidence to support his theory of the case. . . . Generally
speaking, much discretion is vested in the trial court in keeping counsel's arguments
within the scope of the issues and evidence. There have been cases where prosecutors
made statements so far from the facts as to constitute deliberate misrepresentation.
Such cases are, fortunately, rare, and are. . . obviously reprehensible and reversible
2271. 704 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1983).
2272. Id. at 1132 (citing Tenorio v. United States, 390 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir.) (counsel entitled
to reasonable degree of latitude in presentation of argument), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874
(1968)).
2273. Id.
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In Candelaria,the defendant was convicted of making a false bomb
threat.2 27 4 At trial, he admitted making'the threat by telephone call, but
testified that he possessed no malicious intent. Defense counsel argued in

closing tlat the call was a prank and therefore not subject to punishment
under the statute. 2 7 5 The district judge refused to give a jury instruction

proposed by defense counsel, which would have resulted in acquittal if
the jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the bomb threat
was serious.2 27 6
On appeal, the defendant contended that some of the prosecutor's
remarks during closing argument deviated from the evidence, evoking a

judgment based on emotion rather than reason and depriving him of a
fair trial.22 7 7 While arguing the element of intent, the prosecutor as-

serted that the defendant was probably not joking, explaining that today,
when people are subjected to bomb threats, one does not joke about these
things.2 278 The court noted that defense counsel argued the point in2 27its9
own closing, and the prosecutor had the prerogative to respond to it.

Thus, the prosecutor's remarks did not exceed the scope of his discretion.
E.

Continuance

The decision to grant or deny a continuance is within the discretion
of the trial judge2280 and will be reversed only upon a clear showing of
abuse of discretion. 2 8 1 Additionally, a defendant must show that his
2274. 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (1976) provides in pertinent part: Whoever, through the use of the
* , telephone. . . willfully makes any threat, or maliciously conveys false information knowing the same to be false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made, or to be made
• . . unlawfully to damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property
by means of an explosive shall be imprisoned for not more than five years or fined not more
than $5,000, or both.
2275. 704 F.2d at 1130-31.
2276. Id. at 1131. Defense counsel requested the following jury instruction: "A false bomb
report made as a joke or jest or prank is not a crime. If you cannot find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the false statement was not a joke, jest, or prank, you must find the defendant not
guilty." Id.
2277. Id. at 1132.
2278. Id.
2279. Id. The Ninth Circuit accords discretion when the prosecutor responds to defense
comments. See, e.g., United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's remark fell within degree of latitude allowed in argument, especially since it was made in
partial response to defense counsel's arguments); United States v. Greenbank, 491 F.2d 184,
188 (9th Cir.) (prosecutor allowed to praise informant, after defense characterized him as "a
rat"), cert denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974).
2280. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (citing Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,
446 (1940)).
2281. United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 1979).
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defense was prejudiced before the decision will be reversed.22 82
In Morris v. Slappy,2 283 the Supreme Court held that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion by denying the defendant's motions for continuances. In Morris, the defendant was appointed a new public defender
when six days before trial his previously appointed attorney had emergency surgery. 2228
284 On both the first and second day of trial, the defendant complained that his new attorney had not had sufficient time to
prepare. The trial judge construed the defendant's remarks as motions
for a continuance and, after being told by the attorney that he was ready
to proceed, denied the motions.228 5 On the third day of trial, the defendant presented the court with a pro se petition in which he claimed that he
was unrepresented by counsel, stating that his attorney was in the hospital. 22 86 The court treated the petition as a renewal of the defendant's
2 287
continuance motion and again denied it.
On a writ of habeas corpus, the district court construed the pro se
petition to include claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance to permit more time for trial preparation and to
allow the hospitalized attorney to represent the defendant. 2288 The district court rejected both claims. 2289 The court of appeals reversed, holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance which would
have permitted the hospitalized attorney to represent the defendant.2 29 °
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, stating that the
court misread the record. 2291 The Court concluded that the court of appeals misread the record in two ways. First, the Court stated it could not
"fathom" how the defendant's complaint about lack of time to prepare
2282. United States v. Petsas, 592 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979).
2283. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
2284. Id. at 5 (defendant's attorney represented him at his preliminary hearing and conducted an investigation into case prior to having emergency surgery).
2285. Id. at 6-7. On both the first and second day of trial, when the defendant made motions
for a continuance, the attorney clearly stated he was prepared to proceed and the defendant
indicated that he did not object to the attorney. On the first day, the defendant stated he was
"satisfied with the Public Defender." Id. at 6 (emphasis in original). On the second day, the
defendant stated, "I don't mean he's not a good P.D., I don't have anything against him." Id.
at 7 (emphasis in original).
2286. Id.
2287. Id.
2288. Id. at 9.
2289. Id. at 10.
2290. Id. at 10-11. The court of appeals held that the defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel included the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship. Id. at 10. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court's failure to balance the defendant's right against the
state's interest in proceeding with the trial violated the defendant's right to counsel and, therefore, required reversal of his conviction. Id. at 11.
2291. Id. at 12.
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could be construed as an "unspoken preference" for the hospitalized attorney and, second, the Court noted that, on the record, it was reasonable to conclude that the belated requests for the previous attorney's
assistance were a "transparent ploy for delay."2 292 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that the trial judge was justified in denying the continuances and that no abuse of discretion occurred.2 29 3
In United States v. Barrett, 294 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying the defendant a continuance to
obtain an expert's assistance in attacking a government expert's credibility. 2 29 5 The government notified the defendant of its intention to call a
photographic expert eight days before trial and provided the defendant
with a copy of the expert's report only two days before trial. The defendant made numerous motions for continuances before and during the trial
based on an inability to secure an expert to assist him in preparing his
defense.22 96 The trial record indicated that the defendant, given more
time, could probably have obtained the needed expert.2 29 7
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit rule which requires
that a defendant be given adequate time to secure an expert's assistance
in attacking a government expert's findings.22 98 The court limited the
application of the rule to instances where the expert's assistance was
needed to prepare for defense cross-examination and rebuttal of the government expert's credibility. The rule requiring adequate time to secure
an expert does not extend to situations where the expert's assistance is
needed to provide affirmative proof of the defendant's innocence.2 2 99
Although the court held that the denial of the continuance was an abuse
of discretion, the denial was found to be harmless error in view of the
overwhelming amount of evidence produced by the government in addition to the expert's testimony. Thus, reversal of the conviction was not
2292. Id. at 13.
2293. Id. at 14-15. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed with the majority's
conclusion that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the defendant's motions
for a continuance. Id. at 19 (Brennan, J., concurring in result). Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justice Stevens, also agreed that the defendant failed to make a timely motion and that the trial
judge's denial of the motions was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
2294. 703 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983).
2295. Id. at 1081.
2296. Id. at 1080.
2297. Id. at 1081.
2298. Id. at 1080-81 (citing United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1969) (reversed
convictions because defendants were denied a continuance to check government test results
introduced at trial)).
2299. Id. at 1081.
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required.2 3c °
In United States v. Nolan,2 3 °1 the Ninth Circuit held it was not an
abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to continue the defendant's trial until the completion of a related state murder trial. 230 2 From
the record, it was clear that the district court had attempted to accommodate the defendant, having granted three continuances to await the
state trial outcome, until it became clear that the state trial would not
proceed in a timely fashion.2 3 °3 In holding that the district judge did not
abuse his discretion, the Ninth Circuit stated "[w]e do not expect a district judge to put himself at the mercy of state proceedings whenever
' 23 4
there is a somewhat related case in state court." 0
In United States v. Daly,230 5 the Ninth Circuit found that a district
court's denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. In Daly,
the defendant requested a continuance, stating that his wife, his only defense witness, was unavailable to testify.2 30 6 The defendant offered evidence that his wife, who was eight months pregnant, had been told by
her physician to avoid "severely emotional" situations. The district
court found, however, that she was experiencing a normal pregnancy and
was available to testify. 23 7 The Ninth Circuit found support for the denial in the evidence and, therefore, held that the denial was not an abuse
of discretion.230 8
F. Admission of Evidence
1. Competency to stand trial
A criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he cannot
rationally consult with counsel to assist in preparing his defense and
lacks the capacity to rationally and factually understand the proceedings
against him.2 30 9 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that trial of an
2300. Id. at 1081-82. FED. R. CRIM. JP.
52(a) provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
2301. 700 F.2d 479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3095 (1983).
2302. Id. at 482.
2303. Id.
2304. Id.
2305. 716 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1456 (1984).
2306. Id.at 1511.
2307. Id.
2308. Id.The Ninth Circuit relied on the rule that a decision to deny a continuance will not
be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. (citing United States v. Hoyos, 573
F.2d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1978)). See supra text accompanying notes 2280-81.
2309. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (in reversing a defendant's
conviction on grounds that the district court had used an improper standard to determine
competency, the Supreme Court held that the test for determining competency is whether the
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incompent defendant violates due process. 23 10 In federal courts, the accused, the prosecution, or the court sua sponte 23 11 may move for a judicial determination of the accused's mental competency pursuant to 18

U.S.C. section 4244.2312 Furthermore, a defendant's section 4244 motion
defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him"). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) (defendants who lack the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against them
and consult with counsel to assist in preparing their defense are incompetent to stand trial);
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966) (accused has constitutional right to hearing on his
present competency if there is substantial evidence that because of mental illness he is incapable of understanding nature of proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense).
The Ninth Circuit uses the Dusky test for determining competency to stand trial: a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial where he or she has "sufficient present ability to
consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and [has] a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings." Chavez v. United States, 656
F.2d 512, 518 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 172; Pate, 383 U.S. at 378; Dusky, 362
U.S. at 402).
The Ninth Circuit has developed a different test for determining a defendant's competency to plead guilty. In Chavez, the court stated that a defendant who decides to pleadguilty
must have the capacity to make a rational choice between standing trial and pleading guilty.
656 F.2d at 515 (citing Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1977)). The court reasoned
that a defendant is not competent to waive his constitutional right to a fair trial when mental
illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a rational choice among the available
alternatives and his ability to understand the nature and consequences of his waiver. Chavez,
656 F.2d at 518 (citations omitted).
2310. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) ("[T]he failure to observe procedures
adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand
trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial."); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,
378, 385 (1966) ("[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process" because it is incompatible with the "constitutional right to a fair trial.").
2311. [A] due process evidentiary hearing is constitutionally compelled at any time that
there is "substantial evidence" that the defendant may be mentally incompetent
... . Evidence is "substantial" if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's
competency. . . . The function of the trial court. . . is to decide whether there is
any evidence which, assuming its truth, raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competency. At any time that such evidence appears, the trial court sua sponte
must order an evidentiary hearing on the competency issue.
Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Moore v. United States, 464
F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)). The constitutional standard on review is whether
"the evidence of incompetence [is] such that a reasonable judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the defendant's competence." Chavez v. United States, 656
F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Basset v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 621 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977)).
2312. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976) provides:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the expiration of any period of probation the United States Attorney has reasonable cause to
believe that a person charged with an offense against the United States may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the
proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense, he shall file a motion
for a judicial determination of such mental competency of the accused, setting forth
the ground for such belief with the trial court in which proceedings are pending.
Upon such a motion or upon a similar motion in behalf of the accused, or upon its
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to determine competency cannot be denied without first granting a psychiatric examination of the accused unless "the trial judge correctly determines that the motion is frivolous or is not in good faith or does not
set forth the grounds relied upon for believing that the accused may be
incompetent. 2 31 3 Thus, once the motion is made, the court should ordinarily defer making a determination of competency until after the initial
psychiatric examination has taken place.23 14
A competency hearing is required by section 4244 if the psychiatrist's report "indicates a state of present insanity or. . . mental incompetency in the accused. '231 5 Conversely, if the psychiatrist's report does
not indicate a present state of insanity or incompetency, a judicial determination of the accused's competency is not required.2 31 6 Nevertheless,
a hearing is required for due process reasons if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt regarding the accused's competence, despite the psychia-

trist's conclusion that the defendant is neither insane nor
incompetent.2317 The trial court has discretion to grant or deny subseown motion, the court shall cause the accused whether or not previously admitted to
bail, to be examined as to his mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist,
who shall report to the court. For the purpose of the examination the court may
order the accused committed for such reasonable period as the court may determine
to a suitable hospital or other facility to be designated by the court. If the report of
the psychiatrist indicates a state of present insanity or such mental incompetency in
the accused, the court shall hold a hearing, upon due notice, at which evidence as to
the mental condition of the accused may be submitted, including that of the reporting
psychiatrist, and make a finding with respect thereto. No statement made by the
accused in the course of any examination into his sanity or mental competency provided for by this section, whether the examination shall be with or without the consent of the accused, shall be admitted in evidence against the accued on the issue of
guilt in any criminal proceeding. A finding by the judge that the accused is mentally
competent to stand trial shall in no way prejudice the accused in a plea of insanity as
a defense to the crime charged; such finding shall not be introduced in evidence on
that issue nor otherwise be brought to the notice of the jury.

18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976).
2313. United States v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968, 970 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing Meador v. United
States, 332 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1964)). See also Chavez v. United States, 641 F.2d 1253, 1256
(9th Cir. 1981) ("A defendant's first motion for a psychiatric examination under § 4244 may
not be denied unless the court correctly determines that the motion is frivolous or not made in
good faith.") (citations omitted). Furthermore, § 4244 literally reads that "[u]pon such a motion. . . the court shall cause the accused. . . to be examined as to his mental condition by at
least one qualified psychiatrist." 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976) (emphasis added).
2314. Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1981).
2315. See supra note 2312.
2316. United States v. Winn, 577 F.2d 86, 92 (9th Cir. 1978) (hearing on defendant's competency not required on the basis of a § 4244 motion when one report did not indicate a present
state of insanity or incompetency).
2317. Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1981) (history of antisocial behavior and treatment for mental illness, emotional outbursts in open court and conflicting psychiatric reports sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's competence and to require
an evidentiary hearing on that issue).
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quent motions for psychiatric examination after the initial (mandatory)
examination and determination.2 318 In exercising its discretion, however,
the trial court must decide whether there is sufficient doubt concerning
the defendant's competence to warrant further inquiry, in order to afford
23 19
the defendant due process.
In United States v. Bradshaw, 2320 the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial
court's denial of the defendant's section 4244 motions because they "bordered on the frivolous1 232 and set forth no grounds for believing the
defendant was incompetent as required by the statute.2 32 2 Bradshaw was
convicted of kidnapping a nine year old boy from a motel where the victim lived with his mother.2 32 3 Bradshaw also resided at the motel and
was employed as its maintenance man and manager.2 324 While the victim's mother moved belongings from the motel to a new home, the boy
visited Bradshaw in his room where defendant suggested that they move
to Oklahoma together. 2325 The two subsequently met at an appointed
location and began their journey to Oklahoma, during which the two
engaged in oral copulation and mutual sodomy.2326 Bradshaw also gave
the boy marijuana and speed capsules, and tried to dye the child's
hair.

23 27

2318. Id. at 517.
2319. Id. (citing United States v. Clark, 617 F.2d 180, 185 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2320. 690 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3543 (1983).
2321. Id. at 712-13.
2322. Id.
2323. Id. at 706. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) provides in part:
Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries
away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a
minor by the parent thereof, when: (1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce; shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years
or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976). Bradshaw was convicted by a jury and sentenced to thirty years in
prison. 690 F.2d at 707.
2324. 690 F.2d at 707. The Bradshaw court noted that the defendant and the victim had
spent a great deal of time together before the kidnapping in what the victim's mother described
as a" 'father-son type of relationship.'" Id. However, the victim's mother began doubting the
nature of the boy's relationship with Bradshaw and arranged for the boy to stay with his aunt.
Id. The mother's doubt was prompted in part "by her observation of bite marks, or 'hickeys',
on [her son's] neck once or twice after his trips with [Bradshaw]." Id.
2325. Id.
2326. Id.
2327. Id. The .Bradshaw court characterized the "kidnapping" as follows: "when the
mother moved from the motel. . . her son ran away with the appellant." Id. at 706. Superficially, it would appear that the boy consented to go with the defendant, and that therefore,
there was no unlawful confinement or illegal detention sufficient to warrant a kidnapping
charge. For the statutory definition of kidnapping, see 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976); see also
supra note 2323. Bradshaw's chief defense at the trial was that the boy consented. Bradshaw,
690 F.2d at 709. Yet, in ruling favorably on the admission of evidence of drug use and evi-
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On appeal, Bradshaw contended that the trial court erred in denying
his two section 4244 motions 232 8 for a psychiatric examination and a
competency determination.

2329

Affirming the district court's denial of both motions, the Ninth Cirdence relating to the defendant's sexual activity with the victim before and during the trip to
Oklahoma, the Bradshaw court explained that such evidence was relevant to show Bradshaw's
dominion over the boy, and to refute the contention that the victim consented to the trip. Id.
at 708. Evidence of such dominion or control over the victim when he "ran away" with Bradshaw would tend to show that the victim-a nine year old boy-did not knowingly consent to
go with the defendant, but was instead kidnapped. Id.
2328. Defendant's first motion was made on the second day of trial. 690 F.2d at 713. The
Ninth Circuit stated that the psychiatric report accompanying the first motion merely expressed an opinion that Bradshaw was a "mentally disordered sex offender," a notion which
was never disputed. Id. at n.10. Defense counsel renewed the motion five days after the trial.
Id. at 707. The psychiatric report accompanying the second motion was not based upon an
interview with the defendant and simply concluded that Bradshaw was incapable "'of objective, rational decisions. . . concerning his own defense or [of] cooperat[ing] in such a manner
that would minimize the possibility of punishment.'" Id. at 713 n.11.
2329. The Ninth Circuit observed that when Bradshaw's attorney first raised the competency
issue on the second day of trial, he did not move for an examination as required by § 4244.
Rather, he simply presented the trial court with a psychiatric report prepared by a psychiatrist
and other materials for the court's determination of whether an examination and hearing were
warranted. When asked by the trial court whether he would make a § 4244 motion, defense
counsel replied that he would not. Defense counsel moved for a § 4244 motion only after
being informed by the court that such a motion would not be considered unless the defense
raised it. The trial court then denied counsel's motion because the trial judge could find nothing in the psychiatric report indicating incompetency. A subsequent motion brought after trial
was similarly denied. The trial judge ruled that no reasons were provided for concluding that
the defendant was incompetent as required by § 4244. Therefore, the trial judge denied both
motions on grounds that they were frivolous.
The trial court's initial reluctance to make a determination of Bradshaw's competency to
stand trial was arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinions in Robinson and
Drope which indicated that due process requires trial courts to raise the issue of competency
sua sponte. See Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in FederalCourts: Conceptualand ConstitutionalProblems,45 U. CHI. L. REv. 21, 27 (1977). See also supra notes 2309-10 and accompanying text. Furthermore, "[a]lthough section 4244 does not expressly require courts to raise
the issue of competency, federal courts have repeatedly held that due process imposes such an
obligation on trial courts." Pizzi, supra, at 27 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit is in
accord. See supra note 2311 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, Professor Pizzi suggests that:
For practical reasons, the key to the competency issue is the defense attorney.
The defense attorney has the most exposure to his client, and, unlike the court or
prosecutor, he witnesses his client's behavior on various occasions and in various
settings and circumstances. . . . By contrast, the court's contacts with the defendant are fleeting and are usually limited to observations of the defendant in a formal
courtroom setting, where the defendant's active participation is minimal and where a
certain amount of confusion and nervousness on the part of the defendant is to be
expected. Moreover, in many of the cases that go to trial, and particularly in those
cases that result in a guilty plea, the court may not even hear direct testimony from
the defendant. Thus, the defense attorney is usually in the best position to raise the
question of competency.
Pizzi, supra, at 27.
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cuit concluded that Bradshaw's motions were frivolous and failed to set
forth grounds for believing that Bradshaw was incompetent. 2 330 The

court stated that a successful section 4244 motion requires: (1) some
showing of incompetency which prompted the motion, and (2) some reasons for concluding that the defendant may be incompetent. 2331 Neither
a psychiatrist's report labelling Bradshaw as a mentally disordered sex
offender, 2332 nor the psychiatrist's follow-up letter claiming that Brad-

shaw was unable "to cooperate in such a manner that would minimize
the possibility of punishment, ' 2333 established sufficient grounds to justify a section 4244 examination.2 33 4 The court further noted that defense
counsel had twice declined to make a section 4244 motion when the trial
court had provided the opportunity to do so. 2335 Consequently,
the
2336
denied.
properly
been
had
motions
both
that
Ninth Circuit held
2330. 690 F.2d at 713.
2331. Id.
2332. The court indicated that
[i]n his first report, Dr. Moses found Bradshaw to be "an extremely immature,
though not necessarily mentally-ill person." The appellant was diagnosed as suffering from a "gender identity disorder of childhood," and from "undifferentiated type"
schizophrenia complicated by extensive drug use. No opinion was given other than
that the appellant was a "mentally disordered sex offender," and this assessment was
never in doubt nor disputed.
Id. at n.10.
2333. The psychiatrist's second "report" was merely a one sentence letter and was not based
upon a second interview with the defendant. The letter stated:
Pursuant to my psychiatric examination of David Leon Bradshaw, it is my considered opinion that, because of a mental disorder, he is not capable at the present time
of objective, rational decisions regarding matters concerning his own defense or to
cooperate in such a manner that would minimize the possibility of punishment.
Id. at n.ll.
2334. A motion for a judicial determination of mental competency of the accused must set
forth the reasons or grounds for believing that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. § 4244
(1976).
Various evidence may be heard by the courts in determining possible incompetence. See
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Tillery v.
Eyman, 492 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1974) (emotional outburst in open court resulting in forcible
removal from courtroom); Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1972) (history of
antisocial behavior and treatment for mental illness).
2335. 690 F.2d at 713-14.
2336. Id. at 713. A § 4244 motion can be denied without a psychiatric examination "only if
the trial judge correctly determines that the motion is frivolous, is not in good faith or does not
set forth the grounds relied upon for believing that the accused may be incompetent." United
States v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968, 970 (9th Cir. 1971) (trial judge improperly denied § 4244 motion
when no suggestion of frivolity or bad faith appeared on record and counsel's statements adequately provided grounds for believing that accused was unable to assist in his defense because
"he in fact did not assist [his attorney] and. . . he positively appeared to [his attorney] to be
unable to do so"). The Bradshaw court distinguished Irvin, noting that unlike Bradshaw, no
frivolity had been demonstrated and the attorney's observations in Irvin had presented adequate grounds to support the § 4244 motion. 690 F.2d at 714.
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2. Relevancy
The basic test for the admission of evidence in a federal court is
relevancy. 2 337 Relevancy is the probative relationship between an item of
evidence and a fact sought to be proved in the case. 2338 Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 refers to this relationship as a tendency to make a consequential fact more or less probable. 2339 However, not all relevant evidence is admissible.2 34° Although relevant, evidence may be disallowed
because of its prejudicial impact, its tendency to confuse the issues or
mislead the jury, or because its presentation may cause undue delay,
waste of time, or a needless cumulative effect.2 34 1 The trial court is given

considerable discretion in determining relevancy, and its decision will be
overturned only for clear abuse of that discretion.23 42
a. links to the crime
Circumstantial evidence which tends to link the defendant to the
crime may be admitted as relevant.2 34 3 The defendant in United States v.
Abka, 2 34 was convicted on one count of air piracy in connection with
the hijacking of a commercial airplane from California to Cuba. A
United States passport bearing four Cuban immigration stamps was
found in the defendant's possession at the time of his arrest.2 345 On appeal, the defendant argued that the slight probative value of the stamps
was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. The district court had admitted the stamps as evidence that the passport was stamped in Cuba while
2337. FED. R. EVID. 402 states: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible."
2338. FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee note.
2339. FED. R. EVID. 401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
2340. FED. R. EvID. 402. See supra note 2337.
2341. FED. R. EVID. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
2342. See United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1476 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v.
Cox, 633 F.2d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1980)) ("On review, a district court's ruling to admit evidence
and determine relevancy should not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion"),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844 (1981)).
2343. United States v. Akbar, 698 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2433 (1983).
2344. Id.
2345. Id. at 379.
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in the defendant's possession.23 46 The Ninth Circuit found that the district court had not abused its discretion in admitting the stamps as relevant evidence. 2 347 The court also found that evidence of the defendant's
membership in the Black Muslims was relevant because, during the
flight, the hijacker had stated that he was "'one of Muhammed's.' "2348
While the defendant was not convicted on this evidence alone, the stamps
and statement were relevant as circumstantial evidence linking the defendant with the crime.23 49
b. element of charge
Some evidence may be relevant because it tends to prove an element
of the charge. In United States v. Miller,350 the defendant was convicted

of receiving stolen goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2315.2351 This
statute requires that the receiver of goods have knowledge that they were
stolen.2 35 2 The Miller court allowed the prosecution to introduce photographs of a trailer allegedly stolen by the defendant in order to show his
knowledge of its theft.235 3 The photographs had been taken by the victim
of the theft who had recognized his stolen trailer while visiting the defendant's property. Although the trailer had been modified somewhat, 2354 the victim recognized it because of its uniquely large size and
sturdy construction.2 35 5 The defendant protested admission of these
photographs as irrelevant under Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.2 35 6 However, the court found that the photographs showed
the alterations that had been made to the trailer since the theft, and such
alterations gave rise to an inference of knowledge by the defendant of its
235 7
theft.
Miller maintained that this evidence was highly prejudicial since
there was no indication in the record that he had made any of the altera2346.
2347.
2348.
2349.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2350. 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
2351. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1982) states in pertinent part: "[W]hoever receives. . . goods...
knowing the same to have been stolen. . . [s]hall be fined. . . or imprisoned. . . or both."
2352. Id.
2353. 688 F.2d at 661-62.
2354. The trailer was upside down, its axles had been removed, its tail end had been cut off,
and it had been painted. Id. at 655.
2355. Id.
2356. Id. at 662.
2357. Id. See generally United States v. Gibson, 625 F.2d 887, 888 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant's criminal behavior subsequent to alleged commission of crime admitted as evidence because conduct tended to present a whole picture indicating guilt).
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tions or placed the trailer on his property. 235 8 The court found this argument unconvincing, reasoning that the disappearance of the trailer along
with the evidence of the alterations permitted the jury to infer that Miller
knew that the trailer had been stolen.23 59
The defendant, in United States v. Palmer,2360 was convicted of obtaining cocaine by misrepresentation in violation of 21 U.S.C. section
843(a)(3). 236 1 As a practicing dentist, the defendant claimed that all the
cocaine he had purchased was used in his practice. In order to show
misrepresentation, an element of the charge, the government produced
evidence that the defendant had purchased large quantities of cocaine,
but that his records showed only six references to its use in the treatment
of patients. The defendant argued that evidence of his lack of compliance with state drug recordkeeping requirements was irrelevant and prejudicial.2 36 2 However, the court found that the failure to keep proper
records was relevant to the government's charge that the drugs were used
for personal consumption and concluded that any resulting prejudice implying that state regulations were violated was minimal.2 363
c.

impeachment

Evidence may be admitted because it is relevant to disprove a witness' statement. Impeachment evidence includes evidence which questions the accuracy of a witness' observation, his recollection, or the
truthfulness of his testimony.2 3 4
In United States v. Spet, 2365 a book about drug dealing written by
the defendant who had been charged with violating a federal narcotics
law2366 was admitted as evidence to impeach his father's testimony. During cross-examination, the defendant's father had denied stating that he
"'would not be surprised if [his son] had been arrested for drug dealing.' ,2367 He claimed that "he had no 'inkling or knowledge' that his
2358. 688 F.2d at 661.
2359. Id. at 661-62.
2360. 691 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1982).
2361. Id. at 922. 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) (1982) states in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally. . . to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled
substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge. .. .
2362. 691 F.2d at 923.
2363. Id.
2364. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 79 (1978).
2365. 721 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1983).
2366. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) proscribes conspiracy, or attempting to conspire to commit any
offense defined in the Controlled Substances Act.
2367. 721 F.2d at 1476.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

son knew anything about [drug] dealing."2 36 When the prosecutor had
asked him to identify the book and questioned him regarding its contents, the father stated "that he thought the book was about 'international skiing.' "2369 However, as the father had admitted substantial
familiarity with the general nature of the book, and because the district
judge pointed out that "'every few pages they talk about pot transactions,' "2370 the court ruled that the book was relevant to disprove the
father's statement regarding his lack of knowledge about his son's drug
1
dealing.

23 7

When the defense did not request limiting instructions to restrict the
use of the evidence solely to impeaching the father's testimony, as required by Rule 105,2372 the court found that the book was also relevant
to show the defendant's prior familiarity with drug dealings.23 73 In finding no abuse of discretion, the appellate court noted that the trial court
had found conclusive evidence of guilt based on other evidence and that
the book only had some significance to show the defendant's familiarity
with drug transactions.2 37 4
d.

rebuttal

The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Crenshaw, 237 5 held that evidence was relevant to rebut the prosecution's inference that one of the
defendants, Lehman, had planned the robbery of a small rural bank at
Belfair, Washington. 2376 Defendants Gordon and Crenshaw were
charged with bank robbery, while Lehman was charged with aiding and
abetting the robbery, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 2, 2113(a) and
2113(d). 2377 Evidence was offered to establish that Lehman had piloted
2368. Id.

2369. Id. at 1476 n.35.
2370. Id.

2371. Id. at 1476.
2372. FED. R. EVID. 105 requires that "[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one party
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted,
the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly."
2373. 721 F.2d at 1477.
2374. Id.

2375. 698 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1983).
2376. Id. at 1066.
2377. Id. at 1061 n.1. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1982) states in pertinent part: "Whoever enters
. . . any bank. . . with intent to commit. . . any felony affecting such bank. . . [s]hall be
fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1982) states in pertinent part:

"Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a)
and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use
of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined. . . or imprisoned. . . or both." 18 U.S.C.
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the getaway plane used in the robbery.2 37 In addition, the prosecution
had been allowed to introduce, under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, evidence of previous bank robberies committed by Lehman to
show a common plan or scheme.2 37 9 At trial, Lehman offered the affidavit of Danny Mack Martin who took credit for planning the robbery at
issue.2 38 0 The trial court excluded the affidavit as irrelevant. 238' Lehman
also offered evidence that Martin had robbed a bank in Silverdale, Washington, a few months before the Belfair robbery. Lehman intended to
show that Martin's modus operandi in the Silverdale robbery was evidence that he, not Lehman, had played the same role in the Belfair robbery. Lehman argued that this evidence should be admitted to rebut any
inferences produced by the admission of evidence of the three prior robberies by Lehman.2 38 2 The trial court denied the admission.2 38 3 Finally,
Crenshaw, as a witness for the defense, was not allowed to testify that
2 384
Martin planned the robbery.
The government argued that evidence of Martin's masterminding
was irrelevant because Lehman was charged with aiding and abetting
and not with planning the robbery, and even if relevant, the evidence
would confuse the issues and mislead the jury.2 385 The government further noted that the district court had concluded that the issue was not
whether the defendant planned the robbery, but whether or not he "flew
that airplane out of Kitsap County. ' 2386 The appellate court's response
was that the indictment did not specify how Lehman aided and abetted,
nor was the term "aiding and abetting" limited by instructions to the
jury.2 38 7 The court concluded that the jury could have reasonably in§ 2(a) (1982) states: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."
2378. 698 F.2d at 1065.
2379. Id. at 1064.
2380. Id. at 1064-65. The affidavit stated: "'Mr. Crenshaw and another man named
Gordon robbed the Belfair bank,' and to the 'best of my knowledge, Dennis Lehman had
nothing whatsoever to do with the Belfair bank robbery."' Id.
2381. Id. at 1065.
2382. Id. at 1065 n.5.
2383. Id. at 1065.
2384. Id. at 1064.
2385. Id. at 1066.
2386. Id. at 1065-66. The government argued that the evidence of the prior bank robberies
was introduced not to show that Lehman planned the robbery, but to show that Lehman's
manner of robbing banks was to pilot the getaway plane. Id. at 1065 n.7.
2387. Id. at 1065. The jury instructions were:
In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that the accused
willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal venture, and willfully participate in it as he would in something he wishes to bring about; that is to say, that he
willfully seek by some act or omission of his to make the criminal venture succeed.
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ferred from the evidence of Lehman's previous bank robberies, the argument of counsel, jury instructions, and comments of the trial judge, that
Lehman was guilty of aiding and abetting because he planned the robbery,2388 regardless of8
of whether or not he piloted the getaway plane.23 89
Had the government not presented its evidence in such a manner as to
give rise to this inference, the issue of who planned the robbery would
have been irrelevant.2 390 But once the inference was made, Lehman was
entitled to introduce evidence that Martin had planned the robbery.2 391
The court also took care to establish the distinction between evidence of
the prior robberies to show a "common plan ' 2392 and evidence to show
participation in the planning of the robbery at issue.239 3 The court implied that had the prosecution drawn such a distinction for the jury, the
district court's ruling that the proffered evidence was irrelevant might
have been affirmed.2 39 4
e.

existence of a scheme or conspiracy

A defendant's statement that "'[W]e don't have competitors. We
take care of them one way or another . . . . [W]e either burn them
2396
down or blow them up,' "2395 was admitted in United States v. Deluca
2397
because it was relevant to show participation in an alleged conspiracy.
The defendants were convicted of conspiracy and racketeering when
eight of the defendant's competitors in the auto parts trade were hit by
arson. 23 98 Co-defendant Lee challenged the admission of the statement
against him charging that it was only relevant to determine the object of
the conspiracy, 2 399 arson, which is proscribed by 18 U.S.C. section
844.2 0 The court rejected this argument and held that the statement
was "relevant to show agreement and participation or membership in the
Id. Th&court noted that this would include participation in the planning of the crime.
2388. Id.
2389. Id.
2390. Id. at 1066.
2391. Id. (citing United States v. Brannon, 616 F.2d 413, 418 (9th Cir.) (defendant entitled
to prove his innocence by showing that someone else committed the crime), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 908 (1980).
2392. Id. at 1065.
2393. Id.
2394. Id.

2395.
2396.
2397.
2398.
2399.
2400.
ciously

United States v. Deluca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1982).
United States v. Deluca, 692 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1280. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever malidamages or destroys . . . by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or
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In United States v. Gibson,24' 2 an action for fraud,2 4 °3 investors offered as testimony statements made by the defendant's employees concerning assurances, financing, and the projected rate of return on a
franchise investment. 24° The court allowed the statements, over a hearsay objection, because they were relevant to prove the existence of a
scheme and were not offered for their truthfulness. 24°s They were also
admitted to show the defendant's participation in, and intent regarding,
the scheme.24 6 The court held that the evidence, viewed in a light most
favorable to the government, 2407 demonstrated that the defendant authorized the making of the statements, 240 8 and thus, they were admissible
against him.240 9
f

motive

The full text of a cooperation agreement made by a government witness, Green, was admitted by the prosecution in United States v. Rohrer.2 4 10 Green had agreed to testify against Rohrer who was on trial for
possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute coother real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce... shall be imprisoned
S..

or fined ... or both..

2401. 692 F.2d at 1285.
2402. 690 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1046 (1983).
2403. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, & 2314 (1982) respectively prohibit mail fraud, wire fraud
and inducing people to travel in interstate commerce for purposes of fraud.
2404. 690 F.2d at 700.
2405. Id.
2406. Id. at 701-02. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on decisions made in the
Second, Fifth and Tenth Circuits regarding this issue of admissibility. In United States v.
AMREP Corp., 560 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978), statements
and representations made by salesmen trained and instructed by the corporate officers in the
furtherance of a fraudulent sales program were admissible against the officers even though the
salesmen themselves were not knowing participants of the scheme. Id. at 545. The Tenth
Circuit held that the conduct of the company was admissible to demonstrate a course of business to prove a plan or scheme to defraud. United States v. Krohn, 573 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 949 (1978). The Fifth Circuit also followed the Second Circuit's
reasoning in United States v. Toney, 605 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1090 (1980), where salesmen's statements were admissible to show a scheme to promote the
product in a certain manner. Id.
2407. 690 F.2d at 701 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) ("The verdict
of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.")).
2408. Id. at 701-02. While a corporate officer's conviction cannot properly be based on his
employees' statements without a showing of express or implied authorization, evidence that
the officer formed the sales strategy and instructed the employees and monitored their progress
implied sufficient authorization. Id. at 701.
2409. Id. at 702.
2410. 708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1983).
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caine 4 1 In exchange, Green's sentence, for conviction on drug charges,
was reduced. 412 The defense had attacked Green's credibility by exten-

sively questioning his motive for testifying for the state and by referring
to the agreement.24 1 3 The prosecution then introduced the cooperation
agreement to support Green's credibility. 41 4 On appeal, Rohrer accused
the government of impermissibly vouching for Green by referring to the
agreement.2 4 15 The court emphatically replied that the government had
"in no way put its prestige behind the witness. 2 4 16 Noting that the government was careful to request that the jury only look to the issue of
Green's motive, the court found, that without a doubt, the agreement
was relevant to the issue of Green's credibility,2 41 7 and that the government properly introduced the agreement as a factor bearing on Green's
24 18
credibility.
3.

Prejudice

Even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its prejudicial impact substantially exceeds its probative value. 2419 Thus, while evidence of
unquestioned relevance may be excluded in this manner, the trial judge is
given great deference regarding this decision. Appellate courts apply the
24 20
abuse of discretion standard on review.
In United States v. Crenshaw, 4 1" Crenshaw argued that evidence
which included a picture of the getaway plane, receipts for gasoline for
2411. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1982) states in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally-() to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance .
2412. 708 F.2d at 431.
2413. Id. at 433.
2414. Id.
2415. Id. at 432-33.
2416. Id. at 433.
2417. Id. See United States v. Rubier, 651 F.2d 628, 630 (9th Cir.) (government entitled to
have all terms of agreement on record after defense brought up subject of immunity-for-testimony agreement), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 875 (1981); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208,
1218-19 (9th Cir. 1982) (introduction of witness' plea agreement does not constitute government vouching when jury instructed that it was exclusive judge of credibility), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1206 (1983).
2418. 708 F.2d at 433. See United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1981)
(proper for prosecution to point to language of plea agreement regarding witness' motivation
when defense argued motivation of witness testifying under immunity), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
944 (1982).
2419. FED. R. EVID. 403.

2420. United States v. Crenshaw, 698 F.2d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 1983) ("'The judge's determination of this balance is given great deference and this court will reverse it only where there
is an abuse of discretion.'" (citations omitted)).
2421. Id.

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

the airplane, an FBI agent's statements regarding the arrest, and a letter
written by Crenshaw to co-defendant Lehman should have been excluded
because of its prejudicial effect.242 2 The court found no abuse of the trial
court's discretion.2 42 3 Defendant Gordon argued that prejudice resulting
from cumulative errors24 2 4 required a reversal even if the errors were
harmless when considered separately.24 25 The court applied the "more
harmless than not" standard in finding that even if considered cumulatively, Gordon was not significantly harmed by these purported errors.24 26 The court's decision was bolstered by the fact that Gordon's
fingerprints were found at the bank where the robbery occurred.24 2 7 In
light of the Ninth Circuit's holding that fingerprint evidence alone is
enough for conviction,2 42 8 the cumulative effect of the errors was not
consequential.
In United States v. Rohrer,2 42 9 where the credibility of the government witness, Green, was challenged, the district court refused to allow
expert witnesses to testify as to the effects of Green's drug use.2 430 The
appellate court found that there was no abuse of discretion in deciding
that the psychiatrists' testimony was highly prejudicial when weighed
against its probative value because one of the psychiatrists had never met
Green and the other had met him only once. 24 3 1 The issue here was the

witness' credibility rather than his competency.24 32 Although the issue
of witness credibility is a question for the jury, admission of expert testimony bearing on credibility is within the judge's discretion.24 33 The
2422. Id. at 1063 n.4.

2423. Id. at 1063-64.
2424. Id. at 1062. Purported errors were prosecutorial misconduct and tainted in-court
identification testimony.
2425. Id. at 1063.
2426. Id. at 1063-64. See United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 201 (1980) (conviction
should be affirmed if nonconstitutional error is more likely to be harmless than not), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (harmless error is "[a]ny error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights").
2427. 698 F.2d at 1064.
2428. Id. See United States v. Scott, 452 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1971) (fingerprints at scene of
crime together with fingerprints on stolen checks sufficient evidence to submit case to jury).
2429. 708 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1983).
2430. Id. at 434.
2431. Id. See United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1980) (expert testimony concerning effect of drugs on witness' perceptions based on hypothetical question rather than
examination excluded as mere hypothesis).
2432. 708 F.2d at 434. The court distinguished the issues of credibility and competency by
relying on United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), where psychiatric
evidence was admissible to show insanity of a government's witness. Green's sanity was not at
issue.
2433. 708 F.2d at 434 (citing United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 19810)).
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Ninth Circuit has held that such testimony by experts tends to usurp the
jury's function of determining guilt.2434 The court concluded that the
prejudicial impact of the psychiatrists' speculation on the effects of
Green's drug use outweighed its probative value.24 35
4.

Character evidence

Federal rule of Evidence 404(b) allows admission of evidence of
other crimes when it is relevant to prove intent, knowledge, plan, motive,
24 36
opportunity, preparation, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
These purposes are merely illustrative, and not exclusionary.24 37 In
keeping with the general rule excluding circumstantial use of character
evidence,2 4 38 Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts when offered to prove character by showing that subsequent conduct
was in conformity with it.2 4 39 The Ninth Circuit has "uniformly recognized that the rule is one of inclusion and that other acts evidence is
admissible whenever relevant to an issue other than the defendant's criminal propensity." 2" 0 In addition to establishing relevancy, the court
must also weigh the propensity of the evidence against its prejudicial
impact.24 4 '
a. relevancy
Although the general proposition is that all relevant evidence is admissible, 2 ' 2 the Federal Rules of Evidence provide some exceptions, specifically Rule 404(b).2 443 Therefore, even though evidence of other
crimes or wrongdoings may be relevant under Rules 401 and 402, its
admission will be denied under Rule 404(b) if its only relevance is to
2434. Id. at 434.
2435. Id. (citing United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2436. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
2437. United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (9th Cir. 1980).
2438. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee note.
2439. See supra note 2436.
2440. United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1982). See also United
States v. Rocha, 553 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United States v. Riggins, 539
F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977); 2 J.WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 404[08] (1981).
2441. United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1982). See infra note 2511.
2442. FED. R. EVID. 402 states in pertinent part: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided.., by these rles ...
2443. See supra note 2436.
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show that a party has a propensity to commit the crime in question.2 444
In order for character evidence to be admissible under this Rule, proof
must be offered that it is relevant for some other purpose. 244 5
The proponent carries the burden of showing how Rule 404(b) evidence is relevant.2 44 6 "[S]pecifically, it must articulate precisely the evidential hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be inferred from
the other acts evidence."'2 44 7 This burden of precise articulation proves
to be a light one, indeed, since the court generally will allow other crimes
evidence under its inclusionary rule whenever the prosecution can show
"at least some logical connection, however weak," between the evidence
and a central element of the case.2448
In United States v. Mehrmanesh, 44 9 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the district court convicting the defendant of importing heroin and attempting to possess heroin with intent to distribute, despite
charges by the defendant that the lower court had erred in admitting
evidence of his prior and subsequent crimes and wrongs.2 450 Government agents had monitored the delivery of a suitcase containing heroin to
Mehrmanesh's home and had found other drugs, drug paraphernalia,
and opium while searching the house.2451
At trial, the district court allowed the government to introduce four
categories of other acts evidence including (1) evidence of a prior hashish
smuggling incident for which the defendant had been convicted, (2) evidence of the defendant's use of narcotics, (3) evidence of his prior and
subsequent sales of narcotics, and (4) evidence of his possession of narcotics at the time of his arrest.2 452
The government introduced the evidence of a prior incident of hashish smuggling to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
2444. United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1982).
2445. Id.
2446. Id. (citing United States v. Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979)). In
United States v. Hernandez-Miranda, the Ninth Circuit stated:
When the Government offers evidence of prior or subsequent crimes or bad acts as
part of its case-in-chief, it has the burden of first establishing relevance of the evidence to prove a fact within one of the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule of
Rule 404(b) and thereafter of showing that the proper relevant evidence is more probative than it is prejudicial to the defendant.
601 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1979).
2447. United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1982).
2448. Id. at 831.
2449. 689 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1982).
2450. Id. at 825, 830.
2451. Id. at 826-27.
2452. Id. at 830-31.
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knowledge and absence of mistake or accident.24 53 However, the prosecution failed to identify which facts the evidence would tend to prove and
demonstrate why such facts could be inferred. Nevertheless, the court
allowed the smuggling incident evidence because it had some "logical
connection" to the defendant's knowledge of the contents of the suitcase.24 54 While the court seemed reluctant to allow evidence so weakly
connected, it supported its ruling by reasoning that since Mehrmanesh's
only defense was that he was unaware that there was cocaine in his suitcase, the prior smuggling incident was relevant to the issue of intent, a
central element of the case, because it tended to prove that he had knowledge of the contents of the suitcase.24 55 The court stated that, "[w]e cannot say that the logical inference . . . is completely lacking in this
24 56
case."
The Ninth Circuit failed to find any logical relationship between

Mehrmanesh's prior use of cocaine and his importation of drugs, other
than a general propensity to use drugs.24 57 The trial court allowed the

evidence of prior use of narcotics and, on appeal, the government argued
that the testimony was relevant to show intent, knowledge, motive, opportunity and absence of mistake or accident.24 58 Noting that the prosecution had failed to precisely articulate any connection between the
evidence and a consequential fact, the Ninth Circuit disallowed the evi-

dence because the only inference to be drawn was a likelihood that he
would import drugs since he had used them before. 245 9 The court stated:
"[T]his is precisely the inference we [condemn]. 24 6 °
In reviewing the trial court's error in admitting the evidence of prior
2453. Id.
2454. Id. at 831. Knowledge is one of the elements of the crime. Id. The court relied on
United States v. Sinn, 622 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.) (defendant's possession of cocaine five years
previously was relevant to issue of knowledge where sole question was one of intent on charge
of importing and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980)
and United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidence of prior charge of importing controlled substance and conviction for possession of controlled substance relevant to defendant's knowledge and intent when defense was lack of knowledge and innocent association
with wrongdoers).
2455. 689 F.2d at 831 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104, 1108-09
(9th Cir. 1979) ("the greater the similarity of the prior act to the present offense, the less
tenuous the logical inference that may be drawn regarding knowledge or intent")).
2456. 689 F.2d at 831.
2457. Id. at 831-32.
2458. Id. at 831.
2459. Id. at 831-32.
2460. Id. at 832 (citing United States v. Masters, 450 F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1971)). In
Masters, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of prior marijuana use in a charge of
aiding and abetting a marijuana smuggling scheme. The court stated: "We see little or no
significant relationship between isolated incidents of marijuana consumption and willingness to
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drug use for possible reversal, the court looked to whether this error affected a substantial right 4 61 and whether admission of the evidence was
more likely than not to be harmless.24 62 The court concluded that there
was little evidence of cocaine use, few references to the defendant's drug

use, and sufficient limiting instructions to the jury. 4 63 Because there was
also strong direct and circumstantial evidence against the defendant, the
court found64 the error of admission "more probably than not

harmless.

, 24

Testimony of Mehrmanesh's prior possession and numerous sales of

heroin and cocaine was also admitted by the trial court.24 65 The Ninth
Circuit agreed it was admissible stating that it has "consistently held that
evidence of a defendant's prior possession or sale of narcotics is relevant
under Rule 404(b) to issues of intent, knowledge, motive, opportunity,
and absence of mistake or accident in prosecutions for possession of, importation of, and intent to distribute narcotics. ' 24 66 Mehrmanesh possessed a large amount of drugs and sold them before and after his arrest,
and therefore, the jury could properly infer that he intended more than
mere personal use.2 467 Intent was a major issue, because Mehrmanesh
denied knowledge of the contents of the suitcase delivered to him and in
his possession. 2468 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of prior posengage in a smuggling conspiracy. On that theory, anyone who drank during the Prohibition
era should have been a rumrunning suspect." Masters, 450 F.2d at 867.
2461. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) states: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
2462. 689 F.2d at 832 (citing United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 1980)
("beyond a reasonable doubt" standard need not be applied to any determination of harmless
error resulting from admission of evidence that does not assume constitutional proportions)).
2463. 689 F.2d at 832.
2464. Id.
2465. Id. The evidence included large quantities of other drugs seized at his home at the
time of arrest. Id.
2466. Id. (citing United States v. Sinn, 622 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
843 (1980); United States v. Young, 573 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brown,
562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rocha, 553 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976)).
2467. 689 F.2d at 832.
2468. Id. See United States v. Sinn, 622 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir.) (evidence of prior cocaine
possession admissible on issue of knowledge when defendant denied knowing that cocaine was
in a camera case when he was arrested for possession with intent to distribute cocaine), cerL
denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980). Mehrmanesh relied on United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443 (9th
Cir. 1978), where evidence of defendant's prior marijuana trafficking conviction was ruled
inadmissible in a prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The court
noted that this reliance was misplaced, since intent was not an issue in Powell because the
defendant had denied any participation in the crime. 689 F.2d at 832.
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session and sales of narcotics.24 69
The Ninth Circuit again demonstrated its commitment to the inclusionary rule in United States v. Bradshaw,24 70 where evidence of drug use
and sexual relations with a nine year old boy, which was obviously prejudicial, was admitted as relevant against the defendant in a kidnapping
charge. The defendant had taken the victim from California to
Oklahoma, stopping along the way at motels where the defendant had
given the boy drugs and where the two had engaged in mutual sodomy
and oral copulation.24 71 On appeal, Bradshaw maintained that the evidence concerning sexual activity and drugs was irrelevant to the kidnapping charge.2 4a 2 The court found the evidence to be relevant for two
reasons. First, because Bradshaw argued that the victim consented to
the trip and therefore was not kidnapped, the evidence was relevant to
show Bradshaw's dominion over the victim. 2 4 73 This evidence directly
related to the issue of consent.2 4 7 4 Second, the evidence of sexual rela2 475
tions was also relevant to show Bradshaw's motive for taking the boy.
In answer to Bradshaw's contention that motive is not an element of a
kidnapping charge, 47 6 the court replied that although motive need not
be proved, it is relevant as evidence of the commission of any crime.24 77
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Gibson 24 78 that
evidence of sexual relations was relevant to show motive in a kidnapping
charge and to demonstrate the relationship between the defendant and
the victim to present a more complete picture. 47 9
Bradshaw also objected to evidence of sexual relations and drug use
prior to the kidnapping. 24 0 This activity was admitted as relevant to the
issue of consent, because the defendant's chief defense at trial was that
2469. 689 F.2d at 833.
2470. 690 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1982).
2471. Id. at 707.
2472. Id. at 708.
2473. Id. See Holden v. United States, 388 F.2d 240, 242 (1st Cir.) (evidence of rape admissible in kidnapping charge where defense was consent), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968).
2474. 690 F.2d at 708.
2475. Id.
2476. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries
away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a
minor by the parent thereof, when (1) the person is willfully transported in interstate
or foreign commerce;
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
2477. 690 F.2d at 708.
2478. 625 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1980).
2479. Id. at 888.
2480. 690 F.2d at 709.
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the boy had consented.24 8 1 The trial court noted the relevancy of the
evidence by observing that it would be difficult for the defendant to argue
that a relationship caused the boy to consent if there were no prior acts of
sexual gratification.24 82 In addition, since the defense counsel had
opened up this area on cross-examination, the Ninth Circuit found that
the trial court had not abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution
to ask questions concerning drug use and sexual activity prior to the
2 4 83
kidnapping.
United States v. Daly 2484 involved a car theft scheme in which expensive automobiles were stolen, their motor serial numbers were
changed, and counterfeit certificates of titles were prepared. The cars
were then taken to another state where new certificates were issued under
which the stolen cars were sold. Daly, who helped to sell the cars at his
lot, was convicted on a conspiracy count and on two counts of receiving
falsely made securities.24 85 Daly objected to testimony, admitted under
Rule 404(b), given by a co-defendant who claimed that she had received
a car from Daly's lot which she knew had been stolen. 4 86 Daly charged
that because the testimony referred to the co-defendant's acquisition of a
car not named in the conspiracy count and to the knowledge of the stolen
2 487
nature of cars named in other counts, the testimony was not relevant.
However, because the Ninth Circuit "'has adopted the position that
Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule,' "2488 the court admitted the testimony as circumstantial evidence of knowledge, namely that Daly knew
the cars he sold were stolen and that their title certificates were false.2 489
In deciding that the testimony was admissible, the court also noted that
th district judge had issued carefully worded limiting instructions directed to the issue of Daly's knowledge.2 49 °
2481. Id.
2482. Id. at 709 n.3.
2483. Id. at 709 n.4.
2484. 716 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1983).
2485. Id. at 1502-03. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States. . .in any manner or for any purpose, and
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined.

. .

or imprisoned.

. .

or both.

18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1982) states in pertinent part: "Whoever receives . . . falsely made...
securities . . . which constitute interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have
been so falsely made. . . [slhall be fined. . . or imprisoned. . . or both."
2486. 716 F.2d at 1510.
2487. Id.
2488. Id. (quoting United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 737 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,454 U.S.
970 (1981)).
2489. Id.
2490. Id. See infra notes 2556-58 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Crenshaw,2 49 the court held evidence of previous
crimes relevant under Rule 404(b). Evidence of three bank robberies
committed by the defendant was offered by the government, not to prove
the defendant's propensity to commit robberies, but to identify the defendant by showing that the conduct during prior robberies was uniquely
similar to the one at issue. 4ag The robberies were also introduced by the
government as evidence of a common plan or scheme under Rule
404(b). 49 3 Since the record indicated that the trial judge carefully examined each robbery for its similarities to the one at issue, the appellate
court concluded that the trial court properly allowed the evidence under
Rule 404(b) for the purposes articulated by the prosecution. 4 94
One aspect of relevancy considered by the Ninth Circuit is how
close in time another act is to the offense charged.24 95 Generally, evidence of a remote act is less relevant, since the logical relationship between the evidence and the ultimate proposition is more tenuous.
However, in United States v. Rohrer,24 96 the court admitted evidence
seized on November 2, 1981, fifteen months after the last offense charged
on one count and two and one-half years after the offenses charged in
another. 49 7 The defendant was convicted on several counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 4 98 The prosecution introduced a scale with traces of cocaine and
baggies as evidence of "other crimes" to corroborate a witness' testimony
2 49 9
that the defendant kept these items for use in distributing cocaine.
The defendant argued that his possession of these items was not close
enough in time to the conspiracy to be relevant. 25 °° The court admitted
the scale and baggies under Rule 404(b) as evidence of the continuation
of a conspiracy and proof of a plan or scheme, taking into consideration
that the items could have been recently acquired. 250 1 The government
2491. 698 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1983).
2492. Id. at 1064.
2493. Id. The court followed the standard set out in Parker v. United States, 400 F.2d 248
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1097 (1969), where the court held that "[p]roof of conduct similar to that charged, which is peculiar, unique, or bizarre, is admissible to tend to
prove identity. . . . Proof of other crimes has likewise been held admissible to show a common scheme, plan, design, [or] system." Id. at 252 (citations omitted).
2494. 698 F.2d at 1064.
2495. United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 725 F.2d 471, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting
United States v. Bronco, 597 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1979)).
2496. 708 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1983).
2497. Id. at 434-35.
2498. Id. at 431.
2499. Id. at 435.
2500. Id.
2501. Id. The court relied on United States v. Uriarte, 575 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978), where
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alleged that the conspiracy continued through "at least" 1980, and the
court held that the items found more than one year later were relevant to
prove that the plan existed. 2
The court in United States v. Lopez-Martinez 250 3 allowed evidence
of a statement the defendant had made about a prior marijuana offense
which occurred eight years prior to the heroin offense presently at
trial. 2 °" The defendant was charged with knowingly and intentionally
importing and possessing with intent to distribute heroin.250 5 He had
been arrested crossing the border from Mexico to Arizona while carrying
a package that contained about a pound and a half of heroin. After his
arrest, the defendant waived his Miranda rights and stated that he had
been paid $1000 to carry the small package. He denied knowledge of the
contents, but speculated that it might be marijuana.250 6 At trial, the
prosecutor introduced evidence of a statement the defendant had made
while under arrest in 1974 for possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute. He had stated to a DEA agent that he had been paid $1000 to
carry 680 pounds of marijuana from Mexico to Arizona.2 0 7 Here, the
defendant's only defense was that he thought he was carrying marijuana
rather than heroin when arrested. 250 8 The prior statement was relevant
to prove that he knew that he was not carrying a pound and a half of
marijuana for $1000 when he previously had been paid $1000 to carry
340 pounds of marijuana.2 50 9 Since both arrests were for possession with
intent to distribute, there was enough similarity, albeit different drugs, to
find the prior act relevant and admissible to prove knowledge and intent
under Rule 404(b).25 l0
b. Rule 403-probative value versus prejudicialimpact
Even if evidence under 404(b) is admissible for some relevant purevidence of a three year old prior arrest for possession of marijuana was allowed in an indictment for conspiracy to distribute drugs to show a continuation of the conspiracy and as proof
of a plan or scheme.
2502. 708 F.2d at 435.
2503. 725 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1984).
2504. Id. at 475.
2505. Id. at 471-72.
2506. Id. at 472.
2507. Id.
2508. Id. at 475.
2509. Id.
2510. Id. at 476-77 (citing United States v. Bronco, 597 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1979)).
See United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976) (evidence of other acts
admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove intent only if " '(I) the prior act is similar and close
enough in time to be relevant, (2) the evidence of the prior act is clear and convincing and
(3). . . the probative value of the evidence outweighs any potential prejudice.' ").

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

pose other than to prove character, it still may be excluded under Rule
403 if its undue prejudice outweighs its probative value.2 5 1 The Ninth

Circuit will review claims of prejudice under an abuse of discretion stan-

dard, z""2 as district courts have wide discretion in determining prejudice

under Rule 403.513 Even though more than "a 'mechanical recitation'
of the factors of probative value and prejudice"2 51 4 must be presented,
when "the district court [has] engaged in a Rule 403 balance, the de2 515
mands of that rule have been met. .
United States v. Bradshaw21 6 demonstrates the breadth of the dis-

trict court's discretion in ruling on the prejudicial effect of evidence. The
defendant, convicted of kidnapping, charged that the district court failed
to clearly articulate its balancing analysis under Rule 403 when it admit-

ted prejudicial evidence of sex and drug activity with a nine year old
boy.25 17 While a more clearly drawn statement of balancing probative

value against prejudice was desirable, lack of formal articulation did not

constitute reversible error.2 518 The appellate court found the requirements of Rule 403 satisfied when, taken as a whole, the record showed

that the trial judge did the necessary balancing before admitting prejudi-

cial evidence. 25 1 9 The court also noted that the evidence was directly
relevant to the issue of consent, the chief defense of the defendant.5 20
About four months later, the Ninth Circuit used the Bradshaw rea-

soning in affirming the district court's balancing prescribed by Rule 403
in United States v. Carruth.2 12 The defendant was indicted for tax fraud
in connection with the operation of limited partnership tax shelters
2511. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides in pertinent part: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
....
See also United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1982) (Rule 404(b) subject
to the balancing test of Rule 403) (citing United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3543 (1983)).
2512. United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844
(1981).
2513. United States v. Nadler, 698 F.2d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v.
Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2514. United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States
v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978)).
2515. United States v. Carruth, 699 F.2d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
698 (1984).
2516. 690 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3543 (1983).
2517. Id. at 708. See supra notes 2470-71 and accompanying text.
2518. 690 F.2d at 708-09 (quoting United States v. Potter, 616 F.2d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980).
2519. Id. at 709. See infra notes 2521-22 and accompanying text.
2520. 690 F.2d at 708. See supra notes 2474-83 and accompanying text.
2521. 699 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1983).
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formed for breeding non-existing cattle.2 52 2 He objected to the admission
of personal income tax returns under Rule 404(b). Although the defendant admitted having bank accounts in Mexico and Bermuda, he claimed
that these accounts were inactive.2 52 3 The prosecution had used the tax
returns which showed no foreign bank accounts to refresh the defendant's memory. 2524 Bank records were offered to show that hese accounts
were very active. Tax forms were offered to indicate an intent to defraud
and were also used for impeachment purposes.25 25 The defendant argued
that even if relevant, the evidence was prejudicial under Rule 403 and
that the district court erred by failing to enunciate its reasons for rejecting the defendant's prejudice objection. 2526 The Ninth Circuit again
held that the demands of the Rule were met because the record indicated
that the district court had engaged in a balancing analysis.2 527
The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court
in United States v. Ruster.2528 The district judge allowed evidence of several previous false claims and break-ins to be admitted under Rule 404(b)
to establish the guilt of the defendant, who was charged with filing applications for Supplemental Security income under false and fraudulent
names and social security numbers. 2529 The chief defense was insanity
and the sole issue was whether the defendant was sane at the time he
made the false claims. 2530 Although the court found the evidence to be
relevant to the issue of the defendant's mental state during the later offenses, the defendant claimed its probative value was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect under Rule 403.2531 The court noted that the trial
judge's balancing of the issue of admission of evidence in chambers was a
proper exercise of discretion in the matter.25 32 Ruster also argued that
each prior incident should be balanced separately to determine its preju2522. The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See supra note 2485.
2523. 699 F.2d at 1022.
2524. Id.

2525. Id.
2526. Id.

2527. Id. (citing United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978)).
2528. 712 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1983).

2529. Id. at 410-12. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever makes or
presents to any person. . . in the civil. . . service of the United States. . . any claim upon or
against the United States. . . knowing such claim to be false. . . shall be fined. . . or imprisoned. . . or both."
2530. 712 F.2d at 412.
2531. Id. at 411-12.
2532. Id. at 412 (quoting United States v. Ives, 609 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1979) (" 'When
insanity is presented as a defense, the trial judge should be free in his admission of all possibly
relevant evidence.' "), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980)).
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dicial effect. The court stated that in a case where there had been "numerous similar previous incidents," separate balancing was not
required.2 5 33 The court cited no cases to support its holding.
In reviewing the balancing conducted by the trial court, the Ninth
Circuit in recent cases has considered the effect of (a) overwhelming direct evidence,25 34 (b) cautionary instructions issued to the jury,2 53 5 and
(c) whether "other crimes" evidence stemmed from the same
transaction.2 53 6
In United States v. McCown, 2537 three defendants, McCown, Barnes,
Sr., and his son, Barnes, Jr., were convicted of offenses relating to conspiracy to distribute and distributing cocaine and firearms. 2 5 38 There had
been several meetings between the undercover agent and the defendants
between June 17, 1981 and October 9, 1981, when the cocaine transactions actually occurred. 2 539 The agent had testified that at one of these
meetings, in response to the agent's request to see some cocaine, McCown had responded by saying " '[w]e are not used to flashing it in public.' ,251 McCown claimed that the cumulative effect of this statement
and evidence regarding an earlier meeting between the agents, McCown
and Barnes, Jr., gave the impression that he was "'involved in all kinds
of nefarious and illegal transactions with other people outside of the offense charged.' ",254' The court concluded that not only was the evidence
relevant under Rule 404(b) to put the events of October 9th in context,2542 but also that the overwhelming evidence of the October 9th
transaction outweighed any prejudicial effect that may have occurred. 25 43
Specifically regarding the statement offered by the undercover agent,
the court noted that McCown had not objected to the admission at the
time of testimony, but had moved for a mistrial after the court had recessed for the day. 25 " The court found that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by deciding that the statement's effect was so minimal
2533. Id.
2534. United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983).
2535. Id. at 1453-54. See United States v. Nadler, 698 F.2d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 1983).
2536. United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441, 1454 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 659-60 (9th Cir. 1982).
2537. 711 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983).
2538. Id. at 1444-45.
2539. Id. at 1453.
2540. Id.
2541. Id.
2542. Id. See United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 84-88 (4th Cir. 1980) (evidence of prior
crime admissible where it furnished part of context of present crime).
2543. 711 F.2d at 1453.
2544. Id.
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that delivery of cautionary instructions would probably heighten the
prejudicial effect of a statement that the jury had largely ignored.2 54 5
Limiting instructions were given regarding several other statements referring generally to McCown's experience with other illegal activities.2 54 6
The court ruled that these statements were merely part of a "sales pitch"
on their promises to the
to demonstrate the defendants' ability to2 deliver
54 7
prejudicial.
unduly
not
were
agents and
The Ninth Circuit makes the assumption that juries follow admonitions and curative instructions.2 5 48 The force and delivery of the instruction is weighed against the prejudice generated by the evidence. 25 49 This
assumption is taken into consideration during the balancing procedure
under Rule 403.2550 In McCown, the district court instructed the jury
that evidence that Barnes, Sr. was smoking marijuana was to be discounted in determining guilt. 2551 The agent testified that he had seen
Barnes, Sr. smoking marijuana at a meeting and had speculated that it
was a means of "inspecting" the samples that Barnes, Sr. had received
earlier from the agent.255 2 The court noted that Barnes, Sr.'s own counsel had questioned the agent in great detail about the incident on crossexamination, thereby drawing the jury's attention to it.25 53 Additional
evidence had been introduced showing that Barnes, Sr. was anxious to
obtain samples of the marijuana he was to receive in the exchange. Thus,
the jury could infer that any method used to test the marijuana would
involve illegal conduct. 2554 The court did not rule on the admissibility of
the evidence under Rule 404(b), but found that the jury instructions were
sufficient to dispel any prejudice that the testimony might have
caused.2 555
At another point in the trial, the agent mentioned incidentally that
Barnes, Sr. had stated that he had been arrested.25 5 6 There was an immediate objection by the prosecutor, preventing the charge from being dis2545. Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 663 F.2d 824, 833 (9th Cir. 1981) ("failure to object
to exposure of defendant in manacles precludes reversal of court's denial of mistrial")).
2546. Id.

2547. Id. at 1453-54.
2548. United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3095
(1983).
2549. Id.
2550. Id.

2551. 711 F.2d at 1454.
2552. Id.
2553. Id.
2554. Id.
2555. Id. The jury was instructed to disregard any evidence that Barnes, Sr. may have been
smoking marijuana in determining his guilt or innocence.
2556. Id.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

closed to the jury. 25 57 The judge offered to give curative instructions, but

the defense did not request them.2558 The appellate court found that
under the circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial
2559
court in refusing to grant a mistrial.
The same conclusion was reached when Barnes, Jr. rejected the district court judge's offer to give a cautionary instruction when the prosecutor mentioned in his opening statement that Barnes, Jr. was facing
sentencing in another matter.25 60 The evidence of the pending sentence

was never presented because of a stipulation that Barnes, Jr. was under

indictment. 5 61 The court stated that the strong evidence against Barnes,
Jr. precluded a reversal based on the prosecutor's statement even if error

had occurred.2562
Testimony regarding a prior counterfeiting operation was admitted
in United States v. Nadler25 6 3 where the defendants were convicted of
conspiracy and on various counterfeiting charges. 25r The testimony was
offered under Rule 404(b) to prove the defendants' intent to commit
counterfeiting as well as their knowledge of the activity.2565 It was offered to show a common plan or scheme and to provide evidence regarding the background and development of the conspiracy.25 66 The
defendants contended that the testimony was inadmissible to prove intent
because lack of intent was not asserted. 2567 Nevertheless, the court ruled
in favor of the prosecutor and found that the evidence was admissible to
2557. Id. The prosecutor would have an interest in objecting to any inadmissible reference to
a prior conviction on which a reversal or mistrial could be based.
2558. Id.
2559. Id. See United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 712-13 (6th Cir. 1981) (where witness
referred to defendant as a "three-time loser," the trial court offered to give automatic cautionary instructions, but defense counsel declined; error in not giving curative instructions was
harmless where the reference was inadvertent, elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination, and the effect of the remark was mitigated by other evidence, including overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt). Cf United States v. Regner, 677 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir.) (district court not required to give limiting instructions to the jury unless requested by counsel and
such failure is not "plain error"), cert denied, 459 U.S. 911 (1982).
2560. 711 F.2d at 1454.
2561. Id.
2562. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 2534 & 2543.
2563. 698 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1983).
2564. Id. at 997. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982), supra note 2485; 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1982) which
states in pertinent part: "Whoever, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, forges, counterfeits,
or alters any obligation or other security of the United States, shall be fined. . . or imprisoned
or both"; and 18 U.S.C. § 474 (1982) which proscribes possessing, making, selling, or
printing plates or stones for counterfeiting obligations or securities.
2565. 698 F.2d at 1000.
2566. Id.
2567. d.
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show a common scheme or plan and to provide information concerning
the background and development of the conspiracy.25 68 Noting that any
possible prejudice was minimized by cautionary jury instructions concerning the testimony, the appellate court found no abuse of
discretion.2 6 9
When "other crimes" evidence stems from part of the same transaction, the Ninth Circuit has held that the evidence is admissible as direct
evidence of the crime charged, and not barred by Rule 404(b). 257 ° However, any "other crimes" evidence may be admitted under Rule 404(b)
for a relevant purpose, such as to establish identity, if it is not unduly
prejudicial.2 57 1
Recently, in United States v. Miller,2 572 where the defendant contended that "other crimes" evidence was prejudicial, the trial court denied a motion to preclude introduction of such evidence, on the grounds
that it was "part of the same transaction," even though not part of the
indictment.2 7 3 The issue was whether a trailer in the defendant's possession was the same one as that stolen from the victim. 2574 The "other
crimes" evidence pertained to conveyor belts allegedly stolen when the
trailer was taken, and was introduced to establish identity.2 57 5 While
noting that "[c]ompetent and relevant evidence of guilt is not inadmissible simply because it tends to show the commission of another offense, ' 2576 the appellate court reviewed the trial court's finding under the
standard of Rule 404(b) rather than as direct evidence of the crime
charged. 5 7 The evidence was of substantial probative value because it
tended to identify the stolen trailer in the defendant's possession.5 7 8 The
2568. Id. (citing United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 1976) (in prosecution
for conspiracy to traffic narcotics, trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony concerning defendants' prior drug dealings for purpose of showing background and development of conspiracy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977); United States v. Fassler, 434
F.2d 161, 162 (9th Cir. 1970) (evidence of other similar acts relevant to issue of whether there
was agreement or arrangement to smuggle marijuana), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1011 (1971)).
2569. Id.
2570. United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
2571. United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
2572. Id.
2573. Id. at 659.
2574. Id.
2575. Id.
2576. Id. The Miller court cited United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 1980) for
the proposition that "competent and relevant evidence of guilt is not inadmissible simply because it tends to show the commission of another offense." 688 F.2d at 659.
2577. 688 F.2d at 659.
2578. Id. See United States v. White, 645 F.2d 599, 602-03 (8th Cir.) (admission of dent
puller seized from residence of co-defendant together with testimony that dent puller can be
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risk that the jury would infer a propensity for committing the the crime
from the introduction of this evidence was much less than that of "other
crimes" evidence pertaining to separate criminal transactions because
2579
only one event was at issue.
In United States v. McCown,""8 ° McCown argued that evidence of
the events that constituted the charge of unlawfully possessing cocaine
with intent to distribute should not have been admitted in the trial on the
remaining counts of conspiracy, unlawful distribution of cocaine, and unlawful use of a communication facility." 1 However, the court ruled that
the evidence was probative of the conspiracy and the roles of the coconspirators.2 8 2
5.

Scope of examination

The trial court is generally vested with broad discretion in matters
concerning the examination of witnesses.2 5 8 3 The scope of matters that
may be inquired into on cross-examination is also subject to the court's
discretion and control.25 8 4 In a criminal case, however, the scope of
used to start stolen cars relevant under Rule 404(b) to complete story of bank robbery and
kidnapping for which defendant was on trial), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 943 (1981); United States
v. Gibson, 625 F.2d 887, 888 (9th Cir. 1980) (where defendant charged with kidnapping fled
with calculator belonging to victim, the evidence was admissible to connect defendant with car
used in kidnapping).
2579. 688 F.2d at 659. Cf United States v. Two Eagle, 633 F.2d 93, 96-97 (8th Cir. 1980)
("other crimes" evidence that was probative of identity held not to be unfairly prejudicial).
2580. 711 F.2d at 1454. See supra notes 2537-43 and accompanying text.
2581. 711 F.2d at 1454.
2582. Id. See United States v. Moreno-Nunez, 595 F.2d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 1979) (probative value of evidence concerning defendant's willingness to supply narcotics during negotiation with undercover agents to show background and development of conspiracy was not
outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice).
2583. FED. R. EVID. 611(a) provides in part that "[t]he court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses," The advisory committee explains
that "[s]pelling out detailed rules to govern the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence is neither desirable nor feasible. The ultimate responsibility for the effective working of the adversary system rests with the judge." FED. R. EVID. 611 (a) advisory
committee note. See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 611 [01],
at 611-13 (1978) ("[T"]he purpose of Rule 61 l(a) is to encourage flexibility in order to promote
the public's and parties' interest in the efficient ascertainment of truth without unnecessarily
sacrificing the dignity of the individual witness.").
2584. "Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise ofdiscretion,
permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination." FED, R. EVID. 611(b)
(emphasis added). See supra note 2583 for a discussion of the court's general discretion in
matters concerning the examination of witnesses. See also United States v. Miranda-Uriarte,
649 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1980);
and United States v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1976) for the proposition that the
extent of cross-examination is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.
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cross-examination reaches constitutional dimensions because of the defendant's right to confront his accusers.2 58 ' Although an accused's right
to cross-examine witnesses is conferred by the Constitution, the trial
court may limit the scope of cross-examination. Recent Ninth Circuit
decisions have considered the defendant's confrontation right in relation

to the trial court's discretion to limit the scope of this right.
The Ninth Circuit held that the scope of cross-examination was not
improperly restricted by the trial court in United States v. Bennett.258 6
Bennett was convicted on various criminal charges arising out of a plan
to defraud the government of CETA funds.2 5 8 7

Relying on the test enunciated in Chipman v. Mercer,5

ss

the Ninth

2585. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has
recognized that "the right of cross-examination. . . is implicit in the constitutional right of
confrontation." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). However, the Court qualified this language by further observing that "the right to confront and to cross-examine is not
absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the
criminal trial process." Id. at 295. Yet the Court cautioned that the "denial or significant
dimunition [of the right to confront and to cross-examine] calls into question the ultimate
'integrity of the fact-finding process' and requires that the competing interest be closely examined." Id. at 410. Chambers may thus be considered a benchmark against which limitations on the right to cross-examine should be measured.
2586. 702 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1983).
2587. Id. at 835. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), is "a federally funded grant-in-aid program to assist the unemployed through job creation. . . . CETA
funds are used to hire the unemployed in nearly any relevant capacity." A. SALTZSTEIN,
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND POLICYMAKING 71 (1979). Bennett, the secretary-treasurer of a
local labor union, fraudulently billed the CETA program for work that was never performed
by his accomplices. 702 F.2d at 835. The funds were then "kicked back to Bennett." Id. The
defendant further "misrepresented facts in order to collect salaries for four employees for work
in fact not performed." Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Bennett's convictions for conspiracy in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, for making false statements to the Department of Labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, for theft and embezzlement of CETA funds in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 665(a), and for filing false income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Id.
2588. 628 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1980). In Chipman, a state court refused to allow the defendant
in a burglary prosecution to cross-examine the state's sole eyewitness in order to expose the
witness' potential bias. Id. at 529-30. The defendant petitioned for and was granted a writ of
habeas corpus. Id. at 529. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that "the denial of cross-examination for bias or prejudice in this case violated the confrontation clause." Id. at 533. In so
holding, the court observed that "[wihen the cross-examination relates to impeachment evidence, the test as to whether the trial court's ruling violated the sixth amendment is 'whether
the jury had in its possession sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of
the witness.'" Id. at 530 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Bennett court did not explain whether the cross-examination inquiry at issue related
to impeachment evidence, and thus called for the "Chipman test" analysis. More importantly,
the Ninth Circuit failed to discuss the facts and circumstances of the examination process in
Bennett which justified the court's conclusion that the Chipman standards were met. Yet the
Ninth Circuit itself recognized in Chipman that "[c]onfrontation questions must be resolved on
a case-by-case basis based on examination of all circumstances and evidence." Id. (citing
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Circuit summarily concluded that the jury possessed adequate information to evaluate the motivations and biases of those witnesses which the

defendant claimed he was unable to fully cross-examine. 2 89 Hence, it
held that the defendant's sixth amendment confrontation right had not
been violated.25 9 °
In light of the Supreme Court's requirement that limitations on the
'25 9 1
scope of cross-examination in a criminal case be "closely examined,"
the Bennett decision is open to criticism. The Bennett court offered no
description as to what testimony was elicited and from whom in order to

explain what information the jury had in its possession. Thus in terms of
when and under what circumstances the trial court's control over the
defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses implicates the sixth amendment, the Bennett opinion is of little value.
In United States v. Goodheim,5 9 2 the Ninth Circuit held that the

government's inquiry into aliases used by a person whose surname the
defendant had assumed was relevant to prove the defendant's use of the

name as an alias.25 93 Goodheim, a convicted felon, was charged in part

with making a false statement in connection with the purchase of fire-

arms 2594 by using the name "Alexander Fischer" on forms he filled out to
acquire the firearms.2 595 While questioning Goodheim on direct exami-

nation, defense counsel asked him when he had begun using the name
"Alexander Fischer." 25 9 6 Counsel was apparently attempting to elicit
the defendant's state of mind concerning his use of the name.2 597 Goodheim's response indicated that he merely assumed the last name of his
United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976)) (emphasis added). Thus, it is arguable that the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Bennett constitutes an
abrupt break from its own precedent.
2589. 702 F.2d at 836.
2590. Id.
2591. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). See supra note 2586 and accompanying text.
2592. 686 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1982).
2593. Id. at 779.
2594. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1976) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful . . . for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of any firearm. . . from a. . . licensed dealer. . . knowingly to
make any false. . . oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any false, fictitious, or misrepresented identification intended or likely to deceive such . . . dealer
. . . with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale. ...
2595. 686 F.2d at 779. See also United States v. Goodheim, 651 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).
2596. 686 F.2d at 779.
2597. Id. The Goodheim court noted that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1976)
required proof of "the making of a false statement in connection with" the firearm's acquisition. Id. at 780 (emphasis added).
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best friend, Michael Fischer, "who was 'like a brother.' "2598
On appeal, Goodheim argued that the trial court had erred in permitting the government to cross-examine him concerning aliases used by
Michael Fischer because such testimony was irrelevant. 2 599 However,
the Ninth Circuit found the testimony was relevant to rebut Goodheim's
direct examination testimony. 26°° The court reasoned that since the government had demonstrated that both Michael Fischer and Goodheim
had used the "Fisher" surname and that the defendant had used the
name "Alexander Fisher",260 1 the testimony was relevant to show that
Michael Fischer had used the surnames interchangeably, and that Goodheim had assumed the surnames as aliases, not merely because Michael

was like a brother.

62

Accordingly, the court found that Goodheim's

argument was meritless or, at best, concluded that any error was
harmless. 2 6o
6.

Opinion

a. lay opinion testimony
Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence limits opinion testimony
by lay witnesses to inferences or opinions that are rationally based upon
the witness' perception2 " 4 and helpful to a clear understanding of the
2598. Id. at 779.
2599. Id.
2600. Id.
2601. Id.
2602. Id. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. In Goodheim, the existence of a false statement made in connection with the acquisition of firearms was an essential
element of the offense charged. The government contended that Goodheim knowingly made a
false statement by affixing the name "Alexander Fischer" to the firearms forms. The government attempted to establish on cross-examination that Goodheim assumed Fischer's surname
for the purpose of using aliases. Such evidence would have a reasonable tendency of making
the existence of the requisite false statement more probable than it would have been without
the testimony. This same cross-examination evidence tended to impeach Goodheim's prior
testimony. Cross-examination may extend to "matters affecting the credibility of the witness."
FED. R. EVID. 611(b). Furthermore, the test for the permissible scope of cross-examination is
simply whether the inquiry is "reasonably related to the issues [the defendant] puts in dispute
by his testimony on direct." United States v. Miranda-Uriarte, 649 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir.
1981). Since Goodheim's direct testimony implied that he used the Fischer surname because
Michael Fischer was his best friend and like a brother, there was a disputed issue as to whether
his use of Alexander Fischer on the firearms forms was indeed a false statement. The inquiry
was thus relevant both to refute Goodheim's claim that he assumed Fischer's surname because
he thought of him as a brother and to show that Goodheim's purpose was in fact to use an
alias or make a false statement.
2603. 686 F.2d at 779.
2604. Rule 701(a) expressly requires firsthand knowledge or observation of the event or mat-
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witness' testimony or the determination of a disputed fact.26 5 The limitations found in Rule 701 are aimed at accurately reproducing the event
for the trier of fact.260 6 However, the trial court has broad discretion to

determine whether a lay witness is qualified under Rule 701 to testify on
2 7

a matter of opinion.
In United States v. Barrett,260 8 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting lay opinion testimony by the defendant's girlfriend identifying him as the person in bank
surveillance photographs. 260 9 Barrett was convicted of robbing a federally insured savings and loan.2 610 Since the bank surveillance phototer in question. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee note. In addition, a lay witness cannot
"testify to [any] matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has
personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EVID. 602.
2605. FED. R. EVID. 701. Under the common law, the opinion rule simply provided that
"witnesses must generally state facts rather than opinions . . . . [However,] '[t]his statement
of the rule led to more than a hundred years of confusion' . . . [as] the American courts
attempted the impossible task of admitting 'facts' while prohibiting all 'inferences, conclusions,
or opinions.'" 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 701[01] at 701-4
(1982) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]. Thus, by merely requiring the lay witness' opinion to
be "helpful," Rule 701 is more liberal than the common law rule. See S. SALTZBURG & K.
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 701 at 445 (3d ed. 1982) ("Rule 701
marks a sharp departure in theory, if not in practice, from the common law."); J. COTCHET &
A. ELKIND, FEDERAL COURTROoM EVIDENCE ch. 7 at 107 (1983) ("This rule eliminates the
long standing, though often ignored, distinction between fact and opinion."); 3 WEINSTEIN
701[02] at 701-9 (1982) ("In abandoning the orthodox rule of exclusion for a discretionary rule
of admission, Rule 701 is in accord with the modem trend. '[T]he opinion rule today is not a
rule against opinions but a rule conditionally favoring them.' ").
2606. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee note. Professor Weinstein observes that the
rule "seeks to balance the need for relevant evidence against the danger of admitting unreliable
testimony. It recognizes that necessity and expedience may dictate receiving opinion evidence,
but that a factual account insofar as feasible may further the values of the adversary system."
3 WEINSTEIN 701[02] at 701-9 (1982).
2607. See United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871, 876 (9th Cir.) (no abuse of discretion in allowing a lay witness to state her opinion and understanding of a conversation with the defendant), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844 (1980); United States v. Brannon, 616 F.2d 413, 417 (9th Cir.)
(lay witness opinion testimony identifying defendant in bank surveillance photographs properly admitted under Rule 701 where identifications were sufficiently reliable), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Borrelli, 621 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir.) (admission of lay
opinion identification by the defendant's stepfather within the trial court's discretion), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); Unitec Corp. v. Beatty Safway Scaffold Co., 358 F.2d 470, 477-78
(9th Cir. 1966) (no abuse of discretion in district court's admission of opinion evidence on the
causes of negligent property damages).
2608. 703 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983).
2609. Id. at 1083.
2610. Id. at 1079. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) provides:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from
the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of value
belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any...
savings and loan association;. . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both.
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graphs showed a man with a full beard and mustache, while Barrett was
clean-shaven at trial, the bank robber's identity was the major issue.26 "
On appeal, Barrett challenged the admissibility of the testimony of
Barbara Lemon, his live-in girlfriend, which indicated that Barrett was
the person depicted in the bank surveillance photographs taken during
the robbery. 61 2 Barrett argued that Lemon's identification was unnecessary because the jury had been allowed to compare the bank surveillance
photographs with Barrett's in court appearance and with two separate
photographs of Barrett wearing a beard and mustache. 6 13 Thus, he reasoned, Lemon's lay opinion identification violated the opinion rule because it was not "helpful" to the determinaton of the robber's
identify. 6 14
The court, however, rejected Barrett's argument, reasoning that lay
opinion identification is considered helpful and therefore admissible
under Rule 701 if a defendant's appearance has changed significantly
since the commission of the crime. 61 5 Since Barrett had a mustache and
2611. 703 F.2d at 1079-80.
2612. Id. at 1085-86.
2613. Id. at 1086.
2614. Id. As discussed in note 2605 and the accompanying text, supra, lay opinion testimony
is permitted if it is "helpful to a clear understanding of [the witness'] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." FED. R. EVID. 701(b) (emphasis added). Although the defendant in
Barrettconstrued the opinion rule as excluding testimony unless it is 'helpful to. . .the determination of a fact in issue,'" 703 F.2d at 1086, the express language of Rule 701 also permits
the introduction of lay opinion testimony where the testimony is helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony. FED. R. EVID. 701(b). While the Barrett court did not need to
address this issue, it did note that Lemon testified that Barrett shaved his beard and mustache
on the day of the robbery. 703 F.2d at 1080. Therefore, the court could have permitted the
introduction of Lemon's lay opinion under the guise that it was helpful to a clear understanding of her other testimony.
Furthermore, the defendant in Barrett implicitly contended that "necessity" is a requirement for the introduction of lay opinion testimony by arguing that the evidence before the jury
obviated "any need for Lemon's lay-opinion identification." Id. at 1086. However, the advisory committee rejected Barrett's position by merely requiring testimony to be "helpful," noting that "necessity as a standard for permitting opinions and conclusions has proved too
elusive and too unadaptable to particular situations for purposes of satisfactory judicial administration." FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee note (citations omitted).
2615. 703 F.2d at 1086 (citing United States v. Borrelli, 621 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980)). Borrelli involved the admissibility of testimony by Borrelli's
stepfather concerning Borrelli's resemblance to the subject depicted in bank surveillance photographs taken during a bank robbery. United States v. Borrelli, 621 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980). The Borrelli court held that the trial cout did not
abuse its discretion by admitting the lay opinion identification into evidence. The court reasoned that Borrelli had significantly altered his appearance during the time between the robbery and the trial by "changing his hairstyle and growing a moustache, thereby making it
difficult for the jury to compare his appearance in court with the appearance of the man in the
bank surveillance photograph." Id. The court therefore found the opinion testimony helpful

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

full beard near the time of the robbery, yet was clean-shaven at the
trial, 26 16 the court found that Lemon's opinion testimony on the identifi-

cation issue was "helpful" as required by Rule 701.2617 The court accordingly held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Lemon's identification of Barrett.26 18
In United States v. Goodheim,2 61 9 the Ninth Circuit held that lay
opinion testimony identifying a picture of the defendant as the person

who committed a firearms violation was permissible as long as proper
safeguards and procedures were followed. 2620 Goodheim was convicted
of receipt and possession of firearms by a convicted felon, and of making
to the determination of the identity issue "[b]ecause Borrelli's stepfather was in a much better
position than the jury to give an opinion as to the resemblance between Borrelli at the approximate date of the robbery and the man in the surveillance photograph." Id.
Prior to Barrett, the Ninth Circuit considered the admissibility of lay opinion identification testimony in United States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1977). In Butcher, the court
held that opinion testimony by two police officers and the defendant's probation officer identifying the defendant as the person in bank surveillance photographs did not constitute prejudicial error. Id. at 670. The court found that the officers' testimony fell under Rule 701, since
"their opinions were rationally based on prior contacts and conversations with the defendant
and definitely pertained to the determination of the fact in issue." Id. at 669 (footnote omitted). Unlike the defendants in Barrettand Borrelli,however, the defendant's physical appearance at the time of the trial in Butcher was only "slightly different than his appearance at the
time of his arrest." Id. at 667 (emphasis added). The Butcher court nonetheless reasoned that
even if admission of the testimony erroneously invaded the province of the jury, the error was
not prejudicial because ample evidence in the record, aside from the testimony, supported the
defendant's conviction. Id, at 669-70.
Other Ninth Circuit decisions are consistent with the result reached in Barrett. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brannon, 616 F.2d 413 (9th Cir.) (lay witness opinion testimony identifying
defendant in bank surveillance photographs properly admitted under Rule 701 where identifications were sufficiently reliable), cert. denied,447 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Saniti, 604
F.2d 603 (9th Cir.) (roommates' opinion evidence identifying defendant as person in bank
surveillance photographs admissible), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979); United States v.
Young Buffalo, 591 F.2d 506 (9th Cir.) (lay opinion identification by defendant's wife and
parole officer admissible), cert denied, 441 U.S. 950 (1979).
2616. 703 F.2d at 1086.
2617. Id.
2618. Id. The Barrettcourt cited United States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1977)
for the principle that "the trial court's discretion to admit lay-opinion testimony under Rule
701 [will not be disturbed] absent clear abuse." 703 F.2d at 1086. See supra note 2615 for a
discussion of Butcher.
2619. 686 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1982).
2620. Id. at 779. The Goodheim court cited Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384
(1968) as authority for what constitutes proper procedural safeguards. Simmons involved a
situation where several witnesses made in court identifications which the defendant argued
stemmed from previous exposure to a suggestive photographic array. The Court held that the
due process test, when applied to a pretrial photographic identification, is whether the identification procedure "was so impermissively suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. at 384. In so holding, the Court found that the
identification procedures used in Simmons were not violative of due process because the photo-
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a false statement in connection with the receipt of a firearm.2 62 1 On appeal, the evidentiary dispute concerned the introduction of testimony by
the firearms dealer identifying a photograph of Goodheim as the person
who purchased or "received" the three weapons in issue.2 62 2 Goodheim
asserted that there was a "serious question" as to whether he was in fact
the person who received the firearms.26 2 Thus, he argued that the trial
court committed prejudicial error in allowing the photographic identification because the court neglected to take appropriate safeguards.2 62 4
graphic identifications were necessary (since the perpetrators of the crime were still at large)
and reliable. Id.
Similarly, the firearms dealer in Goodheim made a pretrial identification of Goodheim by
selecting a photograph of the defendant from a series of photographs shown to him by a government agent. 686 F.2d at 779. However, the Goodheim court did not discuss the necessity
or reliability of the dealer's pretrial photographic identification as required by Simmons.
Rather, it merely implied that the prior identification was reliable because the dealer never
wavered in his identification when the photospread identification testimony was offered to rebut defense counsel's suggestion that the government helped the gun dealer identify Goodheim. Id. at n.2.
2621. 686 F.2d at 779-80. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976) provides that a convicted felon
"who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce. . . any firearm shall be fined not more
than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person...
who has been convicted. . . of. . . a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year. . . to receive any firearm. . . which has been shipped or transported in interstate
. . . commerce."
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1976) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful . . . for any person in connection with the acquisition or
attempted acquisition of any firearm. . . from a. . . licensed dealer. . . knowingly
to make any false. . . oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any false,
fictitious, or misrepresented identification, intended or likely to deceive such...
dealer. . . with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale ....
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Goodheim's conviction on all counts.
2622. 686 F.2d at 778-79.
2623. Id. at 778. The Goodheim court found that on the record there was no "serious question" that the defendant was in fact the person who had received the weapons. Id. at 779 n.2.
The court observed that the dealer had identified Goodheim on direct examination "as the
person to whom he sold and delivered the firearms . . . [and that] he never wavered in his
identification." Id.
2624. Id. at 779. Goodheim asserted that permitting the dealer to render his opinion that the
person in the photograph was the same person to whom the weapons were sold constituted
reversible error because the court did not follow the standards set forth in United States v.
Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225 (1975). 686 F.2d at 779. Brown involved an expert witness' comparison of bank
surveillance photographs taken during a robbery with those taken of the defendants in custody. The Brown court held:
[W]hen a party seeks to introduce expert testimony on personal photographic identification. . . he should first be required to make an offer of proof to the court outside
the presence of the jury.
After the elicitation of what facts the expert has depended upon in reaching his
conclusions, the court should determine whether it has been convinced by a prepon-.
derance of the evidence that the facts offered are beyond the jury's common experi-
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Goodheim claimed that the trial court failed to comply with the
requirements set forth by the Ninth Circuit concerning the introduction
of opinion testimony on personal photographic identification. 2625 The
standards that he contended were applicable require the government to
make an offer of proof to the court outside the jury's presence, elicit the
facts on which the witness' opinion is based, and convince the court by a
preponderance of the evidence that such facts are beyond the jury's common experience, before the testimony is admitted. 6 26 However, the
court rejected Goodheim's claim. 62 7 The court reasoned that no error
was committed because the standards argued for by Goodheim apply
only to expert testimony and the firearms dealer had testified as a lay
witness, not as an expert.2 628
The decision in Goodheim may be criticized because the court failed
to analyze the reliability and necessity of the dealer's pretrial photographic identification. 6 29 On the other hand, because the dealer had
personal knowledge of the firearms transaction,2 6 30 the lay opinion identification testimony based on the photograph of Goodheim is arguably
analogous to the type of testimony in bank robbery cases permitting lay
witness identifications of persons depicted in bank surveillance photographs taken during a robbery. 2631 Accepting this analogy, the opinion
rendered in Goodheim would have been helpful to a determination that
the defendant was the individual who had received the firearms. This
analogy fails, however, when considered in light of the fact that the bank
surveillance photograph cases all involved situations where the defendant's appearance changed between the time of the crime and the time of
trial.26 32 There was no indication in Goodheim that the defendant's appearance at trial was any different than when he allegedly received the
firearms.
In United States v. Burnette,26 33 the Ninth Circuit held that it was
ence. . . tak[ing] into consideration that the party desiring admission may be free to
argue his position without the benefit of expert testimony.
501 F.2d at 149 (emphasis added).
Conversely, the Goodheim court correctly observed that because the firearms dealer was
not testifying as an expert, Brown was inapposite and the admissibility of the lay opinion testimony concerning the purchaser's identity was governed by Rule 701. 686 F.2d at 779.
2625. 686 F.2d at 778-79.
2626. Id. See supra note 2624.
2627. 686 F.2d at 779.
2628. Id.
2629. See supra note 2620 and accompanying text.
2630. FED. R. EVID. 701(a).
2631. See supra note 2615 and accompanying text.
2632. Id.
2633. 698 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2106 (1983).
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not an abuse of discretion to permit a police officer to render his opinion
that a bank robber's accomplice was removing a rear license plate from
the getaway car. Theresa Burnette was convicted as an accessory after
the fact 2 6 3 4 to an armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan.
The robbery was perpetrated by "a lone black gunman. ' 2635 An eyewitness informed the authorities that the gunman entered a "waiting automobile occupied by two other black persons., 2636 Descriptions of the
gunman, the getaway car, and its Nevada license plate number were
heard over a police radio broadcast by Sergeant Hallums of the Tucson
Police Department, who later spotted a Buick bearing Nevada license
plates outside a Tucson motel. 26 37 Hallums approached the scene and
observed a black female, subsequently identified as Theresa Burnette, by
the rear of the car, who appeared to be removing the license plate.263 8 A

later search of Theresa's motel room produced evidence of the robbery,

2 639
including two Nevada license plates with the reported license number
and two District of Columbia license plates. 2 "4 Theresa was arrested
near the car with two screws fitting the Buick's rear license plate bracket
and a key to the motel room in her possession. 2 " 1
On appeal, Theresa challenged the admission of Sergeant Hallums'
testimony that "in his opinion, Theresa was removing the rear license
plate from the blue and white Buick."'2 ' 2 The Ninth Circuit, however,
held that the district court's admission of the opinion testimony did not

2634. "Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed,
receives, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or
punishment [shall be guilty of an offense against the United States]." 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
The defendant was presumably "assisting the offender in order to. . .prevent his apprehension" pursuant to § 3 by removing the getaway vehicle's Nevada license plates bearing numbers known to the authorities, and replacing them with two District of Columbia license plates.
698 F.2d at 1051. The Ninth Circuit found that the defendant's contentions that the jury was
improperly instructed concerning the elements of the offense and that there was insufficient
evidence to support her conviction as an accessory after the fact to armed robbery without
merit. Id. at 1050.
2635. 698 F.2d at 1042.
2636. Id. at 1043.
2637. Id.
2638. Id.
2639. Id. at 1044.
2640. Id. at n.6.
2641. Id. at 1043. The court explained in a footnote that although the screws and motel
room key were "actually found under the rear seat of the police car used to transport Theresa
to the Tucson Police Station[,] [t]he officer's testimony at trial clearly established that only
Theresa could have secreted the key and screws under the seat." Id. at 1043 n.4.
2642. Id. at 1051. The Ninth Circuit noted that the defendant's pretrial motion to preclude
the opinion testimony was denied by the trial court. Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(6)(3).
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because Sergeant Hallums'

opinion was rationally based upon his personal perception and was helpful in determining the existence of a disputed fact.2 "

The Ninth Circuit

explained that the license plate was still affixed to the Buick when Sergeant Hallums arrived, Theresa was at the rear of the car apparently
holding a screwdriver, and the rear license plate was missing shortly

thereafter. 2 5 Alternatively, the court found that even if the trial court
erred in admitting Sergeant Hallums' opinion testimony instead of limiting his testimony to the underlying facts, the error was harmless.2 es 6
2643. 698 F.2d at 1051. The Burnette court cited United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844 (1981), and Unitec Corp. v. Beatty Safway Scaffold Co.,
358 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1966), for the abuse of discretion standard applicable to the admission
of opinion testimony. In Cox, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the trial court committed
error in admitting a lay witness' impression that the defendant, who was charged with possession of unregistered firearms (pipebombs), was involved in a bombing incident based solely
upon her opinion of what the defendant had meant in his conversation with her. 633 F.2d at
875-76. The court, nonetheless, found that there was no clear abuse of discretion, and that the
error committed was harmless. Id. at 876 (citing Unitec Corp. v. Beatty Safway Scaffold Co.,
358 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1966)). The court in Unitec Corp. found that it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to liberally admit opinion evidence on the causes of property
damage in a breach of contract and negligence action. 358 F.2d at 477-78. However, the
issues in Unitec Corp. were tried without a jury. Id. at 478. The Unitec Corp. court explained
that "[w]here the court is the sole trier of fact, there is even less reason to exclude [opinion
testimony]." Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that both Cox and Burnette were tried
before ajury, so that, arguably, the trial court had less discretion to admit the disputed opinion
testimony in those cases.
2644. 698 F.2d at 1051 (citing FED. R. EVID. 701 (opinion testimony by lay witnesses "is
limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact
in issue")).
2645. Id.
2646. Id.
The Burnette court explained that the "fact in issue"-Theresa's removal of the license
plate and hence her complicity in the robbery-was effectively put to rest even without the
disputed opinion testimony. Id. Her fingerprints were found on the license plate and in the
motel room, and two screws fitting the license plate bracket of the getaway car were on her
person at the time of her arrest. Id. The Burnette court, however, recognized that limiting
Hallums' testimony to the underlying facts "would have perhaps been better." Id. In this
regard, consider the Ninth Circuit's discussion of the rationale of the opinion rule and the
circumstances under which lay opinion testimony should and should not be admitted in
United States v. Skeet, 665 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1982):
Opinions of non-experts may be admitted where the facts could not otherwise be
adequately presented or described to the jury in such a way as to enable the jury to
form an opinion or reach an intelligent conclusion. If it is impossible or difficult to
reproduce the data observed by the witnesses, or the facts are difficult of explanation,
or complex, or are of a combination of circumstances and appearance which cannot
be adequately described and presented with the force and clearness as they appeared
to the witness, the witness may state his impressions and opinions based on what...
the witness has seen or heard. If thejury can be put into a position of equal vantage
with the witness for drawing the opinion, then the witness may not give an opinion.
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b.

expert opinion testimony

Expert testimony is permitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence
if it will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact at issue.2 6 4 7 A qualified expert 264 8 is not limited to testifying in the form of
an opinion, but may also give the trier of fact a dissertation or exposition
of relevant scientific or other principles to apply to the facts of a particular case.2649 The facts or other information upon which an expert may
base an opinion2 65 may be derived from three sources: (1) information
obtained by firsthand observation or examination, such as a treating physician's testimony about what his observations revealed; (2) information
presented at trial, such as an opinion in response to a hypothetical question; and (3) information or facts given to the expert out of court other
than that which the expert perceived.26 51 The Federal Rules of Evidence
expand the common law by permitting an expert to form an opinion
based upon facts or data, which themselves are inadmissible, if such in-

formation is "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions.

'26 52

Similarly, an expert may even render an opinion

Id. at 985 (emphasis added).
Under the facts in Burnette, a reasonable jury could have formed its own opinion or
reached an intelligent conclusion concerning Theresa Burnette's actions as observed by Sergeant Hallums. The court nevertheless found the officer's testimony helpful pursuant to FED.
R. EVID. 701(b). 698 F.2d at 1051. Accord United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329 (9th
Cir.), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982). In Fleishman, the court upheld the introduction of
opinion testimony by a government undercover agent that the defendant, in a prosecution for
drug-related offenses, "was a 'lookout' engaged in countersurveillance activity." Id. at 1333.
The agent had observed the defendant in a hotel lobby watching the elevators. Id. The court
found that regardless of whether the agent was testifying as a lay witness or as an expert, the
admission of the testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1335.
2647. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Conversely, expert opinion is inadmissible in
most common law jurisdictions unless the subject matter is beyond common knowledge and
understanding. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 702, at 451 (3d ed. 1982).
2648. An expert's qualification is a matter for the judge to decide pursuant to FED. R. EVID.
104(a), which provides in part that "[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
• ..witness.. . shall be determined by the court."
2649. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note.
2650. FED. R. EVID. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
2651. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee note.
2652. FED. R. EVID. 703. See, eg., Baumholser v. Amex Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550 (7th Cir.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

on an "ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 2' 65 3
In Barefoot v. Estelle,2 654 the Supreme Court held that it was not
unconstitutional for the State of Texas to introduce expert psychiatric
testimony at a sentencing hearing to assist the jury's determination of
whether the death penalty was required in a particular case. 26 5 Following a jury trial, Barefoot was convicted by a Texas court of the capital
murder of a policeman.2 656 Pursuant to Texas law, a separate hearing
was held before the same jury to determine whether the defendant should
be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.26 57 The statute authorized
the presentation of any constitutionally acquired evidence concerning
any matter which the court deemed relevant to sentencing.2 65 8 In addition, the state and the defendant were given the opportunity to argue for
or against the imposition of capital punishment. 26 9 The state presented
266 1
evidence of Barefoot's prior convictions 2660 and of his bad reputation.
The prosecution also called two psychiatrists as experts at the punishment hearing. 2662 In response to hypothetical questions, 2 663 both psychi1980) (statistics and opinion polls); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971)
(medical reports on defendant's sanity); Brown v. United States, 419 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1969)
(allowing medical experts to use medical treatises). The trial judge has discretion to determine
whether the facts could reasonably be relied upon by the expert. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
2653. FED. R. EvID. 704. "In many jurisdictions evidence in the form of an opinion is excluded if it purports to resolve the 'ultimate issue' to be decided by the trier of fact." S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 704, at 478 (3d ed.
1982). However, the basic approach to lay and expert opinions under the Federal Rules of
Evidence "is to admit them when helpful to the trier of fact. In order to render this approach
fully effective and to allay any doubt on the subject, the so-called 'ultimate issue' rule is specifically abolished by the instant rule (Rule 704)." FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee note.
2654. 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
2655. Id. at 3396.
2656. Id. at 3389.
2657. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981) provides in part:
(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall
be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted in the
trial court before the trial jury as soon as practicable.
2658. Id.
2659. Id.
2660. 103 S. Ct. at 3389. The prosecution established that the defendant had two prior drug
offense convictions and had been convicted twice for unlawful possession of firearms. Id. at
3406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2661. Id. at 3389. Several character witnesses from towns in five states were called by the
prosecution. "Without mentioning particular examples of Barefoot's conduct, these witnesses
testified that Barefoot's reputation for being a peaceable and law abiding citizen was bad in
their respective communities." Id. at 3407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2662. Id. at 3389. "In the presence of the jury, and over defense counsel's objection, each
was qualified as an expert psychiatrist witness." Id. at 3407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2663. Both psychiatrists were asked to assume as true about Barefoot the four prior convic-
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atrists testified that in their opinion Barefoot would probably commit
further violent acts and continue to endanger society. 26" The defendant
did not offer any expert testimony at the sentencing hearing, nor did he
introduce any evidence to rebut the psychiatric opinions given by the
state's experts.26 65
Texas law required the trial court to submit at least two special
questions to the jury after the evidence was presented: (1) whether the
defendant's actions causing the death were deliberately committed "with
the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another
would result;12 666 and (2) whether there was "a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society." 2667 The jury returned an affirmative answer to both statutory questions, a result which required the death penalty under Texas law.26 68
On certiorari from a denial of a stay of execution,2 66 9 the defendant
contended that the Court must vacate his death sentence because the
United States Constitution barred the state's use of psychiatric testimony
against him at the punishment hearing. 267 ° In an opinion written by
Justice White, the Court noted that there were three aspects to Barefoot's
claim: (1) psychiatrists were incompetent, both individually and as a
group, to predict with a satisfactory degree of reliability that a particular
offender will commit future crimes and thus continue to endanger society; (2) psychiatric testimony about future dangerousness based upon
hypothetical questions was, in any event, impermissible absent a personal
examination of the defendant; and (3) the use of hypothetical questions
tions for nonviolent offenses, the bad reputation for being law abiding in various communities,
an escape from a New Mexico jail introduced at the guilt phase of the trial for the limited
purpose of showing that Barefoot committed the crime in order to escape police custody, the
events surrounding the murder for which he was on trial and, in Doctor Grigson's case, a New
Mexico arrest on charges of statutory rape and unlawfully restraining a minor against the
child's will with intent to commit sexual penetration. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2664. Id.
2665. Id. at 3397 nn.5 & 7.
2666. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(1) (Vernon 1981).
2667. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981).

2668. 103 S. Ct. at 3389-90. If the jury finds that the state has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the answer to each issue submitted is "yes," then the death sentence is imposed.
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(c), (e) (Vernon 1981).

2669. Barefoot's petitions for habeas corpus relief were denied by the Texas state courts and
the federal district court. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit
denied a stay of execution pending appeal of the district court's judgment on the merits. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, treating Barefoot's application for a stay of execution as a

petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment. 103 S. Ct. at 3390-92.
2670. 103 S. Ct. at 3395.
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and psychiatric testimony in Barefoot's particular case was so unreliable
that the Court should vacate his sentence because it was imposed in violation of his right to due process of law. 26 71 The Court rejected each of
these claims.2672

The Court noted that a ruling which excluded entirely from all trials
psychiatric testimony about a defendant's future dangerousness would be
akin to "disinvent[ing] the wheel. ' 2673 Initially, such a ruling would be

contrary to the Court's own precedents which establish that it is constitutionally permissible to consider the probability of a defendant's future
dangerousness in imposing the death penalty.2 674 The Court reasoned

that because it was not impossible for lay persons to predict a criminal's
future dangerousness, 2 67 it made little sense to conclude that psychiatrists were so incapable of rendering an opinion on the issue that they
should not be permitted to testify.26 76
2671. Id. at 3395-96.
2672. Id. at 3396-400.
2673. Id. at 3396.
2674. Id. (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The Jurek
Court stated that a capital sentencing procedure which requires the jury to consider, inter alia,
the probability that a defendant will commit future violent acts and endanger society is constitutionally acceptable under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Although a determination
based upon predictions of future behavior may be difficult to make, it is not impossible. Thus,
the jury's task is
basically no different from the task performed countless times each day [by any sentencing authority which necessarily must foretell a criminal's likely future conduct
when it determines what sentence to impose]. What is essential is that the jury have
before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate
it must determine. Texas law clearly assures that all such evidence will be adduced.
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion). See also Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454, 473 (1981) (states are allowed in capital cases to prove a defendant's future dangerousness as required by statute; Jurek in no sense disapproved of "the use of psychiatric testimony bearing on the issue of future dangerousness").
In California v. Ramos, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457 (1983), the Court stated that a jury instruction in a capital sentencing procedure which informed the jury of the governor's power to
commute a life sentence without parole did not violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
By informing the jury that the defendant could possibly be returned to society, the instruction
merely required the jury's assessment of whether the defendant's probable future behavior
made it undesirable to permit him to return to society. The Court indicated that because the
instruction focused the jury's attention on the likelihood of the defendant's future dangerousness, Jurek was controlling. Id. at 3454. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (desirable to permit open and far-ranging argument which places all possible information before the jury).
The Barefoot Court observed that "[a]lthough there was only lay testimony with respect
to dangerousness in Jurek, there was no suggestion by the Court that the testimony of doctors
would be inadmissible. To the contrary, the Court said that the jury should be presented with
all of the relevant information." 103 S.Ct. at 3396.
2675. The Court was referring to the Jurek case, where only lay testimony concerning the
defendant's future dangerousness was presented. See supra note 2674.
2676. 103 S.Ct. at 3396. The Court noted that civil commitment similarly requires a finding
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Secondly, the Court pointed out that federal and state evidentiary
rules generally permit the admission of all relevant and unprivileged information.2 67 7 It is for the trier of fact to determine the weight of the
evidence presented, evidence which the defendant may rebut by crossexamination and by the introduction of contradictory evidence. Thus,
psychiatric opinion about an individual's future dangerousness could be
contradicted by evidence establishing that the opinion is incorrect or generally so unreliable that the fact finder should ignore it.2 678 The Court
reasoned that if jurors could decide about future dangerousness without
the aid of psychiatric testimony, they should be allowed to hear a state
psychiatrist's opinion on the issue along with the opinions of the defendant's experts.26 79
Finally, the Court was not persuaded by the views expressed in the
amicus brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association (APA).
Although the APA's view reflected Barefoot's position that such opinions are almost entirely unreliable,2 6 80 the Court was unwilling to con-

vert that conclusion into a constitutional prohibition against the use of an

entire class of expert testimony.2 68 1 The Court emphasized that profes-

sional doubts about the utility of psychiatric predictions could be called
that the individual involved is dangerous to himself and others. Predictions in commitment
hearings about an individual's future dangerousness routinely turn on the meaning of facts
interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists. The Court stated that acceptance of
Barefoot's claim would case doubt upon its approval of such predictions in civil commitments
and other contexts. Id. at 3396-97 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (The
factual issues in a commitment proceeding are only the beginning of the inquiry; "[w]hether
the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.")).
2677. Id. at 3397. "The [provision] that all relevant evidence is admissible, with certain
exceptions,. . . [is] 'a presupposition involved in the very conception of a rational system of
evidence.'" FED. R. EvID. 402 advisory committee note.
2678. 103 S. Ct. at 3397.
2679. Id. Barefoot did not offer any evidence at his trial to contradict the testimony of the
state's experts. Id. at n.5. Furthermore, the defendant could not claim that he was denied the
opportunity to present expert testimony at his trial because of his indigence. Under Texas law,
an indigent defendant is provided with a $500 payment for "'expenses incurred for purposes
of investigation and expert testimony.'" Id. (citing TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.05,
§ l(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982)).
2680. 103 S. Ct. at 3397. The Court noted that the APA's position that psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness is too unreliable to be used as evidence was
presented and rejected in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472-73 (1981). In Estelle, the Court
vacated the defendant's death sentence because he was not informed of his fifth amendment
right to remain silent, nor of his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel before a
pretrial psychiatric examination. Id. at 466-71. Nevertheless, the Court stated that its decision "in no sense disapprov[ed] the use of psychiatric testimony bearing on the issue of future
dangerousness." Id. at 473. See also supra note 2674.
2681. 103 S. Ct. at 3397. The Court stated:
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to the jury's attention by the opposing party. Therefore, the adversary

process provides the trier of fact with information from which it could
sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence on the issue of future
2 682
dangerousness.
The Court also held that psychiatric testimony on the issue of future
dangerousness need not be based on personal examination of the defendant, but could properly be given in response to hypothetical questions. 268 3 The Court reasoned that expert opinion is often admitted in
the form of a conclusion based on hypothetical questions. 26 4 Although
Barefoot's case involved the death penalty, the Court found no constitutional barrier to the application of the normal evidentiary rules controlling the use of expert testimony.2 68
The amicus does not suggest that there are not other views held by members of
the Association or of the profession generally. Indeed, as this case and others indicate, there are those doctors who are quite willing to testify at the sentencing hearing,
who think, and will say, that they know what they are talking about, and who expressly disagree with the Association's point of view. Furthermore, their qualifications as experts are regularly accepted by the courts. If they are so obviously wrong
and should be discredited, there should be no insuperable problem in doing so by
calling members of the Association who are of that view and who confidently assert
that opinion in their amicus brief.
Id. at 3397-98 (footnote omitted).
2682. Id.
2683. Id. at 3399.
2684. Id. (citing Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 657 (1878)).
2685. Id. at 3400. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert need not testify from
personal observation and may render an opinion in response to a hypothetical question. Moreover, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence if of a type reasonably relied upon by
other experts in the field. FED. R. EVID. 703 & advisory committee note. See also supra notes
2647-54 and accompanying text. In Barefoot, the state appellate court found that the trial
court had properly permitted the psychiatrists to testify on the basis of the hypothetical question discussed in note 2663, supra. The appellate court observed that "[t]he use of hypothetical
questions in the examination of expert witnesses is a well-established practice. 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TExAs EVIDENCE, § 1402 (2d ed. 1956). That the experts had not examined
appellant went to the weight of their testimony, not to its admissibility." Barefoot v. State, 596
S.W.2d 875, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). See also TEX.
EVID. RULES ANN. R. 36 (Vernon Supp. 1982), which provides: "On questions of science or
skill or trade, persons of skill or possessing peculiar knowledge in those departments are allowed to give their opinions in evidence." Under Texas law, an expert may base an opinion on
his own observation of facts, on an assumed state of facts which evidence tends to establish, on
competent evidence in the case, or partly on facts within his own knowledge and partly on
facts shown by other witnesses' testimony. Moore v. Grantham, 580 S.W.2d 142, 149 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 599 S.W.2d 287 (1980). The lower federal courts
similarly found no constitutional barrier to the use of hypothetical questions under Texas law.
Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3400.
In addition, the Supreme Court discussed the defendant's objections to the use of hypothetical questions contained in the comments to the Federal Rules of Evidence. For example,
FED. R. EVID. 705 provides that, subject to the court's discretion, an expert need not disclose
on direct examination the facts underlying his opinion or inference. However, the expert may
be required to state the data supporting his opinion on cross-examination. The advisory com-
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The Court likewise rejected Barefoot's claim that the use of hypothetical questions to predict future dangerousness in his particular case

violated his right to due process of law." 66 Barefoot claimed that the
psychiatrists should not have been allowed to render an opinion on the
ultimate question before the jury, 687 that the hypothetical questions alluded to disputed facts, 2 688 and that the responses to the questions were
so certain that they constituted assertions of fact rather than opinions.2 68 9 The Court, however, agreed with the lower courts and found no
constitutional
infirmity in the application of the state's evidentiary
0
rules.

26 9

Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion 2 69 1 in which he noted
that the psychiatric profession itself conceded that psychiatric predictions concerning future dangerousness are wrong more often than
not.2 692 He concluded that the Court's commitment to reliability in the
mittee note to Rule 705 indicates that "[tihe hypothetical question has been the target of a
great deal of criticism as encouraging partisan bias, affording an opportunity for summing up
in the middle of the case, and as complex and time consuming." Yet the Supreme Court found
that none of these caveats supported Barefoot's constitutional arguments. 103 S. Ct. at 3399.
2686. 103 S. Ct. at 3400.
2687. Id. The Texas appellate court stated that despite the "ultimate issue" rule, experts
could express opinions as to the probability of future violent acts because the terms
"probability," "criminal acts of violence," and "continuing threats to society" were undefined
by statute or case law. Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). Since the terms were words of ordinary meaning, the state court
concluded that "the testimony in question did not involve the application of a legal definition
or test." Id.
2688. 103 S. Ct. at 3400. In response, the Court suggested that "[n]othing prevented the
petitioner from propounding a hypothetical to the doctors based on his own version of the
facts. On cross-examination, both Drs. Holbrook and Grigson readily admitted that their
opinions might change if some of the assumptions in the State's hypothetical were not true."
Id. at n.10.
2689. Id. at 3400. The Court responded:
The more certain a State expert is about prediction, the easier it is for the defendant to impeach him. For example, in response to Dr. Grigson's assertion that he
was "100% sure" that an individual with the characteristics of the one in the hypothetical would commit acts of violence in the future, Dr. Fason testified at the habeas
hearing that if a doctor claimed to be 100% sure of something without examining the
patient, "we would kick him off the staff of the hospital for his arrogance.".
Similar testimony could have been presented at Barefoot's trial, but was not.
Id. at 3400 n.11.
2690. Id. at 3400. The Court stated that acceptance of Barefoot's position would effectively
overrule Jurek v. Texas, see supra note 2674. The Court, however, was "not inclined. . . to
overturn the decision in that case." 103 S. Ct. at 3400.
2691. 103 S. Ct. at 3406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in
parts I-IV of the dissenting opinion.
2692. Justice Blackmun wrote:
The American Psychiatric Association (APA), participating in this case as amicus curiae, informs us that "[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term
future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession." The
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death penalty arena 26 93 required that such highly prejudicial and nonprobative testimony "on the ultimate question
of life or death be ex2694
cluded from a capital sentencing hearing."

7.

Hearsay

a. admissions
Statements made, authorized, acquiesced in, or adopted by a partyopponent are not hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence if offered
against the party-opponent. Statements made by the opposing party's
agent or co-conspirator are similarly not hearsay.2 695 Such statements
are deemed "admissions" and are excluded from the hearsay rule as a
result of our adversary system rather than out of satisfaction that such
statements are trustworthy.

2 696

APA's best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term future violence
made by psychiatrists are wrong .. . [and] [t]he Court does not dispute this
proposition.
Id. at 3408 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
2693. Id. at 3410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (qualitative difference between death penalty and life imprisonment requires greater reliability in determination to impose the death sentence).
2694. 103 S.Ct. at 3413 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun made three points in
his dissent. First, he believed that psychiatric testimony is too unreliable to be allowed at a
capital hearing. Id. at 3408 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He noted that even the majority opinion admitted that such testimony increased the probability of the death sentence, but was
wrong two out of three times. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Second, Justice Blackmun did
not believe that the adversarial process could adequately protect defendants from inaccurate
opinions because experts themselves were incapable of distinguishing between valid and invalid
psychiatric opinions. Thus, he could not understand how jurors could be expected to make
such a distinction. Id. at 3413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He was also unconvinced that
cross-examination and the introduction of rebuttal evidence could adequately overcome the
prejudicial impact of misleading psychiatric testimony. Id. at 3414-16 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Finally, Justice Blackmun stated that neither Jurek v. Texas nor Estelle v. Smith supported the conclusion that expert psychiatric testimony is necessarily admissible on the issue of
a defendant's future dangerousness. Id. at 3416 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). He suggested that
since Jurek involved only lay opinion, the fact that the Jurek court did not disapprove of the
use of psychiatric testimony was irrelevant. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice
Blackmun noted that the Smith Court never reached the issue of the reliability of expert psychiatric testimony nor did it reject the APA's position in Barefoot. Id. at 3417 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
2695. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if. . .offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of
which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E)a statement by a
co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
2696. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note.
This notion, that it does not lie in the opponent's mouth to question the trustworthi-
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In United States v. Gibson,2 69 7 the Ninth Circuit held that out of
court statements made by the defendant's salesmen were admissible
against the defendant for the nonhearsay purpose of showing the existence of a scheme to defraud investors.2698 Gibson was convicted on sev-

eral counts of fraud surrounding his corporation's sale of franchise
distributorship rights and franchises to fast food restaurants.2 69 9
On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony of defrauded investors concerning statements made by the corporation's salesmen.27 °° The defendant claimed that the statements testified to by the investors were hearsay because the trial court failed to find
either that the defendant had authorized the statements270 1 or had been
present 270 2 when the statements were made.270 3 Gibson additionally alness of his own declarations, is an expression of feeling rather than logic but it is an
emotion so universal that it may stand for a reason. The feeling that one is entitled to
use the opponent's words is heightened by our contentious or adversary system of
litigation.
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 239, at 503 (1954).
2697. 690 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1046 (1983).
2698. Id. at 701-02.
2699. Id. at 699-700. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises ... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice
or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail
matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or
thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) proscribes the same offense through the use of the wires. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314 (1976) in relevant part provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transports or causes to be transported, or induces any
person to travel in, or to be transported in interstate commerce in the execution or
concealment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that person of money or property
having a value of $5,000 or more;
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
2700. 690 F.2d at 700.
2701. "A statement is not hearsay if.. .offered against a party and is.

.

.a statement by a

person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject." FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(C).
2702. "A statement is not hearsay if.

.

.offered against a party and is.

.

.a statement of

which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
Although the Gibson court noted that "a corporate officer [could not] be convicted on the basis
of the statement of any salesman [and that] the prosecution must show that the corporate
officer 'expressly or impliedly authorized or ratified' the representations," it held that he evidence showed that Gibson had "authorized and ratified the making of [the] statements" based
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leged that his confrontation rights were violated by the admission of the
hearsay statements. 2 7°4 However, the court rejected the defendant's
claims, holding that the statements were not hearsay2 70 5 and did not violate Gibson's rights under the confrontation clause.2 7 °6
The court reasoned that the purpose of the disputed testimony was
not to prove the truth of the statements related by the investors, but
rather to prove the fact that the statements had been made by the salesmen. That fact was relevant to establish the existence of a plan to defraud investors.2 70 7 In the alternative, the court explained that if the
statements were hearsay, they were nevertheless admissible under one of
two exceptions to the hearsay rule: (1) statements by an agent;270 8 or
(2) statements by a co-conspirator.2 70 9

In reaching its conclusion, the court surveyed recent decisions in
other circuits supporting its construction and interpretation of the hear-

say rule.2 710 However, the court's reliance on decisions from other cir-

upon the "scope of the.scheme [and] the facts and circumstances of the. . . case." 690 F.2d at
701-02. Accordingly, the salesmen's statements were also "admissible to show Gibson's participation in, and intent regarding, the scheme to defraud these investors." Id. at 701.
2703. 690 F.2d at 700.

2704. Id.
2705. "Hearsay" is any out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
2706. 690 F.2d at 701. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (defendant's confrontation
rights are potentially violated whenever hearsay evidence is admitted under the co-conspirator
exception). See also infra note 2742.
2707. 690 F.2d at 700.
2708. Id. at 701. A statement offered against a party is not hearsay if it is "a statement by his
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship." FED. R. EViD. 801(d)(2)(D).
2709. 690 F.2d at 701. A statement offered against a party is not hearsay if it is a "statement
by a co-conspirator of a party [made] during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). In light of the Gibson court's conclusion that the statements were
not hearsay, it was unnecessary for the court to discuss the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule since no conspiracy had been charged, On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has
held that the co-conspirator exception may be used even though no conspiracy is charged. See
United States v. Williams, 435 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1970) (in a prosecution for narcotics, concert
of action established by independent evidence).
2710. 690 F.2d at 700-01. In a mail fraud prosecution case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
admission of testimony concerning out of court statements made by the defendant's salesmen
to investors and prospective investors out of the defendant's presence. The court reasoned that
the statements "were not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Wholly to the
contrary, the Government sought to prove the statements were not true and were intended to
deceive and misrepresent. The statements were introduced to establish trend and common
conduct among salesmen." United States v. Toney, 605 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1090 (1980).
United States v. Krohn, 573 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 949 (1978),
involved a prosecution for mail fraud in which the alleged victims of the scheme testified about
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cuits was arguably unnecessary, because the Ninth Circuit has adopted
this line of reasoning in the past with respect to the admission of statements by a co-conspirator. 271 ' Thus, there was ample authority for the
Gibson court to allow the statements for the nonhearsay.purpose of establishing the existence of a scheme to defraud investors.27 12
b.

co-conspiratorexception

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence27 1 3 excludes
from the hearsay rule a co-conspirator's out of court statement offered
against another co-conspirator. 7 1 4 However, the exclusion is subject to
statements and representations made by participants in the scheme. Id. at 1386. In rejecting
the defendant's hearsay argument, the Tenth Circuit observed that:
The statements and representations complained of were not offered to prove the truth
of the matters stated, and indeed the Government says the statements were essentially untrue. Since the Government sought to prove the making of the statements
but not the truth of the matters asserted by them, there is no actual hearsay question.
Id. (citations omitted).
United States v. AMREP Corp., 560 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015
(1978), likewise involved a business fraud scheme. There, the Second Circuit held that "statements and representations made by the [corporation's] sales representatives in furtherance of
the scheme are admissible against the [defendant] officers" where there is evidence linking the
defendant officers to the scheme. 560 F.2d at 545 (citations omitted). However, the rationale
supporting the admissibility of the evidence in AMREP was that the statements were authorized admissions. Id.
Similarly, the Gibson court reasoned that the salesmen's statements were independently
admissible against the defendant as authorized admissions because the evidence indicated that
the defendant had authorized and ratified these statements. 690 F.2d at 701-02.
2711. See United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 967
(1976), where the court held that in determining the existence of a conspiracy the court may
consider statements made by a co-conspirator. See also United States v. Hatcher, 496 F.2d 529
(9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (statements may be admissible to show that they were made,
rather than for the truth of the matter asserted).
2712. The court recognized in a footnote that the truth or falsity of the. statements "was
important to the outcome of the case. However, the fact that the statements were made was
not used to prove the truth of the content of the statements. Instead, the government sought to
show their falsity [i.e., that they were fraudulent] through independent evidence." 690 F.2d at
700 n.1.
2713. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides: "A statement is not hearsay if. . . offered
against a party and is. . . a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy."
2714. See United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 1981). See also United States
v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978). The Weiner court
noted that, in the Ninth Circuit,
[t]he quantum of independent proof necessary for the application of the coconspirator hearsay exception is sufficient, substantial evidence to establish aprimafacie
case that the conspiracy existed and that the defendant was a part of it.
Once the existence of a conspiracy has been established, independent evidence is
necessary to show primafacie the defendant's connection with the conspiracy, even if
the connection is slight.
578 F.2d at 768-69 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted). Compare this less strin-
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the limitation that the proponent of the evidence first lay a foundation

establishing that: (1) the declaration was made in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the declaration was made during the conspiracy; (3) there is

independent proof of the existence of the conspiracy; and (4) there
is
2 7 15
independent proof of the defendant's connection with the conspiracy.

Recent Ninth Circuit decisions have considered both the sufficiency of
the foundational requirements and the extent to which co-conspirators'
statements themselves may be used as independent proof of the conspiracy's existence.
In United States v. Everett,271 6 the Ninth Circuit held that a hearsay
statement made by an indicted co-conspirator's agent is admissible under
the co-conspirator admission exception where the agent is "sufficiently
connected ' 27 17 to the conspiracy to qualify as an indicted cogent prima facie rule followed by the Ninth Circuit with the rule followed in a majority of the
circuits, which requires that the proponent persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the conspiracy existed. See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 136-37
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1891 (1983); James R. Snyder Co. v. Associated Gen.
Contractors, 677 F.2d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982); United States
v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 459-60 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032
(1980); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1328 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
905 (1980); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. James,
590 F.2d 575, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1970).
2715. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit has held that:
Once the existence of a conspiracy [has been] established only slight evidence is required to connect any given defendant with it. . . . [T]he "slight" evidence must be
of the quality which will reasonably support a conclusion that the particular defendant in question wilfully participated in the unlawful plan with the intent to further
some object or purpose of the conspiracy. A common purpose and plan need not be
proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from [circumstantial evidence].
United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 966 (1977). Freie involved a prosecution for conspiracy to possess marijuana with
intent to distribute. The court found that three of the defendants were sufficiently connected
to the conspiracy based upon direct and circumstantial evidence of their involvement in a
shoot-out with customs officers at an airstrip. However, the court held that a co-defendant
discovered 40 miles from the airstrip was not adequately connected. Cf. United States v.
Dunn, 564 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1977), where the court restated the "slight" evidence rule:
Once the evidence of a conspiracy is established, evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt a connection of a defendant with the conspiracy, even though the connection isslight, is sufficient to convict him with knowing participation in the
conspiracy. Thus, the word "slight" properly modifies "connection" and not "evidence." It is tied to that which is proved, not to the type of evidence or the burden of
proof.
Id. at 357 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
2716. 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) and cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1053 (1983).
2717. The "sufficiency" of the agents' connection to the conspiracy was not discussed in the
court's opinion. The court merely noted that the employee "was a target of investigation." Id.
at 601.
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conspirator.27 18
Defendants Everett and Chira were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States government by hindering and obstructing the

Internal Revenue Service in the collection of tax revenue.2 7 19 Their convictions arose from a scheme by which the defendants sold backdated tax
shelter investments through defendant Everett's firm, Intervest Associates, Inc. (Intervest). The sale of the backdated investments defrauded
the United States by allowing buyers to claim income tax deductions for
years prior to the year in which the investments actually occurred.2 72 °
Intervest was charged in the indictment as a co-conspirator. On

appeal, Chira challenged the admission of testimony related by a government witness 272 1 concerning an alleged telephone conversation between
an Intervest employee and Chira. The conversation tended to show
Chira's knowledge of the backdating scheme and his preparation of a
document relating to the transaction. Chira argued that the testimony
against him was inadmissible hearsay.2 72 2
However, the Ninth Circuit found that admission of the testimony
did not constitute reversible error under the co-conspirator admissions
2718. Id. "It is not necessary for a charge of conspiracy to have been brought in order for
coconspirator hearsay to become admissible." United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768 (9th
Cir. 1978) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1979).
2719. 692 F.2d at 598. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more five
years or both.
A jury found Chira and Everett guilty of defrauding the Treasury Department, a United States
agency, by impairing, impeding, and obstructing its lawful function of collecting tax revenue.
692 F.2d at 598.
2720. 692 F.2d at 598.
2721. The government's witness "was an Intervest employee who acted as a 'trustee' for
Intervest's clients in tax shelter transactions," and who "testified at trial in return for immunity." Id. at 598 n.2.
2722. Id. at 601. It is possible that the employee's declarations were independently admissible as circumstantial evidence of Chira's state of mind because the statements tended to show
that Chira, the listener, knew of the document tying the defendants to the illegal transaction.
When so construed, the evidence would be relevant to the issue of whether Chira intended to
defraud the United States. In fact, the Everett court explained that "[a] conspiracy to defraud
the United States . . . only requires an agreement to impede the government's lawful functions." Id. at 599. Thus, the court reasoned that "the jury could have inferred from the
evidence presented that Chira intended to agree with Everett and others to impede the collection of taxes." Id. at 601-02.
Similarly, the testimony concerning the substance of the telephone conversation may have
been relevant to impeach Chira by showing the existence of contradictory facts had he denied
knowledge and preparation of the document. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN607[05] at 607-50 (1978).
STEIN'S EVIDENCE
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exception. 7 2 3 The court adopted the trial court's rationale, noting that
the Intervest employee was acting as an agent of Intervest, an indicted
co-conspirator. 724 Furthermore, the court reasoned that since the Intervest employee was himself a target of the government's investigation of
the crime and "sufficiently connected" to the conspiracy, he qualified as
an unindicted co-conspirator whose statements were admissible for the
725
purpose of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
In any event, the court concluded that the government's witness had
provided sufficient direct testimony to show that Chira knew of and was
connected with the conspiracy. Therefore, even if the trial court erred in
726
admitting the. hearsay, the error was harmless. 2
In United States v. De Luca,27 27 the court held that an alleged conspirator's extrajudicial remark concerning the destruction of an auto
parts competitor was made in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit arson and extortion.? 7 28 The statement was therefore properly admitted
against a co-defendant in a prosecution arising from his attempt to control the rebuilt foreign auto parts market in Southern California.2 29
Defendant Kaye was the owner of a company which manufactured
rebuilt electric foreign auto parts. The court noted that he disliked competition.2 730 Between 1974 and 1980, eight of Kaye's competitors were
struck by arson. 273 1 Kaye and three co-defendants were subsequently
tried and convicted on counts of conspiracy, racketeering, extortion, and
the use of explosives, based upon acts of arson and threats to Kaye's
competitors.27 32
On appeal, the conspiracy count was reversed because of an errone2723. 692 F.2d at 601.
2724. Id. The court's reasoning is arguably inconsistent with Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The Advisory Committee cautions that the "limitation upon the admissibility of statements of coconspirators to those made 'during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy' is the accepted
pattern. While the broadened view of agency taken in item (iv) might suggest wider admissibility of statements of coconspirators, the agency theory is at best afiction and ought not to serve
as a basisfor admissibility beyond that already established." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note (emphasis added).
2725. 692 F.2d at 601. See supra note 2718 and accompanying text.
2726. 692 F.2d at 601.
2727. 692 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
2728. Id. at 1284.
2729. Id.
2730. Id. at 1280.
2731. Id.
2732. Id. Kaye and a co-conspirator were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which
makes it a crime to destroy a building with explosives. At the time DeLuca was heard, § 844(i)
did not include arson by fire as opposed to arson by explosives. Id. Therefore, the convictions
for violations of § 844(i) required reversal. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 371, discussed supra at note 2719,

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

ous jury instruction.2 73 3 However, the Ninth Circuit rejected Kay's contention that reversal of the conspiracy count precluded reliance on the
co-conspirator's hearsay remark as support for Kaye's other convictions.273 4 The court reasoned that since the evidence was sufficient to

establish a prima facie showing of a conspiracy as well as Kaye's connection with it, the co-conspirator hearsay was admissible despite the ultimate outcome on the conspiracy count.27 35
Alternatively, Kaye contended that the co-defendant's statement
was inadmissible against him because it was not made during the course
of or in furtherance of the conspiracy.27 36 The Ninth Circuit also repudiated his claim.2 7 37 The court admitted that the co-defendant's reference
to the fate of Kaye's competitors would not necessarily further the conspiracy's objectives.2 738 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the trial
is the general federal conspiracy statute. The conspiracy count also failed because the trial
court erred in giving a multiple-object conspiracy jury instruction. 692 F.2d at 1281.
Reversing the conspiracy conviction and the convictions under § 844(i) still had no effect
on the extortion and racketeering counts. Id. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) generally augments the federal conspiracy statute by prohibiting a pattern
of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). "Racketeering activity" includes
extortion under RICO. Id. at § 196 1(1). The DeLuca court reasoned that each fire formed the
basis for extortion by physical violence as defined by state law irrespective of the arson counts.
692 F.2d at 1281. The fires were further "charged as predicate offenses under state law for the
RICO count." Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 518 (West 1970) ("Extortion is the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent. . . induced by a wrongful use of force or fear").
2733. 692 F.2d at 1281.
2734. Id.
2735. Id. The DeLuca court cited United States v. Batimana, 623 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038 (1980), and United States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 685
F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1875 (1983), for this proposition. In
Batimana, the defendants in a prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin challenged their connection to the conspiracy rather than the conspiracy's existence. 623 F.2d at
1368. The Batimana court noted that in the Ninth Circuit, the trial judge may provisionally
admit out of court statements subject to later motions to strike. Id. at 1369 (citing United
States v. Vargas-Rios, 607 F.2d 831, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1979)). Notwithstanding this rule, the
Batimana court concluded that the evidence against the defendants was sufficient to meet the
prima facia showing irrespective of the challenged statements. Id. The DeLuca court likewise
found that a conspiracy had existed which "began with the first arson in 1973." 692 F.2d at
1284. Hence, the reversal of the conspiracy count because of the erroneous jury instruction
did not mean that the trial judge erred when he provisionally admitted the disputed statement
upon hearing sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie conspiracy and Kaye's connection to
it. Id. at 1281. However, the DeLuca court's use of Spawr Optical as authority for the principle that "co-conspirator hearsay [is] admissible notwithstanding the eventual result on the
conspiracy count" is misplaced. Id. The court in Spawr Optical affirmed the defendant's convictions of conspiracy to violate export laws. 685 F.2d at 1083.
2736. 692 F.2d at 1284. The disputed statement: "there is another competitor that's gone,"
was uttered by a co-defendant holding a lit match in Kaye's presence. Id.
2737. Id.
2738. Id. The DeLuca court cited United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir.
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judge could have found that the remark was threatening toward the listener, who subsequently went to work for one of Kaye's competitors.27 39
Furthermore, the court found that the statement was made "during
the course of the conspiracy. 1 27 ' The court reasoned that the statement
must have been uttered after 1973 and during the conspiracy's course
because the threatening remark clearly referred to the destruction' of
Kay's competitors by fire, and the speaker used the present tense.2 74 1
Finally, the court held that the statement manifested adequate signs
of reliability to meet the confrontation requirements of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the confrontation clause.274 2 The court explained that the
1981) (per curiam), for the proposition that not all co-conspirator statements are made in
furtherance of the conspiracy. In Fielding,the court reversed a conviction for conspiracy to
import marijuana. The Fieldingcourt found that hearsay statements spoken by Fielding's codefendants about general business dealings with Fielding were made to impress an undercover
officer to enter into a new deal without Fielding. Therefore, the statements were not made "in
furtherance of" the conspiracy to import marijuana and were improperly admitted at trial. Id.
at 725-28.
2739. 692 F.2d at 1284.
2740. Id. The court observed that "[tihe conspiracy began with the first arson in 1973." Id.
2741. Id. See supra note 2736.
2742. Id. The confrontation cause, discussed infra at notes 2845-46 and accompanying text,
provides that "[ifn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONs'r. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has
warned that a defendant's confrontation rights are potentially violated whenever hearsay evidence is admitted under the co-conspirator exception. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86-89
(1970). The problem in terms of confrontation clause analysis stems from the declarant's assertion of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimimation. The declarant co-conspirator
is thereby made unavailable for cross-examination, which constitutes "the principal means by
which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested." Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). To reconcile these two seemingly inconsistent constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has developed a two-prong test to determine when an accused's
rights under the confrontation clause are violated by the admission of hearsay evidence. In
order to comport with the substance of the confrontation clause, the government must prove
that the hearsay evidence is both necessary and reliable. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-66
(1980). The necessity requirement is satisfied where the prosecution shows that the declarant
is unavailable. Id. at 65. The fulfillment of this requirement is a relatively simple task where
the declarant invokes the fifth amendment. A declarant is "unavail[able] as a witness" when
he is "exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning
the subject matter of his statement." FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1).
The prosecution can satisfy the reliability requirement by demonstrating that the evidence
is "trustworthy." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). In addition, the Ninth Circuit
has recently held that "the relevant factors for testing the reliability of coconspirator's statements suggested in Dutton v. Evans . . . are still to be considered in this circuit for judging
whether a defendant's confrontation rights were violated by the admission of coconspirator
statements against him." United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982); see also United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 660-61 (9th Cir.
1981). The Fleishman court observed:
The four reliability factors discussed in Dutton and Perez are: (1) whether the decla-
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"reliability" requirement was satisfied because the declarant's statement
was spontaneous, 743 against his penal interest, 2 7" and within his per-

sonal knowledge. 2745 Accordingly, the court held that the statement was
admissible against Kaye.2 74 6
In United States v. Gee,2747 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the trial court had committed reversible error by admitting alleged coconspirators' out of court statements which were made before independ-

ent evidence could establish the defendant's participation in an alleged
conspiracy to distribute cocaine.2 74 8
The defendant was prosecuted for conspiracy alone.2 74 9 The court
noted that the government's only evidence against Gee was the testimony
of an undercover agent and two tape-recorded conversations involving
Gee, his alleged co-conspirators, and the undercover agent.2 7 50
The Gee court recognized the Ninth Circuit rule which provides
that an alleged co-conspirator's statements, made before the defendant's
involvement in the conspiracy can be independently shown, are not adration contained assertions of past fact; (2) whether the declarant had personal
knowledge of the identity and role of the participants in the crime; (3) whether it was
possible that the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection; and (4) whether the
circumstances under which the statements were made provided reason to believe that
the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime.
684 F.2d at 1339 (citing Perez, 658 F.2d at 661).
2743. 692 F.2d at 1284. This fact established factors one and three of the Dutton test. See
supra note 2742. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) and (2).
2744. 692 F.2d at 1284. This fact arguably satisfied the fourth prong of the Dutton test. See
supra note 2742. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
2745. 692 F.2d at 1284. The DeLuca court did not elaborate on its finding that the declarant's statement was within his personal knowledge. If the court meant that the declarant's
remark indicated personal knowledge of Kaye's identity and participation in the crime, then
the second factor of the Dutton test was satisfied. Since Kaye was present when the remark
was made, it is reasonable to infer this interpretation. On the other hand, it is of little consequence if the court meant something else because the court correctly cites United States v.
Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1339-40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,459 U.S. 1044 (1982), for the principle that "not all [of] Dutton's reliability factors [are] necessary for admission of declarations." 692 F.2d at 1285.
2746. 692 F.2d at 1284.
2747. 695 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1983).
2748. Id. at 1166.
2749. Id. The defendant was prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), which makes it
unlawful for any person to intentionally or knowingly distribute a controlled substance or to
possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976), which
provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum
punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt
or conspiracy." The Ninth Circuit affirmed Gee's conviction for conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation of § 846, 695 F.2d at 1170.
2750. 695 F.2d at 1170.
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missible to show the defendant's participation. 2751 The court conceded
that the statements were made before independent evidence had established Gee as a participant in the conspiracy; nevertheless the court concluded that the admission of the statements resulted in harmless error
because evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming.2 75 2
In light of the Ninth Circuit rule prohibiting the admission of coconspirator statements against the defendant, made prior to the defendant's participation in the conspiracy, 275 3 the Gee court's holding is ques-

tionable. The government's evidence against Gee consisted primarily of
hearsay. 27 4 Furthermore, many of the tape-recorded conversations between the undercover agent and Gee were unintelligible.2 75 5
Therefore, if the Ninth Circuit rule is taken literally, 275 6 it is arguable that the Gee court should have reversed Gee's conviction. The Ninth
Circuit conceded that the trial judge admitted co-conspirator statements
2751. Id. at 1169. The Gee court cited United States v. Williams, 668 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir.
1982) and United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1979) as authority for this rule. In
Williams, the court reversed Williams' conviction for conspiring to collect a debt by extortionate means. The trial judge made no initial determination concerning whether the alleged coconspirator's statement had been made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, although
it was brought to the judge's attention by the defense counsel. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
held that the hearsay statement made by the defendant's alleged co-conspirator had been improperly admitted. 668 F.2d at 1070. Eubanks involved a prosecution for conspiracy to distribute heroin and to possess heroin with intent to distribute. Again, the court reversed the
defendant's conviction because the trial judge failed to determine whether the foundational
requirements for the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule had been satisfied. 591 F.2d
at 521. On review, the court held that the incriminating statements "were inadmissible hearsay because they were not made in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy." Id. at 519.
2752. 695 F.2d at 1169.
2753. See supra note 2751 and accompanying text.
2754. Hearsay evidence is any "statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
FED. R. EVID. 801(c). The evidence at issue in Gee consisted mainly of two tape-recorded
conversations involving Gee, his alleged co-conspirators, and the undercover agent, as well as
the undercover agent's testimony at trial relating to the out of court conversations. 695 F.2d at
1166. Of course, the trial judge has the responsibility to determine whether a sufficient foundation has been established for declarations to be admissible under the co-conspirator exception.
United States v. Miranda-Uriarte, 649 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, the order of proof is within the sound discretion of a trial judge, who may admit
co-conspirators' statements conditionally subject to a later motion to strike. Id. at 1349 (hearsay statements made before independent evidence established that a conspiracy existed were
improperly admitted, but the error was harmless because the declarations were merely cumulative and evidence of the defendant's participation in the conspiracy was overwhelming).
Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the trial judge in Gee heard sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie showing of a conspiracy before the disputed testimony was introduced. The
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that there was overwhelming evidence of Gee's guilt without elucidation. 695 F.2d at 1169.
2755. 695 F.2d at 1170 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
2756. See supra notes 2751 & 2753 and accompanying text.
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uttered before independent evidence had established Gee as a participant
in the conspiracy charged.2 75 7 On the other hand, a reversal may have

been inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's position that all the proponent
needs to show and the judge needs to find to admit a co-conspirator's
statements is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that a conspiracy
275 8
existed.
In United States v. Tamura,2 759 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting certain
telex messages implicating the defendant in a bribery scheme.27 60

Tamura was the manager of a Los Angeles based corporation which imported telephone cables manufactured by its parent corporation in Japan.
He was convicted on several counts of bribery, mail and wire fraud, conspiracy, racketeering, and Travel Act violations arising from a scheme to
rig the bidding for supplying telephone cable to the City of Anchorage,

Alaska.2 76 ' By bribing a city engineer to tell the defendant's company
2757. 695 F.2d at 1169.
2758. See supra notes 2713-14.
2759. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
2760. Id. at 594.

2761. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976) provides:
Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of
value to any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official, or
offers or promises any public official, or person selected to be a public official ....

isihalil be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary equivalent [of
the thing offered] . . . or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1343 (1976) generally proscribe the use of the mail, wire, radio, or
television for the purpose of conducting, promoting, or carrying on a device or scheme to
defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, and impose a penalty for violation of not more than a $1,000 fine, five
years imprisonment, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1) [or] (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means. . . (2) extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United
States.
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which kinds of cable the city did not intend to purchase, the company
would bid artificially low on the "non-buy items" and thus be awarded

the contract even though the company was not the lowest bidder on the
cables actually purchased.2 7 62
The defendant's company communicated with its headquarters and
subsidiaries through a corporate telex network. Telex messages indicating Tamura's participation in the scheme were offered into evidence at
trial over Tamura's objection that the telex messages constituted inadmissible hearsay. On appeal, the defendant's principal argument against

admissibility was that the telex messages did not come within the business records exception.2 7 63

The Ninth Circuit, however, did not address the business records
exception issue because it found other grounds sufficient to warrant admission of the telex messages.2 76 4 The court first observed that the telex
messages authored by the defendant were properly received as admissions.276 5 The court then discussed the trial court's conclusion that some
of the telex messages were independently admissible as co-conspirator
statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Since Tamura's basic
challenge on appeal concerned the admissibility of the telex messages

under the business records exception, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that he
had waived any objection to those telex messages admitted under the coconspirator exception.2 76 6
2762. 694 F.2d at 594.
2763. Id. at 597-98. The business records exception to the hearsay rule provides:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness [is not excluded by the hearsay
rule] unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
2764. 694 F.2d at 598. The court pointed out that the trial court admitted the telex messages
"on three alternative grounds: (I) they fell within the business records exception to the hearsay rule; (2) they were admissible as co-conspirator statements . . . and (3) they were not
hearsay because they were not used to assert the truth of their contents." Id. at 597-98.
2765. Id. "A statement is not hearsay if. . .offered against a party and is . . .his own
statement, in either his individual or representative capacity." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(A).
See also United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Defendant's own statements are admissions wholly apart from the coconspirator exception and as such are admissible as nonhearsay").
2766. 694 F.2d at 598. "A statement is not hearsay if.. .offered against a party and is. ..
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The waiver rule dictates that a defendant make "known to
the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

Finally, the court held that the remaining telex messages were admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of refuting Tamura's assertion that
he was unaware of the bribery scheme and was merely following orders.2 767 The court implied that the telex messages were relevant as circumstantial evidence of Tamura's knowledge of the bribery scheme.2 76 8
The court reasoned that since "the only manner in which the telexes
could have prejudiced [Tamura] was their use for the non-hearsay purpose of showing his knowledge of the scheme," the trial court had not
abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.27 69
In United States v. Brooklier,277 ° the Ninth Circuit held that co-conspirators' out of court statements are admissible as independent evidence
of the co-conspirators' participation in the conspiracy. 2771 The defendants27 72 were convicted of violating federal racketering statutes as a a

result of their participation in a conspiracy
to extort money from Los
2 77 3
Angeles pornographers and bookmakers.

The defendants challenged

court and the grounds therefor." FED. R. CRIM. P. 51. Furthermore, error "may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits. . . evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and. . . a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection." FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (emphasis added). The record in Tamura indicted that the defendant objected that the telexes were "inadmissible hearsay" at trial. 694
F.2d at 597. However, since Tamura did not challenge on appeal the statements' admissibility
under the co-conspirator statements exception, the court considered it waived. Id. at 598.
2767. 694 F.2d at 598.
2768. Id. The court explained that most of the telex messages were instructions to employees
concerning concealment of the bribery scheme rather than factual assertions. Id. The commentators have noted that "[a]n utterance or a writing may be admitted to show the effect on
the hearer or reader when this effect is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply because the
utterance is not being offered to prove the truth or the falsity of the matter asserted." 4 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 801(c)[01] at 801-77-78 (1979).
2769. 694 F.2d at 598.
2770. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
2771. Id. at 1219-20.
2772. The court found that the defendants were all members of the Los Angeles "family" of
"La Cosa Nostra, a secret national organization engaged in a wide range of racketeering activities, including murder, extortion, gambling, and loansharking." Id. at 1213.
2773. Id. In 1974, defendants Dominic Brooklier and Samuel Sciortino were charged with
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976), which proscribes engaging in a conspiracy to conduct an
extortion ring. 685 F.2d at 1214 n.5. In 1980, an indictment was brought charging defendants
with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976), which makes it unlawful to "conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such [racketeering] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). "Extortion" is defined as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1976). 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976) provides in part:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce. . . by...
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence
to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
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the admission of their alleged co-conspirators' statement 2 774 on the basis
that their co-conspirators' involvement in the conspiracy had not been
corroborated by independent evidence. 277" The defendants asserted that,
in the absence of such independent corroboration, the statements were
inadmissible hearsay.2 77 6
The court stated that in determining whether the declarants participated in the conspiracy, the court treats each declarant's statement as
independent evidence of his participation.27 7 7 In other words, the court
treats the statements as "verbal acts" showing involvement.27 78
violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both.
The defendants appealed their convictions for racketeering violations and for violating 18
U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and (2). 685 F.2d at 1213. For further discussion of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), see supra note 2732 and accompanying text.
2774. The disputed statements were disclosed by the testimony of Aladena "Jimmy the Weasel" Fratianno, a government witness to whom defense counsel referred as "a pejurer, paid
informant, and murderer who escaped the death penalty by cooperating with the FBI, and
whose book sales would be enhanced by a conviction." 685 F.2d at 1218. The court stated
that Fratianno's testimony "was the only link connecting Brooklier and Sciortino to the...
extortion attempt," because the declarants did not testify. Id. at 1219 (emphasis added).
2775. Id. at 1219.
2776. Id.
2777. Id. The Brooklier court cited United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976), for the rule that a declarant's involvement in a conspiracy
must be corroborated by independent evidence in order to invoke the co-conspirator exception
to the hearsay rule. In Snow, the defendant appealed a conviction of conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute. The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence of
conspiracy and of his link to it to satisfy the foundational requirement for admissibility of an
undercover agent's testimony regarding out of court statements made to him by the defendant's alleged co-conspirator. Id. The defendant contended that because these requirements
were not independently met, the trial court erred in admitting the defendant's co-conspirator's
extrajudicial statements implicating the defendant in the crime. Id. However, the court
viewed this reasoning as unpersuasive, finding instead that the following constituted sufficient
independent evidence of a conspiracy: the agent's accounts of discussions with the defendant
in which plans for supplying the cocaine were described in great detail; the defendant's presence at the co-conspirator's home at the time the sale of cocaine was to take place; the defendant's walking directly to the room where the drugs were found; and the defendant's attempted
flight upon learning that law enforcement agents were present. Id. at 733-34.
Brooklier, however, is distinguishable from Snow on its facts. The court noted that since
neither of the declarants testified, the testimony concerning their out of court statements was
the only link connecting the remaining co-defendants to the extortion attempt. 685 F.2d at
1219.
2778. The Brookliercourt cited United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied,424 U.S. 967 (1976), as authority for this principle. 685 F.2d at 1219. In Calaway, the
court upheld the defendants' convictions for conspiring to violate federal gambling statutes
despite arguments that the trial court erred in admitting "out of court (hearsay) statements by
other conspirators, implicating them in the conspiracy." 524 F.2d at 612. On appeal, the defendants contended that there was insufficient independent evidence linking them to the conspiracy to permit the use of the hearsay statements against them. Id. However, the court
reasoned that since the existence of the charged conspiracy was proven on the record before it,
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The use of alleged co-conspirators' out of court statements for the
non-hearsay purpose of showing involvement in the conspiracy arguably
raises serious confrontation clause problems.2 77 9 The defendant against
whom the alleged co-conspirator statements are offered loses the opportunity to cross-examine his "accusers" when they invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2 7 80
The Ninth Circuit held that the improper admission of a co-conspirator's statements was harmless error in United States v. Foster.7 81 Foster and his three co-defendants, Gibson, Wilson, and Jackson, were
convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and of conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute. 7 82
The evidence at trial disclosed that Foster was in charge of an organization of persons which illegally distributed and sold heroin in the
San Diego area. The organization's operation was intricate. Pushers
sold the heroin in the streets. Upon obtaining a customer, the pusher
would telephone an answering service number and leave a message for
his supplier. The supplier would be reached through his beeper, obtain
the pusher's telephone number, and ascertain the amount of heroin required to fill the order. The pusher would then receive this amount. The
heroin for such distribution and sale was obtained and packaged by Foster and others. 278 3 The court found that this evidence was clearly suffi2 784
cient to show that a conspiracy existed as charged in the indictment.
On appeal, however, Foster contended that the trial court erroneously admitted statements made by defendant Jackson to undercover
agents under the co-conspirator exception.278 The first statement was
made during a heroin sale to an undercover agent. Jackson told the
agent that Foster's lieutenants did not have any drugs, that Foster was
no longer selling drugs, and that the arrest of his co-conspirators had
it would "treat testimony by witnesses about statements made by [the defendants] themselves
as part of the independent evidence of their participation in the conspiracy. Such statements
by them are not received to establish the truth of what they said, but to show their own verbal
acts." Id. at 613 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(c)). The Calaway court found that more than
enough evidence existed, exclusive of hearsay, to support a finding that the appellant participated in the conspiracy. Therefore, admitting the hearsay statements was not error. Id.
2779. See supra note 2714.
2780. See supra note 2742.
2781. 711 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1602 (1984).
2782. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit
any offense defined in this subehapter is punishable by imprisonment.
... The intentional
or knowing distribution of heroin or possession with intent to distribute is prohibited in 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
2783. 711 F.2d at 875-76.
2784. Id. at 876.
2785. Id. at 880.
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scared Foster.2 78 6 In the second statement, Jackson told another undercover agent that "Greg" (Foster) was no longer selling the drug because

he had been robbed, but that he intended to sell heroin again after recovering the money.2 78 7 Foster claimed that both statements failed to meet
the co-conspirator exception's foundational requirements.27 8 8
The Ninth Circuit agreed, finding that both statements were "mere
narrative declarations insufficient" to meet the "'in furtherance of the
conspiracy'" requirement of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 278 9 The court rejected
the government's position that the second statement was Jackson's "attempt to nurture [the agent's] continued interest in the organization by
predicting that Foster would soon" renew selling heroin.2790 The court
stated that a co-conspirator's declaration is inadmissible unless he is attempting to induce the listener to deal with or otherwise assist the conspirators in the achievement of their common objective.2 7 9'
The court further stated that declarations regarding activities of the
conspiracy, including declarations of future plans, are also inadmissible
2786. Id.
2787. Id.
2788. Id. See supra notes 2713-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the co-conspirator exception and its foundational requirements.
2789. 711 F.2d at 880 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)) ("A statement is not hearsay if
. . . offered against a party and is. .. a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy"); United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 658 (9th
Cir. 1981) (declaration must be in furtherance of conspiracy to be admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(E)); and United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 1981) (hearsay declarations of co-conspirators in marijuana smuggling venture regarding declarant's general business relationship with defendant, made to impress undercover agent in order to facilitate a new
deal involving a new conspiracy that did not include defendant, were not "in furtherance of"
conspiracy charged; admission of statements through under cover agent's testimony constituted reversible error)).
2790. 711 F.2d at 880.
2791. Id. (citing United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting United
States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976)).
In Moore, the court held that a co-defendant's statement implicating Moore in a prosecution for conspiracy to steal, conceal and sell government property was not made "in furtherance of" the conspiracy. United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1049 (1976) (footnote omitted). The statement was made to a government witness
who testified that, during a conversation with Moore's co-defendant concerning the stolen
property, the co-defendant said that if he had to "go legitimate" he would have to get out of
business. Id. at 1075. The court stated:
There is nothing to support a conclusion that [the co-defendant], by making the
statement, was seeking to induce [the government witness] to deal with the conspirators or in any other way to cooperate or assist in achieving the conspirators' common
objectives. Rather, the statement was, at best, nothing more than the [co-defendant's] casual admission of culpability to someone he had individually decided to
trust.
Id. (citations omitted).
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unless made with the intent to elicit the listener's cooperation. 792 The
court, however, reasoned that no such intent was evident from either of
Jackson's statements. 7 93 Therefore, the court found that admission of
Jackson's statements under the co-conspirator exception had been improper. 794 Nevertheless, the court held that reversal was not required
because the error was harmless, 2795 reasoning that Foster was implicated
by almost
every witness and that there was overwhelming evidence of his
96
27

guilt.

In United States v. Layton,2 79 7 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
court had abused its discretion in excluding certain statements made by
Jim Jones, the leader of a religious organization known as the People's
Temple, that were offered against Layton in his trial for the killing of a
United States Congressman.27 98
Layton was a member of the People's Temple "security force" and a

follower of Jim Jones. He was charged with conspiring to murder and
with aiding and abetting the murder of a congressman2 799 by participat-

ing in the shooting of Congressman Leo Ryan shortly before the mass
suicide at Jonestown, Guyana. 2 °° Congressman Ryan had visited Jonestown 2 80 1 with a group of concerned relatives of Jonestown residents to
2792. 711 F.2d at 880.
2793. Id.
2794. Id. Although Gibson, a co-defendant of Foster, similarly contended that the trial
court violated Rule 801(d)(2)(E) in admitting the first of Jackson's two statements described
above, the court rejected his claim in a footnote. The court stated that "Gibson's contention
based on the admissibility of statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) relates only to the
Jackson/Callier conversation described above. Gibson was never mentioned by Jackson in
these statements. Thus, there is no basis for Gibson's challenge that the trial court violated
Rule 801(d)(2)(E)." Id. at 882 n.5.
2795. Id. at 880-81. The court correctly stated that a "reversal is required only if it is more
probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict." Id. at 880.
2796. Id. at 881.
2797. 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984).
2798. Id. at 557.
2799. 18 U.S.C. § 351(a), (b) (1976) provide in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever kills any individual who is a Member of Congress . . . shall be
punished. . . . (b) If two or more persons conspire to kill or kidnap any [congressman] and one or more persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be punished (1) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or (2) by
death or imprisonment for any term of. years or for life, if death results to such
individual.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides that any person found guilty of aiding or abetting the commission of an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal.
2800. On November 19, 1978, approximately 1200 members of the People's Temple, a religious organization with a settlement at Jonestown, Guyana, committed mass suicide by drinking from a batch of Kool-Aide laced with deadly poison. See generally L.A. Times, Nov. 19,
1978, § 1, at 1.
2801. Jonestown was a settlement located in the jungle of the Republic of Guyana. It was
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conduct a congressional investigation into reports of poor living conditions there and of residents being held against their will.28 2 He was
killed at an airstrip near Jonestown when members of the People's Temple security force began shooting from a truck at Ryan and his party as
they were preparing to leave Jonestown in two planes.28 0 3 Ryan's party
included defectors from the Temple. Layton had feigned defection and
was permitted to board one of the planes. As the plane was preparing to
take off, Layton withdrew a concealed revolver that had apparently been
given to him by other Temple members and shot two of the passengers.
Layton was disarmed when his gun misfired, and the occupants of the
plane escaped into the jungle. Layton was taken into custody by
Guyanese civilians shortly thereafter. 2 8
Layton was additionally charged with conspiracy to murder and
with aiding and abetting the attempted murder of Richard Dryer, who
was wounded in the airstrip shooting incident. Dryer was an internationperson as the Chief of Mission for the United States in
ally protected
28 0 5
Guyana.
Layton's first trial resulted in a hung jury and was declared a mistrial by the district court.28 0 6 Prior to his second trial, the government
moved for an order permitting the presentation of certain previously excluded statements at the retrial.28 0 7 The district court, however, again
ruled that the statements were inadmissible, either as hearsay not falling
within any exception to the hearsay rule, or as violative of the sixth
amendment confrontation clause.28 0 8 The government appealed the
court's denial of the evidentiary motion; the Ninth Circuit reversed as to
composed of approximately 1200 members of the People's Temple, a religious organization
whose membership was primarily made up of American citizens. The leader of the People's
Temple was Jim Jones, who also had control over most of the events in Jonestown. 720 F.2d
at 551.
2802. Id.
2803. Id. at 552.
2804. Id.
2805. 18 U.S.C. § 11 16(a) (1982) proscribes the killing or attempted killing of an internationally protected person, which includes any representative, officer, employee, or agent of the
United States Government.
18 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982) provides: "If two or more persons conspire to violate section
1116 . . . and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
2806. 720 F.2d at 551.

2807. Id. "At the arraignment or as soon thereafter as is practicable, the government may
give notice to the defendant of its intention to use specified evidence at trial in order to afford
the defendant an opportunity to raise objections to such evidence prior to trial
R. CRIM. P. 12(d)(1).
2808. 720 F.2d at 551.

...

"

FED.
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three categories of evidence involving Jones, and it affirmed as to one
2 80 9
category respecting statements made by another Temple member.
The Ninth Circuit first observed that the government had offered
the statements made by Jim Jones and another Temple member to establish that Jones, Layton, and other Temple members had' agreed to kill
Congressman Ryan before Ryan's delegation left Jonestown for the airstrip and possibly before Ryan's arrival at Jonestown. 8 10 Based on the
government's offer of proof, 8 11 the district court found and- the Ninth
Circuit agreed that the government had established a prima facie case of
a conspiracy to kill the congressman. 21 2 The district judge nevertheless
concluded that the statements at issue were inadmissible hearsay or were
so untrustworthy that they did not satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause.28 13 The Ninth Circuit reviewed each category of excluded evidence separately.281 4
The first category of excluded statements consisted of tape-recorded
speeches made by Jim Jones to members of the People's Temple before
Congressman Ryan had arrived at Jonestown.2 81 5 The speeches related
Jones's belief that the Ryan party was antagonistic to the People's Temple movement, that they had lied about the Jonestown community, and
that Jones desired to kill the congressman. 81 6 The government offered
the statements to establish both that Jones had intended to kill Congressman Ryan and that Jones had participated in the conspiracy. 8 17 The
2809. Id.
2810. Id. at 555.
2811. Id. The government's offer of proof showed that the events at the airstrip had been
planned and coordinated: Layton discharged his gun in the plane immediately after other
Temple members shot at part of the Ryan delegation outside; Layton and Jones had been
involved in a discussion just before the Ryan party left for the airstrip; Layton had pretended
to defect with other Temple members who had left Jonestown with Ryan; Layton had engaged
in a conversation at the airstrip with a member of the group that had killed Ryan; and Layton's gun had apparently been given to him by another Temple member. Id. at 554.
2812. Id. at 553.
2813. Id. at 551.
2814. Id.
2815. Id. at 555. In response to reports of poor living conditions in Jonestown and of the
detention of residents against their will, Congressman Ryan went to Guyana. Ryan sent a
telegram on November 1, 1978 advising Jones of his intended visit and his plan to conduct an
official congressional investigation. Concerned relatives of Jonestown residents also planned to
join the Congressman. Ryan's impending visit was discussed by Jones in nightly speeches
piped through loudspeakers throughout Jonestown to its residents. Id. at 551.
2816. Id. at 555. In one of the speeches, Jones stated: "Here comes this man into our community . . . . If they enter this property illegally, they will not leave it alive." Id. Jones
stated in another pre-arrival speech that Congressman Ryan would regret it if he stayed "long
enough for tea," and that Jones did not want to pass up the opportunity of shooting "someone
in the ass like [Congressman Ryan]." Id.
2817. Id.
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government contended that the statements were admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.2 s 8 The district court excluded
Jones' statements were
the statements, however, because it found that
2 8 19
not made "in furtherance of" any conspiracy.
The Ninth Circuit reversed.28 20 The court observed that statements
advancing the objectives of a conspiracy satisfy the "in furtherance of"
requirement of the co-conspirator exception. 28 2 1 The court reasoned that
2818. Id. iA statement is not hearsay if. . .offered against a party and is. . .a statement
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
The government contended that the statements were also admissible under the state of
mind exception or as "nonassertive conduct." 720 F.2d at 555. "A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition" is not excluded by
the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). Furthermore, hearsay is an out of court statement.
FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (emphasis added). All evidence of verbal or nonverbal conduct which is
not intended as an assertion is excluded from operation of the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID.
801(a) advisor committee note.
2819. 720 F.2d at 555-56. Before a statement of a co-conspirator is admitted into evidence
against a defendant, the court must have independent proof of the conspiracy and of the defendant's connection to it. Id. at 555. Furthermore, the court must conclude that the statement was made both during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Fielding,
645 F.2d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 1981). In Layton, the district court conceded that a conspiracy
had been established but concluded that the government had failed to satisfy the "in furtherance of" requirement. 720 F.2d at 557.
2820. 720 F.2d at 564.
2821. Id. at 556-57 (citing 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-174 (1981) (context in which particular statement is made must be
examined in order to determine whether it advances conspiracy's objectives); United States v.
Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 1981) (detailed account of bank robbery given to woman
induced by defendant to let robbers use her home to dispose of their disguises following robbery furthered conspiracy's objectives of robbing bank and escaping safely), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1027 (1982); United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981) (statement ordering person not part of conspiracy to'sell drugs to obtain materials for mixing of drugs was in furtherance of conspiracy);
United States v. Sandoval-Villalvazo, 620 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1980) (approving admission
of statements made to reassure buyers of contraband of conspiracy's existence and to prevent
buyer's departure prior to actual sale); United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir.
1979) (per curiam) (one conspirator's order to another to stop using heroin in order to be
"'cleaned up' enough" to dispense drug, and statements concerning actual negotiations of
heroin sale were in furtherance of conspiracy to distribute drugs); United States v. Eaglin, 571
F.2d 1069, 1083 (9th Cir. 1977) (statements made to inform conspirator about his co-conspirator's actions, to encourage continued involvement in conspiracy, or to allay fears of co-conspirator, were in furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); Salazar v. United
States, 405 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (statements made to reassure buyers that drug
sales would occur and to prevent buyers from leaving before sales were completed were in
furtherance of conspiracies to sell drugs)).
In Layton, the district court reasoned that Jones' statements were merely narrative declarations, conversations, or casual admissions of guilt which did not further any conspiracy to
kill Congressman Ryan. 722 F.2d at 557. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, held that the
statements were "expressions of future criminal intent." Id.
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Jones' statements, when considered in context, supported an inference
that they were made in furtherance of the conspiracy: they were made in
front of a large crowd of Temple members over whom Jones exerted considerable influence; they informed Temple members of Ryan's arrival;
they implied that Jones had spies among Ryan's group; and they expressed Jones' desire to shoot someone like Ryan.2 822 The court distinguished Layton from those cases where mere casual admissions of guilt,
narrations of past criminal conduct, or mere conversations by a conspirator about a crime had been excluded.2 82 3 The court concluded that Jones'
statements were expressions of future criminal intent not only likely to
further
the conspiracy but also made with the intention of advancing
it.282 4 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that under any standard of review the district court had erred in excluding the statements on the basis
that they failed to satisfy the "in furtherance of" requirement. 282s The
court nevertheless remanded for a determination of whether the statements had been made before the conspiracy's inception, as Layton contended, or whether they had been made during its pendency.2 82 6 The
Ninth Circuit directed that if the district court found on remand that the
2822. 720 F.2d at 557. The Ninth Circuit considered the statements "rallying cries of a
charismatic leader to his devoted followers." Id. Thus, the court concluded that "Jones's
statements both had the effect of and were intended to enlist the crowd into compliance with
the imminent murder of Ryan and to bolster the resolve of any in the audience who might
already have agreed to help." Id. (footnote omitted).
2823. Id. at 556-58 (citing United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1981)
(hearsay declarations about declarant's general business relationship with defendant were not
in furtherance of charged conspiracy to distribute drugs); United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d
878, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) (co-conspirator's statement to fellow inmate that he and defendant
were "fixing to kill a Mexican" was inadmissible hearsay because it was not intended to further
conspiracy but was instead mere casual admission to person conspirator had decided to trust);
United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (statements made
by co-conspirator to his common law wife were not evidence that conspirator was attempting
to induce his wife into joining conspiracy)).
2824. 720 F.2d at 557. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that there is some disagreement
concerning which analysis to apply, stating that:
[C]ourts sometimes focus on the speaker's intent in making the statements and sometimes on their probable effect. Thus, courts have applied both a prospective, scienter
analysis and a retrospective, objective analysis. The relationship between these two
analyses is unclear. Statements made with the intent of furthering the conspiracy
will undoubtedly be admitted whether or not they result in any benefit to the conspiracy. On the other hand, it is unclear whether a statement which was not intended to
further the conspiracy, but which in fact furthers or is likely to further the conspiratorial objectives, would be admissible.
Id. at 556-57 n.5. The court did not resolve the issue that it raised because it concluded that
Jones' statements "were not only likely to advance the conspiracy, but. . . were made with
the intention of doing so." Id.
2825. Id. at 557.
2826. Id. at 558.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

statements had been made during the pendency of the conspiracy, the
statements had to be admitted against Layton under the co-conspirator
exception.2 8 27
The second of the four categories of excluded statements consisted
of a statement made by Jones to his attorney shortly after the Ryan party
left Jonestown for the airstrip.28 28 Jones told his attorney that Layton
and another Jonestown resident had taken all of the weapons from Jonestown and were going to the airstrip to perform violent acts, that everything was lost at that time, and that Layton was not really a defector but
was instead going to the airstrip to carry out a violent mission. 2 829 The
government contended that the assertions were admissible under the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule because they were
adverse to Jones' penal interest. 2 830 However, the district court excluded
the statements on the basis that they were untrustworthy and not suffi-

ciently against Jones' penal interest. 2831 The Ninth Circuit reversed on
both grounds.2 8 32
The court first noted that Jones was unavailable as a witness, as
required under the declaration against interest exception,2 83 3 because he
was dead.2 834 Contrary to the district court,28 35 the Ninth Circuit fur2827. Id.
2828. Id.
2829. Id.
2830. Id. Declarations against penal interest are admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, so tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability that a reasonable person in the same position
would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. FED. R. EVID. 804
(b)(3). In addition, when the statement is offered to exculpate a defendant, there must be
corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the statement's trustworthiness. Id. With respect to the second test under Rule 804(b)(3), "the corroborating circumstances must do more
than indicate the trustworthiness of the statement; they must clearly indicate it." United
States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978) (emphasis
in original).
In Layton, the Ninth Circuit noted that all three requirements must be satisfied in order to
admit evidence offered to exculpate a defendant pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3). 720 F.2d at 559.
However, the statements in Layton were offered by the government in order to inclupate the
defendant. Id. at 558. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless declined to decide whether the third
factor--corroboration of the statement's trustworthiness-was necessary when the statement
is offered to inculpate a defendant because it found that Jones' statement was trustworthy. Id.
at 559. See infra note 2839 for a further discussion of the declaration against interest exception
to the hearsay rule.
2831. 720 F.2d at 559.
2832. Id.
2833. See supra note 2830.
2834. 720 F.2d at 559.
2835. Id. The district court stated that Jones' statements were untrustworthy because he
made them to his attorney. Id.
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ther found that statements to an attorney are likely to be more reliable
than statements made to another individual since a client might be more
candid with his or her attorney.2 83 6 Finally, the court noted that Jones'
statements about Layton were subsequently corroborated.28 3 7 Therefore,
the court held that Jones' statements were not untrustworthy merely because he had made them to his attorney. 8 38
The Ninth Circuit next held that the statements were clearly against
Jones' penal interest. 28 39 The court indicated that Congress' motive in
enacting the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule
was to expand the admissibility of remarks which tended to subject declarants to criminal liability.2 8 4 The court observed that Jones' statements in Layton showed that he had detailed information concerning
events which would occur in the very near future. In addition, Jones
would have expected that his follower's acts would be imputed to him
since he controlled most events in Jonestown. Furthermore, when he

spoke to his attorney, he had already expressed a desire to kill Ryan. In
light of these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Jones' state-

ments would tend to subject him to criminal
liability for both Ryan's
28 4 1

murder and participation in the conspiracy.
The court further found that Jones' statements were trustworthy

based upon the surrounding circumstances and corroborating evidence. 28 42 The court indicated that the airstrip violence transpired exactly as Jones had said it would, that the group was on its way to the
2836. Id.
2837. Id. Furthermore, the court did not view Jones' conversation with his attorney as a
normal consultation between a client and his lawyer in light of the circumstances of the case.
Id.
2838. Id.
2839. Id. at 559-60 (citing United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.) (codefendant's statement that he did not deny defendant's involvement in robbery because he did
not want to jeopardize his own appeal was against his penal interest within meaning of Rule
804(b)(3)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th
Cir. 1978) (solidly inculpatory statements against penal interest within meaning of Rule
804(b)(3)); United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir. 1977) (statements by
unindicted co-conspirator to defendant's investigator implicating co-conspirator to defendant's
investigator implicating co-conspirator to defendant's investigator implicating co-conspirator
in major drug sale negotiation admissible as against her penal interest)).
The district court found that the statements tended to implicate other Temple members,
not Jones, in the airstrip shootings that were about to take place. Therefore, the trial judge
suggested that "Jones had an incentive to misrepresent the events at the airstrip and to divert
guilt away from himself and on to other members of the Temple." Id. at 559. Consequently,
the statements would not have been adverse to Jones' penal interest. Id. at 560.
2840. Id. at 559.
2841. Id. at 560.
2842. Id. at 560-61.
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airstrip when Jones spoke with his attorney, and that Layton was feigning defection just as Jones had stated. These facts, which were corroborated by eyewitness testimony and Layton's own confession, highlighted

the reliability of Jones' statements and established that he was part of a
preconceived plan to shoot people in both planes.2 84 3 The Ninth Circuit
found that this evidence did not suggest that Jones was attempting to

shift guilt from himself, as the district court had maintained. Instead,
the court determined that the statements were spontaneous and made, as
the events were occurring or about to occur, to Jones' trusted advisor.
When taken together, all of these factors indicated the trustworthiness of
the statements. Therefore, the statements were admissible as declara2844
tions against Jones' penal interest.

The Ninth Circuit also held that the trial court erred in excluding
Jones' statements on the ground that their admission would violate Layton's confrontation clause rights. 2845 The court explained that the confrontation clause analysis consists of a two-prong test which focuses on

the disputed testimony's necessity and reliability.28 46 Since Jones was
dead, the use of his hearsay statements was clearly necessary.2 84 7
With respect to the reliability prong, the court utilized the four-part
test enunciated in Dutton v. Evans.28 48 The court explained that the two
2843. Id. at 560.
2844. Id. at 560-61. The court also noted that Jones' statements were not made in an effort
to try to win favor with the police, and that he subsequently took responsibility for the
murders in his "last hour" speech. Id. at 560.
2845. Id. at 561. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2846. 720 F.2d at 561 (citing United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 1981)
(admission of evidence under hearsay exception insufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements under confrontation clause; confrontation clause analysis should proceed case by case
under a two-tier approach that tests necessity and reliability of contested testimony); Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980)). In Roberts, the Court stated:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of
admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-toface accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual
case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution
must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring
the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances
only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that "there is no material departure
from the reason of the general rule."
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 65-66 (1980) (citations and footnote omitted).
2847. 720 F.2d at 561.
2848. Id. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (plurality opinion), the Supreme
Court set forth a four-prong test to determine the reliability of a co-conspirator's out of court
statements: (1) whether the declaration contained assertions of past fact; (2) whether the de-
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most important factors for establishing reliability under Dutton are
(1) the existence of corroborating evidence2 84 9 and (2) a declaration

against penal interest. 2850 Although the court recognized that some of
Jones' statement to his attorney were erroneous, it nevertheless concluded that they were reliable to establish Jones' awareness of and participation in the airstrip events.28 5 ' Moreover, the statements were
corroborated by the events at the airstrip.28 52 The court further concluded that Jones' statements were against his penal interest, that they
were apparently not intended to incriminate Layton, and that neither the

declarations themselves nor the context in which they were made demonstrated inherent unrealiability. 8 53 Thus, the statements did not violate

Layton's confrontation clause rights.28 54
The third category of statements disallowed by the district court
consisted of tape-recorded statements about the events at the airstrip

made by Jones just prior to and in the course of the mass suicide at
Jonestown. 28 55 The district judge ruled that although these statements
clarant had personal knowledge of the participant's identity and role in the crime; (3) whether
it was possible that the declarant was relying upon a faulty memory; and (4) whether the
circumstances under which the statements were made supplied reason to believe that the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime. However, not all four
elements need to be present in order to satisfy reliability under the confrontation clause. Id.
In Layton, the district court judge used the four-part Dutton test, but determined that the
statements that Jones made to his attorney were unreliable. 720 F.2d at 561.
2849. 720 F.2d at 561 (citing United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir.
1982); United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rosales, 606
F.2d 888, 889 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204
(9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976)).
2850. Id. (citing United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 1981) (declarations made
by unavailable co-conspirator in drug prosecution admissible over confrontation clause objection where statements were against declarant's penal interest and circumstances did not indicate any reason for declarant to be lying); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 735 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976) (hearsay statements of co-conspirator in drug prosecution admissible as against confrontation clause attack where declarations were against his
penal interest, co-conspirator did not misrepresent defendant's participation in crime, and
statements were otherwise trustworthy)). The Layton court pointed out that in Dutton itself,
the contested statement had been spontaneously made and was against the declarant's penal
interest, and therefore satisfied the fourth requirement under the test. Id. (citing Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion)).
2851. Id.
2852. Id. The court further observed that the declarations were made to Jones' attorney, a
situation which the Ninth Circuit considered suggestive of reliability. Id. By comparison, the
district court's position was that such a situation suggested that the statements were untrustworthy. See supra at note 2835.
2853. 720 F.2d at 561.
2854. Id.
2855. Id. Some statements had apparently been made before and some after Jones had received the information that the airstrip shootings had occurred. In his statements made before
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were declarations against Jones' penal interest, they were nevertheless
inadmissible because they violated the confrontation clause. 28 5 6 The trial
court emphasized that Jones made the statements while he was in a
highly irrational and agitated state. 2 5 7 Accordingly, the judge reasoned

that the declarant's availability for cross-examination purposes would be
essential in order to ascertain the accuracy of the statements. 285 8

The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that under the Dutton rationale285 9 the declarations made in this "last hour" speech were not so
inherently unreliable that they warranted exclusion.28 6 ° The Ninth Circuit focused on whether Jones had personal knowledge of the events and
whether his statements might have resulted from faulty recollection.2 61
Although the trial court apparently equated irrational conduct with an
inability to have personal knowledge or an accurate memory of events,

the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a person's irrational or highly agitated
state alone does not mean that he cannot relate recent events or have
personal knowledge of events which are about to happen.28 62 The court
found not only that Jones had personal knowledge of the events that
were about to occur at the airstrip, but also that his statements were
completely corroborated by the subsequent events.2 86 3 In addition, the
receiving word of the shootings, Jones indicated that one of his people on the plane was going
to shoot the pilot and that it was Layton's apparent role. The statements made after Jones
received word about the shootings indicated that he knew that Ryan was dead and that Jones'
people had killed Ryan. Jones stated at one point: "They're my people. . . . I don't kow who
fired the shot, I don't know who killed the Congressman. But as far as I'm concerned, I killed
him." Id. at 562. Although Jones did not mention Layton directly, he stated: "There's one
man there who blames, and rightfully so, Debbie Blakely,. . . for the murder of his mother
and he'll sh- he'll stop that pilot by any means necessary. He'll do it." Id. Blakely was
Layton's sister and he apparently blamed her for his mother's death. Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that Jones entertained a belief that Layton's role in the events at the airstrip
was to shoot the pilot. The court found that Jones' belief was corroborated by Layton's demand tobe seated on the smaller of the two planes, by his smuggling a pistol aboard the plane,
and by the fact that he had seated himself directly behind the pilot. Id. at 562 n. 11.
2856. Id. at 562.
2857. The district judge's decision was bolstered by Jones' declaration: "I don't kow who
killed the Congressman. But as far as I'm concerned, I killed him." Id. The judge had inferred that this declaration was possibly indicative of "the ravings of a madman who may
merely be asserting an identification with the killers on a mystical bizarre level." Id.
2858. Id. As discussed supra at note 2846, the confrontation clause was apparently designed
to give the accused an effective means to test the accuracy of adverse testimony by crossexamination of the witness.
2859. See supra note 2848 and accompanying text.
2860. 720 F.2d at 562.
2861. Id. (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730,
734-35 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976)).
2862. Id.
2863. Id. The court observed that Jones said one of his followers would shoot the pilot,
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court determined that it was unlikely that Jones' memory was faulty
when he made the statements because they were made soon after the
events at the airstrip occurred. 2 864 Furthermore, the court explained that
the jury would be in a better position than it would otherwise be to determine Jones' mental state when he made the statements, since they were
2 86 6
on tape. 2865 Accordingly, the "last hour" statements were admissible.
The final category of excluded statements consisted of statements
made by Temple member Carter to Parks following Layton's arrest on
the day of the shootings.28 67 Parks was a genuine Temple defector who
had been aboard Layton's plane at the time of the shootings.28 6 8 Carter
told Parks that he had been sent by Jones to infiltrate the Concerned
Relatives Group 2 869 by feigning defection in an effort to find out who was

accompanying Ryan to Jonestown and reason for the

trip.2 870

The state-

ments were offered by the government as statements against Carter's penal interest on the theory that Carter's acts constituted a link in the chain
of events leading to Ryan's assassination.2 87 1 The trial court disallowed
the statements on the ground that they were not sufficiently against
Carter's penal interest, and would violate the confrontation clause if admitted.28 7 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but only on the ground that the
implying that Layton's part in the airstrip murders was to shoot the pilot. Further, Jones'
previous statements to his attorney indicated that Jones knew Layton's defection was feigned.
Id.
2864. Id.
2865. Id. Although the Layton court conceded that cross-examination would be more effective, it suggested that because Jones' statements were on tape, the dangers involved in admitting the statements were minimized. Id. at 562-63. Presumably, the court meant that the jury
would be able to determine Jones' mental state at the time he made the statements from the
sound of his voice on the tape.
2866. Id. at 563.
2867. Id.
2868. Id. at 551-52.
2869. This was a group of relatives of Jonestown residents who had planned to join Ryan on
his trip to Jonestown. Id. at 551.
2870. Id. at 563.
2871. Id. The government contended that:
Carter's infiltration was the first link in a chain that ended with the murder of Congressman Ryan . . . [and] that Carter provided Jones with information that the
Ryan delegation was hostile and had to be silenced. Thus, the statements were
against Carter's penal interest in that they implicated him in the conspiracy to murder Ryan.
Id. In addition, the government suggested that the statements were made immediately following the murders, at a time when a reasonable person in Carter's position would have suspected
that an inquiry would focus on actions leading up to the killings. Thus, the government reasoned that a person in Carter's position would not utter such incriminating statements unless
he believed that they were true. Id.
2872. Id. The trial judge also indicated that the government may have been unable to satisfy
the unavailability requirement under both the confrontation clause and the hearsay exception,
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comments were not solidly against Carter's penal interest.2 8"
The Ninth Circuit conceded that if Carter's infiltration was the first
link in a chain that ended with Congressman Ryan's murder, it was arguable that the statements tended to subject Carter to criminal liability as
required for the declaration against interest exception.2 874 The court
nonetheless recognized that its function on review was limited to determining whether the trial court had abused its discretion. 2875 The court
reasoned that unlike Jones' statements to his attorney, Carter's statements did not establish that Carter had detailed information of the conspiracy to assassinate Ryan. Moreover, Carter's mere infiltration of the
Concerned Relatives Group was not a criminal act and did not itself suggest any connection between the infiltration and the subsequent conspiracy to kill Ryan. Since Carter's infiltration was arguably too remote
from the Jonestown events to make his declarations clearly incriminatory, the court held that the district court had not abused its discretion in
deciding to exclude them.2876
c.

declaration against interest

The Federal Rules of Evidence create an exception to the hearsay
rule permitting the admission of certain out of court statements when the
declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement when made was
against the declarant's interest.28 77 Rule 804(b)(3) expands the common
since Carter did not invoke his fifth amendment rights but merely suggested that he would
invoke his privilege against self-incrimination if he was called as a witness. Id. A witness is
unavailable under the Federal Rules of Evidence if he or she "is exempted by ruling of the
court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his [or her]
statement." FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1). In Layton, however, the Ninth Circuit did not reach
this issue because it concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the statdments after finding that they were not sufficiently against Carter's penal interest. 720
F.2d at 563.
2873. 720 F.2d at 563.
2874. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the only question at issue was whether the statements tended to subject Carter to criminal liability. The court observed that invoking the fifth
amendment is circumstantial evidence that a statement is against a declarant's penal interest.
Id. (citing United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir. 1977) (unindicted co-conspirator's assertion of fifth amendment probative to issue of whether her prior out of court
statements tended to subject her to criminal liability sufficient to satisfy against penal interest
requirement)). The court nevertheless refused to disturb the lower court's ruling on appeal
because it found that there were equally good arguments for exclusion. Id.
2875. Id. See United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir). (standard for appellate review of decision to exclude hearsay statement under Rule 804(b)(3) is whether trial court
abused its discretion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
2876. 720 F.2d at 563.
2877. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The foundation required for admitting a declaration against
interest places a burden on the proponent to establish that: (1) the declarant is unavailable as a
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law exception in two respects: (1) the definition of "unavailability" is
extended to include those situations in which the declarant cannot remember the statement or refuses to testify despite a court order to do
so;2878

and (2) the exception includes declarations against penal inter-

est. 2 879 However, the use of statements against penal interest inculpating
the accused necessarily raises confrontation clause problems because an
"unavailable" declarant whose statement is offered against the accused
cannot be cross-examined by the accused.2 880
witness; (2) the declarant had personal knowledge of the facts to which his statement relates
(not explicitly stated in the exception but required by FED. R. EVID. 602 and case law-see
Gichner v. Antonio Troiano Tile & Marble Co., 410 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (personal
cognizance required)); (3) the statement was contrary to the declarant's financial or penal
interest when made; and (4) a reasonable man would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE t
804(b)(3)[02] (1984). The rationale for admitting such statements is the "circumstantial guaranty of reliability for declarations against interest [based upon] the assumption that persons do
not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that
they are true." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note.
2878. The declarant is "unavailable as a witness" under the Federal Rules when the
declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement
despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statements; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of a [dying declaration, declaration
against interest, or statement of personal or family history], his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a). Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 240 (West Supp. 1985), which follows the
common law in its definition of unavailability, provides: "'Unavailable as a witness' includes,
in addition to cases where the declarant is physically unavailable (Le., dead, insane, or beyond
the reach of the court's process), situations in which the declarant is legally unavailable (i.e.,
prevented from testifying by a claim or privilege or disqualified from testifying)." Id. assembly
committee comment.
2879. See, eg., United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973), where the court
held that a statement to a police informant was admissible under the declaration against interest exception because the statement was contrary to the declarant's penal interest. Id. at 98687. As two commentators note:
Rule 804(b)(3) expands the common law exception for declarations against interest.
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules, declarations against interest were usually limited to statements against pecuniary or proprietary interests. This Rule expands the exception to cover declarations against penal interest, something that
commentators and many Judges have been urging for some time.
S. SALTSBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 804 at 652 (3d ed.

1982).
2880. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804(b)(3)[03] (1984).
Professor Weinstein notes at page 804-112 that:
[i]f the confrontation clause is to have any meaning, then every statement that on its
face is against declarant's interest cannot be admitted without analysis of its reliabil-
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In United States v. Carruth,28 81 the Ninth Circuit held that statements made by the defendant's accountant were admissible under the
declaration against interest exception for the purpose of implicating the
defendant in a prosecution for tax fraud.2 8 2 Carruth was convicted of

conspiracy to defraud the United States as a result of his involvement in
an operation that sold limited partnership tax shelter schemes.2" 83 Carruth and Reed, his co-defendant, syndicated limited partnerships
through Carruth's wholly-owned corporation to engage in cattle breeding. 28 84 Carruth's corporation then contracted with Reed, and with corporations that Reed owned or controlled, to acquire, feed, and manage
the cattle for the limited partnership.2 88 5 However, the government
charged that Reed's corporations were mere fronts used to create the
appearance of and documentation for cattle, feed purchases, and partner-

ship loans which were in fact nonexistent.2886 Carruth's conviction was
based on tax forms that he filed as the general partner of the limited
288 7
partnerships, reflecting such nonexistent transactions.
On appeal, Carruth challenged the trial court's admission of statements made by his accountant to an Internal Revenue Service agent and

to employees of Carruth's corporation before the accountant's death,
contending that the testimony relating the statements was inadmissible
ity in the setting of the case. Even aside from constitutional considerations, unreliable statements must be excluded as a matter of evidentiary law.
Cf The advisory committee's note to Rule 804(b)(3):
The third-party confession . . may include statements implicating [the accused],
and under the general theory of declarations against interest they would be admissible as related statements. . . . [Supreme Court decisions dealing with the constitutional right to confrontation] by no means require that all statements implicating
another person be excluded from the category of declarations against interest.
Whether a statement is in fact against interest must be determined from the circumstances of each case. . . . The rule does not purport to deal with questions of the
right to confrontation.
See also J. COTCHETr & A. ELKIN, FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE 168.1 (4th rev. 1982)

("Counsel should look to Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), for the standards which must
be met in order to afford a criminal defendant his constitutional right to confrontation" (discussing the declaration against interest exception)).
2881. 699 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 698 (1984).
2882. Id. at 1022-23.
2883. Id. at 1019. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
Carruth was sentenced to three years imprisonment. 699 F.2d at 1019.
2884. 699 F.2d at 1019.
2885. Id.
2886. Id.
2887. Id.
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hearsay.28 88 However, the court concluded that the statements were
against the accountant's interest when made because they indicated that
he knew that the cattle and feed figures listed on the partnership's tax
returns were highly inflated. Nonetheless he prepared the returns without examining the underlying documentation. 288 9 Because the accountant died shortly before the indictment, he was "unavailable as a witness"
as required by Rule 804(b)(3). Accordingly, the court held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in ruling that the evidence was
admissible.2 890
In United States v. Rhodes,2 89 1 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
court had properly excluded co-defendant's hearsay remark exculpating
Rhodes because it was not against the co-defendant's penal interest when
made and was not sufficiently corroborated.28 92
Rhodes was convicted of conspiracy to possess and distribute checks
which had been stolen from the mail.2893 The evidence introduced at

trial established that all of the stolen checks had passed through the post
office where Rhodes was employed, that Rhodes had been seen with a
box of mail, and that Rhodes had pulled checks from the mail and had
cashed them. 8 94 Rhodes sought to controvert this evidence with the testimony of a co-defendant's attorney who had been present when co-defendant Lewis stated out of court that Rhodes "was not the source of the
during Rhodes'
stolen checks." 2 89 5 Lewis later suffered a heart 2attack
896
trial and was otherwise unavailable as a witness.
2888. Id. at 1022.
2889. Id. at 1022-23.
2890. Id.
2891. 713 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 535 (1983).
2892. Id. at 473.
2893. Id. at 466. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), supra note 2883. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1976)
makes it unlawful to willfully possess mail matter stolen from an unauthorized depository for
mail matter, which includes any private mail box or any mail receptacle. Rhodes was sentenced to three years imprisonment for his participation in the conspiracy to possess and distribute stolen checks. 713 F.2d at 466.
2894. 713 F.2d at 474.
2895. Id. at 472. The statement was made in a hallway outside the courtroom during a
recess in the trial proceedings. Although Rhodes apparently expected the co-defendant to
testify at his trial, the court was advised that the co-defendant would take the fifth amendment
if asked to testify. Id. at 472-73.
2896. Id. at 473. The requirement of unavailability under the declaration against interest
exception (FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) is satisfied by the declarant's exercise of a claim of privilege or by an existing physical illness or infirmity which prevents the declarant's presence or
testimony at the hearing. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1), (4). Although the trial court in Rhodes
was advised that Rhodes' co-defendant would invoke the fifth amendment and not testify, the
Ninth Circuit stated that the trial court correctly ruled that the witness was unavailable as a
result of his heart attack. 713 F.2d at 473.
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Rhodes asserted that the co-defendants unavailability rendered the
statement admissible under the statement against penal interest exception
to the hearsay rule.28 97 The trial court disagreed, and ruled that the

statement was inadmissible notwithstanding the witness' unavailability
because it was not against the declarant's penal interest when made and
was not trustworthy.28 98
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.2 8 99 The court reasoned that the statement was not against the co-defendant's penal interest because he had
previously pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge when he made the
statement.2 9c ° Moreover, the government had previously agreed to dismiss all remaining charges against the declarant pursuant to a plea bargain arrangement. 290 1 Hence, the statement did not tend to subject him
to criminal liability. 29 2 Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the
statement was not against the co-defendant's penal interest did not
amount to an abuse of discretion.2 90 3
The Ninth Circuit also found that the surrounding circumstances
failed to corroborate Lewis' assertion.2 9 In fact, the court observed
that the surrounding circumstances indicated the statement was unreliable rather than "clearly indicating" its trustworthiness. 290 5 The court
2897. 713 F.2d at 473. If the declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement which tended
to subject him to criminal liability when made such "that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true" is not excluded by the
hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). However, "[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." Id. (emphasis
added).
2898. 713 F.2d at 473.
2899. Id.
2900. Id.
2901. Id.
2902. Id.
2903. Id. (citing United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir.) (trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to admit exculpatory evidence offered as a
statement against interest where the circumstances indicated that the co-defendant might have
staged the argument during which the statements were made with the defendant's help), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.) (trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding exculpatory evidence offered as a statement against the
declarant's penal interest where there was an absence of corroborating evidence as well as
positive evidence that showed that the statement was untrustworthy-such as evidence of the
declarant's drug addiction, bad criminal record, psychiatric problems, and psychiatric disorders), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981)).
2904. Id. "A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement." FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3). See supra note 2897 and accompanying text.
2905. 713 F.2d at 473.
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ord or other qualified witness, though not necessarily the declarant.2 9 14
Finally, the court has the discretion to exclude a business record where
the method or circumstances of preparation or the source of the information indicates a lack of trustworthiness.2 9 15
In United States v. Pazsint,29 16 the Ninth Circuit held that tape recordings of witnesses' emergency calls to the police department did not
fall within the business records exception to the hearsay rule.2 91 7 Pazsint
was convicted of forcibly assaulting an Internal Revenue Service agent
with a deadly weapon, arising from the agent's attempt to question Pazsint about his income taxes.2 91 8 At trial, Pazsint raised a hearsay objection to the introduction of tape-recorded emergency telephone calls by
eyewitness reporting the event to the police. 29 19 However, the trial judge
overruled Pazsint's objection and admitted the tape recordings pursuant
to the business records exception.29 2 °
On appeal, Pazsint contended that the trial judge's ruling was erroneous.2 921 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Pazsint, observing that the
business records exception is applicable only where the person recording
the information is acting in the regular course of business.2 92 2 The court
recognized that a police officer's report indicating his own observations
2914. Id.
2915. Id.
2916. 703 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1983).
2917. Id. at 424.
2918. Id. at 421.
18 U.S.C. § 111 (1982) makes it a felony for any person to forcibly assault, resist, oppose,
impede, intimidate, or interfere with certain federal officers or employees. In Pazsint, an IRS
agent unsuccessfully attempted to question the defendant's wife about the couple's income tax
returns. 703 F.2d at 422. After returning to his car, the agent remained parked outside the
Pazsint home as he filled out a report. Pazsint's wife called her husband at work and asked
him to come to her aid because she was frightened. She explained that the agent said he was
with the IRS and questioned her, but would not leave. She described the agent and his car to
Pazsint. Id. When Pazsint arrived, the agent was pulling away from the house onto a highway. Pazsint forced the agent off the road with his pickup truck. Brandishing a .44 caliber
handgun, Pazsint forced the agent to take a spread-eagle position on the trunk of his car. Id.
Pazsint frisked the agent, refused to let him identify himself, shouted obscenities, and asked the
agent what he meant by coming to his house and threatening his wife. Id.
2919. Id. at 424.
2920. Id.
2921. Id.
2922. Id. (citing Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982) as authority for principle that business records exception only
applies if person providing information to be recorded "is acting routinely, under a duty of
accuracy, with employer reliance on the result, or in short 'in the regular course of business' "). Although the Pazsint court found that the police officer who made the tape-recorded
emergency calls was acting in the regular course of business, it concluded that he lacked
knowledge of the accuracy or "truthfulness" of the information being recorded. Id. at 425.
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explained that the statement was made after the co-defendant had

pleaded guilty, did not subject him to additional criminal liability, was
not made until the time of trial, and was made to an attorney for a coconspirator's benefit. Additionally, the co-defendant became unavailable

because of his decision to invoke his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination and he had made prior statements that were inconsistent

with Rhodes' offer of proof.29

6

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion by excluding the statement.2 9
d.

7

business records exception

Records of regularly conducted business activity are admissible into
evidence pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule. 2908 This exception
is founded on the theory that such records are inherently reliable. 29 0 9 To
qualify a writing as a "business record" under this exception, the propo-

nent must convince the court 2910 that the record was made: (1) in the
regular course of business; 291 1 (2) by a person with knowledge, or from
information transmitted by a person with knowledge under a business
duty to report;29 12 and (3) at or near the time the information was received. 2913 This foundation must be established by the custodian of rec2906. Id.
2907. Id.
2908. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). The scope of this exception is potentially enormous. The term
"business," as defined by the rule, includes "business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind whether or not conducted for profit." Id. Similarly, the
exception permits a wide array of "records," including a "memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses." Id.
2909. The reliability of a business record is supplied by systematic checking, by regularity
and continuity which produce habits of precision, by the business' actual reliance upon the
record, and by the recordkeeper's occupational duty to make an accurate record. FED. R.
EVID. 803(6) advisory committee note (citing C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 281, 286, 287
(1st ed. 1954) and Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. REv. 276 (1961)).
2910. "Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court. . . ." FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
2911. This requirement is established where the employer relies on the record in the regular
course of business. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee note. In this regard, the
Supreme Court held in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), that records kept in contemplation of litigation are not records of a regularly conducted business activity. The disputed
record in Palmerwas an accident report prepared by a railroad company's employee for use in
litigation. The Court reasoned that the company's business was railroad, not accident reporting. Id. at 111-12. Hence, the report was not" 'in the regular course' of business." Id. at 113.
2912. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). Professor Weinstein explains that "[tihe rationale for the exception fails unless some element of unusual reliability can be established for the records in
question by such factors as systematic checking, habits of precision on the part of the record
keeper, reliance by others on the records, or a duty to record accurately." 4 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(6)[03] (1984) (citations omitted).
2913. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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embodying the statements were made by the police officer in the regular
course of business. 2930 The Pazsint court conceded that the police officer
was acting in the regular course of business when he made the recordings. 2931 Furthermore, the "emergency calls" by witnesses reporting the
actions of Pazsint and the IRS agent described either an exciting event or
the witnesses' present sense impression of the incident.29 32 Nevertheless,
the court did not find an alternative basis for admitting the tapes, and
held that the trial court had erred in admitting them.2 93 3
In United States v. Foster,2934 the Ninth Circuit held that a ledger
containing records of drug transactions implicating a defendant in a conspiracy to distribute heroin was properly admitted as a business
record.29 35
The ledger contained entries recording drug transactions that estab-

lished co-defendant Gibson's involvement in an enterprise engaged in the
illegal sale and distribution of heroin.2 93 6 Over the defendant's objection
at trial, the district court admitted the ledger as a business record under
Rule 803(6).2937
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred be-

cause the records were not maintained in the regular course of business
and because the transactions entered were untrustworthy. 293 8 However,
rule. FED. R. EVID. 803(2). "The theory. . . is simply that circumstances may produce a
condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication." FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee note.
2929. "A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter" is not excluded by the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). "The underlying theory. . is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious
misrepresentation." FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee note.
2930. See supra note 2924.
2931. 703 F.2d at 425.
2932. The Pazsint court described "the event" as follows:
Pazsint, driving a pickup truck, chased [IRS agent] Skeete and forced him off the
highway. Carrying a .44 caliber handgun, Pazsint jumped from his truck and forced
Skeete to the rear of his car. He ordered Skeete to take a spread-eagle position across
the trunk while he frisked him. Pazsint, who was extremely excited, used obscenities
and repeatedly asked what Skeete meant in coming to his home and threatening his
wife. He refused to let Skeete identify himself.
Id. at 422.
2933. Id. at 425.
2934. 711 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1983).
2935. Id. at 882.
2936. The defendants were convinced of conspiracy to possess and possession of heroin with
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1982). Id. at 875.
2937. Id. at 882.
2938. Id. The court rejected Gibson's contention that the entries were untrustworthy by
reasoning that there would have been little reason for the witness, Minyon Logan, to distort or
falsify the entries since she had to rely on them. Id. at 883.
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and knowledge may be admitted under the business records exception.292 3 However, the court explained that statements made by third
persons under no duty to report are inadmissible under the business
records exception.2 92 4 The court reasoned that although the police officer recording the emergency calls-was acting in the regular course of
business, the tapes were inadmissible because the officer had no personal
knowledge of the truthfulness of the information being recorded.2 925 The
court noted that the witnesses had personal knowledge of the information conveyed but were not under a business duty to report the information.2 92 6 The court, therefore, concluded that the tapes were

inadmissible at trial because the presumption of reliability and regularity
accorded a business record could not be given to the witnesses' taperecorded statements. 92 7
It may be argued that the tape-recorded emergency calls which the
witnesses in Pazsint made to the police station were admissible on
grounds that the informants' statements qualified as either excited utterances 2 9 28 or present sense impressions, 2929 and that the tape recordings
2923. Id. at 424.
2924. Id. The Pazsint court is not entirely accurate in its statement of the rule. As one
commentator has explained:
The recorders need not have first hand knowledge . . . . As the comments of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. . . indicate, Congress intended a liberal. interpretation
of the phrase "person with knowledge." The name of the person whose first-hand
knowledge was the basis of the entry need not even be known so long as the regular
practice was to get the information from such a person. Cases which at first glance
appear divergent are explicable on the ground of multiple hearsay. If the informant's
statement satisfied some other hearsay exception and was then recorded pursant to
the business records rule, no hearsay bar remained ....
.. . For instance, if the informant's statement qualifies as an admission, or an
exctied utterance . . . the record embodying the statement is admissible if it was
made in the course of a regularly conducted activity.
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(6)[04] (1984).
This interpretation is consistent with Rule 805, which provides that "[h]earsay included
within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules." FED. R. EvID. 805.
Furthermore, the Pazsint court cites United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir.
1975), as authority for its interpretation of the rule. 703 F.2d at 424-25. Yet the Smith court
itself recognized that
while such hearsay in a business record is not admissible under the business record
exception, the hearsay is admissible if it falls within any other exception. . . . Thus,
.. . the hearsay recorded by a police officer [in a record made in the regular course
of business] might be admissible if it was an admission, a spontaneous exclamation, a
dying declaration, or a declaration against interest.
521 F.2d at 964-65.
2925. 703 F.2d at 425.
2926. Id.
2927. Id.
2928. "A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition" is not excluded by the hearsay

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

the court noted that according to the Ninth Circuit, operating accounts

of illegal enterprises constitute business records, subject only to the customary requirements concerning the admissibility of writings.29 39 The

court stated that a business record is admissible under Rule 803(6) if
maintained in the regular course of a business activity. The court further
stated that this requirement is met when the record is made in accordance with established procedures for the "routine and timely making and
preserving of business records," and the business depends upon the accuracy of the record.2 94°
The court noted that the witness testified that she usually recorded
her large drug transactions, regularly entered the number of balloons she
sold on a particular day, and the amount of money she received in return.
She relied on the entries and recorded the transactions contemporaneously. 2941 Therefore, the court held that the ledger was properly admitted because there was sufficient evidence to satisfy Rule 803(6).2942
In Keogh v. Commissioner, 943 the Ninth Circuit affimed the tax
court's finding that a casino employee's personal diary, showing the
amounts of tip income he had received, was admissible as a business rec-

ord in a trial to determine the tax liability of Keogh, another casino em-

ployee. 294 Keogh dealt blackjack, or "21," at the Dunes Hotel in Las
Vegas, Nevada. Blackjack dealers earned regular wages as well as occasional tips or "tokes" in the form of coins or casino chips from blackjack
players.294 5 Dealers were required to report their total annual toke income to their employer. The amounts reported were included on the W2939. Id. at 882 n.6 (citing United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 165 (9th Cir. 1973) (in a
conspiracy prosecution, coded names used by customers, their phone numbers, record of
amounts of narcotics smuggled for them, and record of money received in return was properly
admitted as business record of narcotics operations), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974); and
Arena v. United States, 226 F.2d 227, 234-35 (9th Cir. 1955) (books containing running accounts of illegal bets properly admitted as business records in a prosecution for perjury), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 954 (1956)).
2940. Id. (citing Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing elements of Rule 803(6) in action challenging discriminatory enforcement of zoning
and permit requirements by City of Los Angeles; held that diary kept for purposes of litigation
was inadmissible as business record because it was not made to be used in vendor's business of
selling new and used merchandise), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982)).
2941. Id. at 882.
2942. Id. Neither the incompleteness of the ledger nor the arbitrary sequence of the entries
destroyed the accuracy of the entries. Id.
2943. 713 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1983).
2944. Id. at 500.
2945. Id. at 498. "Players often gave tokes to the dealers directly, at other times, they placed
bets for the dealers, with a player determining after a winning bet how much of the winnings
was the dealer's to keep." Id.
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2 forms of the employer and in the dealer's tax returns.2 94 6 The Commissioner contended that Keogh had underreported his tip income during
the years 1969 through 1971 and assessed a deficiency.294 7 The Commis-

sion recomputed Keogh's tip income through statistical analysis utilizing
dated entries in a personal diary kept by John Whitlock, Jr., a fellow
employee who had worked at the Dunes as a blackjack dealer from
March 1967 to May 1970.2948 The tax court agreed with the Commissioner's analysis, but reduced the asserted deficiency by twenty
percent.

29 49

On appeal, Keogh contended that the trial court erred in admitting
the diary under the business records exception. 2950 Keogh argued that
the business records exception was inappliable because the diary was not
a commercial business record maintained by one obligated to accurately
record transactions.295 1 Since the diary at issue was an employee's per2946. Id.
2947. Id. "[Tihe term 'deficiency' means the amount by which the tax imposed. . . exceeds
the excess of. . . the sum of. . . the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his
return." 26 U.S.C. § 6211(a)(1)(A) (1976). "If the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax
Court, the entire amount redetermined as the deficiency by the decision of the Tax Court
which has become final shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the
Secretary." 26 U.S.C. § 6215(a) (1976). The losing party in a Tax Court case may appeal (as
of right) to the United States Court of Appeals. 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) (1976).
2948. 713 F.2d at 498. A photocopy of the Whitlock diary was a principal piece of evidence
against Keogh. The diary contained wage entries made approximately every two weeks corresponding to the Dunes' payroll records. The diary also contained columns for "tips" in which
an entry of "off," "sick," "vac," or a dollar amount was made daily by Whitlock. The date of
the month and the day of the week were listed in the diary on the left side of each page, with
separate vertical columns designated as "gross," "net," "tax," and "tips." Id. Keogh claimed
that he recorded his daily toke income but had discarded his records each month after he
reported his income to the Dunes. However, the Commissioner's use of the Whitlock diary's
tip entries resulted in an average daily toke income per dealer that exceeded the amount reported by Keogh on his tax return. Id. at 498-99. The Ninth Circuit recognized that there
were several problems with the Commissioner's analysis. Since Whitlock's diary covered only
a portion of the years in question, some calculations were necessarily extrapolated from
amounts that Whitlock had entered in previous years: In addition, Whitlock was not a 21
dealer during the entire time covered by the diary, and it was unclear when he switched from
being a craps dealer (who earns more in tokes than a 21 dealer) to a blackjack dealer. Furthermore, the Commissioner's analysis ignored consultations with gaming experts outside of the
IRS and failed to consider other relevant factors such as the economy, seasons, etc. Finally,
Whitlock had an undisputedly poor reputation for truthfulness and honesty, had been fired
from the Dunes for unsatisfactory work and had been convicted of receiving stolen property.
Id.
Barbara Mikle, Whitlock's former wife, also testified at Keogh's trial concerning the entries in Whitlock's diary. Although Whitlock himself had been subpoenaed by the Commissioner, he failed to appear at trial. Id. at 499.
2949. Id.
2950. Id. at 499-500.
2951. Id. To support this proposition, Keogh cited United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 759-
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sonal record rather than a record of the business concern involved (the
Dunes), Keogh reasoned that the diary was not a "business record. '295 2
The Ninth Circuit disagreed.2 95 3 The court indicated that personal
records maintained for business purposes may be able to qualify as busi-

ness records, provided that such records are regularly and continually
maintained, and checked systematically in order to establish the reliability usually found in records kept by a business enterprise.29 54 The court
reasoned that although Whitlock's diary was personal to him, it showed
every indication of being kept in the course of his "business activity. '2955
Furthermore, Whitlock's former wife testified 2956 concerning the regularity of the entries as follows: (1) that she had seen only Whitlock make

entries; (2) that he usually entered them after his work shift and made no
entries on his days off; (3) that when no entries were made for three to

four days, he would copy entries for those days from a record kept in his
wallet; and (4) that she understood that his diary contained a record of
295 7
tips he had received as a blackjack dealer.
64 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (telex summarizing two year old bank records made in response to subpoena inadmissible under business records exception; telex was not prepared at or near time of
the acts reported, telex was not sent in regular course of business, and trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to admit telex where circumstances indicated lack of trustworthiness)
and Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Randall, 532 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1976) (bank's loan
procedure manual inadmissible as business record because it was not made as record of any
act, transaction, event, or occurrence, and because it was not made contemporaneously with
transaction or within reasonable time thereafter). However, the Ninth Circuit used these same
cases as support for its conclusion that the Whitlock diary was admissible as a business record.
The court stated that the cases stressed "just the sort of timeliness and regularity of entries that
are present here." 713 F.2d at 500. The Keogh court also cited Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank,
415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1969) (blue covered book in which decedent recorded checks and reconciled his bank statements contemporaneously with writing of checks and analysis of statements
admissible as business record, even though check record kept by decedent was used in his
personal business) to support its finding that the diary was admissible as a business record. 713
F.2d at 500.
2952. 713 F.2d at 499.
2953. Id.
2954. Id. (citing 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE % 803(6)[03], at
803-155 (1981); United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1980) (diary kept
by contractor's employee who was responsible for making extortionate payoffs to city building
inspectors admissible as business record); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1347-50
(7th Cir. 1979) (desk calendar appointment diaries kept by unindicted co-conspirator, a corporate officer who testified for the government in prosecution of defendant corporation's alleged
bribery of city officials, were admissible as business records; diaries were kept as part of business activity, entries were made with regularity at or near time of described event, and corporate officer, who needed to rely on entries, would have little reason to distort or falsify entries).
2955. Id.
2956. The principal evidence at trial was a photocopy of the Whitlock diary and testimony
by Whitlock's former wife. Whitlock himself was subpoenaed by the Commissioner, but failed
to appear. Id.
2957. Id. at 499-500.
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The court further found that the diary entries were reliable notwithstanding Keogh's contrary contention. 295 8 The court reasoned that because the diary contained Whitlock's own personal financial records, his
motives in making the entries were not suspect absent a reason for him to
have lied to himself.2 9 9 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court
had not abused its discretion by admitting the diary without the personal
testimony of Whitlock, its "custodian," 2 960 concerning his reliance on the
records kept there. 2961 The court noted that the record failed to suggest
that Whitlock did no rely on his personal financial diary.29 62
Finally, the court rejected Keogh's contention that admission of the
Whitlock diary violated the "best evidence" rule because it was a photocopy. 2 963 Keogh urged that the tax court erred in determining that there
2958. Id. at 500. The trial court may exclude an otherwise proper business record if "the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness." FED. R. EVID. 803(6). Keogh cited Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) to
support his contention that the diary entries were untrustworthy because there was no explanation concerning Whitlock's motives for preparing the diary. 713 F.2d at 500. In Palmer,a
railroad was barred from using the report of a deceased engineer in a grade crossing collision
case because the record had been made in contemplation of the litigation. The Court indicated
that in determining whether the source of the information was contained in a business record
or whether its method of preparation was trustworthy, the trial court may look to the motivation for the report as an aid. 318 U.S. at 114. The Keogh court held that Palmer was inapposite because there was "no evidence that Whitlock's motives in making the entries were
suspect." 713 F.2d at 500.
2959. 713 F.2d at 500. The trustworthiness of the tip entries was further substantiated by
the fact that other entries corresponded with the casino's payroll records. The court did not
consider the tip entries to be any less reliable merely because Whitlock had reported less tip
income to the government than he had in fact received and entered into the diary. Id.
2960. The foundation for the admission of a business record may be "shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witness." FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
2961. 713 F.2d at 500.
2962. Id.
2963. Id. The "best evidence" rule generally requires the production of an original in order
to prove the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph unless the original is shown to be
unavailable. FED. R. EVID. 1002, 1004. "The 'best evidence' rule comes into play only when
the terms of a writing are being established and an attempt is made to offer secondary evidence,
i.e., a copy, to prove the contents of the original writing." J. COTCHETr & A. ELKIN, FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE § 1002, at 188 (1983). In Keogh, the government offered a
photocopy of the Whitlock diary rather than the original. 713 F.2d at 500. A photocopy is
considered to be a "duplicate" under FED. R. EVID. 1001(4). However, "[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate
in lieu of the original." FED. R. EvID. 1003. Several authors have commented that:
Rule 1003 departs from the common law in providing that a duplicate is admissible
to the same extent as an original unless a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or it would be unfair to admit the duplicate under the circumstances of a particular case. In essence, someone opposing the introduction of a
duplicate must show some reason why the original should be produced. In common
law jurisdictions, the assumption is that the Best Evidence Rule, adopted for the
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was no genuine question as to the original's authenticity.2 9
However,
the Ninth Circuit explained that Keogh's contention that the testimony
of Whitlock's former wife failed to prove the source of the entries did not
address whether the duplicate diary was an accurate photocopy of the
diary kept by Whitlock.2 965 Since no one disputed that the photocopy

was a duplicate of the diary actually kept by Whitlock, the tax court
did
2966
not violate the "best evidence" rule in admitting the photocopy.
e. public records exception
The public records exception 29 67 allows into evidence a broad category of writings that would otherwise be regarded as inadmissible hearsay. The exception is premised upon the inherent reliability of public
records and the desire to avoid the inconvenience of bringing busy public
employees into court to testify as to matters that generally have been
thoroughly and reliably reported and recorded.2 96 8
However, concerns voiced in the House of Representatives regarding the validity of this rationale when applied in the criminal context
purposes of avoiding fraud and insuring accuracy, must rest on the opposite premise,
i.e., the original must be favored without any special showing.
S. SALTZBURG

& K.

REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL §

1003, at 736 (3d

ed. 1982).
2964. 713 F.2d at 500.
2965. Id.
2966. Id.
2967. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). The public records or reports qualifying under this exception
fall into three broad classes: (1) reports concerning the activities of the office or agency
((803)(8)(A)); (2) reports or records concerning matters observed, provided that matters were
recorded in the course of the declarant's official duties imposed by law (specifically excluding
in criminal cases matters observed by law enforcement personnel) ((803)(8)(B)); and (3) in civil
actions and criminal actions against the government, factual findings resulting from an authorized investigation ((803)(8)(C)). Although "the public record rule itself is silent [concerning] a
requirement of personal knowledge. . . the general notes to Rule 803 indicate that this condition applies." 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(8)[03], at 803247 (1984).
2968. See generally 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 1 803(8)[01]. See also FED.
R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee note ("justification for the exception is the assumption
that a public official will perform his duty properly and the unlikelihood that he will remember
details independently of the record"). But see S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 803 at 578-79 (3d ed. 1982) (emphasis added):
The theory of the exception, or the apparent theory, is that government reports are
probably reliable. This factor, together with the difficulty that government officials
have in recalling specific incidents, results in a very broad hearsay exception. It is
probably true that although specific agencies can be counted on to be more exact
than others and that even within an agency one part may be more careful than another, this Rule sweeps with a broad brush. When it is remembered that there is no
requirementin this section that thosepersons contributingto a reportmust all be under
a duty to the government agency, it is apparenthow untrustworthy certain information
may be.
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moved Congress to amend the public records exception to exclude in
criminal cases records of observations by police officers and other mem-

bers of law enforcement agencies. 2969 This exclusion in turn has raised
the recurring problem of whether the business records exception 2 970 can
be used to admit evidence in a criminal case that is excluded under Rule
803(8).2971

The Ninth Circuit recently held in United States v. Wilson 29 72 that a

marshal's receipt for a United States prisoner qualified as a public record
under the exception.29 73 Wilson was convicted of escaping from a federal

halfway house where he was serving a sentence for counterfeiting, a misdemeanor.2974 His sentence had been reduced to six months on the condition that he spend the time in a treatment-oriented institution. 9 75
However, two weeks after Wilson arrived at the halfway house, he signed
out and failed to return. 2 97 6 The defendant was subsequently stopped by
marshals who asked for some identification. He tendered two pieces of
false identification and offered a phony explanation as to why he was in
the area.2 977 The officers arrested the defendant. 978
2969. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary. See also 4 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2877, at 803-194. Cf J. COTCHETT & A. ELKIN, FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE 152 (1983):
Much controversy surrounded the adoption of 803(8). The House, desiring to restrict the scope of subsection (b), added the latter qualifying conditions as to the
admissibility of reports on matters observed. This was done to limit the admissibility
of law enforcement reports. . . . The purpose of the criminal law enforcement reports exception was to exclude observation made by officials at the scene of a crime
or apprehension, because observations made in an adversial setting are less reliable
than observations made by public officials in other situations. Congress, however,
did not intend to exclude records of routine, non-adversarial matters.
Id. (citing United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
564 (1980) (warrant of deportation made by law enforcement officer in criminal case considered ministerial observation and hence admissible)).
2970. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). For a discussion of the business records exception, see supra
notes 2908-66 and accompanying text.
2971. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 2879, at 579.
2972. 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 205 (1983).
2973. Id. at 1275-76.
2974. Id. at 1269-70. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General
or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility in which he is
confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any custody under or by
virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States . . . pursuant to
lawful arrest, shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge
of felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. ...
18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
2975. 690 F.2d at 1270.
2976. Id.
2977. Id.
2978. Id.
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Wilson raised three evidentiary claims on appeal. First, he challenged the admission of photocopies of the two pieces of false identification, claiming that these photocopies did not qualify for admission under
the business records exception to the hearsay rule.29 79 Secondly, he argued that the introduction of a certified copy of the judgment and order
relating to the underlying crime for which he was serving his sentence at
the time of his escape was inadmissible hearsay because it related to a
misdemeanor conviction. Therefore, he contended that the prior conviction did not come within the judgment of previous conviction exception
to the hearsay rule. 2980 However, the court concluded that the objections
2981
were waived because the defendant had failed to raise them at trial.
Finally, Wilson urged that the marshal's receipt indicating that a
United States prisoner, Wilson, had been delivered to the halfway house
from which he had escaped was inadmissible hearsay.29 82 Although the
2979. Id. at 1275. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6) which provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule. . .: A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions,
or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with the knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method
or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
For a discussion of the business records exception, see supra notes 2908-66 and accompanying
text. The Wilson court points out in a footnote that the photocopies were independently admissible under FED. R. EVID. 1003, which makes duplicates admissible unless a genuine question is raised concerning the original's authenticity or unless it would be unfair to admit the
duplicate under the circumstances. Because the photocopies were certified on both sides as
required by FED. R. EVID. 902(4) (self-authentication of certified public records), the court
reasoned that they also could have been introduced under the public records exception, FED.
R. EVID. 803(8), regardless of the defendant's challenge to their admissibility as business
records. 690 F.2d at 1275 n.2.
2980. Id. at 1275. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22). The defendant correctly noted that the misdemeanor conviction for which he was serving a six month sentence was not a crime "punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year" as required by Rule 803(22). 690 F.2d at
1275. However, the court did not need to address this issue because it concluded that Wilson
had waived this objection. Id.
2981. 690 F.2d at 1275. In this regard, see the discussion of the waiver rule under the coconspirator exception at note 2766, supra. A party in a criminal action must make "known to
the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the
court and the grounds therefor [unless he] has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 51. Furthermore, "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits. . . evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and. . . a timely objection
or a motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific
ground was not apparent from the context." FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1). The Wilson court
noted that Wilson's attorney failed to object to the admission of the photocopies and specifically stated that "he had no objection to the admission of the judgment and the commitment
order itself," thereby waiving any objections on appeal. 690 F.2d at 1275.
2982. 690 F.2d at 1275.
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court noted that this hearsay objection was properly raised at trial, it
held that the evidence was nevertheless admissible under the public
records exception. 29 3 The court reasoned that the receipt had been
properly authenticated at trial by the director of the halfway house, who
had signed the document.29 84
Implicit in the holding was the court's judgment that the receipt at
issue was not the observation of the marshal, which would have been
298
inadmissible under the exclusion for observations of police officers.
Instead, the court viewed the document as the observation of the corrections officer who signed it.

f

harmless error

Although the Supreme Court has held that the introduction of hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant may violate the confrontation
clause,2986 the erroneous introduction of inadmissible hearsay against a
criminal defendant does not necessarily assume constitutional proportions.2987 When the introduction of hearsay amounts to a violation of an
evidentiary rule, the courts consider its prejudicial impact under the
"harmless error" standard set forth in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure.2988
In United States v. Greene,2 98 9 the Ninth Circuit held that the erro-

neous introduction of hearsay evidence in a prosecution for tax evasion
2983. Id. at 1275-76. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) and supra note 2979.
2984. 690 F.2d at 1275-76. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a), (b)(1), (b)(7) (requirement of authentication may be established by testimony of witness with knowledge; public records routinely
authenticated by mere proof of custody). See also FED. R. EvID. 901 advisory committee note.
2985. "Matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel" are excluded in criminal cases from the public records and reports exception. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)
(3). See supra notes 2967 & 2969.
2986. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1970).
2987. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970). See also United States v. Castillo, 615
F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing the Dutton four factor test for determining whether
admission of hearsay amounts to a constitutional violation). The Castillo court also observed
that when the introduction of inadmissible hearsay arguably violates the confrontation clause,
the court must determine whether the error was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
2988. "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). Thus, reversal under this standard is only
required if the error affected "substantial rights," which means that "nonconstitutional errors
are measured against the more-probable-than-not standard." United States v. Valle-Valdez,
554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977). Therefore, the appellate court may affirm if it finds that the
introduction of the hearsay statement "was more probably than not harmless." United States
v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d at 916).
2989. 698 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1983).
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was harmless
error because it affected none of the accused's substantial
0
rights.

29 9

Greene was found guilty of willfully attempting to evade payment of
federal income taxes as a result of understating his taxable income for
two consecutive years.299 1 On appeal, he challenged his conviction in
part on the claim that the trial court committed reversible error when it
erroneously permitted the introduction of an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) agent's hearsay testimony.29 92 The disputed testimony consisted of
the agent's
conversations with individuals, revealing Greene's true net
93
worth.

29

Assuming that the disputed testimony was hearsay, the court con-

sidered the prejudicial effect of the evidence in light of the harmless error
rule,2 99 4 since Greene did not contend that the error reached constitu-

tional proportions.2995 The court concluded, after reviewing the record,
that the error was more probably than not harmless, and resulted in no
violation of Greene's substantial rights.29 96
8. The right to present evidence
A criminal defendant has the right to present favorable evidence
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.2 9 97 The accused's right to
2990. Id. at 1375.
2991. Id. at 1367. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982) provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed
by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by
law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
2992. 698 F.2d at 1375.
2993. Id. The government was forced to use a net worth method of computing Greene's
taxable income because Greene refused to answer any questions or provide records to the IRS
agent. The government simply estimated the increase in Greene's net assets in order to determine his true taxable income. Id. at 1370.
2994. See supra note 3.
2995. 698 F.2d at 1375. The Greene court noted in passing that there were no constitutional
issues that could have been raised by Greene's evidentiary challenge. Id.
2996. Id. The court's conclusion that the error was harmless was substantiated by the record. The court noted that at trial, "the government introduced the testimony of 59 witnesses
and 345 exhibits in order to prove that Greene had unreported income in 1973 and 1974 upon
which a tax of $97,000 was due." Id. at 1367.
2997. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
...
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. This right
"is so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1967) (footnote
omitted). The right to compulsory process implicitly precludes the state from arbitrarily excluding the testimony of a witness, because "[t]he Framers of the Constitution did not intend
to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses
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introduce evidence, however, is not absolute.2 998 The states have a legitimate interest in reliable and efficient trials and are free to fashion rules of
evidence and procedure for their own courts.2 9 9 9 Therefore, evidence
may be excluded when a significant state interest is at issue. 3°°° In order
to resolve the inherent conflict between state evidentiary rules of exclusion and the defendant's right to present evidence, the United States
Supreme Court has used a balancing approach which weighs the interest
of the defendant against the state's interest in the evidentiary rule. °° 1

In Perry v. Rushen,3 °°2 the Ninth Circuit held that the application of
California evidence law to exclude evidence proffered by the defendant,

that a third party committed the charged offense, did not violate due
process or the defendant's right to compulsory process under the United

States Constitution.

°°3

Perry was convicted in California Superior

Court of aggravated assault. 3"

The female victim had been attacked in

whose testimony he had no right to use." Id. at 23. In addition, the accused's right to due
process in a criminal trial "is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses
in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process." Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
2998. Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in
his own defense. . . . [But] [i]n
the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required
of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed
to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (citations omitted) (trial court erred in excluding hearsay statements of a third person who had orally confessed to the three isolated murders with which the
defendant had been charged; state's further refusal to permit defendant to cross-examine the
third person after defendant called him as a witness deprived defendant of a fair trial in violation of due process).
2999. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) (state interest in reliable trials can
prevail over defendant's right to exclude out of court statements under the confrontation
clause where hearsay evidence is necessary and reliable); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295 ("[T]he
right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.").
3000. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 243 (1895)) (" 'general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and
valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case.' ").
3001. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Green v.Georgia, 442 U.S. 95,
97 (1979) (per curiam) ("Regardless of whether the proffered testimony comes within Georgia's hearsay rule, under the facts of this case its exclusion constituted a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
3002. 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983).
3003. Id. at 1455.
3004. Id. at 1449. "Every person who commits an assault upon the person of another...
by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison for two, three or four years .... ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1984). "Assault" is defined as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to
commit a violent injury on the person of another." CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1970).
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a park and had twice identified Perry as the perpetrator, once at the police station shortly following the attack and again at Perry's trial.3" 5
Perry testified in his own defense that he had never entered the park on
the day of the attack.3 ° 6 He attempted to support his story by proffering
the testimony of two women who had been robbed and raped in the same
area of the park by another man who, Perry argued, resembled him."'
One attack had occurred three years before and the other had taken place
just an hour before the charged assault." ° 8 Perry contended that the
proffered evidence-that a similar looking man had committed assaults
in a similar fashion in the same area of the park around the same timesuggested that the other man might have committed the charged
assault.3c °9
However, under California Evidence Code section 352, the trial
court is given discretion to exclude such collateral evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. ' 30 10 California courts have interpreted section 352 to
mean that evidence of third party culpability, which merely suggests that
someone other than the defendant has committed the offense, is inadmissible, unless coupled with substantial evidence directly connecting that
third party with the commission of the crime in question. ° 1 After com3005. 713 F.2d at 1448-49. The victim's identification was based on Perry's general appearance as well as a distinctive scar on his forehead. He was also identified by other witnesses
who had observed him in the park moments before the attack and again when he was fleeing
from the area after the victim screamed. Id. at 1449.
3006. Id.
3007. Id. The court noted that
[b]oth Perry and Wolfe are black, of similar height and weight, and had distinctive
"sectionally braided" hair on the day of the assault. On that afternoon, Wolfe was

wearing a brown leather jacket and blue jeans; Perry wore a light brown jacket and
blue warm-up pants. Wolfe [was] convicted of both previous attacks.
Id.
3008. Id.
3009. Id.
3010. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966). The Perry court observed that § 352 resembles
Rule 403 of the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. 713 F.2d at 1449 n.1. Rule 403 provides:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
FED. R. EvID. 403.

3011. This is California's so-called Mendez-Arline rule. 713 F.2d at 1449 (citing People v.
Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 22, 609 P.2d 468, 480, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13 (1980)). Accord People v.
Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 P. 65 (1924); overruled on other grounds, People V. McCaughan, 49
Cal. 2d 409, 317 P.2d 974 (1957); People v. Arline, 13 Cal. App. 3d 200, 91 Cal. Rptr. 520
(1970); People v. Edmond, 200 Cal. App. 2d 278, 19 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1962)). In Arline, the
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paring photographs of the defendant and the third party in Perry, the
trial judge concluded that misidentification by the victim was unlikely. 30 12 Therefore, he exercised his discretion under section 352 to exclude the evidence.3 0 1 3
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Perry's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.3 1 4 In so holding, the court applied a
balancing test in order to resolve the conflict between the competing individual and state interests. The court balanced Perry's right to present
evidence against the state's interest in applying the evidentiary rule excluding such evidence. 30 1 5 The court indicated that a prerequisite to the
application of the balancing test is a determination of the weight to be
given to the respective interests which conflict.301 6 While the court conceded that the right to present a defense is fundamental, 0 17 it rejected
Perry's contention that the right to present evidence carried such conclusive weight that it was unconstitutional to exclude any relevant evidence. 0 8 Instead, the court declared that the state also has a legitimate
defendant sought to introduce evidence that a third person committed a prior robbery using
the same modus operandi as the robbery in which the defendant was charged. The evidence
was offered to establish that the third person committed the charged offense, not the defendant. However, the evidence advanced failed to sufficiently establish a modus operandi. Therefore, the trial court properly excluded the evidence under § 352 as not tending to directly
connect the third person with the charged robbery. Arline, 13 Cal. App. 3d at 204, 91 Cal.
Rptr. at 522. In Green, the California Supreme Court affirmed the Mendez-Arline rule and set
forth the principle that a defendant's proffered evidence that another person committed the
offense at issue is inadmissible "if it simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against such
person; rather, it must be coupled with substantial evidence tending to directly connect that
person with the actual commission of the offense." People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 22, 609 P.2d
468, 480, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13 (1980). The Green court reasoned that the Mendez-Arline rule
places "reasonable limits on the trial of collateral issues. . . and. . . avoid[s] undue prejudice
to the People from unsupported jury speculation as to the guilt of other suspects." Id. (citations omitted).
3012. 713 F.2d at 1449. The judge explained: "'Except for the race of the man, there is
nothing similar.'" Id.
3013. Id. Perry was subsequently convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to three
years in prison. Id.
3014. Id. at 1455.
3015. Id. at 1450.
3016. Id.
3017. Id.(citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); United States v. Garner,
581 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ballesteros-Acuna, 527 F.2d 928, 930 (9th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 335 (6th Cir. 1973)).
3018. 713 F.2d at 1451. Perry cited United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.
1980), as support for this proposition. In Armstrong, the defendant was charged with committing three armed robberies. Testimony that another man who matched the robber's description had used "bait money" from one of the robberies to purchase an automobile was excluded
as "irrelevant." The Ninth Circuit reversed, and held that "[fJundamental standards of relevancy, subject to the discretion of the court to exclude cumulative evidence and to ensure
orderly presentation of a case, require the admission of testimony which tends to prove that a

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

and compelling interest in reliable and efficient trials.

° 9

The court fur-

ther suggested that unusually compelling circumstances are required
before the state's strong interest in efficiently administering trials is outSince the exclusion of relevant evidence significant to
weighed."'
person other than the defendant committed the crime that is charged." 621 F.2d at 953 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, "exclusion of this testimony was prejudicial." Id.
The Perry court, however, distinguished Armstrong in two respects. First, Armstrong involved
the erroneous exclusion of evidence under FED. R. EvID. 403. Second, the Armstrong court
did not mention the sixth amendment or due process. Thus, the Perry court reasoned that
Armstrong did not support "a belief that the Federal Rules of Evidence are constitutionally
required, or that the Constitution requires admission of all relevant evidence." 713 F.2d at
1451.
The Ninth Circuit indicated that Perry had similarly misplaced reliance on United States
v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1976) (exclusion of testimony that person in bank surveillance photograph resembled a suspect in other robberies and not the defendant constituted
reversible error because it severely prejudiced defendant's alibi defense), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1050 (1978) and Holt v. United States, 342 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1965) (error to exclude testimony relevant to defendant's alibi defense). The Perry court acknowledged that the Fifth
Circuit seemingly equated Rule 403 with due process in United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239,
244 (5th Cir. 1981) ("If the trial court abuses its discretion in excluding evidence under Rule
403, the error is of constitutional proportion.") Yet the Ninth Circuit in Perry declined to
equate Rule 403 with the "due process line" or to agree "that every error in applying such a
rule results in a constitutional violation." 713 F.2d at 1451 n.2.
Finally, the Perry court distinguished Armstrong on its facts. The court concluded that
the evidence offered in Armstrong-that a man matching the robber's description had used
bait money to buy an automobile the day after the robbery-may have presented "some 'substantial evidence tending to directly connect that person with the actual commission of the
offense.'" Id. at 1451 (citing People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 22, 609 P.2d 468, 480, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 3 (1980)).
3019. 713 F.2d at 1451 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (state's interest in
efficient criminal trial process sufficient to bar federal courts from enjoining most state criminal
and effective law
trials); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (state interest in "[flair
enforcement" outweighs reporter's first amendment interest in withholding source's identity);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965) (state's prohibition of picketing near courthouse
justified by interest in protecting judicial system); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-12
(1974) (interest in preserving confidentiality in White House conversations outweighed by
demonstrated need for evidence in pending criminal trial); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
(accused's right to confront witnesses under confrontation clause can be outweighed by state's
interest in reliable trials where hearsay evidence is necessary and trustworthy)).
3020. Id. at 1452. The Ninth Circuit relied on two Supreme Court cases, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), for this proposition. In Chambers, the defendant sought to introduce testimony that a third person had
confessed to the crime charged. The Court indicated that the hearsay was reliable because it
was against the declarant's interest, and critical because only the excluded evidence could
present Chamber's side of the story. Therefore, the exclusion of this reliable and critical evidence deprived the defendant of due process. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. In Washington, the
trial court excluded the proffered testimony of the defendant's accomplice in a murder prosecution pursuant to an antiquated state statute, barring persons charged or convicted as coparticipants in the same offense from testifying for one another but not for the prosecution.
The evidence indicated that the defendant had tried to persuade the accomplice to leave the
scene, and that Washington had in fact fled before the accomplice fired the fatal shot. The
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Perry's defense implicated both his right to due process and his right to
compulsory process, it was necessary for the court to balance the significance of Perry's proffered evidence against the state's interest in exclud302 1
ing it.
In applying the balancing test to the facts in Perry, the court noted
that the state's interest in excluding the evidence under section 352 was
significant, though not compelling. 30 22 The state's interest was two-fold:
(1) to limit distractions resulting from the introduction of evidence on a
collateral matter; and (2) to avoid unsupported jury speculation concerning the guilt of other suspects.30 23 The court reasoned that the state had
a legitimate interest in avoiding the injection of collateral issues into the
trial because of the time required to present not only Perry's evidence,30 24
but also the prosecution's rebuttal evidence. 3 25 The Ninth Circuit also
evidentiary rule excluding such testimony was apparently based on the belief that accomplices
would commit perjury in order to get each other acquitted. Washington, 388 U.S. at 21. However, the Supreme Court held that the state's rule violated the defendant's right to compulsory
process because "the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who
was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed,
and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense." Id. at 23.
The Perry court concluded that "[iln each of these cases, the [excluded] evidence was
highly exculpatory: third party confessions, if believed, would necessarily exonerate the defendant of the primary offense. In each case, also, the evidence was crucial to the defense; no
other avenues were available to prove the defendant's story." 713 F.2d at 1452 (emphasis in
original). Relying upon these precedents, the district court in Perry had concluded that the
exclusion of the evidence at issue did not violate due process because it was not both crucial
and exculpatory. Id. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt a per se test that only
the exclusion of "crucial and exculpatory" evidence can violate due process. Id. Rather, it
concluded that Chambersand Washington established that "[w]here the state interest is strong,
only the exclusion of critical, reliable and highly probative evidence will violate due process.
When the state interest is weaker, less significant evidence is protected." Id.
3021. 713 F.2d at 1452-53. The court stated:
In .evaluating the significance of the evidence, the court should consider all of the
circumstances: its probative value on the central issue, its reliability, whether it is
capable of evaluation by the finder of fact, whether it is the sole evidence on the issue
or merely cumulative, and whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. The weight of the state's interest likewise depends upon many factors. The
Court must determine the purpose of the rule, its importance, how well the rule
implements this purpose, and how well the purpose applies in the case at hand. The
court must give due weight to the substantial state interest in preserving orderly
trials, in judicial efficiency, in excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence.
Id.
3022. Id. at 1453.
3023. Id. at 1453-54 (citing People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 22, 609 P.2d 468, 480, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 13 (1980) (citation omitted in original)).
3024. Although Perry's attorney urged that his presentation of the witnesses' testimony
would require only 45 minutes, the Ninth Circuit suggested that "the introduction of evidence
of [the third party's] crimes quite possibly might require rebuttal or, at the most extreme, a
full-scale defense of [the third party] by the prosecution." Id. at 1453.
3025. Id.
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found that the state had a legitimate interest in avoiding jury confusion.
The court recognized that although the jury's role is to weigh conflicting
inferences of fact, certain evidence may have so little probative value and
produce such confusion that it may be constitutionally excluded. 02 6

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the weight which it
accorded these interests depended upon the relevance of the excluded
matter. 02 7
The court concluded that Perry's proffered evidence was only
slightly connected to this case. 30 28 The court observed that the evidence
identifying Perry as the assailant was strong; 30 29 that the third party
"suspect" lacked Perry's prominent forehead scar; that the third party's
facial features did not resemble Perry's;3030 and that the clothing worn by
the third party was clearly distinguishable from the clothes worn by
Perry.30 3 1 Accordingly, the evidence had little probative value on the
issue of identification.30 3 2
The court similarly rejected Perry's contention that the evidence
30 33
concerning the third party raised a significant question of identity.
The court explained that the cases Perry relied upon involved circumstances under which the defendant sought to introduce the testimony of
an eyewitness who identified a person other than the defendant as the
perpetrator of the charged offense, 30 3 4 or where the defendant sought to
introduce the direct testimony of a third party who would have admitted
3026. Id. at 1453-54.
3027. Id. at 1454.
3028. Id. The court reasoned that the testimony would merely "show that another black
man, of roughly Perry's height and weight, wearing braided hair and somewhat similar clothing was near the scene an hour before and had a history of sexual assaults." Id.
3029. Id. Perry was positively identified by the victim only minutes after the attack. Id.
3030. In addition, Perry wore chin whiskers and a mustache, while the third party was clean
shaven. Id. Moreover, the victim's assailant had been jogging with a dog. Id. at 1448. The
third party did not have a dog. Id. at 1454.
3031. "[A]lthough both wore blue pants, [the third party's] jeans were not likely to be mistaken for the warm-up pants worn by Perry." Id. at 1454.
3032. Id. The Perry court concluded that Perry's case was analogous to United States v.
Brannon, 616 F.2d 413 (9th Cir.) (no abuse of discretion under FED. R. EvID. 403 to exclude
photographs offered by the defendant in a bank robbery prosecution of another person who
defendant claimed resembled the person shown in bank surveillance photographs), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980). 713 F.2d at 1454.
3033. 713 F.2d at 1454. Perry relied on Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979) for this proposition.
3034. Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476 (1st Cir.) (sixth amendment right to call witnesses in
one's defense required that defendant be permitted to call an eyewitness and ask questions
about an earlier misidentification in order to raise the defense that another man, with similar
characteristics, had committed the crime), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979).
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that he committed the offense for which the defendant was on trial.30 3 5
Conversely, Perry merely sought to establish that a third party, who
faintly resembled him in appearance, had committed other similar crimes

in the same area. 30 36 As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that the evidence offered by Perry failed to impugn the strong identification of him
as the victim's assailant.30 37 Thus, the evidence was not "critical" in the
constitutional balance, and its exclusion did not violate due process or
the right to compulsory process.30 38
G.

Jury Instructions

The instructions to the jury are one of the most important aspects of
the criminal trial. In addition to outlining the issues and the law, the
general instructions must include an explanation of how to weigh the
evidence presented in determining the disputed facts. It is vital that the
charge to the jury be presented in a clear, concise fashion so that obscure
legal principles are made understandable.
A common criticism of a judge's instructions is that they tend to
obfuscate and confuse the issues rather than clarify them. Indeed, it has
been said that the jury instructions consist mostly of" 'ineffective rigmaroles, incantations, or semi-magical rituals which the judge utters to the
jury's uncomprehending ears.' ,,3039 Nevertheless, a party has a right to
3035. United States v. Crenshaw, 698 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1983) (error to exclude evidence
that a third party had actually planned the robbery for which defendant was charged with
aiding and abetting).
3036. 713 F.2d at 1455.
3037. Id.
3038. Id. One commentator has suggested that the state trial court in Perry initially erred in
excluding the disputed evidence. He states:
The facts in Perrywould seem clearly to meet the test of relevancy set forth in Green.
Furthermore, the proffered evidence constituted evidence of significant probative
value to D's defense. As pointed out in People v. Reeder (1978) 82 CA3d 543, 553,
147 CR 275,281: "Evidence Code section 352 must bow to the due process right of a
defendant to a fair trial and his right to present all relevant evidence of significant
probative value to his defense." In Perry, the court should have held that it was an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude D's proffered evidence that X was
the perpetrator of the assault offense against V.
B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 22.1 at 619 (2d ed. 1982). Jefferson
explains that the Perry dissent
pointed out that the only issue was one of identity; that D persuasively suggested
similarities in appearance and in modus operandi between X and V's assailant, placed
X in physical and temporal proximity to the crime, identified and exploited a variety
of weaknesses in the prosecution identification testimony, and indicated that the
proffered evidence to establish X's culpability could be presented in less than an
hour.
Id. at 618.
3039. C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 139 (1962) (quoting Judge Jerome Frank).
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demand that the principles of law applicable to the facts in the case be
presented to the jury, and the judge has a duty to honor that request.
1. Instructions to a capital sentencing jury
In California v. Ramos,3 4 ° the defendant was convicted in the district court of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an instruction to the sentencing jury. California law required that the trial
judge inform the sentencing jury that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may at a later date be commuted or modified by the
governor to a sentence that would include the possibility of parole.3 o1
The Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court's decision
and held that the disputed instruction was not unconstitutional. 3 42
Defendant Ramos was convicted of first-degree murder committed
during the perpetration of a robbery, a "special circumstance" that allowed the jury to sentence him to death in accordance with California
On appeal, the California Supreme Court
Penal Code section 190.2.
affirmed his conviction, but reversed the death sentence, concluding that
the Briggs instruction was unconstitutional under federal standards.3o
3040. 103 S.Ct. 3446 (1983).
3041. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1984). This instruction is contained within a
section of the Penal Code that was added as a result of a voter initiative on Nov. 7, 1978.
Popularly known as the "Briggs Instruction," it "appears to be unique among the 38 states
which have capital punishment statutes currently in effect." People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553,
592, 629 P.2d 908, 830, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 288 (1982).
3042. 103 S. Ct. at 3449.
3043. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1984) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be
death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole
in any case in which one or more of the following special circumstances has been
charged and specially found. . . to be true:
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in. . . the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing...
the following felonies:
(i) Robbery in violation of Section 211.
3044. People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 353, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982). Specifically, the court found the instruction to be violative of the defendant's due process rights as
well as misleading and prejudicial. The court noted that the possibility of a future gubernatorial commutation was irrelevant to the jury's sentencing decision because it had nothing to do
with the particular defendant or his offense. The court also ruled that the instruction biased
the jurors in favor of the death penalty because they may think that is the only method for
keeping the defendant removed from society. Such a result, the court reasoned, violated Ramos' due process rights. Id. at 596-600, 629 P.2d at 933-36, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 291-94.
On remand of the case, the California Supreme Court held tha the Briggs Instruction was
unconstitutional under California's constitutional standards. People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136,
689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984).
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Certiorari was granted to review the constitutional issues involved.

In challenging the instruction, Ramos first argued that the sentencing jury could not constitutionally consider possible commutation and

that the instruction misled the jury because it did not inform it that a
death sentence could also be commuted by the governor.3 ", Justice
O'Connor, writing for jury's decision because it brought to their attention the possibility that Ramos may one day be returned to society. The
effect of this instruction was to focus the jury's attention on the defendant's possible future dangerousness and the issue whether it was desirable
that he ever be released into society.3 ° 46
The Court did not agree with the defendant's characterization of the

Briggs Instruction as "misleading." In the majority's opinion, the instruction actually clarified California's sentencing procedure by correcting the misperception that life imprisonment without possibility of
parole was irrevocable. 3 ° 7
Ramos next argued that the Briggs Instruction undermined the
jury's ability to make an individualized sentencing decision. 3 4 8 The defendant claimed that the instruction encouraged the jury to vote for the
death penalty without considering if the facts actually justified such a
severe penalty. 3 49 The majority dismissed this argument, ruling that the
Briggs Instruction did not have any limiting effect on what sentence was
3045. California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3451. Ramos specifically contended that the possible commutation of a life sentence was irrelevant to the jury's decision and that it was too
speculative for the jury to consider. Id. at 3453.
3046. Id. at 3454. The Court relied upon Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), in deciding
that consideration of a defendant's future dangerousness was not "unconstitutionally vague."
In Jurek, the Court ruled on instructions which asked the jury to determine if the defendant
would constitute a "continuing threat to society" if he were not sentenced to death. Id. at 272.
In upholding the instruction, the Court noted that "prediction of future criminal conduct is an
essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system."
Id. at 275.
Because the Briggs Instruction informed the jury that the Governor could commute a life
sentence without possibility of parole to a lesser sentence that would include the possibility of
parole, it presumably had the effect of making the jury consider if Ramos should ever be
released from prison. As the dissent points out, this would seem to encourage the jurors to
vote for a sentence of death to ensure that a dangerous felon would never be released. 103 S.
Ct. at 3460 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
3047. 103 S.Ct. at 3454-55 n.19. The majority also noted that California Penal Code § 190.3
allows the defendant to "present any evidence to show that a penalty less than death is appropriate in his case." Id.
3048. Id. at 3455.
3049. Id. at 3456. Ramos relied on Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), to support this
argument. In Beck, the Court struck down an Alabama statute that precluded giving a lesser
included offense charge in capital cases. The Court decided that the unavailability of lesser
included offense instructions and the apparent mandatory nature of the death penalty both
interject "irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process, diverting the jury's attention
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chosen, but rather, simply introduced
another element for the jury to
0 50

consider in making their decision.
Finally, the Court considered Ramos' contention that the instruction was unconstitutional because it biased the jury in favor of the death
penalty by creating the misleading impression that a death sentence was
the only way to ensure that the defendant would not return to society. 51
Ramos maintained that the jury should also have been instructed regarding the governor's power to commute a death sentence.
After first observing that Ramos never requested such an instruction
during trial, the Court concluded that an instruction revealing the governor's power to commute a death sentence may actually operate to the
defendant's disadvantage,30 5 2 and, in any event, California state law pre-

cluded giving such an instruction.

53

The fact that no other states al-

lowed any instruction at all regarding the possibility of commutation did

not sway the Court in its decision; the majority simply noted that the
states were free to provide greater criminal justice protection than that

requied by the federal Constitution.

54

In an oftentimes bitter dissent, Justice Marshall rejected the majority's arguments and claimed that the Court was encouraging the death
sentence by deceiving the jury.3 °55 His most compelling argument for
invalidating the instruction was based on the fact that the jury is told
that the governor may commute a life sentence without possibility of pafrom the central issue of whether the State has satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a capital crime." Id. at 642.
3050. 103 S. Ct. at 3456. The Court ruled that the decision in Beck v. Alabama did not apply
here because of the "fundamental differences" between the two decisions. In Beck, the Court
was concerned with the jury being diverted from its central task of determining the defendant's
guilt or innocence. But in Ramos' case, the instruction merely introduced another one of the
"'countless considerations weighed by the jury in seeking to judge the punishment appropriate
to the individual defendant.'" Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2755 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
3051. Id. at 3458.
3052. Id. The Court felt that such an instruction would somehow induce the jury to approach the sentencing decision with less appreciation of its moral impact. The Court cited
People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964) for the proposition that
a defendant would be prejudiced by such an instruction. In Morse, the California Supreme
Court held that an instruction disclosing the Governor's power to reduce a death penalty
would "foster the dual vices of foisting upon the jury alien issues and concomitantly diluting
its own sense of responsibility." Id. at 653, 388 P.2d at 47, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
3053. 103 S. Ct. at 3458. See supra note 3052.
3054. Id. at 3459-60. Justice O'Connor concluded that the Court's decision meant only that
the giving of the instruction in question was not prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
3055. 103 S. Ct. at 3460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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30 56
role, but not that the governor may also commute a death sentence.

This would presumably lead the jury to believe that voting for a death
sentence would be the only guarantee of keeping the criminal off the
streets. Justice Marshall felt this to be misleading because the governor
does have the power to commute a death sentence. ° 7
Justice Marshall also indicated that he would disallow the Briggs

Instruction because it injected a factor into the jury's considerations that
it had no relation or relevance to the character of the defendant or his
crimes.30 58 He also argued that the jury may be encouraged to impose
death to "immunize" its actions from later review by the governor. He
concluded by noting that the majority should have been swayed by the

fact that the vast majority of the states do not allow any directive at all
regarding the commutation power.3 °59
In Zant v. Stephens, 30 60 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether a death sentence may constitutionally be sustained when one of
the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury is subse-

quently ruled invalid. The Court responded in the affirmative, reversing
a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision and affirming the determination of the Georgia Supreme Court.
Defendant Stephens was found guilty of first-degree murder and the
jury sentenced him to death.30 61 The disputed jury instructions concerning the aggravating circumstances identified in the Georgia capital sentencing statute, which, if found to be true, allowed the jury to sentence
the defendant to death. 0 62
3056. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
3057. Id. at 3461 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Justice Marshall's view, the Constitution
simply does not permit a state to 'stac[k] the deck' against a capital defendant in this manner."
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968)).
3058. 103 S.Ct. at 3464 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that the possibility of the defendant's release through commutation was not a permissible factor for the jury to
consider while makings its sentencing decision.
3059. Id. at 3465-67 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). He noted that California was the only state
which actually required that the jury be instructed to consider possible gubernatorial commutation. Id. at 3466, n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun joined in a portion of the dissent, contending that the majority never
addressed the real issue, but instead substituted "an intellectual slight of hand for legal analysis." Id. at 3468 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the
Court should never have initially granted certiorari. He reasoned that the decision of the
California Supreme Court did not substantially prejudice the legitimate interests of the prosecutor. Therefore, the case was not deserving of judicial review. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
3060. 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983).
3061. Stephens was also convicted of armed robbery, kidnapping and motor vehicle theft.
He received life sentences on the robbery and kidnapping charges. Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d
397, 399 (5th Cir. 1980).
3062. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1973) provided in pertinent part:
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At the trial, the state argued that the evidence established aggravating circumstances as identified in the Georgia Code. The trial judge subsequently instructed the jury, following the basic guidelines set out in the
Code" 6 3 and observing these guidelines, the jury convicted Stephens and
sentenced him to death.
Following the trial, but before Stephens' appeal was heard by the
Georgia Supreme Court, that court struct down a portion of the state
code defining aggravating circumstances for purposes of the death penalty.3"" Nevertheless, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's death sentence, noting that the jury had found additional
aggravating circumstances present at the time of his offense that justified
imposition of the death penalty.3 °65
After Stephens had exhausted his state post-conviction remedies, his

application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the federal district
court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It

held that the jury instructions were sufficiently prejudicial to Stephens30to
66
require a reversal of the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief.

In all cases. . . for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall...
include in his instructions to the jury. . . any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory
aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence: (1) The offense
of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with a
prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions.
Stephens' prior criminal record included convictions on two counts of armed robbery, five
counts of burglary and one court of murder. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2736.
3063. The trial judge specifically instructed the sentencing jury that they could consider, as
one of the aggravating circumstances, the fact that the murder "was committed by a person
who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions." Zant v. Stephens,
456 U.S. 410, 412 n.1 (1982).
3064. In Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976), the Georgia Supreme Court
held that GA. CODE § 27-2534.1(b)(1), which allowed for the death penalty where the offense
is committed by a person with a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," was unconstitutionally vague. 236 Ga. at 541, 224 S.E.2d at 392. Interpreting the
landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (as standing for the proposition that
a "wide latitude of discretion in a jury as to whether or not to impose the death penalty is
unconstitutional," the court held that the language of the statute was too subjective to be
properly applied in as serious a matter as the death penalty. 236 Ga. at 541, 224 S.E.2d at 392.
3065. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Stephens' convictions in Stephens v. State,
237 Ga. 259, 227 S.E.2d 261 (1976). The additional aggravating circumstances found were:
"(1) The murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony. . . [and] (2) [t]he murder was committed by a person who has escaped from the lawful
custody of a peace officer .... " Id. at 261, 227 S.E.2d at 263.
3066. The Fifth Circuit found that the mere presence of the unconstitutionally vague jury
instruction regarding the aggravating circumstance "may have unduly directed the jury's attention to his prior convictions." Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397, 406 (5th Cir. 1980), as
modified, 648 F.2d 446, 446 (5th Cir. 1981). The court was concerned because the unconstitu-
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Zant v. Stephens reached the United States Supreme Court on Warden Zant's petition for certiorari. 0 67 The court first noted that it had

sought guidance on the matter from the Georgia Supreme Court, pursuant to a certified question. 31 68 Relying upon the response to this question, the majority held that previous Supreme Court cases did not require
the invalidation of Stephens' death sentence. 3 69 Finally, the Court ruled
that because the trial judge did not give undue emphasis to the rule of
aggravating statutory circumstances in his instructions to the jury, Stephens' death sentence could be upheld. 3 70 The Court observed that,

although the invalid portion of the statute may have given added weight
tional instruction had allowed the jury to consider several of Stephens' prior convictions that
they otherwise would have been forbidden to take into account. The court also observed that
there was o guarantee that the erroneous instruction "did not make a critical difference in the
jury's decision to impose the death penalty." Id.
3067. 454 U.S. 814 (1981).
3068. The certified question presented to the Georgia Supreme Court was as follows: "What
are the premises of state law that support the conclusion that the death sentence in this case is
not impaired by the invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the
jury?" Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 98, 297 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1982).
The Georgia court observed that the purpose of the statutory aggravating circumstance is
to limit to a large degree, but not completely, the factfinder's discretion. Unless at
least one of the ten statutory aggravating circumstances exists, the death penalty may
not be imposed in any event. If there exists at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, the death penalty may be imposed but the factfinder has a discretion to decline to do so without giving any reason.
Id. at 100, 287 S.E.2d at 3-4 (emphasis added).
The Georgia Supreme Court went on to say that even though one of the statutory aggravating circumstances in Stephens' case was invalid, it had "an inconsequential impact on the
jury's decision regarding the death penalty." Id. at 100, 297 S.E.2d at 4. This was because,
under Gerogia Code § 27-2503, Stephens' prior record of convictions was properly before the
jury.
3069. The Court first held that the "limited purpose" achieved by the finding of statutory
aggravating circumstances did not run afoul of the ruling in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)." Furman was summarized to stand for the proposition that "'where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.'" Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2741
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)). The majority opinion found that statutory aggravating circumstances play a "constitutionally necessary function" in that they provide for categorical narrowing at the definition stage. Id. at 2743.
The Court next considered the rule of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931),
which requires that a "general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed that it could
rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of those grounds is insufficient,
because the verdict may have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground." 103 S. Ct. at 2745.
The Supreme Court found that this rule would not require vacating Stephens' sentence, because the jury had returned a verdict that expressly relied on another valid and legally sufficient ground. Id.
3070. 103 S. Ct. at 2749. The Court in effect accepted the Georgia Supreme Court's determination that the instructions had "an inconsequential impact on the jury's decision regarding
the death penalty." Id. The Court also considered it important that the Georgia system had
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to Stephens' past convictions, this was neither prohibited by Georgia law,
nor did it constitute reversible error.30 7 '
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the Court's judgment and rejected

Stephens' argument that the erroneous instruction had a prejudicial effect on the jury. After first noting that sentencing decisions are usually
accorded much greater finality than conviction, 0 72 Justice Rehnquist argued that the improper instruction introduced only one of countless considerations of which a jury takes account in determining a sentence. As

such, the one error could not have had an inordinate effect on the jury's
decision.30 7 3

Justice Marshall, in a vigorous dissent, contended that the majority's decision left far too much discretion in the hands of the jury and was
inconsistent with the Court's earlier decisions.3 07 4 He maintained that
the jury instruction as given may have led the jurors to balance the statutory aggravating circumstances against any mitigating circumstances,

thereby depriving the defendant of any favorable circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. Justice Marshall would have
vacated Stephens' death sentence because he reasoned that there was no
way for the Court to determine whether the jury would have returned a

death sentence if the judge had not erroneously instructed it regarding
the statutory aggravating circumstances.3 7 5
These cases are but two examples of the current Supreme Court's
an indispensible procedural safeguard, "the mandatory appellate review of each death sentence
by the Georgia Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality." Id.
The Court further stated that even if the erroneous instruction placed undue emphasis on
the defendant's prior convictions, there was no constitutional right violated. The Court reasoned that nothing in the Constitution prohibits a trial judge from allowing a sentencing jury
to consider a defendant's prior criminal record in making its sentencing determination. Id.
3071. Id. at 2749-50.
3072. Id. at 2755 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
3073. Id. at 2756 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist stated that if a juror has an
erroneous or misleading factor to consider, it "ordinarily can be assumed not to have been a
necessary basis for his decision." Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The Justice based his assumption on the fact that a juror will have "countless considerations" to take into account in
the sentencing determination. But it seems that, in so important a proceeding, there should be
no risks taken whereby a juror may give undue weight to an improper factor. Simply because
there are a multitude of facts and circumstances to take into account does not mean that jurors
will not seize on one that greatly prejudices their final determination.
3074. Id. at 2757 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall decried a death sentence "based
in part upon a statutory aggravating circumstance so vague that its application turns solely on
the 'whim' of the jury." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 541,
224 S.E.2d 386, 391 (1976)).
3075. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). He would also reverse the majority's decision on the
basis of his long held belief that the death penalty itself is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 278 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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willingness to uphold state capital sentencing procedures against constitutional challenge. If, in the judgment of the Court, a state's death penalty statute genuinely allows a jury to make an individualized
determination on the basis of the defendant's character and the circumstances of the crime, the sentence will stand. The broad test for a state
death penalty statute is whether it violates the constitutional prohibition
on arbitrary and capricious sentencing determinations. 0 7 6
2.

Instructions calling for a "conclusive presumption" on the issue of
intent

In Connecticut v. Johnson,10 77 the United States Supreme Court decided, in a plurality opinion, that a jury instruction which calls for a
"conclusive presumption" on the issue of a defendant's intent could
never be treated as harmless error. 0 7 In affirming the judgment of the
Connecticut Supreme Court, the Court held that such a presumption became the equivalent of a directed verdict and deprived the defendant of
the unfettered consideration of the jury.30 7 9
Defendant Johnson had been convicted in the Connecticut Superior
Court of attempted murder, kidnapping in the second degree, robbery in
the first degree, and sexual assault in the first degree. 30 80 The judge had
3076. A stark illustration of the high Court's recent interpretations of state death penalty
statutes is the increased frequency of executions being carried out in many states. The current
attitude of a majority of the Court may best be summed up in an except from a recent decision
denying an application for a stay of execution. In a case that had been before the Supreme
Court on four previous occasions, the majority opinion observed that "[t]his case has been in
litigation for a full decade, with repetitive and careful reviews by both state and federal courts,
and by this Court. There must come an end to the process of consideration and reconsideration." Sullivan v. Wainwright, 104 S. Ct. 450, 452 (1983) (per curiam). In a concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Burger denied that the Court had "rushed to judgment" and declared
that "[t]he argument so often advanced by the dissenters that capital punishment is cruel and
unusual is dwarfed by the cruelty of ten years on death row inflicted upon this guilty defendant
by lawyers seeking to turn the administration of justice into the sporting context that Roscoe
Pound denounced three-quarters of a century ago." Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
3077. 460 U.S. 73 (1983) (plurality opinion).
3078. Justice Stevens did not feel that the case raised a valid federal question, and argued
that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. However, since a fifth vote was needed to
authorize the entry of a Court judgment, he joined with the plurality. Id. at 89-90 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
3079. Id. at 84.
3080. Id. at 75. The evidence showed that Johnson had agreed to ride with a young woman
in her car to show her the way to her destination. Instead the defendant and four companions
seized her car, robbed the woman, and threatened her with bodily harm. Thereafter, all five
men sexually assaulted her. A short while later, Johnson directed the driver to a bridge, bound
the woman's hands with a cord and threw her over the railing into a river. She managed to
surive this ordeal, obtain help and subsequently identify Johnson and his accomplices, Id. at
76-77.
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instructed the jury first that the state had to prove the existence of every
element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt and explained
the presumption of innocence. 0 8 1 The court next described the element
of intent to the jury and stated that "'a person's intention may be inferred from his conduct and every person is conclusively presumed to
intend the natural and necessary consequences of his act.' "3082
On appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, Johnson argued that
the foregoing "conclusive presumption" instruction was unconstitutional
under the ruling of a recent United States Supreme Court case.30 83 The
Connecticut court agreed, and reversed the defendant's convictions for
attempted murder and robbery.30 84 Subsequently, the Supreme Court
granted the state's petition for certiorari because there had been inconsistent state court opinions on the subject.30 8 5
Analogizing to the decision in Sandstrom v. Montana,0 8 6 the plurality opinion observed that a "conclusive presumption" on the issue of intent would ease the state's burden of proof and may have led the jurors to
believe that, once they found certain preliminary facts, they had to rule
against the defendant on the element of intent.30 87 Since such an error
would violate Johnson's basic constitutional rights, it could not be
3081. Id. at 78.
3082. Id. (quoting court transcript at 22-23).
3083. Id. at 79. In the interim between Johnson's conviction and appeal, the Supreme Court
decided the case of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). In Sandstrom, a unanimous
Supreme Court declared that a jury instruction which stated that "'[t]he law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts' "was unconstitutional because
it deprived the defendant of his right to due process of law. Id. at 513-14. The Sandstrom
Court decided that because the jury could have "interpreted the judge's instruction as constituting either a burden-shifting presumption. . . or a conclusive presumption," it invaded the
fact-finding mission of the jury and relieved the state or proving the existence of every element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 524.
3084. 460 U.S. at 79-80. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed Johnson's convictions for
kidnapping and sexual assault because the instructions regarding those offenses did not include
the "conclusive presumption" language.
3085. Id. at 75. In Sandstrom, the Court merely ruled that such an instruction violated the
due process clause. The Court left open the question whether the giving of the instruction
could ever be harmless error. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526-27 (1979).
In its petition for certiorari, the state argued that the erroneous jury instruction should
have been analyzed for harmlessness under the rule announced in Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the Supreme Court observed that "there are some constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error," id. at
23, thus implying that violation of other constitutional rights may be harmless under the circumstances. But the Court went on to declare that before a constitutional error could be held
harmless, "the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. at 24.
3086. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). See supra note 3083.
3087. 460 U.S. at 84 (quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979)). The Court
held that the trial judge's instruction may have led the jurors to disregard Johnson's defense
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deemed harmless. 3°8 8

The Ninth Circuit addressed the question of jury instructions that
called for a reasonable assumption of a defendant's intent in United States
v. Lord.3 "s9 The crucial difference between these instructions and those
struck down in Connecticut v. Johnson was the inference that the jury
was allowed to make in determining the intent of the defendant.
Defendant Lord was convicted in the district court of distribution
and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and of carrying a concealed weapon
in the commission of a felony.30 90 The evidence showed that Lord had
sold cocaine to an informer for the Drug Enforcement Administration.
His principle defense during the trial was that he had been entrapped by
the government. 30 91 Nevertheless, the jury convicted him and sentenced
him to five years in prison.
Lord raised a number of arguments on appeal, one of which the
Ninth Circuit found convincing enough to vacate his conviction.3 °9 2 As
to the jury instructions, however, the court of appeals found no error.
theories because of a belief that the intent element of the offenses had already been proved.
Justice Blackmun declared that a verdict reached in such a fasion could not be upheld because
[t]o allow a reviewing court to perform the jury's function of evaluating the evidence
of intent, when the jury never may have performed that function, would give too
much weight to society's interest in punishing the guilty and too little weight to the
method by which decisions of guilt are to be made.
460 U.S. at 86.
3088. Id. at 88. In writing for the dissent, Justice Powell viewed the Court's decision as
serious error because it would "create an automatic reversal whenever a Sandstrom-type instruction is given, regardless of the conclusiveness of the evidence of intent." Id. at 90 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
Justice Powell argued that the Court had gone far beyond the scope of Sandstrom and
disputed the plurality's characterization of the conclusive presumption instruction as being
equivalent to a directed verdict on the issue of intent. He contended that "[a] directed verdict
removes an issue completely from the jury's consideration. Such a presumption, by contrast,
leaves the issue ultimately to the jury." Id. at 95 (Powell, J., dissenting).
He went on to argue that since the evidence of intent varies wideley with each individual
case, the plurality should not have established an automatic rule of reversal. Indeed, there
may be facts whereby "a reviewing court might well say beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury found the presumption unnecessary to its task of determining intent." Id. at 101 (Powell,
J., dissenting). He concluded that, because this was an issue more appropriate to the consideration of a state court, he would remand the case for determination of whether the erroneous
instruction was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 102 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3089. 711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983).
3090. Id. at 888.
3091. Id. at 889. Lord conceded that he had freely delivered one-half gram of cocaine to the
informer, but claimed that subsequent sales were made as a result of threats against him by
DEA agents.
3092. Id. at 888. The court found a possibility that prosecutorial misconduct may have
caused a valuable defense witness to invoke his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Since his testimony may have been relevant to Lord's entrapment defense, the Ninth
Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 891.
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The defendant claimed that the disputed instruction3 0 93 was infirm
under the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana. °9 4 The Ninth Circuit first observed that the instruction in Sandstrom regarding intent was dissimilar

to that given to Lord's

jury.3 °9 5

The court then noted it had recently

upheld an instruction substantially comparable to the one in question
and held that the district judge did not err in his instructions to the
jury.

30 96

3. Instructions concerning criminal intent and deliberate ignorance
In United States v. Garzon,3 °97 the Ninth Circuit considered the context in which a "conscious avoidance" instruction is warranted. Such an
instruction is usually justified in a case where the defendant pleads innocent to actual knowledge of the illegal nature of his act, but, where the
facts indicate that he or she deliberately avoided learning the truth regarding its illegality. °98
Defendant Garzon was convicted of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute and conspiring to distribute cocaine. The facts adduced
3093. The instruction on intent that the trial judge gave to the jury is as follows: "'It is
ordinarily reasonable to assume that a person intends the natural and probable consequences
of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted ....
"' Id. at 892.
3094. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). The instruction held to be improper in Sandstrom was that
"'[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.'"
1d. at 513 (emphasis added). See supra note 3083 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Sandstrom decision.
3095. 711 F.2d at 892.
3096. Id. In United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127
(1981) (per curiam), the court considered an intent instruction which informed the jury that it
was "reasonable" to draw an "inference" that a person intends the natural consequences of his
acts. Id. at 375. The court distinguished this instruction from that held improper in Sandstrom v. Montana because the former, unlike the latter, "does not tell the jury to presume
intent from a voluntary act but merely permits the jury to infer intent." Id.
The Ninth Circuit in Lord did not give a rationale for its decision, but merely cited to
Mayo as an example where a similar instruction had been upheld. The court apparently felt
that Lord's instruction did not create a "conclusive presumption" for the jury, but merely
allowed them to make an inference-to assume the defendant's intent from the acts he committed. Such an assumption is permitted, thus the instrution was proper.
Lord and its progeny stand for the proposition that the Ninth Circuit will not uphold an
instruction that supposedly allows a jury to conclusively presume a defendant's intent, but will
allow an instruction whereby the jury may assume, or infer a criminal defendant's state of
mind. It seems doubtful, however, that the average juror would be able to distinguish the legal
niceties and treat the two directives differently.
3097. 688 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1982).
3098. "The substantive justification for the rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive
knowledge are equally culpable." United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.) (en
bane), cert denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). "Deliberate ignorance" instructions have been approved in criminal cases by the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth
Circuits. See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702 n.12.
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at trial showed that Garzon's co-defendant, Moreno, had instigated contact with a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) informant regard-

ing possible drug transactions. The sales took place at Garzon's father's
residence, with the father actively participating. There was conflicting
testimony as to Garzon's participation in the drug transactions. The defendant claimed that he had no knowledge of any cocaine deal, while the
DEA agents and the informant testified that Garzon openly negotiated
the sale of the drugs. 30 99 Garzon contended that he was only present at
these meetings because his father had asked him to be there. The defendant denied having had any discussion with the DEA agents regarding the
sale and admitted only to carrying a package across a room and opening
it to show the agents its contents. It was later revealed that the package
contained cocaine. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial judge
granted the government's request that a "conscious avoidance" instruction be read to the jury.3 1°
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that such an instruction has a

limited use and should only be given in those cases where it is clear that
the defendant acted with deliberate ignorance.31 0 1 Otherwise, there
would be a chance that the defendant could be convicted on a negligence

standard. That is, the jury might return a guilty verdict if they felt that
the defendant should have known that his conduct was illegal.3 10 2 Be-

cause the court was not convinced that Garzon acted with deliberate ignorance, and since the government had not argued that the error was
harmless, his conviction was reversed." 0 3

The issue of conscious avoidance was again addressed by the Ninth
3099. 688 F.2d at 608.
3100. The gist of the instruction was that "the jury could have found the appellant had the
requisite knowledge if he was aware of the high probability that a drug deal was taking place
and deliberately avoided learning the truth." Id. at 609.
3101. Id. The court cited its opinion in United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323
(9th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that the instruction "should not be given in every case
where a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, but only in those comparatively rare cases
where, in addition, there are facts that point in the direction of deliberate ignorance." Id. at
1325. The instruction was approved in Murietta because of the overwhelming evidence that
showed the defendant knew he was smuggling drugs.
3102. 688 F.2d at 609.
3103. Id. The Ninth Circuit felt that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to
conclude that Garzon had intentionally tried to avoid learning of the drug transaction. Indeed, the court wrote that the defendant's conduct "was inconsistent with conscious avoidance." Id. (emphasis in original). This was because he had willingly opened a bag containing
cocaine to show it to the DEA agents. Such conduct, the court reasoned, showed that he was
not trying to avoid enlightenment, and it was up to the jury to determine whether he was
telling the truth in denying knowledge of the contents of the package.
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Circuit in United States v. Suttiswad.31 0 4 Defendant Suttiswad, a native
of Thailand, was charged with importing and possessing heroin, with intent to distribute. He was arrested by custom officer at San Francisco
International Airport when they found 3.98 pounds of heroin concealed

behind linings in his luggage. He claimed that an American named
"Tom," whom he met in Bangkok, had given him money, clothing and a
suitcase so he could visit the United States. Suttiswad maintained that he
had no knowledge of the contraband hidden in the suitcase.1 0 5
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that "the element of knowl-

edge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that a defendant
deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious
to him., 3 10 6 Suttiswad was convicted and sentenced to two concurrent
terms of five years. On appeal, he maintained that it was reversible error

for the trial judge to have given a "conscious avoidance" instruction
under the facts of his case.3 1 °7
After explaining the proper use of the "deliberate ignorance" instruction,1 0 8 the Ninth Circuit found that the facts were sufficient to
show that Suttiswad had deliberately closed his eyes to what should have

been obvious, namely that the suitcase probably contained contraband. 1 0 9 Considering the instructions as a whole, the Ninth Circuit
found no error.3 110

In considering whether "deliberate ignorance" instructions are
proper, the Ninth Circuit appears to place great importance on facts

which suggest that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning
the truth. The evidence in Suttiswad was overwhelming to show that the
3104. 696 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982).
3105. Id. at 646-47.
3106. Id. at 650.
3107. Id. at 650-51. Alternatively, Suttiswad argued that the instruction was unsound because it did not require the jury to find that the defendant was aware of the "high probability"
that he was carrying drugs into the United States. Id. at 651. The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
noting that although the trial judge's instructions did not contain the words "high
probability," the jury was sufficiently instructed "to find that defendant had a subjective
awareness" of the existence of the contraband. Id. at 652. The jury was also instructed that
negligence or mistake was insufficient to impute willfulness or knowledge.
3108. See supra notes 3098 and 3101. The court cited to its earlier decisions in Jewell and
Murrieta-Bejarano.
3109. 696 F.2d at 651. The court observed that the defendant showed deliberate ignorance if
he was not suspicious of the fact that a relative stranger had given him an airline ticket, clothing, cash, and a heavy, perfumed suitcase.
3110. Judge Hug dissented on the basis that the "instruction given in this case would permit
conviction on deliberate avoidance of knowledge without a subjective awareness of high
probability." Id. at 654 (Hug, J., dissenting). He interpreted the court's decision in United
States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1977) to require the "high probability" finding.
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defendant had purposely avoided learning that drugs may have been
present in the suitcase. At first impression, the facts in Garzon seem to
suggest the same; that there was no way the defendant could not have
know that a drug transaction was occurring. However, Garzon may be
distinguished from Suttiswad in one crucial respect: Garzon's conduct
was simply inconsistent with a person deliberately trying to avoid learning the truth, since he in fact opened a bag containing the cocaine. It was
for the jury to determine if he was telling the truth when he denied knowing the white powder was cocaine.
4.

Instructions regarding the credibility of government witnesses

As the trier of fact, the jury is normally the sole judge of the credibility of a witness and will determine the weight to give such person's
testimony. However, when the testimony in question is that of an immunized government witness, or a co-defendant, it is especially important
that the jury consider the credibility of the declarant carefully. An interested witness is presumably much more likely to alter his or her testimony to the prejudice of the defendant.3 1 I
In United States v. Tamura,' 2 the Ninth Circuit ruled on the issue
of giving the jury limiting instructions when a government witness is also
a co-defendant. Tamura was convicted on fifty-nine counts of bribery,
mail and wire fraud, conspiracy, rackettering, and Travel Act violations.31 13 On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in failing to give
appropriate jury instructions concerning the guilty pleas and the credibil31 1 4
ity of the government's two main witnesses.
Tamura contended that the trial judge committed reversible error by
admitting the guilty pleas of the co-defendants into evidence without giving a limiting instruction to the jury.31 1 After noting that the defendant
3111. Indeed, in United States v. Blue, 430 F.2d 1286, 1287 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), the
Fifth Circuit held that it is proper to instruct the jury that it should acquit if it does not accept
the testimony of a government witness, and that such an instruction did not remove from the
jury the question of reasonable doubt.
3112. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
3113. Id. at 594. Tamura's conviction was based on a kick-back scheme involving a rigged
system of bidding to gain contracts from a municipally owned utility. Tamura's defense was
that he was unaware of the bribery scheme.
3114. Id. Two of the co-defendants had agreed to testify against the others in return for plea
bargains.
3115. Id. at 601. However, the judge did instruct the jury that "'[y]ou must base your
verdict as to each of the remaining defendants solely on the evidence against each.'" Id. at
602. It was established that Tamura's attorney not only consented to the instruction, but was
asked at least five times whether he had objections to the instruction. In fact, it was the defense counsel who initially brought the guilty pleas to the jury's attention.
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never requested that such an instruction be given, the Ninth Circuit held
that the district court did not commit plain error. 3 116 The main justificaguilty
tion for this holding was that the prosecutor did not misuse the
3117
pleas by insinuating that they were evidence of Tamura's guilt.
Instructions that appeared to identify the credibility of the government's key witness as the primary issue in the case were considered by
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Rohrer.3 11" Defendants Rohrer and
Bump were convicted in the district court of possession with intent to
distribute and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.119 Much of the governdrug dealer, testimony
ment's case rested on the testimony of a convicted
312 0
about.
jury
the
caution
did
that the trial judge
3116. Id. This ruling is supported by the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Anderson, 642 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1981). There, the court ruled that the trial judge's failure to give
the jury a cautionary instruction regarding a co-defendant's guilty plea when only one of the
defendants requested it and the request was later withdrawn was not plain error. Id. at 286.
Thus, a sua sponte instruction on the issue is not required in the Ninth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit took a somewhat different approach in United States v. King, 505 F.2d
602 (5th Cir. 1974). The court stated that "this circuit had emphasized that cautionary instructions by the trial court are both essential and effective in avoiding prejudice where the fact
of a coconspirator's guilty plea is brought out at a trial before a jury." Id. at 607. But the
court did go on to state that the lack of such instructions did not necessarily constitute reversible error. The issue had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
3117. 694 F.2d at 602. Tamura also challenged the district court's failure to give a specific
credibility instruction regarding the testimony of the co-defendants. The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument, observing that the trial judge gave alternate instructions, indicating to
the jury that the co-defendant's credibility "was open to question." Id. See, e.g., United States
v. Allen, 579 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir.) (jury instrution upheld where the trial judge gave a
"general" instruction on witness credibility), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933 (1978); United States v.
Allain, 671 F.2d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 1982) (instruction approved which stated that the witness'
testimony "must be considered with caution and great care").
The Ninth Circuit went on to consider two additional challenges to the propriety of the
jury instructions in the case. Tamura argued that the trial court erred in admitting certain
telex transmissions, purportedly offered to prove the defendant's participation in the bribery
scheme. He maintained that the telexes were improperly used to prove the truth of their contents and that the district judge should have told the jury that they could not be considered for
their truth. 694 F.2d at 598. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that Tamura did not explain
how the absence of a limiting instruction could have prejudiced him. Because the defendant
had admitted the existence of the bribery scheme, the nature of the telexes were such that they
could only have been used for nonhearsay purposes. Id.
Tamura further contended that he had been unfairly surprised by the testimony of a government witness. The court of appeals agreed with the defendant on this point, but saw no
error in the district court's offer to remedy the testimony's prejudicial effect by either cautioning the jury or excluding the testimony altogether. At trial, Tamura refused both these alternatives and insisted on either a dismissal, mistrial, or continuance. The Ninth Circuit decided
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving a limiting instruction rather than
the remedies the defendant requested. Id. at 599-600.
3118. 708 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1983).
3119. The defendants were specifically found guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846.
3120. At the trial, this witness admitted during cross-examination that he had used drugs
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Both Rohrer and Bump contended on appeal that the trial judge's

focus on the credibility of the government's witness denied their their

right to a jury trial. 12 1 The Ninth Circuit did not agree, observing that
the trial judge remedied any potential prejudicial effect by immediately
reminding the jury of the correct burden of proof.3 122 Thus, the error, if
any, was deemed harmless.
In United States v. Lane,3" 23 the question presented was whether the
trial judge's refusal to give a requested cautionary instruction regarding

the credibility of an immunized witness constituted reversible error. The
Ninth Circuit decided that while such an instruction, if requested, is usually required to be given, refusal to do so did not amount to automatic
reversible error.3 12 4
Defendant Lane was charged with obstruction of justice by initiating
extensively in the past and had experienced blackouts during the period in which defendant's
alleged illegal acts had taken place. 708 F.2d at 431. The trial judge instructed the jury at
length regarding this government witness, and specifically told it to consider the informant's
credibility. Id. at 432 n.l. Rohrer claimed on appeal that this instruction had reduced the
primary issue in the case to the credibility of the informer. Id. at 432.
3121. Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed that an "instruction that appears to reduce a criminal
case to acceptance or rejection of a government witness' testimony may impermissibly lead the
jury to forget that the defendant cannot be convicted unless guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id Accord United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1974) (district court committed reversible error "by repeatedly casting the jury's ultimate determination of whether to
convict or acquit in terms of a mere credibility choice between the informer and appellant").
3122. 708 F.2d at 432. The trial judge informed the jury that, if after considering all the
evidence, "you're left with a reasonable doubt about the guilt or innocence of either of the
defendants on any charge, it's your duty to acquit on those charges." Id. at n.2.
Defendant Bump also argued that the district court committed prejudicial error by refusing to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding the use of testimony that only pertained to
Rohrer. After noting that the trial judge has great discretion as to the giving of additional
instructions, the Ninth Circuit decided that Bump's contention was without merit. The court
thought it was clear that the jury did not associate the questioned testimony with Bump. Id. at
435.
3123. 708 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
3124. Id. at 1398-99. Lane also objected to the trial judge's refusal to amend an allegedly
ambiguous jury instruction. The dispute arose when the jury requested clarification of an
instruction defining the elements of the offense of obstruction ofjustice. All of the jury instructions had been delivered to the jury by Judge Schwarzer who later substituted out of the case.
The request for clarification was received by Judge Orrick, who consulted with Judge
Schwarzer and was advised to tell the jury to "read the instructions." Id. at 1397.
When Lane's defense counsel was informed of Judge Schwarzer's suggestion, he requested
that the instruction be amended. Judge Orrick refused this request and proceeded to instruct
the jury to "read the instructions." Id.
The Ninth Circuit found that Lane had made a proper objection, but decided that the trial
court had not erred. The court of appeals held that the original jury instruction "adequately
and correctly conveyed to the jury the elements of defendant's requested instruction." Id. at
1398. As such, Lane was not prejudiced by Judge Orrick's refusal to amend the instruction.
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false charges of embezzlement and misconduct against a union officer.3 az5
Unbeknownst to Lane, one of his accomplices had decided to cooperate

with the government, in exchange for immunity from prosecution. Much
of the government's case rested upon his testimony and on certain taped
conversations between him and Lane.
At the trial, Lane requested that the jury be given a cautionary instruction informing it that the government's key witness had been
granted immunity for his testimony. 3 126 The district court refused this
request, and Lane was subsequently convicted.
On appeal, Lane contended that the refusal to give the requested
cautionary instruction amounted to reversible error. The Ninth Circuit
first observed that if such an instruction is requested, the trial judge is
usually required to comply. 3127 But the court noted that this rule only
applied in instances where the witness' testimony was largely uncorroborated by the evidence.312 8 Since the incriminating conversations between
Lane and the informer were tape recorded, and because the trial judge
had cautioned the jury to some degree regarding the informer testimony,
Lane's conviction was affirmed.3 129
3125. Lane was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which provides in pertinent part:
"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication,
endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede. . . the due administration of justice, shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1503
(1982).
3126. 708 F.2d at 1398.
3127. Id. Accord Guam v. Dela Rosa, 644 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant's conviction was reversed where the primary evidence of his guilt was supplied by an informant, and
the district court had refused a requested cautionary instruction about informer testimony); see
also United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1980) (court held that trial judge
committed prejudicial, reversible error by refusing to give cautionary instruction regarding
testimony of accomplice).
3128. 708 F.2d at 1398. Both Dela Rosa and Bernard were cases in which the defendant's
guilt rested almost entirely on the testimony of the accomplice or informer.
3129. Id. at 1399. The district court had told the jury to consider whether the informer had
any interest in the determination of the case and if he was biased toward any principal involved
in the case. Another factor in the Ninth Circuit's decision was the fact that Lane's attorney
was allowed to bring the immunity issue to the jury's attention during the cross-examination of
the informer. The court did note that "if this testimony had been uncorroborated it would
have been reversible error to refuse the instruction." Id. at 1398-99.
Nevertheless, the court seemed to step back from its earlier ruling in United States v.
Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1980) (see supra note 3127). The Bernard court stated that it
would be desirable for the trial judge to inform the jury on accomplice testimony, "even ifsuch
an instruction were not requested." Id. at 857 (emphasis added). This may have been due to
the fact that the informant in Bernard was paid by the government, was a drug addict, and was
not prosecuted. That court also minimized the effect of the defense counsel admonishing the
jury in regard to accomplice testimony, observing that "[c]ounsel's argument is neither law nor
evidence, and the jury is so instructed." Id. The two opinions are not completely inconsistent,

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

5.

[Vol. 18

Instructions concerning the specific intent and knowledge elements
of an offense

A crime that is traditionally classified as a specific intent offense requires a high level of culpability on the part of the defendant. Specific

intent is usually proven through a showing of actual subjective intent,
involving purposefulness of knowledge, as opposed to mere negligence or
recklessness.3 13 °
In Wainwright v. Sykes,3 131 the Supreme Court ruled that a state
prisoner who was barred by a procedural default from raising a constitu-

tional issue on direct appeal could not litigate that claim in a habeas
corpus proceeding without showing "cause for" and "actual prejudice"

from the default. 3132 This decision played a major role in the case of
Myers v. Washington,1 3 3 a recent Ninth Circuit ruling dealing with a

defendant making a collateral attack on an earlier conviction by challenging the jury instruction on intent given at his trial.
Defendant Myers was convicted in 1957 of second-degree murder
and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. 31 34 Two decades after his
trial, Myers petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for release
from prison, arguing inter alia that the instructions given to the jury were
unconstitutional.3 35 The Washington court disagreed and upheld his
conviction. 1 36
but the Bernard court was clearly more concerned with the possible prejudicial effect of accomplice testimony.
3130. For the government to establish specific intent on the part of an accused, it "must
prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, [or knowingly failed to
do an act which the law requires,] purposely intending to violate the law. Such intent may be
determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.' I DEvITr & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.03 (3d ed. 1977).
3131. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
3132. Id. at 90-91. In Wainwright, the Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Fifth Circuit and ruled that the defendant was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. At the
original trial, the defendant had failed to object to the admission of inculpatory statements
made by him after his arrest on murder charges, a failure which amounted to non-compliance
with the Florida "contemporaneous-objection rule." The Supreme Court denied the habeus
corpus relief because the defendant had not shown cause for this non-compliance with the rule,
nor had he made any showing of actual prejudice.
3133. 702 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1983).
3134. State v. Myers, 53 Wash. 2d 446, 334 P.2d 536 (1959). Myers testified at his trial,
admitting that he had beaten his victim, Sigurd Oliver, because Oliver had made homosexual
advances toward him. Myers v. Washington, 646 F.2d 355, 356 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456
U.S. 921 (1982) (Myers I).
3135. In re Myers, 91 Wash. 2d 120, 587 P.2d 532, cert. denied,442 U.S. 912 (1979), rev'd on
other grounds, sub nom. Hews v. Evans, 99 Wash. 2d 80, 660 P.2d 270 (1983).
3136. The Supreme Court of Washington held that even though the challenged instructions
may have been defective, "we believe the negative effect on the administration of justice out-
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Myers next filed for federal habeas corpus relief3137 in the United
States district court, raising the same arguments he made with the Washcourt also denied relief and Myers
ington Supreme Court. The district
3 138
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
In 1981, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Myers' contentions and reversed the decision of the district court. 31 39 The court of appeals found
that the jury instructions given at Myers' 1957 trial were constitutionally
defective because they shifted to the defense the burden of persuasion on
the intent element of the offense. 31" The court also decided that the
instructions violated the due process clause of the Constitution.3 141
The state appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, which vacated the determination of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for

further consideration in light of two recent Supreme Court rulings.314 2
Thus the Ninth Circuit was once again faced with the question of

whether Myers could collaterally attack his earlier conviction, an attack
based on alleged violations at his trial of legal rules that were not recognized until long after his conviction.3 14 3
After considering the impact of the two recent Supreme Court cases,
weighs the interest of a defendant in having his guilty redetermined in accordance with subsequent decisions of this court or the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 124, 587 P.2d at 534.
3137. Federal habeas corpus relief is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982), which provides:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
3138. The district court granted the state's motion for summary judgment, without giving its
reasons for doing so. Myers v. Washington, 646 F.2d at 361.
3139. Id. at 363.
3140. The Ninth Circuit decided that Myers did not come under the rule of Wainwright v.
Sykes, (see supra notes 3131-32), because Myers "had no reason at the time of trial to believe
his rights had been violated by the jury instructions." 646 F.2d at 360. While it was true that
Myers had not complied with a state procedural rule requiring that objections to a conviction
be raised on direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not consider this to be determinative of the
issue. Id. at 361.
3141. 646 F.2d at 363. Myers' due process rights were violated because the disputed jury
instructions had placed the burden of persuasion on him with respect to the intent element of
second-degree murder. The court noted that a similar rule had been struck down by the
Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 646 F.2d at 362.
In dicta, the Ninth Circuit also found that Myers had met the "cause" and "prejudice"
requirements set forth in Sykes because his challenge to the jury instructions could not have
been predicted at the time of his trial. 646 F.2d at 359. The court concluded that the erroneous jury instructions required that relief be given to Meyers and that "[e]rroneous jury instructions will support a collateral attack on a criminal conviction if they so infect the entire trial
that the conviction violates due process." Id. at 363.
3142. Washington v. Myers, 456 U.S. 921 (1982). The two rulings to be considered were
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), and United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
3143. Myers v. Washington, 702 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1983).
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The court distin-

guished the two decisions, noting once again that there was no feasible
way for Myers to know in 1957 that the jury instructions were open to a
due process attack. 31 45 Because there was a strong possibility that the
improper instruction had played a role in Myers' conviction, the Ninth
3 14 6
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of relief.
In United States v. Ramirez,3" 4 7 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the district court erred in refusing to allow the defendant's requested jury instructions regarding his participation in the offense
charged. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling
48

that the jury was properly instructed as to the defendant's theory. 31
Defendant Reynolds was convicted in the lower court of foreign
transportation of stolen aircraft, 3149 and was sentenced to four years in

3144. Id. at 769. The court observed that the defendants in Isaac had petitioned for federal
habeas corpus relief "on the ground that the instructions given at their trials, allocating to
them the burden of proof on their claims of self-defense, violated the Due Process Clause." Id.
at 767. However, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that a defendant "must demonstrate
cause and actual prejudice before obtaining relief." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982).
The Court found the defendants' appeal to be without merit because their legal basis for relief
either was known to them, or should have been known to them, at the time of their trials. Id.
at 131-33. Thus, they could not complain at that late date that they had unknowingly waived a
constitutional objection. Id. at 131. As such, they did not satisfy the "cause" requirement of
Wainwright v. Sykes. See supra text accompanying note 3132.
In Frady,the defendant based a collateral attack on his murder conviction on the grounds
that the trial judge's instructions on malice were erroneous. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 157-58 (1982). Frady had not challenged the disputed instructions either at trial or on
direct appeal. The Supreme Court found that Frady had not met the "actual prejudice" requirement of Wainwright because the erroneous instruction concerning malice had not substantially prejudiced his case to the degree "necessary to overcome society's justified interests
in the finality of criminal judgments." Id. at 175.
3145. 702 F.2d at 768. The Ninth Circuit noted that in Isaacthe appellant had relied on In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), to establish the basis for attacking his conviction. However,
Winship had been decided more than a decade after Myers' trial and appeal. Thus, the court
ruled that "the Supreme Court's reason for finding no 'cause' in Isaac is inapplicable to Myers." 702 F.2d at 768 (footnote omitted).
The court distinguished Frady because the appellant there had denied having anything at
all to do with the iling in question. Thus, he suffered no prejudice from the improper instructions. Id. In contrast, Myers had admitted to the killing "but introduced evidence from which
lack of the intent element of second degree murder could have been inferred." Id. at 768-69.
3146. 702 F.2d at 769. In his dissent, Judge Poole maintained, as he had in Myers I, that the
defendant was barred from obtaining habeas corpus relief under the rule of Wainwright v.
Sykes. Id. (Poole, J., dissenting).
3147. 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1983).
3148. Id. at 544.
3149. Reynolds was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1982), which provides: "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same
to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both."
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prison. His conviction arose out of the thefts of two aircraft and the use
of those planes to transport approximately 1000 pounds of marijuana
into the United States from Mexico. The evidence adduced at trial
showed that Reynolds had been working as an informer for the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) before the alleged conspiracy commenced. 3150 During the trial, Reynolds freely admitted that he had acted
to implement the goals of the conspiracy, but maintained that at all times

during this scheme his role was that of a police informant.
Reynolds claimed that since he was acting on behalf of the police, it
was impossible for him to have the specific intent necessary to sustain a

conviction. 3151 He then offered two jury instructions that were consistent

with this theory.31 52 The district court refused both and instead instructed the jury regarding the specific intent requirement of the crimes
charged.3 153 Reynolds argued on appeal that the district court's refusal to

give his requested instructions constituted reversible error.
The Ninth Circuit first noted that a district court need not give a
defendant's proposed jury instruction in the exact language requested.

The important consideration is whether the instruction ultimately given
adequately instructed the jury as to the defendant's theory.315 4 The court

then cited two recent Ninth Circuit decisions in which similar claims
3150. 710 F.2d at 538. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the relationship between Reynolds and
the LAPD "was not a happy one." Id. Most of the investigations that took place between the
defendant and the police were not successful and Reynolds had even warned one suspect of an
upcoming narcotics arrest. Indeed, a month before Reynolds' alleged crimes took place, "the
LAPD had decided that Reynolds was not trustworthy and that he would be regarded as a
double agent." Id. The Ninth Circuit wryly observed that "[t]he aura these facts emanate is
one familiar to readers of spy novels." Id. at 540.
3151. Id. at 538. The evidence did show that at various times during which the conspiracy
was said to have taken place, Reynolds had informed the LAPD of upcoming meetings between him and other co-conspirators. This was done presumably so that the police could
observe the meetings. Id.
The government argued that Reynolds was aiming to "set-up" the police, and cited numerous instances in which the defendant had "double-crossed" the LAPD. The government
further contended that "Reynolds was a 'double agent' using the cloak of police authority to
cover his intention to complete the plane theft and marijuana importation scheme and to leave
the LAPD 'out in the cold."' Id. at 540-41.
3152. Reynolds' proposed instruction stated in part that "[a] person who participates in a
crime solely at the behest of law enforcement agencies, and solely for the purpose of providing
the agencies with information about the crime or its other participants, cannot himself be
found guilty of the crime." Id. at 543 n.5.
3153. Id. at 543. After first explaining to the jury that the crimes charged required the
finding of a specific intent by the defendant to commit them, the district court instructed that
"[t]o establish specific intent the Government must prove that the defendant knowingly did an
act which the law forbids. . . purposely intending to violate the law." Id. at n.6.
3154. Id. at 543 (citing United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 968 (9th Cir.), cert denied,
434 U.S. 956 (1977)).
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were presented by a defendant, and ruled that these were dispositive of
the issue.31 5 5
The court of appeals determined that the trial judge's instructions
on the specific intent element of the offense charged had adequately con-

veyed Reynolds' defense theory to the jury. This was because the jury
could never have found the requisite intent on Reynolds' part if they had
believed that he was simply acting on behalf of the police.31 56 Because
the district court's instruction had fairly informed the jury of the defendant's theory, its refusal to give his proposed instruction was not error and
his conviction was upheld.3 157
While distinctions continue to be made between crimes that require
the specific intent of a defendant and those that call for a general intent,
the Supreme Court has observed that such distinctions are more likely to

confuse than enlighten juries. 3 58 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit continues to adhere to the "venerable" definition of a specific intent which requires that the government prove that a defendant knowingly committed
a forbidden act, purposely intending to violate the law.
It is axiomatic that a jury must be instructed as to the knowledge

element required to find a defendant guilty of the crime charged. An
offense must have been committed with the particular mental state that

would warrant punishment. Thus, it is essential to inquire into an ac3155. 710 F.2d at 543. In United States v. Hughes, 626 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1065 (1980), overruled on other grounds, United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th
Cir. 1984), the defendant was charged with converting government property, specifically wild
horses. He claimed that the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had authorized him to sell the horses, and during the trial requested a jury instruction as to that theory.
The district court refused, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed because the trial court had instructed as to the required criminal intent. The court observed that "[i]f the jury had believed
that [the defendant] had the authorization of the BLM to sell the horses. . . they could not
have found the intent necessary to support the conviction." Id. at 627.
Similarly, in United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969
(1979), the defendant had been convicted of illegally obtaining defense secrets and selling these
secrets to Russian agents. On appeal, Lee maintained that he had been working for the CIA
by selling misinformation to the Soviets, and thus did not possess the requisite intent to be
found guilty. As in Hughes, the district court charged the jury as to the specific intent element
and the Ninth Circuit upheld its refusal to give other requested instructions. The court of
appeals noted that "[h]ad the jury believed that Lee was acting for the C.I.A. or had a reasonable belief that he was acting for the C.I.A. then they could not have found that he had the
specific intent as the judge had instructed them." Id. at 986.
3156. 710 F.2d at 543-44.
3157. Id. at 544.
3158. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980), wherein the court opined that
"[t]his venerable distinction [between specific and general intent], however, has been the source
of a good deal of confusion." The Court went on to consider several alternatives to the traditional mens rea analysis.
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cused's state of mind at the time he or she performed the alleged act to
determine culpability.
In United States v. Burnette,31 5 9 the Ninth Circuit determined the
adequacy of jury instructions concerning the knowledge required for a
person to be convicted of aiding and abetting armed bank robbery. Defendant Lynette Burnette was charged with aiding and abetting armed
bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2.316 ° Defendant Theresa
Burnette was charged as an accessory after the fact to armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 3.3161 Both were convicted of the

charges and both contended on appeal that the district court's jury instructions were erroneous.3 1 62

During the trial, Lynette had requested a jury instruction to the effect that she could not be found guilty of aiding and abetting an armed
bank robbery without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew the
robber had actually been armed.3 163 The district court refused to so instruct the jury and Lynette's defense counsel made a timely objection.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with Lynette's contention and reversed
her conviction. 31" The court ruled that a defendant must have actual
knowledge that the principal has and intends to use a gun to be guilty of
3159. 698 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 2106 (1983).
3160. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982) provides: "Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as
a principal."
3161. 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, knowing that an offense
against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after
the fact."
3162. 698 F.2d at 1042. The actual perpetrator of the robbery was Michael Burnette.
Lynette and Theresa were believed to have been in the "getaway car," and were instrumental
in attempts to cover up the robbery.
3163. Id. at 1050.
3164. The seminal Ninth Circuit case on the matter is United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974), wherein the driver of a "getaway car" used in a
bank robbery was convicted in the trial court of aiding and abetting the crime. The situation
in Short is almost indistinguishable from Burnette; the district judge in the former also instructed the jury that they need not find that Short knew the robber was armed in order to
convict him of aiding and abetting. In both cases, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction,
finding the instruction to be erroneous because "it fails to require the jury to find an essential
element of the crime of armed bank robbery as a prerequisite to conviction." United States v.
Short, 493 F.2d at 1172. The essential element was the state of mind of the aider and abettor,
who is made punishable as a principal, and "the proof must encompass the same elements as
would be required to convict any other principal." Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114,
123 (9th Cir. 1962). That is, the abettor must share in the criminal intent of the principal,
which in this situation demands that he or she knew the principal was armed and intended to
use the weapon, and intended to aid the principal in that respect. Accord United States v.
Jones, 592 F.2d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979).
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the offense of aiding and abetting armed bank robbery.3 165 The trial
court's failure to give a requested instruction to this effect constituted
reversible error.3 16 6

Theresa Burnette argued on appeal that the district court improperly instructed the jury regarding the elements of the offense of being an
accessory after the fact to armed bank robbery.3 16 7 Specifically, she con-

tended that the instructions were inadequate to instruct the jury that it
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew the gunman was
armed in order to find her guilty as an accessory after the fact. 3 168
The alleged error was based upon the trial judge referring to the

code section while neglecting to restate the elements of a violation of that

section.31 69 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument, observing that
the trial judge had previously stated in full the elements of the offense,
and reiterating the rule that jury instructions are to be interpreted as a
3165. 698 F.2d at 1050 (citing United States v. Jones, 592 F.2d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979)). Lynette's conviction was reversed only as to the armed portion
of the offense. In such a situation, the government has the option of retrying the defendant for
aiding and abetting armed bank robbery, or allowing the district court to resentence under the
charge of aiding and abetting unarmed bank robbery, if there is sufficient evidence to convict
the defendant of the lesser offense. In Lynette's case, the court found the evidence sufficient.
Id. (citing United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974)).
3166. Id. Most of the circuit courts that have directly ruled on this question would agree
with the result in Burnette. See, e.g., United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir.
1978) (government must establish defendant knew the principal was armed and that he intended to aid him in that respect); United States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 1977)
("["]o convict an aider and abettor of the aggravated offense we think the Government must
show that the accomplice knew a dangerous weapon would be used or at least that he was on
notice of the likelihood of its use.")
The Fourth Circuit, however, has taken a somewhat different approach to this issue and,
in United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 (1982),
decided that the district judge did not err in failing to sua sponte give an instruction similar to
that deemed necessary in Short. The Fourth Circuit distinguished McCaskill from Short in
two respects: (1) there was no question that McCaskill did know the robbers were armed; and
(2) unlike the situation in Short, McCaskill did not make a timely objection to the instruction
in question. Id. at 1001.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit would leave the decision in the hands of the trial judge as to
instructing the jury on the aider and abettor's knowledge of the principal's use of a gun. If the
evidence was undisputed that the defendant possessed this knowledge, such an instruction is
not necessary. But, judging from the decision in Short, the Ninth Circuit would require the
instruction in all instances, regardless of any clear evidence of the abettor's knowledge.
3167. 698 F.2d at 1051-52. The trial judge informed the jury of the elements of the offense of
armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). One of these elements was the use of a gun in
the commission of the robbery. He then instructed thjury that "in order to find Theresa guilty
as an accessory after the fact, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt 'that she knew that
Michael Curtis Burnette . . . [committed] the bank robbery . . . in violation of Title 18,
United States Code Section 2113(d).'" 698 F.2d at 1052 (quoting trial court transcript).
3168. 698 F.2d at 1051-52.
3169. Id. at 1052.
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whole.3 17 o
In United States v. Herbert,3 17 1 the Ninth Circuit held that the district court judge erred in giving jury instructions which could permit a
conviction for illegal possession or transfer of unregistered weapons
when one of the defendants did not know that the weapons were firearms
within the meaning of the applicable statute. Defendants John and Joseph Herbert were convicted of possessing and transferring unregistered
3 172
machine guns in violation of 26 U.S.C. sections 5861(d), (e) and (f.
At the trial, the district court gave an instruction to the jury regarding the knowledge element of the charged offenses. It provided that the
government did not need to prove that the defendant knew that the
weapon was a firearm within the meaning of the statute.3 173 Both John
and Joseph Herbert objected to the instruction at the trial, and on appeal
argued that the charge was erroneous because a person could be convicted without knowledge of the true nature of the weapon.3 174
As to Joseph Herbert, the Ninth Circuit agreed, noting that in order
to convict him under the statute, it must be shown that the defendant
knew that he was dealing with such a dangerous device as would alert a
person to the likelihood of its regulation.31 7 5 The court reasoned that,
since the weapons looked perfectly legal on the exterior, and legal fire3170. Id. The Ninth Circuit also observed that the district court had instructed the jury on
the lesser included offense of accessory after the fact to unarmed bank robbery "despite the fact
that the evidence conclusively established that the robber was armed." Id. at n.30. The court
of appeals reasoned that this instruction emphasized the fact that Theresa could not be found
guilty as an accessory unless she knew Michael was armed. Id.
3171. 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 87 (1983).
3172. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)-(f) (1976) provides: It shall be unlawful for any person--(d) to
receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him . . . or (e)to transfer a firearm in
violation of the provisions of this chapter; or (f) to make a firearm in violation of the provisions
of this chapter .... "
Both John Herbert and Joe Herbert were convicted of violating the statute. Joe and John
Herbert are brothers, and according to evidence presented at trial, John was the instigator of
the crime while Joe stood by and watched. Joe contended that he did not know that the
weapons had been converted into illegal automatics. 698 F.2d at 986.
3173. 698 F.2d at 986.
3174. Id. Since the weapons externally appeared to be legal semi-automatics, Joe Herbert
argued that there was no way for him to know they were illegal. Id.
3175. Id. (citing United States v. DeBartolo, 482 F.2d 312, 316 (1st Cir. 1973)). The
DeBartolo court ruled that a sawed-off shotfun fell within the category of dangerous devices
that should alert one to the likelihood of regulation. United States v. DeBartolo, 482 F.2d 312,
316 (1st Cir. 1973). Accord United States v. Tarr, 589 F.2d 55, 60 (Ist Cir. 1978) ("All that is
required for proof of a violation is that the accused know that a machine gun is being transferred and intentional participation in such transfer."); Morgan v. United States, 564 F.2d 803,
805 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Sufficient intent is established if the defendant is shown to have possessed
an item 'which he knew to be a firearm, within the general meaning of that term.'" (quoting
United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 836 (1973))).
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arms were quite prevalent in society, the guns were not of the type that
would naturally alert a reasonable person to their illegality.3 17 6 In light

of the fact that Joseph Herbert was merely a passive spectator while the
crime was committed, and that there was insufficient evidence to show
that he knew the true character of the guns, the error in the instruction
3 177
was not harmless. Thus, his conviction was reversed.
As to John Herbert, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the error

was harmless, because his defenses were, first, that he had never possessed the weapons; and second, that he was entrapped.3 17 8 Further,
there was overwhelming evidence that John Herbert knew that the weap3179
ons were automatic.

6.

Instructions defining the "reasonable doubt" standard

In a criminal trial, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and a conviction may not
be sustained if this burden is not met. The Supreme Court has ruled that
this standard of proof is mandated by the Constitution, 1 80 and is re-

quired in both criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. An exact definition of the term is difficult to ascertain, but nevertheless a careful
explanation of its meaning must be given by the judge to the jury.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of jury instructions that define the reasonable doubt standard in United States v. Miller.1 81 Miller
was convicted in the district court of receiving and concealing stolen
goods.3 182 He complained of several errors on appeal, one of which was
3176. 698 F.2d at 986.
3177. Id. at 987. The court observed that "[m]ere presence while a crime is being committed
is insufficient to infer criminal knowledge or intent." Id. (citing United States v. Sutherland,
463 F.2d 641, 648 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972)).
3178. Id.
3179. Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, since this evidence was so overwhelming, there
was no "'reasonable possibility that the error materially affected the verdict.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 1977)).
3180. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[l]est there remain any doubt about the
constitutional statute of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
3181. 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
3182. Id. at 655. Miller was specifically charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1982),
which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or
merchandise securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or more, .. knowing the
same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken;
.... Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten yers, or
both.
The facts adduced at trial showed that Miller received and concealed a stolen trailer.
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the trial court's instructions defining reasonable doubt.3 18 3
Miller's proposed instruction was similar to that upheld in an earlier
Ninth Circuit decision, an instruction he claimed was required because
3 18 4
the government's case depended largely on circumstantial evidence.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that it had previously upheld an instruction which excluded language similar to that offered by Miller.3 18 5
The court then explicitly approved the trial court's language that defined
reasonable doubt as the type of a doubt that would make a reasonable
person hesitate to act,3 186 observing that it fairly and adequately informed the jury as to the correct standard.31 87
The Ninth Circuit again dealt with instructions defining this concept
in United States v. Rhodes.3 111 Defendants Dudley and Rhodes made
various challenges to their convictions,3189 including a challenge to the
instruction given to the jury on the meaning of reasonable doubt.31 90 The
instruction given by the trial court defined reasonable doubt as the kind
3183. 688 F.2d at 662. The disputed portion of the jury instruction was as follows: "A
reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It's the kind of a doubt that
would make a reasonable person hesitate to act." Id. at n.6 (emphasis omitted). As the Ninth
Circuit noted, this instruction is substantially the same a that at 1 DEvrrr & BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 11.14 (3d ed. 1977).

3184. 688 F.2d at 662 n.6. Miller's proposed instruction was similar to that upheld by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 227 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978). In James, the
court declared that "although a criminal defendant is entitled to an instructive regarding his
theory of the case, challenges which merely pertain to the trial judge's language, or formulation of the charge are reversible only for an abuse if discretion." Id. at 227 (citation omitted).
Miller's proposed instruction can be found at 688 F.2d at 662 n.8.
3185. 688 F.2d at 662. See United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir.) (court
upheld trial court's decision not to instruct jury that if they found the evidence pointing to
either a verdict of guilt or innocence they must choose innocence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 875
(1979). The court also observed that, according to United States v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608, 611
(9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit does not always require a definition of reasonable doubt.
However, having an instruction on the concept, the instruction must accurately convey the
term's meaning. 688 F.2d at 662.
3186. Id.
3187. Id. The "hesitate to act" language was also upheld in United States v. Robinson, 546
F.2d 309, 313-14 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918 (1977); United States v. Patman,
557 F.2d 1181, 1182 (5th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); and United States v.
Knight, 547 F.2d 75, 77 (8th Cir. 1976).
Miller also objected on appeal to the trial court's refusal to give an eyewitness "identification instruction." The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument by noting that Miller had failed
to comply with FED. R. CRIM. P. 30, which requires a party to raise a timely objection at trial
to the omission of a requested instruction. 688 F.2d at 662-63.
3188. 713 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 535 (1983).
3189. See infra notes 3288-305 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the facts of
Rhodes.
3190. 713 F.2d at 471. The Ninth Circuit observed that a defendant in a criminal case has a
constitutional right to have the jury instructed correctly regarding the concept of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978)). However, the court
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district judge went on to define these terms and the defendants contended
that the effect of this further explanation was to transform the instruction

into an erroneous willingness to act instruction.3192 Dudley also argued
that the trial court's instruction tended to suggest that the test of reasonable doubt was whether the jury was comfortable with its verdict.31 9 3

The Ninth Circuit disagreed on both counts, ruling that the instructions, taken as a whole, were adequate to inform the jury of the correct
definition of reasonable doubt. 3 194 The court also stated that even if the
district judge's explanation had transformed the "hesitate to act" language into the erroneous "willingess to act" language, it did not necessarily constitute reversible error.319
The instructions conveyed the
meaning of the term accurately, and that is all that is required by the
Ninth Circuit.3 196
7.

Limiting and curative instructions

The traditional function of a limiting or curative instruction has

been to caution a jury regarding the proper use that it can make of certain evidence. It is a recognition that, especially in respect to evidence of
additional crimes committed by a defendant, a jury could easily use such

evidence for improper purposes. The most troubling aspect of the instruction itself is that a judge can never really know how a jury has been
affected by certain testimony; all he or she can do is instruct on its proper
purpose.
In United States v. Bradshaw, 3197 the Ninth Circuit considered the
has also held that a district court is not always obligated to define this term, even upon a
request by the defendant. See United States v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1981).
3191. 713 F.2d at 471 (emphasis in original). The district cout's instruction on reasonable
doubt was identical to that given in Devitt & Blackmar; see supra note 3183.
3192. 713 F.2d at 472. The Supreme Court has declared that such an instruction should not
be phrased in terms of "willingness to act." Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140
(1954).
3193. 713 F.2d at 472.
3194. Id. The court also decided that when the trial judge instructed the jury to be "comfortable" with its decision, he was merely informing them that they should not be concerned
with the length of time it might take them to reach a decision. Id.
3195. Id. The court cited its decision in United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 313 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918 (1977), for the proposition that " '[t]he courts of appeals
have consistently held that [the willingness to act] language does not constitute reversible error.'" Id.
3196. The Ninth Circuit decided that the disputed instruction met the "test" of United
States v. Clabaugh, 589 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1979), wherein the court declared that the test is
whether "the instructions, as a whole, fairly and accurately convey the meaning of reasonable
doubt." Id. at 1022 (citations omitted).
3197. 690 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3543 (1983).
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adequacy of instructions informing the jury of the limited purpose for
which certain evidence was admitted during the trial. The court found
that because the instruction requested by the defendant differed only
slightly from that given by the trial judge, the jury was not misled, and
therefore affirmed the defendant's conviction.3 19 8
Defendant Bradshaw was convicted of kidnapping and sentenced to
thirty years in prison.3 199 On appeal, he argued that the trial court

abused its discretion in not giving a requested cautionary instruction to
the jury. The instruction was designed to admonish the jury to only consider evidence regarding the offense charged, since the district court had
admitted evidence of additional crimes committed by Bradshaw.32 °°
The Ninth Circuit first decided that the evidence of other crimes

committed by Bradshaw was not unduly prejudicial because it was sufficiently probative to show the defendant's motive in committing the
charged offense. 320 1 The court then noted that, once evidence of other
crimes is admitted at trial, the trial judge should caution the jury regarding the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 32 2 Bradshaw requested such an instruction,3 20 3 and the district court complied by giving
3198. Id. at 710.
3199. Id. at 707. Bradshaw was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1982), which
provides in pertinent part:
Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case
of a minor by the parent thereof, when:
(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce...
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
The evidence showed that Bradshaw befriended the nine-year-old son of a woman who
lived in the same motel complex as Bradshaw. He spent a substantial amount of time with the
boy for six months, until the mother sent the boy to live with his aunt. Her reason for sending
him away was a doubt about her son's relationship with the defendant. Bradshaw continued to
meet with the boy and later suggested that the two of them move to Oklahoma together. The
boy agreed, and they soon left California for Oklahoma, where Bradshaw was arrested. 690
F.2d at 706-07.
3200. 690 F.2d at 709. It was established at the trial that while Bradshaw and the boy were
travelling, they engaged in mutual sexual activity. There was also evidence that showed Bradshaw had supplied the boy with marijuana and "speed." Id. at 708. The district judge admitted evidence of these crimes over the defendant's objections.
3201. Id. at 708-09. The Ninth Circuit observed that "[e]vidence of drug use and sexual
relations with a nine-year-old boy was obviously prejudicial to the defendant. But it was also
relevant to show Bradshaw's dominion over [the boy]." Id. at 708. The court ruled that the
probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice to the
defendant. Id.
3202. Id. at 709 (citing United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1978)). The
court noted that the purpose of a limiting instruction is to "reduce or eliminate prejudice
which would otherwise occur." Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
3203. Had Bradshaw not requested a limiting instruction, the district court was not required
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the jury a directive almost identical to that proposed by the
defendant. 3 2

The court observed that jury instructions do not have to be given in
the exact words requested by a defendant; thus, the district court's action

was not an abuse of discretion.32 °5 The Ninth Circuit thought the instruction could have been more carefully drafted, but, because the one in
question was substantially identical to that requested by Bradshaw, the
trial court's decision did not constitute reversible error.320 6
In United States v. McCown,32 °7 the Ninth Circuit considered sev-

eral objections to both the inclusion and exclusion of various jury instructions. The court of appeals ruled on both the adequacy of curative

instructions and on a claimed violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Defendants McCown, Gary Lee Barnes (Barnes, Sr.), and Gary Leslie Barnes (Barnes, Jr.), were convicted on various courts relating to a
conspiracy to distribute and actual distribution of cocaine and firearms.

The convictions stemmed from a joint undercover investigation by the
Drug Enforcement Administration and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms.3 20 8
On appeal, both Barnes, Sr. and Barnes, Jr. complained that they
had been prejudiced by testimonial evidence of a co-defendant's guilty
plea. The trial judge had initially allowed the prosecutor to question the
co-defendant on cross-examination regarding a plea bargain agreement. 320 9 But on the next day of the trial, the district judge reversed
to give one sua sponte. Id. (citing United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir.
1978)). However, the Sangrey court also stated that a limiting instruction would have been
"appropriate." United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978). In United
States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1976), the Sixth Circuit held that it constituted reversible error for the district court not to give a limiting instruction sua sponte, when
testimony was allowed at trial that revealed the defendant's prior prison record. Id. at 129192.
3204. 690 F.2d at 710. The district court's instruction was essentially a shorter version of
that requested by Bradshaw.
3205. Id. The court also noted that the sufficiency of jury instructions is determined by
viewing them as a whole. Id. This is the general rule in the circuit courts. See, e.g,, Davis v.
McAllister, 631 F.2d 1256, 1260 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 907 (1981); United
States v. Bums, 624 F.2d 95, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980).
3206. 690 F.2d at 710. It was also important to the Ninth Circuit's decision that the disputed evidence "was admitted only for purposes of proving motive and disproving consent."
Id. But in reality, it would seem that a jury might easily use the highly prejudicial testimony
regarding Bradshaw's heinous acts for other purposes, such as inferring guilt on the kidnapping charge.
3207. 711 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983).
3208. Id. at 1443.
3209. Id. at 1451. Testimony of the co-defendant's guilty plea was first brought out by
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himself and instructed the jury to disregard the evidence of the co-defendant's guilty plea. 32 10 Defendants Barnes, Sr. and Barnes, Jr. contended that the curative instruction was insufficient to correct the error
and that they were unfairly prejudiced.32 1 1
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the trial judge did cure his
initial error in admitting the evidence. Important to the court's decision
was the fact that the jury instructions admonished the jury that they

were not to use evidence of another defendant's guilty plea in determin-

ing the guilt or innocence or the defendants before them.32 12
During the trial, Barnes, Jr. had requested a jury instruction regarding an entrapment defense. The district judge had maintained until closing argument that he would not grant the request. But after closing
arguments the trial judge reversed his earlier position and sua sponte decided to give an entrapment instruction.3 2 13 On appeal, Barnes, Jr.
claimed that this action violated Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 2 14 and that the late decision deprived his counsel of the
opportunity to argue for the entrapment theory to the jury.3215
The Ninth Circuit observed that a violation of Rule 30 by a district
court is deemed to be reversible error only if the defense counsel's closing
argument is substantially prejudiced thereby.321 6 However, the court deBarnes, Jr.'s defense counsel while attempting to show bias on the part of the witness. The
Ninth Circuit noted that neither counsel for Barnes, Jr. nor Barnes, Sr. objected to the prosecutor's cross-examination. The court stated that "neither can now claim that he was unduly
prejudiced by admission of this evidence." Id.
3210. Id. The district court judge apparently felt he was wrong in admitting this evidence
because its effect was to bolster the co-defendant's credibility. This was due to the fact that the
prosecutor had attempted to restore the co-defendant's credibility "by introducing evidence
that [he] feared that he would receive a stiffer sentence if he were to commit perjury." Id.
3211. Id.
3212. Id. The Ninth Circuit cited to its earlier ruling in United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193
(9th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981), wherein the court stated that "[a] timely
instruction from the judge usually cures the prejudicial impact of evidence unless it is highly
prejudicial or the instruction is clearly inadequate." Id. at 198.
3213. 711 F.2d at 1451.
3214. FED R. CRIM. P. 30 provides in pertinent part:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury
on the law as set forth in the requests. . . .The court shall inform counsel of its
proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court
shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed.
3215. 711 F.2d at 1451-52.
3216. Id. at 1452. This view is in accordance with that held by the other circuit courts. See,
e.g., United States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir.) ("The trial court's failure to comply
with Rule 30 constitutes reversible error only if the party was unfairly prevented from arguing
his defense to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating his arguments."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir.) (failure to
comply with Rule 30 "constitutes reversible error only if it impairs the effectiveness of the
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clared that the risk of a prejudicial effect is far greater when the defense
counsel goes into closing arguments with the expectation that a certain
instruction will be given and then it is withheld by the court.3 2 17 The

situation as regards Barnes, Jr. differed since his attorney did not expect
an entrapment instruction to be given. The court concluded by noting

that the instruction was "merely superflous" in any event because there
was no evidence to support a finding of entrapment.32 18
The Ninth Circuit also considered curative instructions as to
Barnes, Sr., and evidence of "prior bad acts. '321 9 During the trial there
was testimony by one of the undercover agents that he had seen Barnes,
Sr. smoking a marijuana cigarette. On appeal, Barnes, Sr. argued that,
notwithstanding the trial judge's curative instruction, he had been unfairly prejudiced by this testimony. 3220 The court of appeals disagreed
and ruled that the district court's instruction dispelled any possible preju-

dicial effects.3221
At another point in the trial, an agent mentioned that Barnes, Sr.
had told him he had previously been arrested.32 22 The prosecutor ob-

jected to this statement and the nature of Barnes' prior arrest was not
revealed to the jury. The trial judge offered to caution the jury regarding
the testimony but Barnes, Sr. did not request such a curative instruction.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court was correct in denying
Barnes' later request for a mistrial.32 2 3
defense"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979); United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182, 186 (2d Cir.)
("But it is settled law in this Circuit that reversal is appropriate only when a defendant can
demonstrate that a Rule 30 lapse has resulted in prejudice."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979).
3217. 711 F.2d at 1452. The court noted that such a situation could devastate a closing
argument because counsel may have tailored it toward the jury receiving a particular
instruction.
3218. Id. The court decided that the inclusion of the entrapment instruction after closing
argument "did not prejudice Barnes, Jr., since the evidence would not have supported a finding
of entrapment even if that defense had been more strenuously urged upon the jury." Id.
3219. Id. at 1454.
3220. Id. The district court judges had admonished the jury that this evidence was not to be
used by it in deciding Barnes' guilt or innocence on the charges before them. The Ninth
Circuit declared that the prejudical effect of this testimony was compounded by Barnes, Sr.'s
own defense counsel because he questioned the agent further on the matter during cross-examination. Id. Nevertheless, the court of appeals declined to overrule the district court's
decision.
3221. Id. The court cited to its earlier decision in United States v. Johnson, 618 F.2d 60 (9th
Cir. 1980), where the court stated that "[a]Ithough curative instructions are not always effective, we have stated that we must assume that the jury followed the curative instruction." Id.
at 62 (citations omitted).
3222. 711 F.2d at 1454.
3223. Id. The court noted that its decision in United States v. Regner, 677 F.2d 754, 757
(9th Cir.) (district court's failure to give a limiting instruction where defendant did not request
one did not amount to "plain error"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 911 (1982), supported affirmance.
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8. Standard of review

The basic test used by the Ninth Circuit when reviewing alleged instructional errors is to view the jury instructions as a whole, as opposed

to reading the disputed instruction in its own narrow context. This was
the standard of review utilized in the recent case of United States v.
Cusino.3 22 4 Defendant Cusino was convicted in the trial court on one
count of mail fraud and six counts of wire fraud. 322 5 The convictions
stemmed from a scheme whereby Cusino defrauded potential investors
who were interested in an energy amplifying machine which he had allegedly invented.32 26
On appeal, the government conceded that there was insufficient evidence to support the mail fraud conviction, but argued for the affirmation of the wire fraud verdict.322 7 Cusino first contended that the district

court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the elements
of wire fraud. Instead of informing the jury that it must find Cusino had

devised the alleged scheme, the trial judge gave instructions regarding a
purported scheme.3 22 8
The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had read the indictment in its entirety to the jury, and it had been instructed that, to be
proved by the government, the scheme had to be substantially the one
alleged. 3229 As such, Cusino's objection did not meet the applicable stan-

dard-the instruction was, more probably than not, harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. 32 30 The court acknowledged the general rule that jury
3224. 694 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2096 (1983).
3225. The relevant statute violated was 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982), which provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud. . . transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any . ..signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
3226. 694 F.2d at 186. The facts adduced at trial showed that Cusino solicited investors for
a device which he claimed could amplify energy by a ratio of nine to one. He eventually
received over $916,000, much of which was wired from a Nevada bank to a California bank.
Id.
3227. Id.
3228. Id. at 187.
3229. Id. at 187-88.
3230. Id. at 187. The Ninth Circuit cited to its earlier decision in United States v. ValleValdez, 554 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1977). There the court ruled that an appellate court must
reverse a conviction where the defendant makes a timely objection to a deficient jury instruction, unless it is more probablethan not that the error did not materially affect the verdict." Id.
at 915 (emphasis in original).
Cusino also argued that the jury was not informed that the wire transmissions must have
been made with the specific intent to defraud, which is an essential element of the scheme. 694
F.2d at 187. The Ninth Circuit held that this was a misconception of the specific intent're-
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instructions are to be examined as a whole and that they will not be
found to be defective unless "plain error" is shown.32 31
The defendant also argued that the evidence supported an instruc-

tion on good faith, as a complete defense to the allegations. The Ninth
Circuit noted that the jury had been told that it must find the defendant
acted with a specific intent to defraud in order to convict him. The court
felt that this was tantamount to an instruction on good faith, since good
faith is essentially the obverse of intent to defraud.32 32 Thus, the instruction in question did not amount to plain error.3 233

Finally, Cusino contended that the combination of alleged errors in
the instructions amounted to plain error.3 23 a The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument, stating that the instructions, taken as a whole,
were adequate.3 23 5 The court then affirmed the defendant's conviction of
wire fraud.
In United States v. Kendrick,3 23 6 the Ninth Circuit considered the
standard of review to be used when a defendant assigns as error the refusal of the district court to give a requested jury instruction.32 3 7 Kendrick had been charged with violating federal securities laws, 3238 and had
quirement under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. This requirement "pertains to the scheme to defraud...
not to the causing of wire transmissions." Id. at 188 (citation omitted).
3231. 694 F.2d at 187-88. See infra note 3314.
3232. 694 F.2d at 188 (citing United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 289 (10th Cir. 1978)).
3233. Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (plain errors that affect "substantial rights" may be
raised on appeal even though defendant failed to object during trial).
The Ninth Circuit stated that Cusino also failed to object at trial to a jury instruction
"which this Court has condemned several times." 694 F.2d at 188. The court did not explain
exactly what that instruction was, but instead cited to its decision in United States v. Brown,
522 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975). Judging from the Brown opinion, the district court in Cusino
most likely gave an instruction regarding the burden of proof that omitted the words "beyond
a reasonable doubt." See id. at 11. The Ninth Circuit noted that at Cusino's trial, the district
court made 10 references to "beyond a reasonable doubt" in other instructions to the jury. 694
F.2d at 188. The effect of this was to cure any prejudicial errors that may have occurred due
to the one deficient instruction.
3234. 694 F.2d at 188.
3235. Id. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658 (1975), where the Court stated that "in reviewing jury instructions, our task is also to
view the charge itself as part of the whole trial." Id. at 674.
3236. 692 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
3237. Id. at 1266. Kendrick also contended on appeal that the jury instruction that was
given on fraud was deficient. Id. at n.3. The Ninth Circuit refused to consider this issue
because the defendant had not objected to the instruction during the trial. The court noted
that the "'general rule is that appellants cannot raise a new issue for the first time in their
Reply Brief.'" Id. (quoting Thompson v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 642, 649 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981)).
3238. Kendrick was specifically charged with violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
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requested an instruction to the effect that he may have had implied authority to draw on one of his customer's accounts. 3239 The trial court
refused to give the instruction and Kendrick was ultimately convicted.
On appeal, Kendrick claimed that such refusal constituted reversible error.3 2"' The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that there was no
evidence to suggest that the defendant had any implied authority to withdraw the funds, 3241 and that the jury instructions were complete. The
court concluded by stating that the district court's instructions covered
this aspect of Kendrick's case adequately and that was all that was
required.32 42
3 24 3 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a reIn United States v. Candelaria,
quest for a jury instruction which was denied due to lack of supporting
evidence. Candelaria was charged with communicating a false bomb
threat in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 844(e). 324 At trial, the defense
requested a jury instruction to the effect that the jury must find the defendant not guilty if it considered his actions merely a joke or prank.324 5
3239. 692 F.2d at 1266. The defendant was accused of making unauthorized drafts on a
margin account of a customer, depositing the money in his own account, and then falsely
reporting to the customer that the withdrawals had been made for the purpose of acquiring
securities for him. Id. at 1264.
3240. Kendrick presumably relied on the customer's testimony at trial, "that at a May 1978
SEC proceeding he had 'testified that an implied authorization might have been interpreted
from the course of transactions between myself and Kendrick and Co."' Id. at 1266 n.4.
3241. The Ninth Circuit observed that "[t]here was nothing from which the jury could have
concluded that appellant had implied authority to draw on [the customer's] non-discretionary
account for his own benefit." Id. at 1266. Kendrick may have had implied authority to
purchase stock, but not to use the funds for his own purposes.
3242. Id. The court cited its earlier decision in United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981). The Kenny court held that:
When a defendant's jury instructions have been refused, the following principles apply. The jury must be instructed as to the defense theory of the case, but the exact
language proposed by the defendant not be used, and it is not error to refuse a proposed instruction so long as the other instructions in their entirety cover that theory.
Id. at 1337.
3243. 704 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1983).
3244. 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (1982) provides:
Whoever, through the use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, or other instrument
of commerce, willfully makes any threat, or maliciously conveys false information
knowing the same to be false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made,
or to be made, to kill, injure, or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage or
destroy any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property by means of fire or
an explosive shall be imprisoned for not more than five years or fined not more than
$5,000, or both.
3245. 704 F.2d at 1131. Candelaria conceded that he had made the bomb threat but contended that he had no malicious reason for doing so. He also testified that he had been drinking that night. His defense counsel argued that in light of these facts, it was obvious that the
call was made in jest, and therefore it should not be subject to punishment under the statute.
Id. at 1130-31.
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The district judge instructed the jury regarding the issues of malice and
intent, but refused the defendant's proposed instruction.32 46 On appeal,

Candelaria argued that the trial court's refusal constituted reversible
error.
The Ninth Circuit observed that the underlying issue was whether

18 U.S.C. section 844(e) actually required or allowed criminal sanctions
for threats made in jest,3247 but the court concluded that it need not address the issue.3 24 8 The court failed to find any evidence or testimony3249
in
the record that would suggest the threat was in fact made in jest.
Because the defendant's theory did not appear to have any support what-

soever in the evidence or in the law, the district judge was not obliged to
instruct on that theory.3 250

9. Erroneous jury instructions that did not prejudice the defendant
In United States v. Bertman, 25 1 the Ninth Circuit considered

whether jury instructions regarding coercion, which failed to inform the
3246. Id. at 1131.
3247. Id. at 1132. The Ninth Circuit cited two earlier cases that addressed the issue of
threats supposedly made in jest. The first, Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969),
concerned a defendant who had placed a call to the telephone operator and threatened the life
of the President of the United States. The operative statute that defined the offense, 18 U.S.C.
§ 871 (1982), required that the threat be made "knowingly and willfully." Id. at 876. The
defendant argued that the willfulness requirement of the statute was not satisfied because he
told the same operator in a later call that the threat was a joke. Id. at 878. The Ninth Circuit
ruled that if the threat were made "in a context of levity," so that a reasonable person would
realize that the caller was not serious, the threat would not be an offense under the statute. Id.
Nevertheless, the court held that Roy's call did consitute a proscribed offense because the
telephone operator "had no reliable way to determine whether the anonymous caller was joking." Id.
A somewhat different interpretation of the statute was set forth by Justice Marshall in
Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975). The defendant had been convicted of threatening
the life of the President, but the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Marshall argued that the
statute had been construed too broadly and stated that "I would therefore interpret § 871 to
require proof that the speaker intended his statement to be taken as a threat, even if he had no
intention of actually carrying it out." Id. at 48 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
This statement did not contrast with the majority opinion; Justice Marshall was merely explaining his own view of the statute.
3248. 704 F.2d at 1132.
3249. Id. The court postulated that the testimony in this regard related more to the question
of intent, and held that there was sufficient instruction on that subject. Id.
3250. Id. The principle that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction only on a theory of
defense which has some foundation in the evidence or in the law is thoroughly consistent with
previous Ninth Circuit decisions, as well, as the decisions of other circuit courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Posey, 647 F.2d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Davis, 597 F.2d
1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lewis, 592 F.2d 1282, 1285 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 987 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,425 U.S. 973 (1976).
3251. 686 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1982).
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jury that the burden of proof was on the government, constituted reversible error. Defendant Bertman had been convicted of violating the
Travel Act 3252 by travelling in interstate commerce with the intent to
promote a bribery scheme in violation of Hawaiian law. 25 3
Bertman requested, over the government's objection, a jury instruction stating that the government had to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that he did not engage in the bribery scheme as a result of extortion or coercion.3 254 The district court refused Bertman's requested instruction, but it did instruct the jury that coercion could be a defense to
bribery.32 55 On appeal, Bertman contended that the district court's instruction erroneously shifted the burden of proof on coercion from the

government to himself, despite Hawaiian law clearing placing that burden on the government.32 56
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court erred in failing to
place on the government the burden of proving the absence of coercion. a2 57 However, the court did not agree that this error required a reversal of Bertman's conviction, because the defendant failed to present
3252. The Travel Act is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) and (b)(2) (1982), and provides in
pertinent part:
Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce. . . with intent to . . . promote, manage, establish, [or]
carry on. . . any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform
any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2) and (3), shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
As used in this section "unlawful activity" means. . . extortion, bribery, or
arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States.
3253. 686 F.2d at 773.
3254. Id. at 774. The charges against Bertman arose from an alleged scheme by him to bribe
the Liquor Control Administrator of Honolulu in order to secure approval of his plan to import Coors beer into Hawaii. The defendant did in fact give the Liquor Administrator gifts
and promised to pay him $500,000 over a period of two years. Bertman contended that these
transactions were a result of "coercive pressure" placed on him by the Administrator and that
he merely played along in order to preserve his chances of obtaining a permit. Id. at 773.
3255. Id. at 774.
3256. Bertman was charged in the indictment with bribery of a public official in violation of
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 710-1040(l) (Supp. 1976), which provides in relevant part that: "A
person commits the offense of bribery if: (a) He confers, or offers or agrees to confer, directly
or indirectly, any pecuniary benefit upon a public servant with the intent to influence the
public servant's vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of discretion, or other action in his official
capacity .... "
Section 710-1040(2) provides: "It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (1) that
the accused conferred or agreed to confer the pecuniary benefit as a result of extortion or
coercion." HAWAII REV. STAT. § 710-1040(2) (Supp. 1976).
3257. 686 F.2d at 775. The court noted that since the coercion defense under Hawaii law
was nonaffimative, all Bertman need do was to present "some credible evidence of coercion."
Id. at 774-75. The burden then shifts to the government to negate the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 775. Thus, the court concluded that Bertman had not shown evidence of
the essential element of the coercion defense. Id.
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any credible evidence whatsoever that would entitle him to an instruction

on the defense of coercion.3258 The Ninth Circuit held that because
Bertman was not entitled to an instruction regarding a coercion defense,

the one given by the district court, albeit clearly erroneous,
could only
32 9

have benefitted the defendant and was therefore harmless.
Potentially erroneous jury instructions were discussed by the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Alexander..32° The defendant was convicted
on four counts of first degree murder and on four counts of burglary
committed in the perpetration of a felony. On appeal, Alexander contended that conflicting jury instructions were prejudicial to him, while
the government argued that the judge's instruction on manslaughter was
improperly given. 3261
The trial judge had instructed the jury that coercion or duress could
3 26 2
provide a legal excuse for the crime of robbery, but not for murder.
He also gave an instruction, at Alexander's request, on the elements of
voluntary manslaughter, and explained that an act causing death may
constitute voluntary manslaughter if it is committed under duress or coercion and without malice aforethought. 26 3
The government argued that the manslaughter instruction should
not have been given to the jury. 32 " The Ninth Circuit decided that the

issue was moot because the jury had convicted Alexander of first degree
murder and thus must have found the existence of malice aforethought

when the homicides occurred.3265 Such a finding showed that the jury
3258. Id. The court observed, that even if Bertman's testimony was believed, it did not establish that "he was constrained ... to do what his free will would have refused." Id.
3259. Id. That erroneous jury instructions may actually work to the benefit of a defendant is
well documented in the federal circuit courts. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d
1120, 1142 (1st Cir. 1981) (district court error in giving conspiracy instructions only benefitted
defendant because it required government to prove more than necessary), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979) (giving entrapment
instruction when not required only benefitted defendant); United States v. Rea, 532 F.2d 147,
149 (9th Cir.) (ambiguity in the instructions could only have helped defendant because it may
have given jurors more stringent view of government's burden of proof), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
837 (1976); United States v. Furr, 528 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1976) (since defendant was not
entitled to duress instructions at all, he could not complain that the one he received was too
narrow).
3260. 695 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2458 (1983).
3261. Id. at 401.
3262. Id.
3263. Id.
3264. The government relied on United States v. Buchanan, 529 F.2d 1148, 1153 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976), which states flatly that "coercion is not a defense to
murder."
3265. 695 F.2d at 401. "Malice aforethought" has been defined as:
the characteristic mark of all murder, as distinguished from the lesser crime of man-
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did not believe that Alexander committed the crimes under the influence
of duress or coercion,3266 and as a result, any potential error was clearly
harmless. 2 67
The Ninth Circuit concluded its discussion of the jury instructions
that any potential conflict arising from the voluntary mannoting
by
slaughter directive was a result of the defendant requesting such an inwas precluded from
struction. 2 6 8 The court then ruled that Alexander
269
arguing on appeal errors which he invited.
In United States v. Manuel,3 27° the Ninth Circuit considered
whether an involuntary manslaughter instruction could be consistent
with a self-defense instruction given in the same proceeding. Defendant
Manuel had requested jury instructions on both self-defense as a defense
to the murder charge, and on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense. 3271 The district court refused to give both instructions
and compelled Manuel to make a choice between the two, whereupon the
defense proceeded on the self-defense theory.32 72
On appeal, Manuel argued that the trial judge committed reversible
error by refusing to instruct on the two theories. The Ninth Circuit
agreed that the trial court erred, holding that there were indeed situations where a defendant could legitimately claim both involuntary manslaughter which lacks it. It does not mean simply hatred or particular ill will, but
extends to and embraces generally the state of mind with which one commits a
wrongful act. . . . It is not synonymous with premediation, however, but may also
be inferred from circumstances which show a wanton and depraved spirit, a mind
bent on evil mischief without regard to its consequences.
Virgin Islands v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770, 774 (3d Cir. 1966).
3266. 695 F.2d at 401.
3267. Id. at 402.
3268. Id.
3269. Id. Accord United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Under the
doctrine of invited error, a defendant who asks for an instruction will not be heard to complain
about the instruction on appeal."), cerL denied,449 U.S. 1091 (1981). See also United States v.
Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 708 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1860 (1977), where the court
stated that "even had the instruction been erroneous which is not the case, Riebold could not
now raise the challenge. A defendant cannot complain of error which he invited upon
himself."
3270. 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1983).
3271. Id. at 915.
3272. Id. The district court relied upon United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309-10
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3569 (1983), for the proposition that an involuntary
manslaughter instruction need not be given when the defense also requests a self-defense instruction. In Skinner, the defendant had admitted to intentionally killing the victim, allegedly
in self-defense. The court reasoned that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter (an unintentional, but criminally negligent offense), would be inconsistent with Skinner's intentional
act. Because no rational jury could convict Skinner of involuntary manslaughter, he was not
entitled to such an instruction. Id. at 1310.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

slaughter and self-defense instructions.3273 Even though the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the district court had erred in rejecting Manuel's re-

quested instructions, it held the error to be harmless because Manuel was
3274
not entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction in any event.
Manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of the crime of murder. 3275
In order for a defendant to be entitled to an instruction regarding a

lesser-included offense, it is essential that a rational jury could find the
defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense, but not guilty of the
greater offense.3 2 76 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Manuel could not

be convicted of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter because
there was no evidence to show that he acted without malice,32 77 a requisite condition for an involuntary manslaughter conviction. 3278 Because
the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding involuntary
manslaughter, the lower court's error was deemed harmless. 2 7 9
3273. 706 F.2d at 915. As an example, the court gave a situation where the defendant is
assaulted,
but does not have a reasonable apprehension of suffering great bodily harm or death,
and is therefore privileged to use force, but only non-deadly force, in self-defense. . . . If the defendant attempts to use non-deadly force, but does so in a criminally negligent manner and death results, then both involuntary manslaughter and
self-defense instructions would be warranted.
Id. The Ninth Circuit distinguished these circumstances from Skinner because, in the latter,
the defendant had intentionally shot and killed the victim. Here, the court is theorizing a
negligent killing. Id.
3274. Id. at 916.
3275. See United States v. Celestine, 510 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1975; see generally C.
TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 152 (14th ed. 1979).

3276. United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982); see also United States v.
Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1980); Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c).
3277. "Malice" has been defined as "a condition of the mind which prompts a person to do a
wrongful act wilfully. ., to the injury of another, or to do intentionally a wrongful act toward
another without justification or excuse." 1 DEvITr & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS § 16.06 (3d ed. 1977).
3278. 706 F.2d at 916. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982) provides:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of
two kinds:
Voluntary-Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
Involuntary-In the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony,
or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.
The Ninth Circuit noted that, even if the court accepted Manuel's version of the facts,
there was clear evidence of a malicious killing. At best, Manuel stood by and watched his
friends beat the victim with a heavy board and helped drag the body to another location where
a heavy tree stump was dropped on him. At worst, Manuel himself had dropped the tree
stump on the victim. The court argued that a rational jury could not consider this evidence
without concluding that "Manuel acted with wanton and callous disregard of human life
amounting to malice." 706 F.2d at 916.
3279. 706 F.2d at 916.
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10.

Instructions in entrapment cases

Entrapment occurs when the government induces a person to commit a crime which that person would not otherwise be predisposed to
commit.3 2 80 In United States v. Tornabene,328 1 the Ninth Circuit consid-

ered whether the lower court's jury instructions on entrapment constituted reversible error. Tornabene was charged with distributing LSD in
violation of 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1). At trial, he requested a jury
instruction that placed the burden on the government to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped.3 28 2 The district
judge refused to give the instruction and Tornabene was subsequently
convicted.
On appeal, Tornabene argued that the lower court committed reversible error by refusing his proposed instruction.32 8 3 After noting that
the requested instruction did not conform to the suggested approach of a
treatise on the subject,32 84 the Ninth Circuit nevertheless found no error
in the district court's ruling.328 5 The court of appeals held that the en-

trapment instructions that were given adequately informed the jury that
3280. United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 834 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1449 (1983). The elements of entrapment are present "when the criminal design originates
with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the
disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may
prosecute." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). The justification for the defense is "that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has
committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, but was induced to commit them by the
Government." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
3281. 687 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1982).
3282. Id. at 317. The basis for Tornabene's indictment was a sale of approximately 5,000
units of LSD that he made to two undercover Drug Enforcement Administration agents.
3283. Id.
3284. The Ninth Circuit noted that the defendant's proposed instruction reflected an amendment of DEvIT & BLACKMAR'S FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS to conform
with United States v. Johnson, 590 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1979), reh'g en banc, 605 F.2d 1025,
cerL denied, 441 U.S. 1033 (1980). On the first appeal, the Johnson court overturned the
defendant's conviction because the jury instructions failed to specifically place the burden of
proof on the entrapment issue on the government. 590 F.2d at 251. The court noted that
entrapment instructions are "exceptions to the general rule" that the "propriety of a given
instruction is to be determined from all the instructions viewed as a whole." Id.
On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit reversed itself and declared that "[it is axiomatic that
in determining the propriety of an instruction that all the instructions be considered as a
whole." 605 F.2d at 1027 (emphasis added). Since the district judge had placed the burden of
proof on the government in other jury instructions, the court found that his failure to specifically include it in the entrapment directive did not constitute reversible error. Id. at 1028. The
Seventh Circuit stated that, while it is "preferable" to have the specific provision, a lack
thereof would not "automatically require reversal." Id. The Eleventh Circuit is in accordance
with this view. See United States v. Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781 (1lth Cir. 1982).
3285. 687 F.2d at 317.
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the government had to prove lack of entrapment beyond a reasonable
doubt.32 86 The court concluded by stating that the instruction in ques-

tion was virtually identical with entrapment instructions it had approved
in earlier decisions.3 287
In United States v. Rhodes,32 88 the Ninth Circuit ruled on various
challenges to the district court's instructions to the jury. The court of
appeals ultimately agreed with the trial court in all respects and affirmed
the defendants' convictions.3 28 9
Defendants Rhodes and Dudley were convicted in the lower court
of conspiracy to possess and distribute stolen mail. 3290 Dudley was also
convicted on two counts of possession of stolen mail.32 9 1 The convictions

stemmed from a scheme whereby the defendants planned to distribute
numerous checks which had been stolen from the mail.
On appeal, Dudley first argued that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury concerning the defense of entrapment.32 92 Dudley

claimed that the man who arranged the meeting at which his arrest took
place was, in reality, a government agent, and that he had been
entrapped.

3293

3286. Id.
3287. Id. The court cited its earlier decisions in United States v. Pico-Zazueta, 564 F.2d
1367 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 946 (1978), and United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa,
548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978). But it is unclear from these
two cases whether the jury was specifically instructed that the government bore the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped.
However, in another Ninth Circuit case decided just six months before Tornabene, the
court held that:
[a]n entrapment charge must clearly instruct the jury that the Government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was ready and willing to commit
the crimes whenever an opportunity was afforded. It is the rule in this circuit that
where the substance of this charge is omitted, the instructions are not adequate.
United States v. Dearmore, 672 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). See also
United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1979) (entrapment directive must "unmistakably apprise" jury of government's burden).
Because the Tornabene opinion did not describe the disputed instructions, it is difficult to
determine whether they conform to the standard established in earlier decisions.
3288. 713 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 535 (1983).
3289. Id. at 476.
3290. Id. at 466. The defendants were convicted of violating the general conspiracy statute.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) provides in pertinent part: "If two or more persons conspire. . . to
commit any offense against the United States. . . and one or more of such persons do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both."
3291. 713 F.2d at 466. Specifically Dudley violated 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1982), which proscribes the offense of the theft or receipt of stolen mail.
3292. 713 F.2d at 467.
3293. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that the person who had arranged this meeting, Will
Cunningham, was a "bounty hunter" who shared information with the police about fugitives

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

The Ninth Circuit reiterated the requirements that must be present
for an entrapment defense: (1) the government must have induced the
defendant to commit the criminal act, and (2) the defendant must lack
any predisposition to commit the crime.329 4 Both these elements must be
present 5 in order for the entrapment defense theory to be submitted to the
329

jury.

The Ninth Circuit decided that Dudley could not satisfy either of
these tests. The court ruled that there was no evidence to show that the
person who arranged the meeting at which Dudley was arrested was a
government agent.3 29 6 In addition, the court noted that there was overwhelming proof to show that the defendant was predisposed to participate in the conspiracy.32 97 The court concluded by stating that because
there was not sufficient evidence to show the defendant had been entrapped, the issue was not one for the jury to consider. As such, the
district court judge had acted correctly, and indeed had a duty to rule on
the defense theory as a matter of law, since there was no factual issue for
329 8
the jury.
Dudley also contended on appeal that the district judge had errone3299
ously instructed the jury on the definition of constructive possession.
The concept of constructive possession was crucial to Dudley's convic-

tion because it could not be proved that he was every in actual physical
possession of stolen checks. Dudley claimed that the trial judge's choice
of language tended to nullify the knowledge requirement of constructive
possession. 3300 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the defendant
misconstrued the district court's language, and that the example used by
he was seeking. The court declared that such conduct did not transform him into a government agent.
3294. Id. (citations omitted).
3295. Id. (citing United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 941 (1974)).
3296. 713 F.2d at 467. See supra note 3294.
3297. 713 F.2d at 467. The court recited a litany of various acts that Dudley engaged in to
further the objects of the conspiracy. These included recruiting persons to distribute stolen
checks, actual receipt of stolen checks, the opening of mail, and the attempted sale of stolen
checks. Id.
3298. Id. (citing United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1977)).
3299. Id. at 470. The Ninth Circuit noted that the standard of review in this respect was
"'whether the instruction, taken as a whole, was misleading or represented a statement inadequate to guide jury deliberations.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225,
1230 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 873 (1979)).
3300. Id. at 471. The trial court instructed the jury that "[a] person who, although not in
actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise
dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then
in constructive possession of it." Id.
The judge went on to give an example of the concept, using his and his wife's possessiori of
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the trial court was adequate to explain the concept to the jury.3 3 ° '
Finally, defendant Rhodes argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the inferences made in the court's jury instruction regarding the stolen checks. 330 2 The district court had told the jury that, if
it believed the letters were placed in the mail and had not been received,
it could infer that they had been stolen while in the possession of the post
office. At trial, Rhodes contended that the government should have the
burden of proving that the letters were indeed properly posted and addressed. He then offered two alternate instructions to that effect. The
trial court refused to give either instruction.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the government's position that the
entire dispute was moot because the parties had stipulated that the items
330 3
stolen from the mail had been properly mailed, but never received.
The court went on to say that, even if the instruction was improper, it
constituted harmless error.33° The instruction did not tell the jury that
they must draw certain inferences; it merely informed them that they
could. Because the jury did not have to rely exclusively on the inferences
330 5
in the disputed instruction, any error committed was harmless.
11.

Jury instructions that broaden the grand jury indictment

It is a universally accepted rule in the federal judiciary that a court
may not amend a grand jury indictment through its instructions to the
jury.330 6 This issue was recently dealt with by the Ninth Circuit in
their cars as an illustration. The disputed passage in the instruction was: "[m]y wife is driving
in one car probably now." Id. (emphasis omitted).
Dudley maintained that the trial judge's use of the term "probably now" confused the
knowledge requirement because it implied that a defendant may be in constructive possession
of an item "whether or not the defendant has knowledge that another person has actual possession of the item." Id.
3301. Id. The court of appeals stated that the use of the word "probably," "merely referred
to the likelihood that the trial judge's wife was in actual, as opposed to constructive, possession
of the car." Id.
3302. Id. at 475.
3303. Id. The court also ruled that the instruction was proper given the large number of
checks involved. It was ludicrous to believe that the 841 checks had been stolen after delivery
to each intended recipient, rather than while in the custody of the post office. Id.
3304. Id. The court observed that "It]he giving of an erroneous jury instruction is a nonconstitutional error." Id. (citing United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir 1977)).
A defendant's conviction will not be reversed as a result of a nonconstitutional error unless it is
"'more probable than not'" that the error "'materially affected the verdict.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977).
3305. Id. at 476.
3306. See, eg., United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, 851 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1207 (1983); United States v. Ramirez, 670 F.2d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1139 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States
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United States v. Pazsint.330 7 The defendant had been charged in a grand

jury indictment with impeding, intimidating, and interfering with a federal officer by use of a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. section
111.3308 However, he was tried and convicted before a jury which was
330 9
instructed only on the offense of forcible assault.
On appeal, Pazsint argued that he was convicted of an offense different from that charged in the indictment. The Ninth Circuit agreed, ruling that an amendment of the indictment that charges a new crime
through the jury instructions constitutes per se reversible error.3 310 The
jury instructions were held to be clearly erroneous because they did not

describe the offense charged in the indictment. The effect of this was to
destroy the defendant's substantial right to be tried only on charges
presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury.33 11 The conviction
was therefore reversed.

12. The accomplice credibility instruction
In 1909, the United States Supreme Court observed that the testimony of criminal accomplices "ought to be received with suspicion, and
with the very greatest care and caution, and ought not to be passed upon
by the jury under the same rules governing other and apparently credible

witnesses.

' 3312

The very real possibility that one accomplice to a crime

may be tempted to testify falsely against another in an attempt to receive
v. Cusmano, 659 F.2d 714, 717 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Delargaza, 650 F.2d 1166,
1167 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981).
3307. 703 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1983).
3308. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes
with any person. . while engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties. . .[and] in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or dangerous
weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten yeras,
or both.
Pazsint, while brandishing a handgun, had made a "citizen's arrest" of an IRS agent
whom be believed to be harassing his wife. 703 F.2d at 422.
3309. 703 F.2d at 422. In returning the indictment, the grand jury had chosen to omit the
words "assaults", "resists", and "opposes", and had only charged Pazsint with impeding, intimidating and interfering with a federal officer. Id. at 423. But he was actually found guilty
of another crime-that of assaultingan officer with a deadly weapon. Id. at 424.
3310. Id. at 423. See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960). In Stirone, the
defendant was indicted and charged with intefering with interstate commerce by extortion, but
he was convicted of an additional charge of unlawful exportation of steel. The court reaffirmed
the rule that "a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the
indictment against him." Id. at 217.
3311. 703 F.2d at 424. The district court had first read the indictment to the jury, then gave
them instructions only on the crime of forcible assault. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found
the instructions to be "both conflicting and misleading." Id.
3312. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909).
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a reduced charge has led most federal courts to give cautionary instructions to juries hearing such testimony. The issue in United States v.

Moore 3313 was whether it constituted "plain error ' 3314 for a court not to
give an accomplice directive in the absence of a request for such an
instruction.
Moore was on trial for the offense of aiding and abetting a bank
robbery. During the trial, one of the robbers pleaded guilty and testified

against the alleged accomplices. Moore was named as the driver of the
"getaway car" and was convicted on the charge.33 15
On appeal, he contended that the district court committed plain er-

ror in not giving the jury a cautionary instruction regarding the accomplice testimony. 33 16 The Ninth Circuit took note of the fact that Moore

did not request such an instruction during the trial, a request that, if not
honored by the judge, would have constituted reversible error. 33 17 However, the court held that there was no plain error in this situation because
the rule in the Ninth Circuit is that where the defendant does not request

an accomplice instruction, it is not plain error to fail to give one sua
sponte.3 3 1 s
3313. 700 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1983), modified, 730 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1984).
3314. "Plain error" has been defined as "a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial
rights." United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979
(1979). A criminal conviction will be reversed on the basis of plain error" 'in the very exceptional situation only, situations wherein it appears to be necessary in order to prevent miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.'" Id.
(quoting Marshall v. United States, 409 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1969)).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that plain errors "may be noticed although they
were not brought to the attention of the court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The purpose of the
rule is to prevent wholesale reversals for immaterial and harmless errors, while protecting the
defendant from those errors so substantial that his case was irreparably prejudiced.
3315. 700 F.2d at 536.
3316. Id.
3317. Id.
3318. Id. (citing United States v. Gere, 662 F.2d 1291, 1295 (9th Cir. 1981)). The circuit
courts are somewhat divided on this issue, but the majority have ruled that, when an accomplice instruction is not requested, it is plain error to fail to give the directive only if substantial
prejudice to the defendant will result from its omission. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 673
F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir.) (court should give a cautionary directive regarding "uncorroborated
accomplice testimony (1) where it is solely relied upon for conviction and (2) where there are
strong indicia that the testimony of the accomplice may be a fabrication"), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 863, (1982); United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108, 124 (1st Cir. 1980) (failure to give a
cautionary instruction sua sponte will not constitute plain error if the accomplice testimony is
both internally "consistent and credible").
However, the First Circuit did reverse a conviction for failure to give a cautionary instruction where the only evidence connecting the defendant with a bank robbery "came from the
mouths of others involved in that escapade." McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29, 36 (1st
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968). And in United States v. Windom, 510 F.2d 989
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 862 (1975), the court stated flatly that "[t]he failure to give
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13.

Instructions on robbery through intimidation

In United States v. Hopkins,3 3 19 the Ninth Circuit addressed the accuracy of a jury instructions defining the offense of taking by intimidation. Defendant Hopkins was convinced of attempted bank robbery by
intimidation, a violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2113(a).3 32 °
On appeal, Hopkins contended that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to modify the jury instructions to conform to the suggested approach of an earlier Ninth Circuit case. 332 1 The instruction
given by the district court stated that intimidation could be established
by proof of an act "as would produce in the ordinary person fear of bodily harm. '33 22 The requested instruction stated that an attempt to "take"
by intimidation meant to take "'in such a way that would put an ordinary, reasonable person in fear of bodily harm.' "3323
While the difference may seem to be one of semantics, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the "reasonable person" standard was a more accurate
statement of the law, and thus should be used in the future. However,
the Ninth Circuit also held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in using the alternate instruction.3 32 4
such an instruction where the testimony of the accomplice is the only direct evidence against
the accused is plain error." Id. at 994 (citation omitted).
Defendant Moore prevailed, however, on another argument. During his trial the district
court had asked for a numerical division of the jury during its deliberation. Such an inquiry is
forbidden in the Ninth Circuit and Moore's conviction was accordingly reversed. 700 F.2d at
536.
3319. 703 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 399 (1983).
3320. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of
value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of,
any bank...
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both.
3321. 703 F.2d at 1103. The earlier case was United States v. Alsop, 479 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.
1973).
3322. Id. (quoting 2 DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 44.05 (3d ed. 1977)).
3323. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Alsop, 479 F.2d 65, 67, n.4 (9th
Cir. 1973)). In the text of its opinion, the Alsop court actually approved language similar to
that in DEVrrT & BLACKMAR. But in a footnote, the court stated that the proper test in
determining the presence of intimidation is an objective one, and that "requires the application
of the standard of the ordinary man." United States v. Alsop, 479 F.2d 65, 67 n.4 (9th Cir.
1973). The court then suggested, but did not command, that in the future it would be wise for
the district courts to use a definition including the terms, "ordinary, reasonable person." Id.
(emphasis added).
3324. 703 F.2d at 1103. Cf United States v. Roustio, 455 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1972)
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Instructions in antitrust cases

According to the United States Supreme Court, "[i]t has long been
settled that an agreement to fix prices is unlawful per se."3325 The Ninth

Circuit recently addressed the "per se" theory of price fixing in United
States v. Kahan & Lessin Co.3 326

The defendants, two health food distributors, were convicted of conspiring to restrain trade by fixing prices, terms, and conditions for the

sale of health foods in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.3327 On
appeal, the defendants argued that the district court erred in instructing
3328
the jury on the goverment's "per se" theory regarding price fixing.
The Ninth Circuit noted that, while the theory should be used with
some caution, the Supreme Court had recently reaffirmed the rule of con-

elusive presumption of illegality in price fixing cases.33 29 The defendants
contended that the "per se" rule should not apply if it could be shown
that the price fixing had some procompetitive justifications. 3331 The

Ninth Circuit rejected this argument without discussion, noting simply
that the Supreme Court had specifically ruled against that

justification.3331
(court construed another portion of the "bank robbery statute"-18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)-to require that the "life of the person assaulted must be placed.in an objective state of danger").
Hopkins also argued on appeal that the district court prejudiced is case by refusing to
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of bank larceny. The Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court's decision because the bank larceny statute did not expressly proscribe an attempt offense. Thus, there was no way for Hopkins to have been found guilty of "attempted"
bank larceny. 703 F.2d at 1103.
3325. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (per curiam). The Court
also ruled that it "is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves reasonable." Id.
3326. 695 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
3327. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States. . .is declared to be illegal."
3328. 695 F.2d at 1125.
3329. Id. The Ninth Circuit specifically referred to Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), and Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). In
Maricopa County, the Court stated that "[w]e have not wavered in our enforcement of the per
se rule against price-fixing." 457 U.S. at 347. And in Target Sales, the Court declared that
"since price-fixing agreements have been adjudged to lack any 'redeeming virtue,' it is conclusively presumed illegal without further examination under the rule of reason." 446 U.S. at 650.
3330. 695 F.2d at 1125.
3331. Id. The Supreme Court decided that "[t]he anticompetitive potential inherent in all
price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are
offered for some." Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982).
The defendants also argued that they were entitled to a mistrial due to prejudicial questions asked of witnesses by government counsel. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the district
court cured these errors with appropriate cautionary instructions. It noted that "the trial
court has broad discretion, and its rulings will not be reversed unless there was an abuse of that
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15.

Instructions in conspiracy cases

A conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act. The rationale behind the law of conspiracy is the protection of society from the
dangers of concerted criminal activity, a danger considered so great that

it warrants criminal sanctions
regardless of whether the crime agreed
3332

upon is actually committed.
In United States v. Brooklier, 333 the Ninth Circuit considered the
adequacy of jury instructions defining the elements of a conspiracy. Five
defendants were convicted in the district court of violating the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute.3334 They contended on appeal that the jury was erroneously instructed regarding the
elements of a RICO conspiracy. The Ninth Circuit upheld the disputed
instruction and stated that, not only was the instruction not prejudicial
to the defendants, but it actually placed an undue burden on the
government.
It was adduced at trial that all five defendants were members of La
Cosa Nostra, a secret nationwide organization allegedly engaged in a
wide range of criminal activities, including murder, gambling and extortion.33 35 Specifically, the defendants were members of the Los Angeles
"family" and their convictions stemmed from both conspiracy to violate
36
33
and substantive violations of RICO.

On appeal, the defendants argued that the jury instructions were
defective because they allowed the jury to convict on the basis of multiple
discretion that unfairly prejudiced the appellants." 695 F.2d at 1125. Finding none, the court
of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
3332. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94 (1975). The Court noted that danger was
inherent in an unlawful agreement, because "[c]riminal intent has crystallized, and the likelihood of actual, fulfilled commission warrants preventitive action." Id. at 694.
3333. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
3334. Id. at 1213. This statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) and provides in pertinent part:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
As the Ninth Circuit explained, "[t]he essence of a RICO conspiracy is not an agreement
to commit racketeering acts, but an agreement to conduct or participate in the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering." 685 F.2d at 1216 (citing United States v.
Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1170 n.15 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981)).
3335. 685 F.2d at 1213.
3336. Id. at 1213-14. In addition, two defendants were convicted of extorting money from
an FBI-operated pornography business.
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conspiracies without finding the existence of an overall conspiracy.33 37

After first elaborating on the purpose underlying the RICO statute,3338
the Ninth Circuit stated that the pattern of racketeering required could
be established by showing two or more acts or attempts of the requisite
type that the defendant committed and that were connected by a common scheme or plan.33 39 The court then noted that, in order to convict
under the disputed instructions, the jury had to find that each defendant
had agreed to participate in two specific racketeering acts.3340
The Ninth Circuit ruled that these instructions were sufficient to
explain the elements of a RICO conspiracy and that they required the
jury to find the existence of an overall conspiracy.3341 Moreover because
the instructions could have been interpreted to require that the government prove the defendants had actuallyparticipatedin two or more acts
of racketeering, they constituted an undue addition to the government's
burden of proof.3342 As such, the defendants actually benefitted by the

language of the instructions, and their convictions were affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit considered the adequacy of the jury instructions

in a prosecution charging multiple-object conspiracy in United States v.
DeLuca.3343 DeLuca and three co-defendants were convicted on a twenty

count indictment charging conspiracy, racketeering and extortion. The
charges stemmed from allegations that the defendants committed arson
in their attempts to eliminate competing businesses in the foreign auto3337. Id. at 1222. A portion of the disputed instruction consisted of the trial judge's response to an inquiry from the jury. The judge stated that "[e]ach individual has to have
knowledge of two or more racketeering acts and been a part of and committed those, and as
part of those it could be conspiracies to commit those racketeering acts." Id. The Ninth
Circuit observed that these instructions were not "models of clarity," but noted that any ambiguity only favored the defendants. Id.
3338. "The purpose of the RICO statute is to allow a single prosecution of persons who
engage in a series of criminal acts for an enterprise, even if different defendants perform differing tasks or participate in separate acts of racketeering." Id.
3339. Id.
3340. Id. The jury was also told that "they must find each defendant was employed by or
associated with a racketeering enterprise, and that the racketeering offenses were connected by
a common scheme, plan, or motive so as to constitute a pattern 'and not merely a series of
disconnected acts.'" Id.
3341. Id. at 1223.
3342. Id. Most courts that have considered the question hold that only an agreement is
necesssary for the defendant to be guilty of a conspiracy to violate RICO. See, e.g., United
States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (Ist Cir. 1981) ("a RICO conspiracy count must charge
as a minimum that each defendant agreed to commit two or more specified predicate crimes"),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.) (defendant "must have objectively manifested an agreement to participate. . . through the commission of two or more predicate crimes"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (emphasis
omitted).
3343. 692 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
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mobile parts industry. 3 3" The Ninth Circuit ruled that the disputed inthe jury to focus on
struction was erroneous because it may have allowed
3345
conspiracy.
the
of
object
a legally insufficient
On appeal, the defendants contended that the arson convictions
should be reversed because the crime charged in the indictment did not
meet the Ninth Circuit's definition of the term "explosive. 3 34 6 The
court agreed, noting that it was bound by an earlier decision and was
thus forced to interpret the meaning of "explosive" narrowly. 3347 This
action directly affected the next issue on appeal, the multiple-object conspiracy instructions, because the trial judge had instructed the jury that it
need find only one of the multiple objects to convict under the conspiracy
count. The Ninth Circuit ruled that, in such a case, if the appellate court
holds that any of the supporting counts are legally insufficient, the conspiracy count must also fail.334 8 The rationale behind this rule is the
danger that the jury may have relied on insufficient legal grounds to convict the defendant. 33 49 Because the district court's instruction may have
3344. The facts showed that from 1974 to early 1980, eight competing foreign auto parts
stores in Southern California were struck by arson. Id. at 1280.
3345. Id. at 1281. The term "legally insufficient object of the conspiracy" refers to the fact
that in this case there was charged a conspiracy involving multiple objects, or illegal objectives.
The objectives themselves must be unlawful, otherwise a defendant could be convicted of a
"legally insufficient" charge.
3346. Id. at 1280. The defendants were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (197b),
which defines the offense of destruction of a building by "means of an explosive." DeLuca and
his co-defendants were alleged to have committed arson by spreading gasoline inside the buildings, and then setting fire to them. The defendants argued that these fires did not meet the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the term "explosive," as explained in United States v. Gere,
662 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1981). In Gere, the Ninth Circuit quoted with approval the definition
of "explosive" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 232(5)(c) (1976): "any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire
bomb, or similar device." 662 F.2d 1296.
3347. 692 F.2d at 1280-81. The court adhered to its earlier decision in United States v.
Cutler, 676 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982), where a broad interpretation of § 844(i) was rejected.
The court noted that Congress had amended 18 U.S.C. § 844 to include arson by fire as a
proscribed offense. However, because this case arose prior to the amendment, the court reversed the substantive convictions on the relevant counts.
3348. 692 F.2d at 1281.
3349. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that" '[t]he one-is-enough charge makes it impossible
to know precisely what the jury considered. Not knowing, a reviewing court must overturn
the conspiracy conviction.'" 692 F.2d at 1281 (quoting United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d
556, 568 (9th Cir. 1978)).
A majority of the federal circuit courts are in accord regarding the rule that a conspiracy
conviction cannot stand if it cannot be determined whether the jury based its verdict on legally
insufficient grounds. See, eg., United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 680 (10th Cir. 1981)
(conspiracy charges failed as a matter of law, thus conviction was reversed because it could not
be determined if the jury had relied on those charges), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982);
United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730, 739 (Ist Cir. 1980) (court reversed an "ambiguous" verdict where it was impossible to determine if the jury had based their decision on
proper legal grounds); United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977) (conviction
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had this effect, the court reversed the defendants'
convictions under one
3350
of the conspiracy counts of the indictments.
The Ninth Circuit construed unambiguous jury instructions that

may have prejudiced the defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict in
United States v. Echeverry.3351 The court reversed the defendant's con-

viction on the basis of indefinite jury instructions regarding the duration
of the alleged conspiracy.
Defendant Echeverry was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine.3 352 The indictment charged that the conspiracy had existed existed between December, 1980, and June, 1981, and proof was offered at

trial of cocaine sales by the defendant on those dates.3353 In response to
an inquiry by the jury concerning the duration of the conspiracy, the trial

judge gave an instruction stating that they could find Echeverry guilty if
they found the existence of a conspiracy "between two ore more persons
for some period of time, though not necessarily the entire period of time,
'33 4
within the dates charged in the indictment. 1
On appeal, Echeverry claimed that his case was prejudiced by this

instruction and by the variance between the indictment and the evidence
of the duration of the conspiracy that was offered at trial. The Ninth

Circuit agreed that the ambiguity of the judge's instruction may well
have harmed the defendant, and therefore constituted reversible error.3355 The court observed that the trial judge could simply have told
reversed where there was a failure of proof in regard to an alleged objective of the conspiracy
and the jury may have based its verdict upon that objective); Van Liew v. United States, 321
F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1963) ("The guilty verdict was general. With inquiry forever foreclosed, it is just as likely that the verdict was based on the insufficient charge ... ") (emphasis in original).
But see United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1401-02 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming the rule
in the Second Circuit that where an indictment charged a conspiracy to engage in various
offenses "and only one was proved, the conviction could still stand").
3350. 692 F.2d at 1281. Defendant Danno also argued on appeal that the trial judge should
have used a "more strongly worded" jury instruction regarding the testimony of a government
witness who had once been addicted to drugs. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in its choice of language for the instruction, observing that "[o]ne
instruction that fairly conveys the care to which the testimony should be subjected is adequate." Id. at 1285-86. Furthermore, because the witness admitted to only a prior addiction,
the trial judge would have been justified in refusing any addict-witness instruction whatsoever.
Id.
3351. 698 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
3352. Id. at 376. Echeverry was specifically found guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982),
the attempt and conspiracy statute as regards illegal drugs.
3353. 698 F.2d at 376.
3354. Id. (emphasis in original).
3355. Id. at 377. Most troubling to the Ninth Circuit was the fact that there was no way to
determine if the jurors had agreed on the existence and duration of the same conspiracy. The
court noted that both the judge and the jury seemed confused regarding the duration of the
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the jury that they did not have to find the existence of a conspiracy over
the entire period, but that they still must unanimously agree on the dates
of any conspiracy in which they found that Echeverry had
participated.3 35 6
In United States v. Jones,335 7 the defendants were convicted of various offenses in connection with sale/leaseback transactions in which investors would buy equipment from one company and lease it back to a
trucking company. 3358 The disputed instructions involved the conspiracy prosecution for mail and securities fraud.
The defendants first argued that it was error for one of the instructions to incorporate count one of the indictment in its explanation of the
conspiracy's overt acts. 335 9 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this contention,
noting that the instruction distinguished the allegations in the indictment
from the overt acts charged and that it was standard practice to incorporate overt acts in such a manner.33 °
The defendants next argued that the conspiracy instructions were
erroneous because they did not require unanimity by the jury. They
maintained that, as a result of the "overt act" instruction, members of
the jury may not have relied on the same overt act to convict.3 36 1
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that the disputed instruction
conspiracy. Id. at 376-77. The court stated that it was not "free to hypothesize whether the
jury indeed agreed to and was clear on the duration of a single conspiracy or of multiple
conspiracies." Id.
3356. Id. at 377. Echeverry's conspiracy conviction had to be reversed because it was impossible for the court to determine if the jury's verdict was unanimous. The Ninth Circuit also
reversed the guilty verdict on the substantive counts because the jury had most likely relied on
the conspiracy conviction in determining Echeverry's complicity as to those courts.
This was due to the fact that the trial judge submitted the case to the jury with an instruction approved by the Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
Under such an instruction, once the jury determines the defendant's guilt as to the conspiracy
count, it is allowed to rely on the acts performed in furtherance of the conspiracy by the
defendant's co-conspirators in deciding whether the defendant himself was guilty of the substantive courts. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-47. Since Echeverry's conspiracy conviction was
fatally flawed, it also tainted the guilty verdict on the substantive counts due to the jury's
reliance on the conspiracy conviction. 698 F.2d at 377-78.
3357. 712 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1983).
3358. Id. at 1319-20. In this case, the defendants controlled both the company which leased
the equipment and the company which was selling the equipment.
3359. Id. at 1322. The defendants contended that the jury may have based its findings of an
overt act in support of the conspiracy on legally insufficient grounds-namely, on the introductory paragraphs of count one of the indictment, which simply alleged that the trucking
company was engaged in the transportation of property. Id.
3360. Id. The Ninth Circuit neither cited authority for this proposition, nor did it quote the
instruction in question.
3361. Id. The instruction stated that "the jury must find at least one conspirator guilty of
one of the overt acts." Id.
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referred many times to a certain overt act.3 362 Furthermore, another instruction did require that the jury bring forth a unanimous verdict.
Reading the instructions as a whole, the court could not say that reversible error had occurred.3 36 3
16.

Failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses

A lesser-included offense is one that is included in the definition of
the primary offense charged. To be convicted of the lesser offense, a defendant need not be specifically charged with that crime. It is generally
agreed, however, that because the lesser crime merges into the greater
offense, a defendant may not be convicted of both crimes.
In United States v. Harvey,336 a consolidated appeal involving defendants convicted of separate offenses, the Ninth Circuit dealt with the

question of instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses within the
crime charged. Both defendants had been convicted in the district courts

of involuntary manslaughter involving alcohol related automobile
deaths.
On appeal, defendant Harvey argued that the district court erred

because it failed to instruct the jury that it need not unanimously decide
in favor of the defendant on the manslaughter charge before it could deliberate on lesser-included offenses.3 365 The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument, stating that it saw no error in the trial judge's instruction.3 3 66
3362. Id. The language used in the instruction referred to "the overt act" or "such overt
act." Id.
3363. Id. The court ruled that taken together, the two instructions did require that the jury
return a unanimous verdict on the overt act committed.
3364. 701 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1983).
3365. Id. at 806. The district court had followed the suggested approach in 1 DEvIr &
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INsTRUCTION (3d ed. 1977). Section 18.05 provides, in pertinent part, that "if the jury should unanimously find the accused 'Not Guilty' of
the crime charged in the indictment (information) then the jury must proceed to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused as to any lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
crime charged." Thus, the trial court had instructed the jury that they first had to decide in
favor of the defendant on the greater charge before moving on to the lesser ones.
3366. 701 F.2d at 806. Harvey had argued that the Ninth Circuit should adopt the rule
proposed in United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
There, the Second Circuit held that a defendant could choose to have the jury instructed that
they could move on to a lesser offense if they could not reach agreement on the greater offense.
Id. at 346. The Tsanas court also ruled tha the defendant must make a timely request for such
an instruction. Harvey did not make her request until the jury had deliberated for three hours.
701 F.2d at 806. Thus, her request was not timely and, because the Tsanas rule "is not of
constitutional dimension," the Ninth Circuit decided that the district court did not err." Id.
See also United States v. Dixon, 507 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1974) (court affirmed conviction of
lesser offense when jury reported it could not decide on greater charge), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
976 (1976).
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The court found that Harvey's neglect in not making a timely request for
3367
her proposed instruction was decisive on the issue.
Defendant Chase asserted on appeal that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by not instructing the jury on the lesser offense of care-

less driving.33 68 The government conceded that careless driving is a
lesser-included offense within vehicular involuntary manslaughter, but
argued that a reasonable jury simply could not have convicted Chase of
careless driving.3369 The Ninth Circuit agreed and affirmed the
conviction.33 70
H.

JudicialMisconduct

A jury's verdict will not be overturned based on the conduct of a
trial judge unless that conduct, when measured against the facts of the
case and the result of the trial, was clearly prejudicial. 33 71 This assess3 372
ment is to be made in light of the evidence of the defendant's guilt.
3367. 701 F.2d at 806. Harvey also argued that the district court erred because it did not use
the exact language of an earlier Ninth Circuit decision regarding the correct instruction on the
knowledge element of involuntary manslaughter. Id. The court dismissed this contention,
stating that the instruction given in the trial court had the same effect that the proposed instruction would have had.
Harvey's involuntary manslaughter conviction was ultimately reversed by the Ninth Circuit due to inadmissible evidence being introduced at trial. The court held that evidence of the
defendant's blood alcohol tests should have been suppressed because the blood sample was
seized without a warrant, consent, or a prior formal arrest. For the conviction to stand, Harvey should have been arrested prior to the taking of the blood sample. Id. at 802.
3368. The Ninth Circuit noted that "[a] defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction if: (I) the lesser included offense is identified within the offense charged; and (2) a
rational jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense but not the greater." Id. at
807 (citing United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Muniz, 684 F.2d 634, 636 (9th Cir. 1982)).
The above is the general rule among the circuit courts as to the inclusion of a lesser
included offense instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 652 F.2d 760, 761-62 (8th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13, 24 (2d Cir. 1978).
3369. 701 F.3d at 807. The evidence at trial showed that the defendant had not acted "in
anything less than a grossly negligent manner." Id. He also had not offered any witnesses to
rebut the government's charges. In fact, Chase's defense was basically limited to an attempt to
exclude evidence of his blood alcohol level at the time of the accident. Id.
3370. Id. The court ruled that the evidence adduced "at trial was not such that a reasonable
jury could find Chase guilty of careless driving and not involuntary manslaughter." Id.
3371. United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1978) (asking defense counsel to
stop questioning witness on matters which witness had no knowledge, instructing defense
counsel to proceed after covering the same subject with a witness for the third time, and attempting to ascertain relevance and admissibility of a line of questioning did not constitute
judicial efforts to intimidate defense counsel and were not clearly prejudicial).
3372. United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884, 886, 894 (9th Cir.) (even if sarcastic statements
of trial judge were error, which they were not, evidence of guilt was too strong to affect the
verdict), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981).
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1. Reprimand
In United States v. Bennett,3 37 3 defendant Bennett was convicted of
embezzling CETA funds.3 374 During the trial, the judge rebuked defense
counsel several times. The defendant argued that these reprimands con-

veyed an impression to the jury of bias, and thus denied him a fair
trial.33 75 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that it was
justifiable for the trial judge to reprimand defense counsel for holding a

document in his hand in a way designed to give the appearance that he
was reading from it, where the judge had previously warned defense
counsel in a sidebar conference not to use that tactic. 3376 All of the other
reprimands, with the exception of one, took place outside the presence of
the jury and were not prejudicial.33 77 The one instance of judicial impropriety took place when the trial judge rebuked defense counsel for asking

that a witness' nonresponsive answer be stricken from the record. Subsequently, that answer was stricken.337 8 The court reasoned that this one
instance of misconduct, when measured against the entirety of the case
evidence of guilt adduced at trial, did not warrant
and the substantial
9
reversal.

337

In United States v. DeLuca,33 8 ° the trial judge raised his voice at
3373. 702 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1983).
3374. Id. at 835. Bennett participated in a scheme to defraud the government of CETA
funds through a series of kickbacks, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 665(a) (Supp. V 1981),
which states:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent, or employee of, or connected in any capacity with any agency receiving financial assistance under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act knowingly hires an ineligible individual or individuals,
embezzles, willfully misapplies, steals, or obtains by fraud any of the moneys, funds,
assets, or property which are the subject of a grant or contract of assistance pursuant
to such Act shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 2
years, or both; but if the amount so embezzled, misapplied, stolen or obtained by
fraud does not exceed $100, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
Bennett also violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976), which provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
3375. 702 F.2d at 836.
3376. Id.
3377. Id.
3378. Id.
3379. Id.
3380. 692 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982). Defendant DeLuca attempted to dominate the rebuilt
foreign auto parts market in Southern California. Over a six year period, from 1974 to 1980,
eight rival companies were victims of arson. As Circuit Judge Wright stated, "he did not like
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defense counsel, refused to allow their approach to the bench, and admonished them.3 38 1 Most of the instances cited by the defendants took
place outside the jury's presence. Those which the jury did observe were
provoked by defense counsel, 3 382 or were deemed proper exercises of the
3383
judge's power to control the proceedings.
While expressing concern for the trial judge's conduct, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the defendants failed to show "the extremely high
level of interference necessary" to overturn their convictions.33 84 The
court attached great importance to the trial judge's three cautionary in-

structions to the jury that his admonitions to defense counsel were not
evidence and were not to be considered in arriving at a verdict.3 38 5
Defendants also objected to the trial judge's restriction on the crossexamination of government witnesses.3 38 6 The court stated that the requirement of confrontation 3387 is satisfied once cross-examination reveals

enough information with which to assess a witness' possible bias and motives.3 388 In reviewing the record, the court concluded that the jury had
before it the requisite information to make that assessment.33 89
competition." Id. at 1280. Defendants were variously charged with conspiracy, racketeering,
extortion and explosives counts.
3381. Id. at 1282.
3382. Id.
3383. Id. Defense counsel repeatedly and unnecessarily requested permission to approach
the bench and was repeatedly rebuffed.
3384. Id. See United States v. Saavedra, 684 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1982) (comments by
counsel during closing argument require reversal only when so palpable as to be likely to cause
prejudice to defendant and where that prejudice is not neutralized by trial judge).
3385. 692 F.2d at 1282. See United States v. Robinson, 635 F.2d 981, 984-86 (2d Cir. 1980)
(judge's instructions made it clear that jury alone was to decide credibility of witnesses), cert
denied, 451 U.S. 992 (1981).
3386. 692 F.2d at 1282.
3387. The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. The main purpose of confrontation is to allow the deferdant to crossexamine those witnesses so that the jury will be able to assess the witnesses' demeanor, credibility, and truth of their testimony. Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1980).
3388. 692 F.2d at 1282. If the right to effective cross-examination is denied, constitutional
error exists without the need to show actual prejudice. Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381,
1388 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 1009 (1978).
When cross-examination relates to impeachment evidence, the test for a violation of the
sixth amendment is whether the jury had sufficient information with which to assess the bias
and motives of the witness. Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1980).
The extent to which a witness may be cross-examined is a matter to be determined by the
trial court in exercise of its sound discretion. United States v. Garrett, 542 F.2d 23, 25 (6th
Cir. 1976).
There is no abuse of discretion where the essence of the desired testimony was sufficiently
before the jury. United States v. Elorduy, 612 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
910 (1980).
3389. 692 F.2d at 1282-83. A judge cannot be faulted for using his authority to prevent what
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Interruptions

In United States v. DeLuca,3 39 ° the defendants contended that an
interruption 339 ' by the trial judge during cross-examination of a witness
diluted the impact of that cross-examination. 3 92 While not discounting

the defendants' allegation, the court nonetheless held that a judge may
intervene to clarify evidence or testimony.33 93 Since the judge's comments were not directed at the credibility of the witness, the interruption
did not constitute reversible error.339 4
In United States v. Moreno-Pulido,3 39 5 the defendant was convicted
3 3 96
of manufacturing and selling counterfeit immigration green cards.
The trial judge twice interrupted defense counsel's summation. The-de-

fendant claimed a denial of due process. He alleged that the judge's first
comment was erroneous as to the law, and that the two interruptions
discredited the defense in the eyes of the jury. Defense counsel had suggested that green card forms could not pass as completed documents and
therefore did not come under 18 U.S.C. section 1426(b). 3397 The judge
he thinks is a waste of time. United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980).
3390. 692 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
3391. Id. at 1282. The judge insisted on apprising the courtroom that he had a policy of
refusing to accept sentencing recommendations.
3392. Id.
3393. Id. See, eg., United States v. Price, 623 F.2d 587, 592-93 (9th Cir.) (clarifying testimony and expediting examination are proper if done nonprejudicially), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1016 (1980), overruled on other grounds, United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir.
1984). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
3394. 692 F.2d at 1282. Although the circuit judge who wrote the opinion denied the appeal, he remarked in a parting statement that if there were a retrial, he would anticipate that
"more judicial restraint will characterize the proceedings." Id. at 1283.
3395. 695 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983).
3396. Id. at 1141-42. The defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 1426(a), (b) (1976), which
provides:
(a) Whoever falsely makes, forges, alters or counterfeits any oath, notice, affidavit, certificate of arrival, declaration of intention, certificate or documentary evidence of naturalization or citizenship or any order, record, signature, paper or
proceeding or any copy thereof, required or authorized by any law relating to naturalization or citizenship or registry of aliens; or
(b)) Whoever utters, sells, disposes of or uses as true or genuine, any false,
forged, altered, antedated or counterfeited oath, notice, affidavit, certificate of arrival,
declaration of intention to become a citizen, certificate or documentary evidence of a
naturalization or citizenship, or any order, record, signature or other instrument,
paper or proceeding required or authorized by any law relating to naturalization or
citizenship or registry of aliens, or any copy thereof, knowing the same to be false,
forged, altered, antedated or counterfeited. ..
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
3397. 695 F.2d at 1146. See supra note 3396.
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interrupted and contradicted defense counsel's interpretation of the statute. The Ninth Circuit found that the judge's interruption was proper to
forestall jury confusion on a matter of law.339 8
The second interruption was occasioned by defense counsel's attempt to define the scope of the duress defense it was using in the
case.339 9 The trial judge interrupted to state that the court, not defense
counsel, would instruct the jury on the proper boundaries for such a

defense. 3"
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial judge's two interruptions

in the two-day trial were "brief, limited to the law and carefully couched
to show respect for defense counsel's role." 3 ° I' The defense was not unfairly discredited and the remarks did not deny defendant's right to due

process of law. 3 °2
3. Comments
In evaluating whether a defendant was denied a fair trial by a com-

ment of a trial judge, the defendant must show that prejudice derived

from that comment. 3 4 3 In United States v. Herbert,34° 4 an attorney,
John Herbert, was one of the defendants. He was convicted of conspiring
to violate firearm laws and of possessing, making and transferring unregistered machine guns. 34 0 5 Defense counsel attempted to establish that
due to the complexity of the Gun Control Act, Herbert did not under3398. 695 F.2d at 1146.
3399. Id. Defense counsel argued that the defendant did not have a "reasonable opportunity
to escape compulsion" and that a "reasonable opportunity" should be understood by reference
to the defendant's "entire life structure."
3400. Id.
3401. Id. at 1147.
3402. Id. Compare United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979) (trial court's 250
interjections, in limiting cross-examination by defense, in taking over cross-examination of
defense witnesses, and exhibiting an anti-defendant tone left a firm impression of judicial prejudice); United States v. Sheldon, 544 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1976) (appellate court reversed where
trial judge intervened approximately 130 times during defendant's presentation and only 10
times in government's case, stating that jury must have understood such behavior to indicate
trial judge's belief that defense was without merit).
3403. United States v. Price, 623 F.2d 587, 593 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1979).
3404. 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 87 (1983).
3405. Id. at 983. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)-(f) (1976) provides:
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stand what weapons fell within the purview of that Act.3 4 °6 Defense
counsel asked Herbert how complicated the Act was and the prosecutor
objected on the grounds that the question called for a legal opinion. The

trial judge sustained the objection and commented,
"[y]ou're not imply340 7
ing it's too complicated for a lawyer, are you?"

The Ninth Circuit characterized the comment as "obviously a jocular aside."' 3" 8 Although the comment could have been construed by the
jury to mean that because he was a lawyer, Herbert should have understood the Act, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless stated that the comment
could have had only minimal impact and therefore did not prejudice the

defendant's right to a fair trial. 34 9 Further, the trial court later cautioned the jury not to draw any inferences from the court's action in the
case.

34 10

In United States v. Greene,3411 defendant Greene was convicted of
attempting to evade federal income taxes.34 12 Greene maintained that his

unreported income was generated from foreign bank accounts. He introduced bank records to support his contention, but did not do so until the

trial had already begun. The trial judge commented on the lateness of
the records, and explained to the jury that since the records had not been
timely produced, it could take lateness into account in appraising the
credibility of the records.34 13

The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the judge did not characterize the foreign bank records as unreliable, but merely stated that lateIt shall be unlawful for any person(d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record; or
(e) to transfer a firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or
(f) to make a firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter ....
Herbert was converting semi-automatic weapons to fully automatic weapons while preserving
the look of semi-automatic weapons. 698 F.2d at 983.
3406. 698 F.2d at 984-85.
3407. Id. at 985.
3408. Id. Actually, because Herbert was videotaped with an informant discussing what steps
to take if apprehended by the police with the weapons, the Ninth Circuit's characterization is a
particularly appropriate one.
3409. Id.
3410. Id Compare United States v. Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.) (some remarks
may be so prejudicial that no cautionary instruction can cure the impropriety), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 984 (1980).
3411. 698 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1983).
3412. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976) provides: "Any person who willfully attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof. . . shall be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of
prosecution."
3413. 698 F.2d at 1375.
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ness could be a factor in evaluating credibility, the defendant was not
prejudiced. 4 14 The court also pointed out that Greene did not object at
the time of the judge's comments, but only raised the issue on appeal.34 15
Greene also failed to object when the trial judge chastised a defense
witness in front of the jury for being present during defense counsel's
opening statement.3 41 6 The judge then cautioned the jury that the witness might be influenced to conform his testimony to the facts defense
counsel indicated that he expected to prove. 3417 The Ninth Circuit disposed of this issue by pointing out that the trial judge also reprimanded
the prosecutor for not immediately objecting to the witness' presence.34 18
The judge also instructed the jury that defense counsel had the right to
inform the witness outside of the courtroom about the content of his
opening statement. 34 19 The court held that the trial judge's comments
regarding the witness did not constitute reversible error, because they
were within his broad discretion to supervise the trial, and because the
defendant was not prejudiced by the comments. 420
4.

Questioning witnesses

A trial judge has the authority to question witnesses in order to clarify and develop facts but must never prejudice a defendant by taking a
partisan stance.3 42 1 In United States v. Bradshaw,34 2 2 the defendant was
convicted of kidnapping a nine year old boy. 34 2 3 Bradshaw argued that
the trial judge improperly interrogated a prosecution witness, thereby
prejudicing Bradshaw's case.342 4 The witness was a woman who had
raised the defendant for a number of years. Bradshaw had allegedly told
3414. Id.
3415. Id.
3416. Id.

3417. Id.
3418. Id.
3419. Id.
3420. Id. See Rogers v. United States, 609 F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1979) (federal judges
have broad discretion in supervising the trial, questioning witnesses and controlling counsel,
but it is important that appearance of partiality or hostility be avoided).
3421. See United States v. Medina-Verdugo, 637 F.2d 649, 653 (9th Cir. 1980) (trial judge
asked three questions deemed pertinent and designed to clarify facts, and gave a curative instruction to the jury).
3422. 690 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3543 (1983).
3423. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976) provides: "Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles,
decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any
person . . . shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
3424. 690 F.2d at 707. Defense counsel made a motion for mistrial based partly on the
judge's improper questioning. Bradshaw alleged partisanship and a high degree of prejudice.
Id. at 710-11.
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the woman that he intended to leave the state with the boy. The trial
judge took over the questioning following redirect examination of the
woman.

34 25

Bradshaw claimed that the trial judge's use of the phrases "impending kidnapping" and "a crime as serious as kidnapping" were suggestive
of how the judge felt the proceedings should be decided and thus unduly
influenced the jury. 34 26 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this allegation by

pointing out that the witness' testimony had already established Bradshaw's plans to leave the state with the boy. 3427 The court minimized the
importance of the alleged impropriety, stating that the witness' testimony
should be read as a whole and not in selected passages.34 28 The court
concluded that, when viewed in perspective, the trial judge's questioning
was aimed at the issue of the boy's consent and at the nonresponsiveness

of the witness.342 9 Additionally, the court noted that the trial judge had
cautioned the jury that it alone would decide the facts and credibility of
the case and not to draw inferences from anything the trial judge had
said. 34 31 Such a cautionary instruction is generally an adequate curative. 34 31 The judge's questioning was found not to have prejudiced the
defendant.34 32
3425. Id. at 711. The judge questioned the witness as to why she did not notify anyone once
she had knowledge of Bradshaw's intent to leave the state with the boy. The significant portion of the examination was as follows:
THE COURT: And that's the only reason you didn't call the authorities and notify
them of the impending kidnapping that you thought that you personally could handle
the matter?
THE WITNESS: Before I was told anything I promised faithfully I would not tell
anything of our conversation ....
THE COURT: Well, when it develops that the conversation anticipates a crime as
serious as kidnapping, don't you think that both morally and legally you are released
from such an obligation?
Id.
3426. Id. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 12 (1954) (a finding of partiality arises
from the impression remaining after reading the entire record).
3427. 690 F.2d at 711.
3428. Id.
3429. Id. at 712.
3430. Id. See United States v. Siegel, 587 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1979) (a trial judge may question a witness provided he makes it clear that all matters of fact are for the jury to decide).
3431. 690 F.2d at 712. See also United States v. Gunter, 631 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1980) (cautionary instruction was not dispositive of whether trial judge improperly assumed prosecution's function).
3432. 690 F.2d at 712. See also United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978) (trial
judge overstepped his bounds in questioning witness; court held that when counsel is competently conducting their case, judges shall refrain from questioning witnesses).
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5.

Polling the jury

The Supreme Court in Brasfield v. United States34 3 held that it was
reversible error per se for a judge in a federal trial to inquire into the
numerical split of a jury.3 434
In Locks v. Sumner,3 43 5 the appellant, Locks, was convicted of two
murders in a California state court. He appealed the district court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus. Locks sought to extend the rule in
Brasfield to cover state trials. 4 36 The state argued that Brasfield was
merely an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the
federal courts.3 43 7
While acknowledging that the language in Brasfield appeared to
have "constitutional underpinnings,, 3431 the Ninth Circuit relied heavily
on recent decisions of other circuit courts which found Brasfield involved
a supervisory rule and not a constitutional mandate. 343 9 The court de3433. 272 U.S. 448 (1926). See United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303, 1304 (9th Cir. 1979)

(court held that it was plain error to make inquiry as to the numerical division of a jury).
3434. The rationale behind the prohibition of making inquiry as to the numerical split of the

jury is that it accomplishes nothing useful, but does have a tendency to coerce. Brasfield,272
U.S. at 450.

3435. 703 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 338 (1983). Before excusing the jury
for the weekend, the trial judge, who was substituting for the judge who had heard the case but
was ill that day, asked the foreman what the numerical split was after the last ballot. The
inquiry went as follows:
Court: "I say, just on a numerical basis only without telling how many for one side
or how many for another, can you give me the standing of the jury at the last ballot?"
Foreman: "They were eight on one position, three on another and one on another."
Id. at 405 n.1.
3436. Id. at 405-06. Locks emphasized the language of Brasfield which stated: "We deem it
essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial, that the inquiry itself should be regarded
as ground for reversal." Id. at 406 (quoting Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450
(1926)).
3437. Id. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has held that the Brasfield rule
is a necessary component of the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury which is made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 405.
3438. Id. at 406.
3439. See United States ex rel. Kirk v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 678 F.2d 723 (7th
Cir. 1982); Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 1126 (1981);
Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979). In Kirk, the Seventh
Circuit stated that if the strong language of Brasfield was not tempered, the court would find
itself constrained to hold the rule to be constitutionally required. 678 F.2d at 725. All three of
the above mentioned circuits did in fact temper Brasfield, analyzing this problem in a similar
fashion. Each circuit concluded that the rule was not "essential" to a fair trial and thus not of
constitutional dimension.
In Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 307-08 (1905), the Court, in dicta, stated that
judges should not make inquiries into the division of the jury. After Burton, there was a
controvery as to whether inquiry into jury balloting was reversible error per se in federal
courts. The circuit courts all stated that the strong language in Brasfieldwas meant to condemn such practice. Further, these courts relied upon language in Burton to support their
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clined to give the Brasfield rule constitutional dimension, 3 440 but stated
that inquiry by a trial judge which is likely to coerce a jury member into
changing his views in order to reach a unanimous verdict would constitute reversible error. 34 1 The determination of coercion must be made
not in isolation, but within the context in which the inquiry was
made. 3 " 2 The Ninth Circuit found the circumstances in Locks to be
44 3
uncoercive, and affirmed the district court's decision on this issue.1
In United States v Akbar,344 defendant Akbar was convicted of air
piracy in connection with the hijacking of a commercial airliner from
Ontario, California, to Havana, Cuba. During deliberations, the jury
sent an ambiguous note to the judge requesting transcripts of defense
witnesses' testimony. The trial judge sought to clarify the request by
questioning the jurors about who needed what testimony.3" 5 The
judge's question as to the necessity of rereading the testimony inadverproposition: "'[W]e do not think that the proper administration of the law requires such
knowledge or permits such a question on the part of the presiding judge.'" Locks, 703 F.2d at
406 (citing Burton, 196 U.S. at 308). Considering both the relationship of Brasfield to Burton
and the language of Burton, the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits all concluded that the
rule was only supervisory and not constitutionally mandated.
3440. Locks, 703 F.2d at 406.
3441. Id. (citing Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044, 1048 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1126 (1981)).
3442. Id. at 406-07 (citing Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195, 1200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 973 (1979)).
3443. Id. at 407. The jury was about to be dismissed for the weekend, and the judge was
uncertain whether to have the jury continue its deliberations or to break. The court's reasoning was that the judge made a simple, uncoercive inquiry. He did not ask whether the jurors
favored acquittal or conviction. Neither did the judge make any statement pressuring the jury
to come to a decision and, in fact, the jury was not sent back to deliberate, but was immediately dismissed.
3444. 698 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2433 (1983).
3445. Id. at 379 n. I. The judge began to question the jurors one by one asking them if they
wanted information and exactly what information they did want. Five jurors requested descriptions that some witnesses had given during their testimony and seven responded that they
didn't need it. Then one juror spoke out:
JUROR NO. 8: It's only one person that's-all 11, I think, are for it. One is
against is [sic]. So we can't come up with an agreement.
THE COURT: Eleven want the testimony read?
JUROR NO. 8: No. Eleven has [sic] decided. One hasn't.
THE COURT: Well, let me ask all of you eleven how you feel, if you need it, if you
think that it's only fair that this one juror, whoever it may be, should have it. Have
you anything against it?
JUROR NO. 10: No, we are not against it if she wants it.
THE COURT: And that juror, I take it, is No. 7 that wants it.
JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
JUROR NO. 8: Right.
THE COURT: All right. Juror No. 7, then, I will go back to you. Do you think
you really need it to make a decision or can you go back and sit down with your
fellow jurors, discuss it, go over it, and finish your deliberations without our reading
all of this testimony? Or do you feel you want it?
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tently elicited the jury's split vote on the issue of guilt. Akbar argued
that this constituted reversible error. 3 44 6 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
holding that the disclosure of the jury's split vote was unsolicited. 3 " 7
The trial judge's question referred to a collateral issue and therefore was
distinguishable from Brasfield.344 ' The court added that there was no
coercion, since the requested transcripts were read to the jury before it
resumed deliberations. 3 " 9 Therefore, the conviction was affirmed.3 450
V.

POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS

A.

Double Jeopardy

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment 345 1 prohibits the

criminally accused from being "twice put in jeopardy" for committing
"the same offense.", 34 52 The clause, historically, has been applied to pro-

tect individuals "from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible
conviction more than once for an alleged offense. ' 345 3 The double jeopardy clause may also serve to prohibit cumulative sentencing for "the
JUROR NO. 7: Your Honor, I feel that in order to make a fair decision that-a
point that I brought up and the others don't quite agree on thatTHE COURT: Well, I don't want to know what you brought up. But you want the
testimony read that covers descriptions?
JUROR NO. 7: I would like to have it read, at least three of the witnesses.
Id. at 379-80 n.l.
The judge then solved the problem by having all four witnesses' testimony read back immediately. The reading took approximately three and one-half hours after which time the jury
began deliberations. One hour and twenty-five minutes later the jury brought back a guilty
verdict. Id. at 380.
3446. Id.
3447. Id.
3448. Id. The judge's inquiry was intended to solve the problem of needed testimony and not
to reveal the numerical split on the issue of guilt. See Carlton v. United States, 395 F.2d 10, 11
(9th Cir. 1968) (trial judge inquired into the likelihood of whether a verdict could be reached),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1030 (1969).
3449. 698 F.2d at 380.
3450. Id. Judge Kennedy, in his concurrence, was persuaded that any coercive pressure had
been relieved based on the amount of time it took to read the testimony and to further deliberate. He was, however, puzzled by the court's inquiry into the identity of the party desiring the
testimony and felt that the case came to the precipice of reversible error. Id. at 380-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
3451. The fifth amendment provides "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This edict stems from
ancient common law principles emanating from the Magna Charta, which prevented retrial
after acquittal or conviction under the concept of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168-71 (1873).
3452. The fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is enforceable in state proceedings through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
3453. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1977).
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same offense" at a single trial.3 45 4 The double jeopardy clause, however,
3 455
prevents only the judiciary from imposing cumulative punishments
for the same criminal conduct. The legislatures are free to expressly enact, and the courts are permitted to enforce, cumulative statutory punishments for criminal behavior arising from the same criminal activity.345 6
Additionally, double jeopardy clause issues arise in the context of crimi-

nal sentencing, although its principles generally have been applied less
3 457

rigorously.

1. Cumulative punishment for "the same offense" at a single trial
The power of the legislature to define crime and fix punishment is
not disturbed by the double jeopardy clause. 458 However, the legislatures seldom expressly state their intent regarding cumulative punishment under two or more statutes for the same or similar criminal
conduct. 4 59 To fill this void, the courts developed judicial rules of statutory construction, such as the Blockburger test,346 ° to determine if the
3454. At present the Supreme Court uses the term "cumulative" sentences in discussing
double jeopardy principles. See infra notes 3466-504 and accompanying text. Cumulative
sentences are defined as:
[S]eparate sentences (each additional to the others) imposed upon a defendant who
has been convicted upon an indictment containing several counts, each of such
counts charging a distinct offense, or who is under conviction at the same time for
several distinct offenses; one of such sentences being made to begin at the expiration
of another.
Black's Law Dictionary 1222 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). These types of sentences are contrasted to
the "concurrent" type, which is to be served at the same time as another sentence which has
been imposed. Id.
3455. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873) (double jeopardy clause protects not only against
more than one trial, but prevents more than one sentence from being pronounced on same
verdict).
3456. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983), see infra notes 3464-504 and accompanying
text. Cf. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). "[T]he Fifth Amendment double jeopardy
guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains
free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the
legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense
." Id. at 165.
3457. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (a sentence does not have qualities
of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal).
3458. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977), see supra note 3456; United States v. Wilson,
420 U.S. 332, 339-42 (1975) (double jeopardy clause derives from improprieties in common
law tradition, rather than from legislative excesses).
3459. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 394 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
3460. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Blockburger the defendant, a
pharmacist, was charged with, inter alia, a single sale of narcotics which violated two statutory
provisions: making a sale not made from the original stamp package, and permitting a sale not
made pursuant to a written order of the purchaser. The Court formulated the often cited test
to determine whether the two statutes describe the same offense: "A single act may be an
offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the
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statutes describe "the same offense." Under the Blockberger test, before
cumulative punishment may be meted out for conviction of violating
more than one statute at a single trial, each statute must require proof of
a fact that the other does not. 3461 Developed prudentially, 346 2 these rules
of statutory construction became bedrock double jeopardy doctrine for
multiple punishment analysis to determine if each statute was "the same
offense. ' 3463 Recently, however, the Supreme Court in Missouri v.
Hunter34 4 undermined the Blockburger test for determining "the same
offense" by holding that the legislatures are free from double jeopardy

constraints to expressly provide for cumulative punishments.3465
In Missouri v. Hunter,34 6 6 the Supreme Court held that the double
jeopardy clause does not preclude imposing, at a single trial, cumulative
sentences for two or more similar statutory offenses.3 467 The Court reasoned that although each offense may not require proof of a fact that the

other does not under the Blockburger test,3468 the legislatures are not
precluded under the double jeopardy clause from expressly enacting stat-

utory schemes
that carry multiple punishments for the same criminal
9
conduct.

346

In Hunter, the defendant robbed a Kansas City, Missouri store at
gunpoint and then exchanged gunfire with the police as he fled the
scene. 3470 Hunter was subsequently arrested, convicted and sentenced to,
inter alia, ten years imprisonment for first degree robbery347 1 and fifteen
other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant
from prosecution and punishment under the other." Id. at 304.
3461. See supra note 3460.
3462. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rules of construction are not mandated by Constitution, but are attempt by judiciary to deduce legislative
intent); but see Missouri v, Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Blockburger
rule is a constitutional doctrine to define "the same offense").
3463. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1979) (courts have consistently relied
upon Blockburger test to determine whether Congress has in a given situation provided that
two statutory offenses may be punished cumulatively).
3464. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
3465. Id. at 368-69. See also Comment, Missouri v. Hunter, 9 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. AND
CiV. CONFINEMENT 461, 474 (1983).

3466. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
3467. Id. at 368. See infra note 3489 and accompanying text.
3468. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), see supra note 3460.
3469. 459 U.S. at 368.
3470. Id. at 361.
3471. Id. at 362. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.120 (Vernon 1969) defined first degree robbery as:
"[T1aking the property of another. . . by putting him in fear of some immediate injury to his
person ....

1979)).

"

(amended in 1979, current version at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.020 (Vernon
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years imprisonment for armed criminal assault,14 72 each sentence to run
concurrently.3 47 3 The Missouri Court of Appeals 34 74 reversed Hunter's
armed criminal assault conviction on the grounds34 that
it violated the
75
double jeopardy clause under the Blockburger test.
3472. 459 U.S. at 362. Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.225 (Vernon Supp. 1975) defined armed criminal assault so that: "[A]ny person who commits any felony.

. .

with.

. .

the use.

. .

of a

dangerous or deadly weapon is also guilty of the crime of armed criminal action." It also
provided that "[tihe punishment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to
any punishment provided by law for the crime committed. . . with. . . the use. . . of a
dangerous or deadly weapon." Id. (amended in 1977, current version at Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.050 (Vernon 1979)).
3473. 459 U.S. at 362. Double jeopardy issues more frequently arise in the context of consecutive sentencing. Defendants, however, frequently appeal from concurrent sentencing, presumably because of the collateral consequences of multiple convictions. See infra note 3502
and accompanying text. The Hunter Court broadened its discussion beyond the facts to discuss cumulative sentences.
3474. State v. Hunter, 622 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), vacated, 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
3475. 459 U.S. at 362-63. The Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. Hunter held that the
two crimes arose out of the same criminal incident and thus the conviction violated the double
jeopardy clause. 622 S.W.2d 374, 375-76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). The court vacated Hunter's
conviction and sentence for armed criminal action, relying on the Missouri Supreme Court in
State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1981) which reaffirmed two prior cases, Sours v. State,
593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.), vacated, 446 U.S. 962 (1980) (hereinafter referred to as Sours 1), and
Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981) (hereinafter
referred to as Sours I1).
In Sours I, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for armed
criminal action and affirmed his conviction for robbery, holding that the two were "the same
offense" for double jeopardy purposes. 593 S.W.2d at 210. The United States Supreme Court
vacated that decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980), see infra notes 3479-81 and accompanying text. The result of that
reconsideration was Sours II, where the Missouri Supreme Court upheld its previous holding
in Sours . The court cited Blockburger as not only a rule of statutory construction, but also as
a rule defining "the same offense" in double jeopardy cases. 603 S.W.2d at 595-97 (citing
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. at 692 (1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11
(1978); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) (other citations omitted)).
Shortly after Sours II, in State v. Haggard,the Missouri Supreme Court reexamined its
position on double jeopardy in light of Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), see
infra notes 3482-87 and accompanying text. 619 S.W.2d at 51. In Haggard, the Missouri
Supreme Court aligned itself with the view of the concurring Justices inAlbernaz and held that
while the Missouri legislature had intended to twice punish the appellant, the multiple punishments for the same offense arising out of the same transaction violated the double jeopardy
clause. Id. at 45, 51. "Until. . . the Supreme Court. . . declares clearly and unequivocally
that the Double Jeopardy Clause. . . does not apply to the legislative branch of the government," the court in Haggardreasoned, "we cannot do other than what we perceive to be our
duty to refuse to enforce multiple punishments for the same offense arising out of a single
transaction." Id. at 51. The dissent in Haggard strongly criticized the majority's "cavalier
evasion of the principles of Whalen and the mandate of Ahbernaz," noting that the rule of
federal supremacy did not permit such a variance from federal case law. Id. at 55.
In State v. Hunter, the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the defendant's conviction for
armed criminal action, citing the Missouri Supreme Court ruling in Haggardas binding. 622
S.W.2d at 375.
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The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, holding that
the Missouri Supreme Court had misconstrued the Blockburger test.34 76
The Supreme Court analyzed Blo.ckburger in light of its recent decisions
in Whalen v. United States3 47 7 and Albernaz v. United States.34 78
In Whalen, the Court examined the District of Columbia statutes
defining the crimes of rape and murder committed during a rape.34 79
Although the Court rejected the imposition of cumulative punishments
under these statutes, the Court limited the Blockburger test by stating in
dicta that the double jeopardy clause limits the scope of punishment to

the intent of Congress.34 80 The Court reasoned that if Congress is silent,
the courts should not administer punishment for the same offense under
two statutes. The Court, however, drew upon authority from House
Committee reports to underscore the power of Congress to define offenses and permit consecutive punishment for the same criminal
conduct.34 81
In Albernaz, the defendant appealed from his conviction and consecutive sentencing for importing marijuana 348 2 and conspiracy to distribute
marijuana 34 83 on double jeopardy grounds. The Court upheld the imposition of cumulative punishment on the ground that each violation of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 19703484 is a separate
offense as defined by Congress, 3485 and held that, under Blockburger, the

two offenses were sufficiently distinguishable to permit cumulative punishment for violation of similar offenses. 3486 Additionally, the Court em3476. 459 U.S. at 365.
3477. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
3478. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
3479. 445 U.S. at 686. Under the laws enacted by Congress for the governing of the District
of Columbia, rape and killing a human being in the course of any six specified felonies, including rape, are separate statutory offenses. The latter, the felony-murder offense, is a species of
first-degree murder but does not require proof of an intent to kill. It does, however, require
proof of a killing and the commission or attempted commission of one of the six specified
felonies. Id.
3480. Id. at 693. The Whalen majority of five concluded that "where the offenses are the
same under [the Blockburger] test, cumulative sentences are not permitted, unless elsewhere
specifically authorized by Congress." Id. Four concurring and dissenting opinions were also
filed in Whalen. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist discounted the value of applying the double
jeopardy clause to consecutive sentencing cases and minimized the need for the Blockburger
test, terming it "simply an attempt to determine legislative intent" which need not be applied
to the wording of a particular indictment. Id. at 711 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3481. Id. at 692-93.
3482. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976).
3483. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
3484. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969 (1976).
3485. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1981).
3486. Id. at 339.
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phasized in dicta that a finding under Blockburger that the statutes are

not sufficiently dissimilar to permit consecutive sentencing should not be
7
348
controlling if there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.
Relying on Whalen and Albernaz, the Court in Hunterreasoned that

with respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the double
jeopardy clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from

prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.3488 In fact,
the double jeopardy clause does not apply to instances where the legislature expressly provides for cumulative punishment for the same act. The
Court thus reasoned that the judiciary has no power under the fifth

amendment double jeopardy clause to interfere with statutory schemes
that expressly provide for cumulative punishment for the same criminal
act. The Court limited the use of the Blockberger test to those instances

in which Congress did not expressly indicate an intent to impose cumulative punishments.3 48 9
The majority opinion in Hunter, written by Chief Justice Burger, is,
unfortunately, an abstract treatise on double jeopardy concepts rather
than an attempt to squarely meet and resolve the issues on appeal. The

defendant in Hunterappealed from concurrent not consecutive, or cumulative, sentences.34 9 ° Chief Justice Burger's analysis and review of prece-

dent is, however, limited to cumulative sentencing double jeopardy
principles.3 491 This fundamental imprecision in the majority opinion
may cause considerable confusion as the lower courts attempt to apply
the Court's holding in Hunter.3 49 2
3487. Id. at 340. Justice Rehnquist concluded his opinion with the statement that "the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of
what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed." Id. at 344. The concurring opinion by Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, agreed that the intent
of the legislature should be considered, but criticized Justice Rehnquist's conclusion equating
constitutionally permissible punishment to legislative intent as unsupportable by precedent or
reasoning and unnecesary to reach the Court's conclusion. The opinion emphasized that "[n]o
matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact that the other did not, under the
criterion of Blockburger v. United States." 450 U.S. 344-45 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
3488. 459 U.S. at 366.
3489. Id. at 368. In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Burger relied exclusively on the
recent precedents of Whalen, see supra notes 3479-81 and accompanying text, and Albernaz,
see supra notes 3482-87 and accompanying text. Id. Additionally, Chief Justice Berger made
reference to Whalen and Albernaz in holding that the Missouri Supreme Court in Sours 1,
Sours II, and Haggard, see supra note 3475 and accompanying text, had "misperceived the
nature of the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against multiple punishments." Id. at 366.
3490. See supra note 3473 and accompanying text.
3491. See supra notes 3488-89 and accompanying text.
3492. In Whalen, see supra notes 3479-81, Albernaz,see supra notes 3482-87 and accompany-
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The dissent in Hunter argued that the double jeopardy clause should
apply in the broader context of forbidding both multiple prosecutions
and multiple punishments 3493 for "the same offense. '34 94 The dissent
urged that because the double jeopardy clause expressly forbids multiple
prosecutions for "the same offense," the clause also forbids multiple punishment for "the same offense., 3495 Accordingly, the double jeopardy
clause does not permit the state to twice punish conduct that is, as here,
"the same offense" within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause.34 96

The dissent concluded that the Blockburger rule34 97 is much more than a
ing text, and now Hunter,see supra notes 3493-502 and accompanying text, and infra notes
3488-89, the Supreme Court appears to be laboring to redefine the constitutional scope of the
double jeopardy clause. As Justice Rehnquist aptly observed in Albernaz, while the double
jeopardy clause itself is simply stated, "the decisional law in the area is a veritable Sargasso Sea
which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." 450 U.S. at 343. Independent observers of the Supreme Court have noted that the emphasis in the Court's view on
double jeopardy is shifting not because of changes in the alliances among Justices with clearly
defined positions, but because of uncertainty among the individual justices as to the proper
meaning of the concept of double jeopardy. Western & Dribel, Toward a General Theory of
Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Cr. RFv. 81, 83 (1978).
3493. Justice Marshall, in the dissent, referred to double jeopardy principles in the context of
multiple punishment rather than cumulative punishment as stated in the majority opinion.
Although multiple punishment may denote consecutive sentencing, see BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 916 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), the context of Justice Marshall's discussion strongly suggests
that he is addressing issues that arise from concurrent sentencing; i.e., compromise jury verdicts, see infra note 3501 and accompanying text, and collateral consequences of multiple convictions, see infra note 3502 and accompanying text.
The dissent's discussion of double jeopardy principles therefore more closely addresses the
concurrent sentencing issue on appeal in Hunter, see supra note 3473 and accompanying text.
The majority opinion, however, appears to limit its discussion to consecutive sentencing, see
supra notes 3490-92 and accompanying text. This difference in treatment of double jeopardy
principles only further disturbs the internal precision of the Hunter decision.
3494. 459 U.S. at 369 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The double jeopardy clause specifically protects against being twice put in jeopardy for "the same offense." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (double jeopardy clause embodies three
separate constitutional protections: protection against second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal; protection against second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense); United States v. Benz, 282 U.S.
304 (1931) (double jeopardy guarantee applies to all cases where court attempts to inflict second punishment for same offense); Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873) (double jeopardy guarantee protects not only against more than one trial, but also prevents more than one sentence
from being pronounced on same verdict)).
3495. 459 U.S. at 369 (Marshall, J., dissenting). If the defendant in Hunter had been tried
for the two crimes in separate trials, he would have been subjected to multiple prosecutions for
"the same offense," in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Id. (citing Harris v. Oklahoma,
433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam) (person tried and convicted for a crime which includes various incidents cannot be tried a second time for one of those incidents without violating double
jeopardy clause); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), see infra note 3535).
3496. 459 U.S. at 373-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3497. See supra note 3460.
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rule of statutory construction; it is a constitutional doctrine that defines
3498
the term "the same offense" as set forth in the double jeopardy clause.

Without the restraint of the double jeopardy clause, legislatures would
have the power to create endless variations of substantively identical
crimes based on the same act and state of mind, and multiple punishments could be meted out ad infinitum for "the same offense. ' 3499 There-

fore, the phrase "the same offense" must apply in both multiple
prosecution and multiple punishment cases.35co
Additionally, the dissent emphasized that multiple prosecution for
"the same offense" creates severe hardships on defendants that the
double jeopardy clause was meant to alleviate. The accused must pre3498. Id. at 374 & n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall pointed out that the
Blockberger rule was taken from Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927), wherein Justice
Brandeis had expressly analyzed a multiple punishment claim in constitutional rather than
statutory terms and rejected the claim because it would have been impossible to commit either
crime without committing the other. Id. at 11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's
view that the Blockburger rule is a constitutional doctrine defining "the same offense" was also
acknowledged in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Albernaz, 450 U.S. 333, 345 (1981)
(Stewart, J.,
concurring), see supra note 3487, and by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v.
Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1981), see supra note 3475.
3499. Justice Marshall took strong exception to the majority's reliance on Albernaz, 450 U.S.
333 (1981), see supra notes 3482-87 and accompanying text, and Whalen, 445 U.S. 684 (1980),
see supra notes 3479-81 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall reasoned that the statement
in Albernaz that cumulative punishment does not violate the Constitution so long as it is authorized by the legislature, 450 U.S. at 344, is clearly dicta; that the Court in Albernaz, in fact,
relied on the Blockburger test, 450 U.S. at 339; and that the Court in Albernaz simply did not
discuss the question of whether the double jeopardy clause forbids multiple punishments for
two crimes that are the same offense under the Blockburger test. 459 U.S. at 371 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall reasoned that Whalen, likewise, did not decide the issue presented in
Hunter. In Whalen, the Court observed that in the absence of a clear indication of contrary
legislative intent, a defendant cannot be subjected to multiple punishments for two crimes that
constitute the same offense under Blockburger,445 U.S. at 692. The Court made no decision
as to whether multiple punishments for two crimes can be imposed if clearly authorized by the
legislature. 459 U.S. at 371 n.3 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
3500. 459 U.S. at 371 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The issue clause, initially adopted to
curb excesses in the common law, see supra notes 3451 & 3456, should extend to comprehensive criminal statutory schemes that have replaced the common law crimes. The Supreme
Court has previously addressed the constitutional significance of changing from a common law
tradition to a statutory scheme in the context of the seventh amendment right to trial by jury
in civil matters. The result reached is irreconcilable with the double jeopardy treatment announced in Hunter. The seventh amendment right to a jury trial by its own terms applies only
to suits at common law. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974), however, Justice Marshall wrote that the extension of the constitutional right to a jury
trial in actions involving statutory matters is a matter too obvious to be doubted. Id. at 193.
The Court held that a jury trial must be available if the statutory action involves rights and
remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law. Id. at 194. In Hunter, the Court
held that the double jeopardy clause has no application to statutory "offenses" passed by the
legislature. 459 U.S. at 368-69.
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pare a defense to each crime charged, risk a compromise jury verdict of

guilty as to one charge,35 " and accept the collateral consequences of
multiple convictions.3 5 2
As a statement of constitutional doctrine, Hunter may signify a substantial reduction in the power of the courts to define and apply double
jeopardy clause principles. Formerly, under the rules of statutory con-

struction announced in Blockburger,3503 the judiciary was not compelled
to endorse statutory schemes that provided for cumulative punishment

for "the same offense." Now, under Hunter,the judiciary must mete out
cumulative punishments if expressly provided by statute without scrutiny
of whether the statutes provide for punishments for "the same offense"

within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause.
The following decisions were heard by the Ninth Circuit prior to the
Hunter ruling. Accordingly, the court did not examine express legislative intent. These decisions, therefore, must be considered only as further clarification of the Blockburger rule. Since express legislative intent

was not considered in Hunter, the decisions are not conclusive as to the
application of the Blockburger rule.
In United States v. Bennett,3 5 the defendant was indicted and convicted of, inter alia, making false statements to the United States Department of Labor3 5 5 and of theft and embezzlement of CETA funds.350 6
The defendant, as secretary-treasurer of a teamsters union local, had participated in a scheme to defraud the government of funds administered
3501. 459 U.S. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966)
(Fortas, J., dissenting) (submission of more than one charge gives prosecution advantage of
offering jury a choice, a situation which may induce a doubtful jury to find defendant guilty of
the less serious offense rather than to continue to debate defendant's innocence)).
3502. 459 U.S. at 372-73 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969) (criminal convictions cause adverse collateral consequences such as use of habitual
criminal statutes and character impeachment at a future trial); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40 (1968) (criminal convictions cause adverse collateral consequences such as deportation of
aliens and loss of civil rights)).
3503. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), see supra note 3460.
3504. 702 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1983).
3505. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1979) states:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully. . . makes any false. . . statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing. . . knowing the same to contain any
false. . . statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
3506. 18 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1979) states:
Whoever . . . connected in any capacity with any agency . . . receiving . . . any
funds under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act [and] knowingly enrolls an ineligible participant, embezzles,. . . or obtains by fraud any of the moneys
• . . which are the subject of a. . . contract pursuant to such Act shall be fined . .
or imprisoned. . . or both.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

under CETA. The defendant appealed his conviction, claiming that his
prosecution for both misrepresentation and embezzlement violated the
double jeopardy clause.35 7

The Ninth Circuit applied the Blockburger test,35 " and held that
the offenses of misrepresentation and embezzlement each require proof of
a fact that the other does not.3 50 9 Consequently, the court concluded
that these were separate offenses and affirmed the convictions.
In United States v. Bosque,351 ° the defendant was convicted of aggravated bank larceny3511 and theft from an interstate shipment. 35 12 At the
time of the incident, the defendant, a former Brinks guard, was assisting
in transporting a currency shipment that had arrived at San Francisco
via airplane from federally insured banks in Hawaii. The currency was
to be transported by a Brinks truck to the San Francisco Federal Reserve
Bank. Once the currency had been placed in the truck at the airport, the
defendant seized the truck and fled, eventually commandeering another

vehicle at gun point to facilitate his escape.351 3 The defendant received
concurrent sentences and appealed, claiming that the sentences consti351 4
tuted improper multiple punishment for a single act.

The Ninth Circuit reviewed the defendant's double jeopardy clause
claim and held that the defendant committed two separate crimes under
3507. 702 F.2d at 835.
3508. Id. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), see supra note 3460; see
also Dixon v. Dupnik, 688 F.2d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 1982), see infra notes 3539-51 and accompanying text.
3509. 702 F.2d at 835. The court specifically found that § 665(a) requires the defendant to
be connected with an agency receiving financial assistance under CETA while § 1001 does not.
Furthermore § 1001 requires a showing of falsifying or concealing a material fact while
§ 665(a) does not.
3510. 691 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1982).
3511. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976) states in pertinent part: "(b) Whoever takes. . . with intent
to steal . . . any . . . money.

. . exceeding $100 belonging to . . . any bank . . . shall be

fined. . . or imprisoned. . . or both; . . . (d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to
commit, any offense defined in. . . this section, assaults any person. . . shall be fined. . . or
imprisoned. . . or both."

3512. 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976) states in pertinent part: "Whoever embezzles [or] steals...
. .with intent to convert to his own use any goods. . . which are
. . shipment of freight. . . [s]hall. . . be fined. . . or impris-

from any. . . motortruck.
a part of. . . an interstate.
oned. . . or both."

3513. 691 F.2d at 867.
3514. Id. at 867-68. The Ninth Circuit reached the merits of the issue although it commented in dicta that double jeopardy principles may not apply to concurrent sentences. Id. at
869. Under concurrent sentencing, the accused only serves the greater of the sentences imposed. But see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 372-73 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (each
conviction causes collateral consequences under the penal codes).
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the Blockburger test.3

15

The court found that bank larceny required

stealing money belonging to a bank and interstate theft required taking

money from a vehicle moving in interstate commerce.

16

The court also

differed. 351 7

found that the purpose of each statute
Accordingly, it affirmed the defendant's convictions.
In United States v. Herbert,351 8 the defendants were indicted and
convicted for illegal sale of automatic weapons. 351 9 The Ninth Circuit

held that the defendants' multiple punishment 352° from their convictions
of conspiring to violate the firearm laws, 3521 and of aiding and abetting in

the making, possession and transfer of unregistered firearms 3522 did not
violate the double jeopardy clause.35 23 The Ninth Circuit summarily disposed of the issue, stating that the double jeopardy clause only prevents
multiple punishment for the same offense, 3 24 and that the crimes of conspiracy and aiding and abetting are not the same. 25 While conspiracy
requires a prior agreement to commit an offense,3 526 aiding and abetting
does not require a prior agreement, but only that the defendants consciously share in a criminal act.3 527
In United States v. Smith,35 28 the defendants had participated in a

massive heroin importation and distribution conspiracy throughout Cali3515. Id. (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), see supra note 3460;
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), see supra note 3478).
3516. 691 F.2d at 869.
3517. Id. The purpose of § 659 is to protect interstate shipments. Section 2113 is designed
to make it a federal offense to rob federally insured banks.
3518. 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 87 (1984).
3519. Id. at 983.
3520. The defendant's appeal on double jeopardy grounds was from concurrent sentences.
Id.
3521. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), states: "If two or more persons conspire. . . to commit any
offense against. . . or to defraud the United States,. . . and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined. . . or imprisoned. .. ."
3522. 26 U.S.C. § 5681 (1976) states in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person
• . . (d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him. . . or (e) to transfer a
firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or (f) to make a firearm in violation of the
provisions of this chapter ...
"
3523. 698 F.2d at 985.
3524. Id. (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (double jeopardy clause protects a defendant in a criminal proceeding against multiple punishments or repeated prosecutions for same offense); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (a defendant may not be
tried or sentenced for same offense more than once); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), see supra note 3494).
3525. Id.
3526. Id. (citing United States v. Valencia, 492 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1974) (conviction of
conspiracy only requires proof of an agreement to commit an offense)).
3527. Id. (citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) (aiding and abetting does not
presuppose existence of an agreement)).
3528. 690 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983).
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On appeal, defendant Smith

contended that his conviction on separate counts of conspiracy 35 30 and
continuing criminal enterprise3 5 3 1 under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse

and Control Act of 19703532 violated the double jeopardy clause. 3533 The
government conceded that there was a violation of the double jeopardy
the Ninth Circuit reversed the lesser included offense
clause and, hence,
35 34
of conspiracy.

2. Prohibition against retrial for "the same offense"
Double jeopardy issues arise when a second criminal prosecution

3535
follows an acquittal or conviction for the same or a similar offense.

The double jeopardy clause generally prohibits the government from

prosecuting an accused for both a greater and lesser included offense.3536
However, successive prosecutions of similar offenses are permitted under
3529. Id. at 749. The indictment named more than 20 co-defendants and a large group of
unindicted co-conspirators as participants in the scheme. The thrust of the indictment was for,
inter alia, possession and distribution of a controlled substance (heroin) in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 845(a) (1970).
3530. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) states: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not
exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the attempt or conspiracy."
3531. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1976) states in pertinent part:
[A] person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if(1) he violates any provision of. . . subchapter [I] or subchapter II of this
chapter..

.

and

(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of. . . subchapter [I] or subehapter II or this chapter(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of. . . management,
and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
3532. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969.
3533. 690 F.2d at 750 (citing Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 149-51 (1977) (Court
assumed, arguendo, that prosecution for violations of §§ 846 and 848 violate double jeopardy
clause because a conviction under § 848 requires proof of conspiracy making § 846 a lesser
included offense)).
3534. Id.
3535. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). In Brown, the defendant stole a vehicle, and was
arrested and convicted of joyriding; thereafter he was indicted for car theft. The court held
that the subsequent car theft prosecution was barred by the double jeopardy clause prohibition
against successive prosecution of the lesser included crime, followed by the greater included
crime. Id. at 168.
3536. Id. at 169. But see id. at 169 n.7 ("An exception may exist where the State is unable to
proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to
sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due
diligence.").
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the Blockburger3 53 7 rule if the respective prosecutions are brought under
separate statutes where each requires proof of a fact that the other does
3538
not.
In Dixon v. Dupnik,35 39 the defendant was charged with a crime and
released on his own recognizance. While free, the defendant was arrested
for the unlawful sale of heroin. 35" After conviction and sentencing, the
defendant was indicted under Arizona law for the crime of having committed a felony while free on his own recognizance. 35 ' If convicted of
the second crime the defendant's sentence would be consecutive to that
which he received for his conviction of the underlying heroin sale offense. 354 2 The defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court,
claiming that his subsequent felony prosecution violated the double jeopardy clause because it arose from a separate, distinct prosecution and was
a penalty for the same criminal offense.3 543
The Ninth Circuit agreed, 35 " ruling that although the legislature
has wide latitude to define the same offense in multiple statutes, the court
may not apply these statutes against a criminal defendant in a manner
that violates the double jeopardy clause. 35 5 Applying the Blockburger
test, the court concluded that there were no elements in the statute proscribing the sale of heroin which were dissimilar from those in the statute
making it a crime to commit a felony while released on one's own recognizance.3 54 6 Consequently, the court held that the second conviction relating to the commission of a felony while free on one's own recognizance
violated the double jeopardy clause because the offense underlying the
3537.
3538.
3539.
3540.

284 U.S.299 (1932), see supra note 3460.
Id.
688 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 683. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1002.02 (1974).

3541. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3970 (1978), provided in applicable part:
A person. . . convicted of committing any felony offense. . . which [was] committed while such person is released on. . . his own recognizance. . . is guilty of the
offense of committing a. . . felony. . . . The sentence imposed shall be in addition
to and shall be served consecutively to any penalty imposed for the offense committed while released on. . . his own recognizance.
This statute was repealed in 1981; its substance was incorporated into Arizona's penalty enhancement statutory scheme, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604(m) (1984). 688 F.2d at 683
n.3.
3542. See supra note 3541.
3543. 688 F.2d at 683.
3544. Id. at 686.
3545. Id. at 684 (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)). See supra notes 3535-36
and accompanying text.
3546. 688 F.2d at 684 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). See
supra notes 3460 & 3541.
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47

The validity of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dixon is suspect, however, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Hunter." a

This opinion significantly shifted the matrix of a double jeopardy analysis
from applying judicially sanctioned rules of statutory construction to determine if the statutes are "the same offense" to examining, on a case by
case basis, the statutory scheme and legislative record to ascertain the
intent of the legislature. 4 9
In Dixon, it may be persuasively argued that the Arizona legislature
intended cumulative punishment for a conviction of a felony committed
while on release on one's own recognizance. In fact, the crime has now
3 550
been incorporated as part of the state's penalty enhancement statute.
In United States v. Brooklier,3 55 1 the Ninth Circuit held that the
double jeopardy clause did not prevent successive Racketeer Influence
and Corrupt Organization (RICO) prosecutions and convictions arising

from the same extortion incident if based on different RICO violations.3552 Defendant Brooklier and others were members of La Cosa

Nostra, a racketeering organization. In 1980, they were indicted and
subsequently convicted of RICO violations for extorting money from
bookmakers and pornographers, including Sam Farkas. Previously, in
1974, the defendants had been indicted for RICO violations, including
conspiracy to extort from the same Sam Farkas. In 1975, based on a plea

agreement, the defendants pleaded guilty to the Farkas extortion conspiracy count. One of the acts of the Farkas extortion forming the basis of
the 1980 indictment was the same act set forth in the 1974 indictment to
which the defendants pleaded guilty. The indictments, however, were
35 53
based on different RICO subsections.
3547. 688 F.2d at 685-86. The state unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish Blockburger by
maintaining that the underlying felony and the § 13-3970 prosecution for the sale of heroin
were dissimilar crimes-the first based on the commission of a felony, and the second on the
conviction of a felony. The court held that each crime was based on the commission of the
same wrongful act. The basis for the holding was that a conviction itself cannot be a wrongful
"act" because the conviction represents the act of the state not of the defendant. Id. at 685
(citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (condition of public intoxication cannot be a crime
unless the accused has committed some illegal act); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (condition of under the influence of narcotics is not a crime unless the accused has
committed some illegal act)).
3548. 459 U.S. 359 (1983), see supra notes 3464-504 and accompanying text.
3549. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
3550. See supra note 3541 and accompanying text.
3551. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
3552. Id. at 1214-15.
3553. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit applied the Blockburger test 3. 4 to the 1974 and
1980 RICO violation convictions arising from the Farkas extortion. It
concluded that the convictions resulted from violations of different
RICO statute subsections, each having dissimilar and distinct elements,
such that the defendants' subsequent convictions did not violate the
double jeopardy clause.3555
In United States v. Stearns,3 55 6 the defendants had been convicted of
theft and interstate transportation of stolen property in connection with
the theft of a yacht and the disappearance of the persons aboard.3 55 7 Sev-

eral years later, additional facts were discovered and the government proceeded against the defendants on felony (robbery) murder charges.355 8
Prior to the felony murder trial, the defendants moved for dismissal on
double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the dismissal motion
and defendants appealed, contending that a subsequent prosecution after
trial and conviction of a lesser included offense is barred by the double
jeopardy clause.3 559

The Ninth Circuit held that an exception applies to the double jeopardy bar to subsequent prosecution for a greater offense where the government diligently, albeit unsuccessfully, attempted to discover sufficient
evidence to proceed on the more serious charge at the first trial. 356 ° The
The 1974 indictment charged these appellants under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which
makes it unlawful to engage in a conspiracy to conduct an extortion ring. The 1980
indictment charges the appellants with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which makes
it unlawful to participate in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a
pattern of racketeering activity.
Id. at 1214 n.5.
3554. Id. at 1214-15 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), see supra note
3460).
3555. Id. Consecutive sentences for RICO violations probably would withstand double jeopardy scrutiny under the Hunter legislative intent test. See supra note 3488 and accompanying
text.
3556. 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984).
3557. Id. at 392. The victims, Eleanor and Malcolm Graham, and their yacht had disappeared from the atoll of Palmyra in the South Pacific in August of 1974. The defendants, who
had been at the atoll at the same time, appeared in Hawaii in October of 1974 with the
Grahams' vessel. The yacht had been registered under a new name, its trim repainted, and its
figurehead removed. The defendants claimed that the Grahams had drowned; the state made a
thorough search, but was unable to discover any clues as to their disappearance. The defendants were indicted and convicted on charges of theft and interstate transportation of stolen
property. Id.
3558. Id. In 1981, Mrs. Graham's remains were discovered and the circumstances suggested
foul play. Subsequently, appellants were indicted for felony murder. Id.
3559. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that this contention was meritorious.
Id. at 393 (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) (subsequent prosecution for a greater
included offense generally is barred by prior prosecution of a lesser included offense based on
the same transaction)).
3560. Id. The court adopted dicta from Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). In Brown, the

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

court noted that the exercise- of due diligence is a factual issue, and upon
reviewing the record, it found that the government had demonstrated its
diligence to the trial court.35 6'
3 562 Gooday had been tried on a one
In United States v. Gooday1
count indictment for first-degree murder. During the trial, Gooday requested that the jury also be instructed on the lesser included offenses of
second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. The jury acquitted Gooday of first-degree murder, but could
not reach a verdict on the lesser included offenses. The trial court declared a mistrial and, using the same indictment, set the case for retrial
on the lesser included otnses. Oft'appeal, Gooday contended that the
indictment ceased to exist when the jury acquitted him of first-degree
murder. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.3" 6 3
The Ninth Circuit recognized that if the jury is not instructed on the
lesser included offenses, an acquittal of the crime explicitly charged necessarily implies an acquittal on all lesser offenses included within that
charge. 3 5 The court held, however, that since the jury was instructed
on the indictment for first-degree murder and the three additional lesser
included offenses that Gooday had requested, Gooday's acquittal on the
first-degree murder charge. did not preclude retrial on the three lesser
included offenses on which the jury was instructed but could not reach a
verdict.35 6 5
court had suggested that "where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at
the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or
have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence," a subsequent prosecution
should not be barred by the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 169 & n.7.
The court in Stearnsalso considered the underlying policies served by the double jeopardy
clause: prevention of multiple punishments for a single offense, harassment, and the physical,
psychological and financial burdens of multiple prosecutions, balanced against society's interest in imposing just punishment. on the gilty. 707 F.2d at 393 (citing Howard v. United
States, 372 F.2d 294, 299 & n.10 (9th'Cir.), cerL denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967)). After carefully
weighing these considerations, the court, adopting the Brown dicta, held that the state may
proceed on the more serious felony murder charges without offending double jeopardy principles. Id.
3561. 707 F.2d at 394. The search.for the missing persons aboard the vessel had been conducted by an investigation team of FBI agents and Coast Guard scuba divers. The search
canvassed the island and lagoons where the boat had last been seen with its missing occupants.
The court noted that a more thorough search using bloodhounds, experts on discovery of
bodies, and divers capable of operating at great depths might have been employed, but would
have required an exorbitant amount of time, effort and money. The court further found that
these measures were not warranted based on the facts known during the investigation.
3562. 714 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1983).
3563. Id. at 81.
3564. Id. at 82 (citing In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) (an acquittal on explicit charge bars
subsequent indictment on implicit lesser included offenses)).
3565. Id. (citing Edmonds v. United States, 273 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (reversal of de-
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3.

Sentencing changes

A sentence does not have the constitutional finality that attends an
acquittal.3 5 66 Double jeopardy considerations do not prohibit the courts
from changing a sentence,35 67 although increasing a sentence by resentencing is generally prohibited unless the sentence was illegal or erroneous when first imposed. 35 68 The underlying rationale for permitting the

correction of sentences is that "the Constitution does not require that
sentencing should be a game in which the wrong move by the judge
means immunity for the prisoner."3 5 69 .
35 7 ° the defendant was convicted of
In United States v. Carter,
3
5
71
and sentenced to five years imprisonment.3 57 2 After appeal and
rape
affirmation of his convictions, the defendant moved to reduce his sentence. The district court granted his motion and reduced his sentence to
four months in a community treatment center; and four years and eight
months probation.3 57 3 The government objected on the grounds that the

sentence was illegal, stating that the sentence of probation is not permitted for the crime of rape.357 a The trial'court granted the government's
fendant's second-degree murder conviction obtained finder a-first-degree murder indictment
did not bar retrial for second-degree murder even-though the defendant could not have been
retried after an implied acquittal on the first-degree murder count specified in the indictment),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 977 (1960); Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1965) (in a
two count indictment, acquittal on one count does not preclude retrial if the jury cannot reach
a verdict on the other count), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966)).
3566. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134 (1980).
3567. Id.
3568. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947).
3569. Id.
3570. 704 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1983).
3571. 18 U.S.C. § 2031(b) (1976) states: "Whoever; within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, commits rapje shall suffer death, or imprisonment for any
term of years or for life."
3572. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1976) states: Upon entering a judgment of conviction, th court .... may (1) designate. . . a
minimum term at the expiration of which the prisdnefrshall become eligible for parole, .... or (2) the court may fix the maximum sentence . . . to be served [and]
specify that the prisoner may be released on parole [when] the Commission may
determine.
3573. 704 F.2d at 1063. Carter sought reduction of his sentence under FED. R. CRIM. P.
35(b), which states: "The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is
imposed. . . . Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation
shall constitute a permissible reduction of sentence under this subdivision."
3574. 704 F.2d at 1063-64. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976). The government specifically contended
that § 3651 prohibits the sentence of probation for rape. Section 3651 states, in part: "Upon
entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment,
any court having jurisdiction . . . when satisfied that the ends of justice. . . will be served
thereby, may suspend. . . sentence and place the defendant on probation. . . ." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651 (1976) (emphasis added).
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motion and resentenced the defendant to thirty months imprisonment
with parole eligibility after six months. 3 - 7' The defendant appealed the
sentence on double jeopardy clause grounds.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the double jeopardy clause does not
bar the increase of an illegal or erroneous sentence. It found that the
initial resentence was illlega135 76 and thus, held that the sentence could be
corrected and increased without violating the defendant's double jeopardy clause rights.357 7
In United States v. Wingender,35 7 8 the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court may modify the sentencing order to correct a mistake that
caused an ambiguity, notwithstanding the fact that the effect of the
change was to make the sentences imposed run consecutively rather than
concurrently.35 79 In 1979, the defendant received a suspended sentence
for falsifying a loan application.3 58 ° In 1981, the suspended sentence was
reinstated after the defendant was convicted of violating federal counterfeiting laws.35 81
The district court ordered the defendant to serve the reinstated sentence consecutively with any state criminal counterfeiting convictions
and sentences. The next day, the prosecutor realized that the district
court had erred, since there was no state conviction or sentence. Two
days later the court modified its sentencing order, and the defendant was
ordered to serve consecutive sentences for violation of the two federal
statutes.3 58 2 The Ninth Circuit allowed this change on the ground that
the trial court was only clarifying previous ambiguities in the sentence.
The court held that the uncorrected sentence's reference to any state sentence was so ambiguous as to be illegal, such that the ambiguity could be
corrected to refer to the federal sentence rather than the nonexistent state
sentence.35 83
3575. 704 F.2d at 1064. Carter was resentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1); see supra note
3572.
3576. 704 F.2d at 1064. The court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) and the parallel
provisions of FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e) act as a limitation on FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b), such that
the trial court's sentence of Carter to probation was illegal.
3577. 704 F.2d at 1064 (citing Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947) (double jeopardy
clause does not prevent increasing illegal or erroneous sentences); United States v. Connolly,
618 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980) (correction of an illegal sentence to comply with requirements of
law does not violate double jeopardy clause, even if the sentence is increased)).
3578. 711 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1983).
3579. Id. at 870-71.
3580. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976).
3581. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976).
3582. 711 F.2d at 869-70.
3583. Id. at 870 (citing United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1982) (an ambiguous sentence may be clarified without placing the defendant in jeopardy a second time)). The
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3 5 84 the defendant had been convicted on
In United States v. Hagler,
thirteen counts of a twenty count indictment for credit card fraud. He

received a sentence of one year and a fine of $1000 for his conviction on
count fifteen. His sentence on the other counts was suspended, conditional on five years probation. He was also ordered to make restitution of
$77,000. On appeal, his conviction on five of the counts, including count
fifteen, was reversed and the case was remanded for resentencing. The
defendant was thereafter resentenced in the identical manner that he had
been sentenced initially, with the exception that he was sentenced under

count sixteen rather than count fifteen.

85

The defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the resentencing

violated his double jeopardy clause rights. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the sentence, noting that the defendant did not receive any net increase in
his sentence and was not subjected to a retrial. The court therefore reasoned that the defendant's only plausible double jeopardy clause argument was that he had a right to know at the termination of his trial the
precise count on which he would be punished. 35 86 The court held that
double jeopardy clause protections do not include a right to know at a
particular time what the sentence will be.35 s7

4. Point in proceedings at which jeopardy attaches
Protection against double jeopardy generally attaches when the jury
has been impaneled and sworn. 35 88 The criminal defendant may be re-

tried for the same crime if the trial did not end in a conviction or an
acquittal.

9

court in Wingender noted that as a general rule, the increase of a legal sentence violates the
double jeopardy clause. Id. (citing Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1964)
(double jeopardy clause prohibits ten year sentences for crimes with maximum sentences fixed
by statute at five years)). The court in Wingender concluded, however, that there is no such
bar to increase an illegal or erroneous sentence. Id. (citing United States v. Carter, 704 F.2d
1063 (9th Cir. 1983)). See supra notes 3570-77; United States v. Henry, 680 F.2d 403 (5th Cir.
1982) (a sentence may be increased to correct an illegal sentence without violating double
jeopardy clause); United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.) (there is no double jeopardy
bar to increasing sentence on one count of a two count conviction, if conviction on other count
has been vacated), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
3584. 709 F.2d 578 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 282 (1983).
3585. Id. at 579.
3586. Id.
3587. Id. (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (a sentence does not have
the finality of an acquittal)).
3588. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978).
3589. State v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). The Perez Court held that a second trial
is not precluded under the double jeopardy clause if the second trial is manifestly necessary to
safeguard the interest ofjustice. Id. at 580. The Court then permitted a second trial since the
jury had become deadlocked at the first trial. Id.
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In People of Guam v. Fejeran,s5 9 ° Fejeran, a juvenile, had been convicted in superior court of murder. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
Fejeran sought to overturn his conviction on the ground that he had been
placed in jeopardy for the same offense in a prior juvenile court proceeding. The juvenile court had held a certification hearing solely to determine whether Fejeran should be tried as a juvenile or if the court should
transfer his case to superior court for adult proceedings. 9 1
The Ninth Circuit held that Fejeran had never been put in jeopardy
by the juvenile proceeding. The court reasoned that the certification
hearing was not an adjudication to determine whether Fejeran had committed criminal acts. 59 2 The court concluded that Fejeran's double jeopardy argument failed because he could not be placed in jeopardy by a
juvenile proceeding lacking jurisdiction to decide his guilt or
innocence.3 59 3

Under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fejeran, jeopardy does not
attach until the initiation of proceedings that will determine whether the
defendant is criminally culpable and should be punished. This holding is

thus consistent with the fundamental fairness notions of the double jeopardy clause.3 594
B.

Inconsistent Verdicts

Inconsistent verdicts generally occur when a defendant is acquitted
on some counts and convicted on other related counts in the same action.

If the counts are legally severable so as to constitute different crimes, the
conviction will not be overturned for inconsistency.
3590. 687 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1045 (1983).
3591. Id. at 303.
3592. Id. The Guam Code of Civil Procedure § 255 provides for a certification hearing to
determine in which forum, the juvenile or superior court, the actual adjudication hearing will
proceed. Additionally, Rule 20(e)(J)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of Juvenile Court of Guam
provides:
"Upon filing of such a petition [for certification], the court shall schedule it for preliminary hearing for the sole purpose of determining whether the juvenile should be
certified to the criminal court for prosecution as an adult. The evidence to be
presented and considered. . . shall . . . not [relate] to the issues of guilt or innocence of the charge or of probable cause."
687 F.2d at 304.
3593. 687 F.2d at 303-04. The court distinguished the facts in Fejeran from those in Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). In Breed, the Court held that a juvenile's transfer from the juvenile court system to the state court for prosecution as an adult violated the double jeopardy
clause because at a juvenile hearing the court had found that the youth had violated a state
criminal statute. Id. at 527, 541.
3594. See supra notes 3452-57 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Powell,3 595 the Ninth Circuit reversed Powell's
convictions on three counts listed as overt acts to support a conspiracy
charge because she was acquitted on the conspiracy charge. The court
held that these were inconsistent verdicts.3 59 6
In the first count, Powell was acquitted of conspiring to knowingly
and intentionally possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. 3597 She
was convicted on three other counts, however, of using a telephone to
further the conspiracy described in count one.359 8 Since these three

counts were based on the conspiracy charge in count one, the Ninth Circuit found that the convictions on the communication charges were inconsistent with the acquittal on the underlying conspiracy charge.3 599
In United States v. Upshaw,360° the court affirmed Upshaw's conviction of aiding and abetting 3601 and employee of a federally insured savings and loan institution to fraudulently misapply funds. 3 "2 The court
held that Upshaw had not been subjected to inconsistent verdicts, even
though the employee was acquitted. The Ninth Circuit offered two rea3595. 708 F.2d 455 (1983). Powell was indicted on fifteen counts and ultimately convicted
on four.
3596. Id. at 457.
3597. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) states that "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally-(l) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) states that any person who "attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subehapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not
exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the attempt or conspiracy."
3598. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1976) states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any communication facility in committing.

. .

a felony. .

.

. Each separate use of a communica-

tion facility shall be a separate offense under this subsection. For purposes of this
subsection, the term "communication facility" .
includes mail, telephone, wire,
radio, and all other means of communication.
3599. 708 F.2d at 456 (citing United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 244-45 (9th Cir. 1979)
(since conspiracy conviction failed, the 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) communication count convictions
also failed for lack of sufficient evidence), cert denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980); United States v.
Hannah, 584 F.2d 27, 28-30 (3d Cir. 1978) (not guilty verdict on conspiracy charge should
have resulted in finding defendant not guilty under § 843(b) facilitation count)).
3600. 685 F.2d 1202 (1982) (per curiam).
3601. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) states:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
3602. 685 F.2d at 1203. 18 U.S.C. § 657 (1976) states in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, agent or employee of or connected.

. .

with.

. .

any.

..

credit or savings and loan corporation or association. . . and whoever, being a receiver of any such institution, or agent or employee of the receiver . . . willfully
misapplies any moneys.

. .

belonging to such institution.

. .

shall be fined not more

than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. .

..
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sons for its decision: (1) legislative history indicated that Congress reacted against the common law rule tying the fate of an accessory to that
of the principal,3 6 3 and (2) under the statute, the government need not
identify, let alone indict and convict, any specific employee. 3 6 The
court cautioned against inferring too much from what appear to be inconsistent verdicts. Often there are less obvious reasons for an inconsistency than an improper conviction.3 6°s
C. Appellate Review
1. The plain error rule

Generally, the admissibility of evidence may not be challenged on
appeal if the proper objection was not raised at the trial level.36 6 However, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow an appeal to be
brought where the improperly admitted evidence affects a party's substantial rights. 3 6° 7 This standard of "plain error" allows a court to hear

an appeal which might otherwise have been unreviewable. However, the
existence of plain error does not automatically mean that a reversal is

warranted.360 8 If the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
conviction will be upheld. 3 °9
In United States v. Wilson,3 61 0 the court upheld an escape convic3603. 685 F.2d at 1203 (citing Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22-23 (1980) (convictions of aiding and abetting a revenue official in accepting compensation additional to that
statutorily authorized upheld even though IRS agent was acquitted)).
3604. Id. at 1204. See United States v. Campa, 679 F.2d 1006, 1013 (Ist Cir. 1982) (conviction of aiding and abetting in the possession and distribution of cocaine upheld even though
identity of the principal was not determined); United States v. Harper, 579 F.2d 1235, 1239
(10th Cir.) (conviction of aiding and abetting in the distribution of heroin upheld because
"[p]roving beyond a reasonable doubt that a specific person is the principal is not an element of
the crime"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978); Feldstein v. United States, 429 F.2d 1092, 1095
(9th Cir. 1970) (conviction of aiding and abetting in smuggling marijuana upheld even though
the alleged principal was never tried).
3605. 685 F.2d at 1203 (citing Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981) (per curiam)). The
Court in Harrissuggested that the co-defendant may have been acquitted on the charges of
robbery, grand larceny and burglary for reasons of inarticulable doubt, an error of law, or
mere leniency. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344 (1981) (per curiam). See also Dunn v.
United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932) (conviction for maintenance of a public nuisance not necessarily inconsistent with acquittal on second count of possession of intoxicating liquor because
of possible reasons of leniency, compromise, or mistake).
3606. Vitello v. United States, 425 F.2d 416, 423 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,400 U.S. 822 (1970).
3607. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
3608. United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1978). In Lopez, the prosecutor's comments were held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there was independent evidence already in the record regarding the same aspect of the testimony. Id. at 685.
3609. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
3610. 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 205 (1983).
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tion 36 1' but acknowledged that the trial court erred in admitting false
statements made by the defendant. 3612 The defendant contended that he
had made the false statements while he was in custody but before he had
been given Miranda warnings.361 3 The Ninth Circuit considered this
contention even though the defendant had failed to properly object to the
admission of the statements during trial. The court held that "admission
of those statements clearly violated [the defendant's] Fifth Amendment
rights [against self-incrimination] and this rises to the level of 'plain
error.' "3614
Despite the finding of plain error, Wilson's conviction was upheld.
After reviewing the record as a whole, the Ninth Circuit found that evidence of the defendant's guilt was substantially, independently, and credibly represented at the trial level so as to convince the court that the error
was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2.

'361 5

Finality

The jurisdiction of the court of appeals is limited to the final decisions of the district courts.3 61 6 In the Territory of Guam, however, this
jurisdiction extends to the final decisions of the appellate division of the
district court.3 617 To determine the standard of finality for these appellate division decisions, the Ninth Circuit has used a test " 'analogous to
the standard applied by the United States Supreme Court to test the finality of state court judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257.' ",3618
The Supreme Court has recognized four situations in which the
strict rule of finality necessary to establish federal appellate jurisdiction
may be relaxed.3 61 9 The Ninth Circuit determined, in Guam v.
3611. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever escapes . . . from
if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of
felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined. . . or imprisoned ..
3612. 690 F.2d at 1275.
3613. Id. at 1273.
3614. Id. at 1274.

...
custody ...shall,

3615. Id. at 1275. The substantial evidence included the defendant's "fidgety" appearance
and an unsuccessful search for a man whom the defendant claimed to be visiting. Id. at 1270.
3616. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) states in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the. . .District Court of Guam ...."
3617. Guam v. Kingsbury, 649 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir.) (citing Corn v. Guam Coral Co., 318
F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1963)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
3618. Guam v. Quinata, 704 F.2d 1085, 1086 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Guam v. Kingsbury, 649
F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981)).
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) states in pertinent part: "Final judgments or decrees rendered by
the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court ...."
3619. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). The four situations are:
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that because later review of the federal issue might be pre-

cluded if Quinata prevailed on nonfederal grounds, a review of the ruling
by the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam was
necessary.3 62 1

In Quinata, the defendant had been charged with committing a
crime which occurred just prior to his eighteenth birthday. After origi-

nally filing and then dismissing the charges in superior court, the Government of Guam refiled in juvenile court. The juvenile court dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction because the defendant was then over eighteen
years of age. The government filed an appeal with the Appellate Division

of the District Court of Guam which reversed the decision of the juvenile
court. The defendant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. section 129 1.3622 The Ninth Circuit raised the question of the finality requirement because the defendant's case was still scheduled to be
tried by the juvenile court. 62 3
One exception to the finality requirement provides that when the

party seeking review might prevail on nonfederal grounds, thus precluding review of the federal issue by the Supreme Court, an interlocutory

appeal will be allowed. Relying on this exception, the Ninth Circuit held
that Quinata's appeal was reviewable.3 624 It reasoned that if the trial was

allowed to proceed in the juvenile court without review by the court of
appeals, the defendant might succeed on other grounds, preventing a fur(1) where the federal issue on appeal is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings is
preordained; (2) where the issue on appeal will survive and require further decision regardless
of the outcome of future state court proceedings; (3) where the issue on appeal cannot be
reviewed at a later time regardless of the final outcome in the state court; and (4) where the
party seeking review of the issue might prevail on nonfederal grounds, thus precluding review
of the federal issue by the Supreme Court. Id. at 476-87.
3620. 704 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1983).
3621. Id. at 1086. The Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam had reversed the
juvenile court's order of dismissal and had directed the juvenile court to proceed.
Before proceeding with the issue of the applicability of a § 1257 exemption, the Ninth
Circuit qualified its adherence to the standard of analogy as set forth in Guam v. Kingsbury,
649 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981). The Ninth Circuit stated that the
Kingsbury court had been imprecise in analogizing review of Guam appellate decisions to
Supreme Court review of state court rulings. Although this statement is based on the dissent
in Kingsbury, 649 F.2d at 744-48 (Poole, J., dissenting), the Quinala court stated that "(tihe
federal balance requires special rules to prevent Supreme Court review from becoming entangled in state law matters, and no such intent is present in our review of Guam cases, as we have
jurisdiction to decide Guam local law questions." Guam v. Quinata, 704 F.2d at 1086. Nevertheless, the Kingsbury rule was applied as the law of the circuit.
3622. See supra note 3616 for statutory language.
3623. 704 F.2d at 1086.
3624. Id. (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)).
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ther determination on the jurisdictional question.3 62 5 Although the court
acknowledged Congress' strong policy against "piecemeal" or interlocutory appeals, 3 626 it reasoned that the importance of the jurisdiction issue
outweighed stated congressional concerns.3 62 7 In further support of its
position, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that review of this decision would
not result in additional interruption of the trial.3628 Therefore, the court
proceeded to consider the merits of the defendant's appeal.
3. Government appeals
The United States Supreme Court has held that in the absence of
express statutory authority, the government may not appeal in a criminal
case.362 9 In Guam v. Okada,3 630 the Ninth Circuit held that the Legislature of Guam does not have the power to authorize government appeals
in criminal cases decided in the District Court of Guam.36 3 1
In Okada, an indictment was dismissed when it was found that the
defendant's due process rights had been violated.36 32 The government
3625. Id. The court also recognized the "important federal interest in the prompt. . . resolution of significant issues of Guam law." Id. Unlike the hands-off policy of the federal courts
toward state law, federal courts possess a legitimate interest in the development of Guam law.

Id.
3626. Id. at 1086-87.
3627. Id. at 1087. Congress was concerned with the "'effective and fair administration of
criminal law'" which could be hampered by the delays and disruptions accompanying an
intermediate appeal. Id. (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977)).
Although a defendant may not appeal an unsuccessful challenge to the trial court's subject
matter jurisdiction before trial, see United States v. Layton, 645 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981), the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the seriousness of the matter at
hand far outweighed these concerns. 704 F.2d at 1087.
3628. 704 F.2d at 1087.
3629. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975) ("This Court early held that the
Government could not take an appeal in a criminal case without express statutory
authority.").
3630. 694 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982).
3631. Id. at 570.
3632. Id. at 566. The government had failed to preserve "certain discoverable evidence." Id.
Traditionally, government appeals were not favored because of the potential for a double
jeopardy claim by a defendant. The Ninth Circuit did not need to deal with the double jeopardy question here: "'[I]t is well settled that an appellate court's order reversing a conviction
is subject to further review even when the appellate court has ordered the indictment dismissed
. . .' since 'reversal on appeal would merely reinstate the jury's guilty verdict.'" Id. at 566 n.1
(quoting United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 322, 344-45 (1975)).
See also Virgin Islands v. Hamilton, 475 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1973) where the government of
the Virgin Islands brought an appeal of the district court's reversal of a criminal conviction.
Id. at 529-30. The government claimed that the sole authorization for the appeal was 28
U.S.C. § 1291. This claim was rejected by the Third Circuit. Where there was no additional
statutory authority for the appeal, § 1291, standing alone, was not sufficient authorization. Id.
at 531.
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appealed and the defendant brought a motion to dismiss on the ground
that there was no statutory authority expressly authorizing a government
3633
appeal in a criminal case.
The court did not agree with Guam's argument that the Guam Code
of Criminal Procedure provided the necessary authority for an appeal. 3634 In fact, the Ninth Circuit held that the Guam Legislature has

no authority to allow
government appeals from judgments of Guam's
36 35
District Court.

In reaching their decision, the court briefly reviewed the structure
and power of the Guam Legislature. 3636 The court found that section
1424(b) of the Organic Act of Guam provides that federal rules of procedure are applicable to the District Court of Guam.3637 The court therefore reasoned that Guam could not enact laws regarding procedure for
either the District Court of Guam or for an appeal from the district court
to the Ninth Circuit.3 63 8
If the right to appeal is a procedural right, then the Guam Legisla3633. 694 F.2d at 566. The defendant had been convicted in the Superior Court of Guam.
The Guam Government appealed to the Ninth Circuit when the Appellate Division of the
District Court of Guam reversed the conviction. Id.
3634. Id. at 569. GUAM CRIM. P. CODE § 130.20(a) (1977) provides for initial appeals from
the trial court to the intermediate appellate court. The issue here, however, was "whether any
law authorizes a second appeal, from the District Court to this court." 694 F.2d at 568.
Preliminarily, the Ninth Circuit discussed the scope of the Criminal Appeals Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) and whether it authorized appeals by prosecuting entities other than the
United States. 694 F.2d at 567 n.3. However, the Government of Guam did not claim that
§ 3731 applied in the present case. It appears that the Ninth Circuit was merely reasserting its
interpretation of § 3731 to the United States Supreme Court, which, in an earlier case, had
declined to decide the scope of that section. The Ninth Circuit stated:
This court held in Arizona v. Manypenny, 608 F.2d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 1979), that
section 3731 was "limited by its own terms to appeals by the United States as a
prosecuting entity." The Supreme Court declined to decide whether section 3731
authorizes federal appeals by prosecuting entities other than the United States.
Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 243, n.18, 101 S. Ct. at 1665. In the absence of Supreme
Court instructions to the contrary, we adhere to our former view and hold that section 3731 does not authorize appeals by prosecuting entities such as states and territorial governments.
694 F.2d at 567 n.3.
3635. 694 F.2d at 569.
3636. Id. at 568. The present government of Guam was established by Congress in 1950.
The laws regulating that government are contained in the Organic Act of Guam, 48 U.S.C.
§§ 1421-28 (1976).
3637. 694 F.2d at 569. Section 1424 of the Organic Act of Guam concerns the Guam court
system and to what extent the Guam Legislature can enact laws regulating those courts. The
pertinent part of § 1424(b) states: "The rules . . . promulgated and made effective by the
Supreme Court. . . pursuant to section 2072 of title 28, in civil cases; [and] sections 3771 and
3772 of title 18, in criminal cases; . . . shall apply to the District Court of Guam and to
appeals therefrom .... " 48 U.S.C. § 1424(b) (1976).
3638. 694 F.2d at 569.
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ture has no power to authorize it.36 39 Substantive law defines crimes and
establishes punishments, while procedural law describes the manner in
which the crimes are prosecuted and the punishments are enforced.3"
The Ninth Circuit held that the right to an appeal is a procedural right
and that a restriction on appeals by the government "does not affect the
rules by which courts decide whether the defendant has committed a
crime. It simply limits the Government's ability to continue its prosecution."' 36 41 The court held that since the right to appeal is procedural and
Guam has no authority to legislate procedure, Guam's Criminal Procedure Code cannot provide the authority for a government appeal. 3 42
Since the government could not claim any other statutory authority for
its appeal, the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. 3 " 3
The effect of the Ninth Circuit's decision is clear. The Guam Legislature is not empowered to enact laws controlling procedure in either the
district court or on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether or not the statute involved specifically authorized a government appeal, since the Guam Legislature had no authority to pass such a
statute.
4. Timeliness
Under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence will
not be considered timely unless it is brought within two years after final
judgment. 3 6" A judgment is considered final on the date the appellate
process "is terminated." 3" 5 When an appellate court issues its mandate
of affirmance, the process is terminated. 3 6
In United States v. Cook, 3 4 7 the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that his motion for a new trial, filed more than two years
3639. Id.
3640. Id.
3641. Id.
3642. Id. Guam also argued that as a matter of policy, decisions from their district court
should be reviewable by the Ninth Circuit since the Guam District Court, as a territorial court,
was not created under Article III of the United States Constitution and therefore, the right to
appeal to the Supreme Court is unclear. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, ruling
that such a concern should be addressed to the United States Congress, not the federal courts.
Id. at 569-70. See Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 201 (1977).
3643. 694 F.2d at 570. The government's appeal was initially heard on the merits but subsequently the decision was vacated. Id. at 566.
3644. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
3645. United States v. Cook, 705 F.2d 350, 351 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v.
White, 557 F.2d 1249, 1250 (8th Cir. 1977)).
3646. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 558 (2d ed. 1982).

3647. 705 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1983).
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after his conviction was affirmed, was timely."' 8 The defendant's robbery conviction had been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in June, 1979. A
petition for rehearing was denied, and the court issued its mandate of
affirmance on October 11, 1979. The defendant thereafter sought review
by the United States Supreme Court which denied certiorari on January
14, 1980. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial on December 14,
3 9
1981. 6
The defendant argued that the two year time period under Rule 33
did not begin to run until the date the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3650 According to the defendant, his motion for a new trial would
therefore be timely, with one month to spare. 365 ' The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, however, because the defendant had neither obtained nor sought to obtain a stay of the appellate court's mandate of
affirmance before proceeding to the Supreme Court.3 65 2 Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a mandate may be stayed pending an
appeal to the Supreme Court if a motion is filed. 65 3 The Ninth Circuit
held that without this motion, the action on a petition for certiorari is
unimportant to the issue of timeliness under Rule 33.3654
5. Abatement
If a defendant, convicted of a criminal act, dies before his pending
appeal has been heard, the United States Supreme Court has held that all
proceedings, including the appeal, shall be abated.3 6 5 This rule of abatement was extended by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Oberlin,3 65 6
to include a defendant who died before an appeal had been filed.3 657 The
defendant had committed suicide immediately following sentencing and
an appeal was filed on the deceased's behalf three days later.365 8 The
Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded to the district court
3648. Id. at 351.
3649. Id. at 350.
3650. Id.
3651. Id. at 351.
3652. Id.
3653. FED. R. App. P. 41(b) states in pertinent part: "A stay of mandate pending application to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari may be granted upon motion ..
3654. 705 F.2d at 351.
3655. Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (per curiam) (citing Crooker v.
United States, 325 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1963)). In Durham, the Supreme Court conducted a
survey of various circuits which revealed that the federal courts have expressed a seemingly
unanimous agreement for abatement.
3656. 718 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1983).
3657. Id. at 896.
3658. Id. at 895.
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with instructions to dismiss the indictment.3 65 9
Historically, the reason for the abatement rule was that "crimes...
are buried with the offender." 3 660 Recently, the courts have based their
decisions on the procedural rights of the accused, including the right to
the resolution of an appeal on the merits. 3661 Although Oberin died
before an appeal was filed, he nevertheless possessed the right to appeal. 3662 Like the criminal who dies with an appeal pending, Oberlin was
"denied the resolution of the merits of the case on appeal. ' 3663 The
Ninth Circuit therefore dismissed the appeal.
D. Sentencing
1. Jurisdiction of sentencing authority
In general, once a final judgment or order has been appealed, the
court which rendered the judgment no longer has jurisdiction over any
matters involved in the appeal. 36 " Thus, once a defendant has been sentenced and the sentence has been appealed, the district court lacks juris3659. Id. at 896.
3660. Id. (citing United States v. Dunne, 173 F. 254 (9th Cir. 1909)).
3661. United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977).
3662. 709 F.2d at 896.
In a petition for rehearing, the government claimed that by killing himself, Oberlin
waived his right to appeal. Id. The court did not agree that suicide was "the ultimate waiver."
Furthermore, the court held that the doctrine of waiver is in no way connected with an issue of
abatement. Id.
3663. Id.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the government's contention that abatement does not
apply to a criminal forfeiture proceeding. Id.
3664. In re Matter of Thorpe, 655 F.2d 997, 998 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Moroyoqui v.
United States, 570 F.2d 862, 864 (9th cir. 1977) (once appeal was lodged, district court had no
jurisdiction to proceed with new trial), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997 (1978); Kinard v. Jordan, 175
Cal. 13, 16 (1917) (once appeal from judgment is taken, consent of parties cannot reinvest
lower court with jurisdiction).
The jurisdiction referred to is not statutory, nor is it derived from any mandatory language in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rather, it is "judge-made doctrine
designed to avoid the confusion and waste of time that might flow from putting the same issues
before two courts at the same time." 9 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 203.11,
n.1 (2d ed. 1983). As such, the rule is not without exceptions. See, e.g., Oliver v. Home
Indemnity Co., 470 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1972) (district court modified judgment after appeal had
been filed and court of appeals dismissed appeal on grounds that it was moot). In addition, the
trial court may act to enforce the conditions of a bond under which the defendant has been
released after appeal has been taken (see United States v. Black, 543 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Elkins, 683 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1982)) or, with leave of the appellate court, to
correct inadvertent errors in the record (see FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a); Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608
F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1106 (1982); Perlman v. 322 West SeventySecond Street Co., 127 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1942)).
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diction to entertain a motion to reduce the sentence.3 665 However, the
lower court's jurisdiction is merely stayed while the appeal is pending,
and is resumed when the district court receives the mandate of the court
of appeals.3 66 6
In United States v. Coleman,3 667 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether sentencing occurs on the date of the sentencing hearing or on
the date the sentence is docketed.36 68 In Coleman, the defendant's sentencing hearing had been held prior to the issuance of the appellate
court's mandate disposing of the defendant's appeal. 3669 However, the
defendant's sentence was not entered on the district court docket until
after the appellate court's mandate had been docketed.36 70
Challenging the validity of her sentence, Coleman argued that the
district court had lacked jurisdiction to sentence her because the sentencing hearing, at which she was orally sentenced, had been held while her
appeal was pending in the circuit court.367 1 Rejecting Coleman's contention, the Ninth Circuit held that sentencing takes place when the sentence is docketed.3 67 2 Consequently, the defendant's sentence was valid
because it was docketed subsequent to the appellate court's disposition of
3673
her appeal.
3665. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 214 (1937); United States v. Ramey, 559 F.
Supp. 60, 68 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
3666. See J.MOORE, supra note 3664, at %203.11.
3667. 688 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). The defendant had been convicted of the
robbery of a savings and loan association, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976). The
district court granted the defendant's motion for arrest ofjudgment and judgment of acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict on the basis that the government had failed to prove that the
institution robbed was a federal savings and loan. United States v. Coleman, 656 F.2d 509, 510
(9th Cir. 1981). The government then appealed the grant of the defendant's motion and the
Ninth Circuit reversed and reinstated the jury verdict. Id. at 512. The present action ensued.
3668. 688 F.2d at 663.
3669. Id. at 664. The sentencing hearing was held on November 30, 1981, and the mandate
disposing of the defendant's appeal did not issue until December 2, 1981. Id.
3670. Id. The appellate court's mandate was docketed on December 8, 1981; the defendant's
sentence was docketed on December 14, 1981. Id.
3671. Id.
3672. Id. The court particularly noted three factors which indicate that the docketing date,
rather than the date of the sentencing hearing, is the sentencing date: (1) the 10-day period
during which an appeal may be filed begins to run upon entry of judgment on the docket;
(2) the Third Circuit has held that the activity which is prohibited while an appeal is pending is
the entry of judgment (see District 65 v. McKague, 216 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 1954)); and
(3) a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 may be heard and
denied while the appeal is pending, but may not be granted until after remand. 688 F.2d at
664. However, the court also noted that Coleman's counsel had agreed to proceed with the
sentencing hearing prior to the appellate court's disposition of Coleman's appeal. Id.
3673. 688 F.2d at 664. The court observed that "[w]hile the district court's practice in this
case is not preferred, . . . the district court had jurisdiction to sentence when the mandate
from the circuit was docketed in the district court." Id.
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2.

Presentence information

A defendant is entitled to be apprised of adverse information relied
upon by the sentencing judge when imposing sentence.36 74 However, if
adverse information is neither presented to the sentencing judge nor relied upon by the judge in passing sentence, the information need not be
disclosed to the defendant.3 67 5
In Baumann v. United States,367 6 the Ninth Circuit addressed the
disclosure requirements concerning presentence information about the
defendant provided by the government to the sentencing authority. Baumann claimed that a letter from an Assistant United States Attorney,

which discussed Baumann's prospects for rehabilitation and recommended that parole not be granted, was a "presentence report" within

the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

32(c). 3677

He argued

3674. See United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1975) (imposition of sentence
based on allegations in confidential reports was improper when defendant was denied access to
reports). Section 404(a) of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (Approved Draft 1968) provides: "Fundamental fairness to the defendant requires that the substance of all derogatory information
which adversely affects his interests and which has not otherwise been disclosed in open court
should be called to the attention of the defendant, his attorney, and others who are acting on
his behalf."
The defendant's right to inspect the adverse information in a presentence report has been
held to be absolute, except as to the recommendation of sentence which is clearly excluded by
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(c). United States v. Woody, 567 F.2d 1353, 1361 (5th
Cir.) (defendant has constitutional right to test accuracy of any statement relied upon by judge
in sentencing), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 908 (1978). For the text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c), see
infra note 3677.
3675. United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1348-49 (9th Cir.) (letter from non-party containing no factual information or opinion as to sentence and not relied upon by sentencing
judge not required to be disclosed to defendant before sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 920 (1981); United States v. Read, 534 F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1976) (disclosure of information obtained by judge prior to sentencing not required if judge has good reason for nondisclosure, so long as judge does not rely on information in sentencing).
3676. 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982). Baumann was convicted on four counts of mail fraud
and aiding and abetting a corporation which was engaged in a fraudulent land sale contract
scheme. He was fined $1000 and received a total sentence of ten years imprisonment, which
was later reduced to five years. Id. at 569.
3677. Id. at 573. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) provides in part:
(1) . . . The probation service of the court shall make a presentence investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence. . . unless, with the
permission of the court, the defendant waives a presentence investigation and report
The report shall not be submitted to the court or its contents disclosed to anyone
unless the defendant has pleaded guilty. . . or has been found guilty, except that a
judge may, with the written consent of the defendant, inspect a presentence report at
any time.

(3) * **

t o
(A) Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the defend-
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that because the letter was not disclosed to him or his attorney, Rule
3 67 8
32(c)(3)(A) had been violated and his sentence was therefore invalid.
The court rejected this argument for two reasons.
First, the letter was never submitted to the court nor relied upon by
the judge in passing sentence. 6 79 In addition, the letter was not a
"presentence report," but rather a communication to the Parole Commission. 36 ° The defendant, therefore, was not entitled to relief on the
ground that he was not apprised of the contents of the letter.3 6 81

The Ninth Circuit will vacate a sentence on appeal if the judge relied
on false or unreliable information when sentencing. 6 8 2 In United States
v. Ruster, 683 the defendant challenged his sentence claiming that the
judge had relied on misinformation when imposing the sentence. 6 8 4 The
defendant had been convicted, under 18 U.S.C. section 287,685 on six

counts of filing fraudulent social security applications and making false
disability claims thereunder.3 686 The trial court levied the maximum fine
and sentenced the defendant to three consecutive five-year prison terms
and five years of probation.

The record showed that the sentencing judge believed that Ruster
would be eligible for parole after serving forty-eight months of his
term.36 87 However, Ruster would not be eligible, under the parole
ant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the presentence investigation exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence . . . . [Tihe court shall
afford the defendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon and, at the
discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any
alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the presentence report.
3678. 692 F.2d at 573.
3679. Id.
3680. Id.
3681. Id. at 574. Judge Pregerson agreed with the majority on this issue. Id. at 582 (Pregerson, J.,concurring and dissenting).
3682. United States v. Williams, 668 F.2d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant's right to
due process is violated when judge determines sentence using "materially false or unreliable"
information); Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1987) (defendant's motion to vacate denied where judge was apprised of both defendant's and prosecutor's view of
facts and it was not clear that challenged information was the basis of sentence); United States
v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971) (sentence vacated where district court relied on
information in presentence report and no information was provided to corroborate serious
charges made therein), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
3683. 712 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1983).
3684. Id. at 412.
3685. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976) provides in part: "Whoever makes or presents. . . any claim
upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to
be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
3686. 712 F.2d at 410.
3687. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the probation officer stated that Ruster
would be eligible for parole after serving 48 to 60 months of his sentence, partially confirming

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY

rule, 3688 until after he had served at least one-third of his prison term, or
sixty months. The Ninth Circuit held that the judge's understanding of
the parole rule was incorrect, and the record clearly showed that he relied on that misunderstanding when sentencing. 368 9 The court therefore
3690
vacated Ruster's sentence and remanded for resentencing.
3. Judge's discretion
a. automatic or arbitrarysentences
Generally, a sentence within statutory limits is not subject to review
on appeal. 3 69 1 However, if it appears that the sentencing court abused its
discretion or failed to exercise discretion, the sentence will be subject to
limited review. 3692
In United States v. Lopez-Gonzales,3 69 3 for example, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court had failed to exercise its discre-

tion by mechanically imposing the maximum sentence following the
defendant's conviction for felony illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C.

section 1325.3694 Although the defendant was permitted to present mitithe judge's misunderstanding that the defendant would be eligible for parole after 48 months.
Id. at 412.
3688. The federal parole rule is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976) which provides in
part: "Whenever confined and serving a definite term or terms of more than one year, a prisoner shall be eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of such term or terms. .. "
3689. The court rejected the prosecution's argument that the misinformation was not materially false enough to require vacating the sentence, holding that, in a sentence the length of
Ruster's, the difference between serving four years and five years in prison before becoming
eligible for parole is material. 712 F.2d at 412-13.
3690. Id. at 413.
3691. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974); United States v. Chiago, 699
F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 171 (1983); United States v. Garrett, 680
F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
3692. United States v. Lasky, 592 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mejias, 552
F.2d 435, 447 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 847 (1977); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881,
893 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); United States v. Wilkinson, 513 F.2d 227, 234
(7th Cir. 1975).
In California, the determination that a judge has abused his or her sentencing discretion
requires a "clear showing that [the] sentencing decision was arbitrary or irrational." People v.
Giminez, 14 Cal. 3d 68, 72, 534 P.2d 65, 67, 120 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579 (1975). The District of
Columbia Circuit has found review proper when the sentencing judge relied on improper or
inaccurate information, the defendant was not represented by counsel at sentencing, a stiffer
sentence was imposed because the defendant asserted his innocence at trial, the prosecutor
violated his agreement not to allocute at sentencing, or the judge failed to exercise discretion.
United States v. Stoddard, 553 F.2d 1385, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
3693. 688 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982).
3694. Id. at 1276. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immi-
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gating evidence prior to sentencing, 3695 the record suggested that the trial
judge had ignored Lopez-Gonzales' evidence as well as any other individual circumstances relating to the defendant's case.369 6 Instead, the judge

had automatically imposed the maximum sentence.
The government offered two arguments on appeal in support of the
trial court's sentence. The government first argued that the sentence
should be upheld because the defendant was given the opportunity to
present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. 3697 However, the

court rejected this argument because, even though the defendant was
given the opportunity to present evidence of mitigating circumstances,
the judge had failed to consider the evidence.3 69 8
The government next argued that the trial judge had exercised discretion but merely omitted to state on the record that he had taken the
defendant's individual circumstances into account. The government implied that requiring a sentencing judge to state that he or she has exercised discretion is to compel the performance of a "hollow ritual. ' 36 99
The Ninth Circuit also rejected this argument, stating that the rule re-

quiring the trial court to exercise discretion ensures the performance of a
judicial obligation to weigh mitigating and aggravating circumstances
before imposing sentence.370 " Thus, requiring the sentencing judge to

make clear in the record that he exercised discretion is not a "hollow
ritual. 3 7° 1 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that the district judge
failed to exercise discretion by automatically imposing the maximum sen372
tence, and remanded the case for resentencing. 1
gration officers, or (3) obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation . . . [commits a misdemeanor, and] . . . for a subsequent
commission of any such offenses shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by a fine
of not more than $5,000, or both.
The defendant was apprehended after fleeing from a border patrol agent while driving an
automobile in which several other illegal aliens were concealed. After a bench trial and conviction, the defendant was sentenced to the maximum term of two years imprisonment. 688
F.2d at 1276.
3695. Lopez-Gonzales argued, as mitigating factors, that his "prior record was insignificant," his flight from the border patrol agent differed from the "ordinary flight and pursuit
scenario involving high speed dangerous chases," and that no one was injured as a result of his
actions. Further, he "expressed remorse for fleeing" and stated that "all he wanted to do was
return to Mexico and live quietly with his family." 688 F.2d at 1276.
3696. Id. The judge stated that his established policy, with respect to cases of illegal entry
involving flight and pursuit, was to impose the maximum sentence upon conviction. Id.
3697. Id. at 1277.
3698. Id.
3699. Id.
3700. Id. at 1276-77.
3701. Id. at 1277.
3702. Id. In so holding, the court followed its own precedent. See Verdugo v. United States,

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

In United States v. Ismond,37 °3 the defendant also challenged his
sentence on the ground that the judge had mechanically imposed sentence. The defendant had pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful reentry
after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. section 1 3 2 6 .3704 Contrary
to the lenient sentence recommended by the government in exchange for
the guilty plea,37 °5 the judge imposed a two-year term of imprisonment.
The record suggested that the sentence had been mechanically imposed
because the judge had stated that each time the defendant was apprehended in Washington and appeared before him, he would impose a twoyear sentence.370 6
370 7
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Ismond from Lopez-Gonzales
402 F.2d 599, 611 (9th Cir. 1968) (in order to obtain accurate evaluation of the offender,
sentencing judge has broad scope of inquiry), cert denied,402 U.S. 961 (1971). The court also
noted that automatically imposing sentence is contrary to the public policy favoring evaluation
of each defendant according to individual circumstances. Lopez-Gonzales, 688 F.2d at 1277.
This principle has also been applied in other circuits. See, eg., United States v. Sparrow, 673
F.2d 862, 866 (5th Cir. 1982) (sentencing procedure at which defendant was denied opportunity to offer mitigating evidence contradicted policy in favor of individualizing sentences);
Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 144 (8th Cir. 1973) (automatic imposition of maximum prison term on conscientious objector clearly conflicts with Supreme Court sentencing
guidelines on individual sentencing); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir.
1971) (mechanical imposition of five-year sentences on all conscientious objectors demonstrates "inflexible practice in sentencing contradic[ting] the judicially approved policy in favor
of 'individualizing sentences' "); United States v. McCoy, 429 F.2d 739, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(judge's policy of imposing sentence entirely by reference to crime committed is not an exercise
of discretion).
3703. 704 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1983).
3704. Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976) provides in part:
Any alien who(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, unless
' * * the Attorney General has expressly consented. . . shall be guilty of a felony,
and upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not more than two
yers, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
The defendant, who had a drinking problem, had been deported from the United States in
1973. He resided near the United States-Canada border. On the night of his arrest, he had
taken a taxi across the border into the United States and had gone to a tavern, where he
became intoxicated. Later, local police officers noticed the defendant and reported his presence to the dispatcher, stating their intention to send him back to Canada. A border patrol
agent listening to the transmission recognized Ismond's name and, remembering Ismond's earlier deportation, had him detained. 704 F.2d at 1156.
3705. In exchange for Ismond's guilty plea, the government had recommended that he "be
deported on unsupervised probation [on condition that] he not return to the United States
without official approval for five years." 704 F.2d at 1156.
3706. Id. The judge also expressed his concern that, if not punished, the defendant would
feel free to enter the United States with impunity and commit crimes, or cause crimes to be
committed, in the United States. The judge based his concern on the defendant's prior record.
Id.
3707. United States v. Lopez-Gonzales, 688 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 3693702 and accompanying text.
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because the judge in Ismond had considered the defendant's individual

circumstances. 37°8 The court explained that Lopez-Gonzales forbids a
court from mechanically imposing a specific sentence on all members of a

certain class of offenders. However, it does not forbid a court from imposing the same sentence on a particular offender every time he commits
a particular offense. 370 9 The court affirmed the sentence, noting that it

would be exceeding its authority in overruling a sentencing decision
when the record clearly showed that the trial court had exercised
discretion.3 7 10
37 11 the Ninth Circuit considIn United States v. Medina-Cervantes,
ered whether the defendant's sentence resulted from an unconstitutional
exercise of the trial court's sentencing discretion. Certain statements
made by the sentencing judge implied that he had imposed the maximum

sentence, not as a sanction for the crime committed, but to punish the
defendant for having asserted his sixth amendment right to a jury
trial.37 12 Although the sentence was within the statutory range, the
Ninth Circuit found that the trial judge's language clearly gave rise to an
inference of impropriety which the record failed to dispel. Consequently,

in order to avoid any "chilling effect" on a defendant's exercise of his
right to a jury trial, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the
3 713
case for resentencing.
3708. 704 F.2d at 1157.
3709. Id.
3710. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, questioned the wisdom of this sentence, noting the
somewhat innocent circumstances of the offense, as well as the fact that the defendant would
impose a burden on American taxpayers during his two-year prison term. Id. at 1156-57.
However, since the trial judge did exercise discretion, the court lacked authority to overrule
the sentence "even though the [trial] court may have exercised its discretion in a manner that
does not commend itself to a panel of appellate judges." Id. at 1157.
3711. 690 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1982). The defendant was convicted of illegal entry and illegal
reentry into the United States after having been deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 and
1326. See supra notes 3694 & 3704. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined
$1000 for each violation, the sentences to run concurrently. 690 F.2d at 716.
3712. The trial judge had stated that Medina-Cervantes had "a lot to lose," implying that
imposition of the maximum penalty was a consequence of his insistence on a jury trial. The
judge further stated that, in his view, the defendant was "just thumbing his nose at our judicial
system." 690 F.2d at 716. The judge also itemized the costs of the defendant's jury trial and
stated that the purpose in imposing the maximum fine was to reimburse the government for
those costs. Id. at 716-17.
3713. Id. at 717. In so holding, the court relied on United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186
(9th Cir.) (an accused may not be subject to more severe punishment because of exercising his
right to jury trial and court must not create appearance of such practice), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
948 (1973).
In a footnote, the court explained that defense attorneys would be reluctant to advise their
clients to go to trial if the defendant could be punished more severely as a result of exercising
this right. Such an attitude by attorneys would result in "chilling" the exercise of a defend-
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b.

disparatesentences for co-defendants

A sentencing court has discretion to impose disparate sentences

upon co-defendants provided that the court explains its reasons for doing
so and does not otherwise abuse its discretion.3 7 14 The Ninth Circuit
recently affirmed this principle in United States v. Chiago.371 5 After
pleading guilty to first-degree murder and robbery, Chiago was given
consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for murder and twenty-five
years imprisonment for robbery. 371 6 However, his three co-defendants
each received one term of life imprisonment. The record showed that

Chiago played a more brutal part in committing the murder than his codefendants.37 17
Chiago argued that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing
a more severe sentence on him than it had imposed on his co-defendants.3 7 18 The court rejected Chiago's argument and upheld his sentence,
ant's right to trial, a right which is constitutionally guaranteed and for the exercise of which no
defendant should fear penalty. 690 F.2d at 716 n.3.
3714. See, eg., United States v. Garrett, 680 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1982) (disparity in sentences
imposed on co-defendants does not by itself indicate abuse of discretion); United States v.
Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1979) (an explanation is required when court imposes disparate sentences, but not formal statement of reasons).
3715. 699 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 171 (1983).
3716. Id. at 1013. Chiago was convicted of first-degree murder under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and
1153, and of robbing a postal employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2112 and 2114. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1111 (1982) provides in part:
(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or
attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human
being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976) provides in part: "Any Indian who commits against the person or
property of another Indian or other person. . . murder. . . shall be subject to the same laws
and penalties as all other persons ..
" 18 U.S.C. § 2112 (1976) provides in part: "Whoever
robs another of any kind or description of personal property belonging to the United States,
shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years." Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1976) provides in
part:
Whosoever assaults any person having lawful charge, control, or custody of any
mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States, with intent to
rob, steal, or purloin such mail matter, money, or other property of the United
States, or robs any such person [of such property] shall. . . if in effecting or attempting to effect such robbery he wounds the person having custody of [such property], or
puts his life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon. . . be imprisoned twenty-five
years.
3717. 699 F.2d at 1013. In imposing sentence, the trial judge stated that Chiago "committed
physical and abusive assaults on [the victim],. . . repeatedly stabbed her,. . . showed a total
lack of concern for her, and . . . demonstrated a wanton and depraved spirit of mind [and
was] bent on evil without regard as to its consequences." Id.
3718. Id. at 1014. Chiago's counsel declined to advance this argument in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (court appointed counsel on appeal may, if he or she
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noting that the trial court took individual circumstances into account
when it sentenced each defendant, explained its reasons for imposing disparate sentences, and did not otherwise abuse its discretion.3 7 19
c. Rule 35 motions
Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
a sentencing court has discretion to reduce a sentence either by reducing
the term of incarceration or by granting probation within 120 days after
the sentence becomes final.3 720
3 72 1 the Ninth Circuit held that a trial
In United States v. Carter,
court's discretion under Rule 35(b) to reduce a sentence from incarceration to probation does not apply to rape convictions. 22 Carter was convicted of rape and sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 4205(b)(2).37 23 After the Ninth Circuit
affirmed his conviction, Carter moved for a reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b). The district court granted the motion, reducing the
defendant's sentence to four months in a treatment center and four years
and eight months probation.

3724

In a motion to correct the sentence, the government argued that 18
U.S.C. section 36513725 does not allow probation for a rape conviction
finds client's case or argument to be "wholly frivolous," after thorough examination and after
preparing brief containing such support for appeal as counsel can muster, request permission
to withdraw from appeal). 699 F.2d at 1014 n.2.
3719. 699 F.2d at 1014.
3720. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) provides in pertinent part:
The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed or
probation is revoked, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate
issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days
after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or
having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction. . . . Changing a sentence
from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation shall constitute a permissible
reduction of sentence under this subdivision.
3721. 704 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1983). The defendant was convicted of rape under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2031 (1976) which provides: "Whoever. . . commits rape shall suffer death, or imprisonment for any term of yers or for life."
3722. 704 F.2d at 1064.
3723. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1976) provides in part: "Upon entering ajudgment of conviction,
(2) the court may fix the maximum sentence of imprisonment to be served in which event
the court may specify that the prisoner may be released on parole at such time as the Commission may determine."
3724. 704 F.2d at 1063.
3725. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides that "[u]pon entering a judgment of conviction of
any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction . . .
may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation."
(emphasis added).
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because rape is punishable by life imprisonment.37 2 6 The court granted
the government's motion and modified the sentence to thirty months imprisonment with eligibility for parole beginning after six months.3 72 7
On appeal, the defendant argued that Rule 35(b) permits the reduction of a sentence of imprisonment to probation for a rape conviction,
notwithstanding the contrary provision of section 365 1.3728 The court
rejected the defendant's argument, holding that section 3651 limits the
scope of the district court's discretion under Rule 35(b).3 7 2 9 As a result,
the court affirmed the granting of the government's motion to correct the
defendant's illegal sentence.3 730

A sentencing court's decision against holding a hearing on a Rule 35

motion will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.3 73 x In United
States v. Holt,3 73 2 the appellant contended that the district court was required to hold a hearing on his Rule 35 motion, and had failed to do
3733
However, the defendant did not demonstrate that the district
SO.

judge abused his discretion by ruling on the motion without a hearing. 3734 The court rejected the defendant's claim, holding that its author3726. 704 F.2d at 1063-64.
3727. Id. at 1064. The modified sentence was imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1976),
which provides in part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court . . . may (1) designate in the
sentence of imprisonment imposed a minimum term at the expiration of which the
prisoner shall become eligible for parole, which term may be less than but shall not
be more than one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the court ....
3728. 704 F.2d at 1064. The defendant relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976) which nullifies all
laws not consistent with federal rules. The court noted that § 3771 would nullify § 3651 if
§ 3651 were in conflict with Rule 35(b), but found it doubtful that such a conflict exists. Id. A
more reasonable interpretation suggests that § 3651 is a limitation on the court's Rule 35(b)
probation granting power. Id.
3729. Id. The Fifth Circuit agrees with this position. See United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d
1143, 1146 (5th Cir. 1979) (district court exceeded its authority by ordering probation for
defendants convicted of offense punishable by life imprisonment). The Cartercourt also noted
that even if 18 U.S.C. § 3771 did nullify 18 U.S.C. § 3651, the trial court's decision would be
upheld because FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e) repeats the § 3651 provision that probation may not be
granted for offenses punishable by life imprisonment. Since § 3771 applies only to the nullification of laws, not of federal rules, the government's motion would also have been properly
granted under Rule 32(e). 704 F.2d at 1064.
3730. 704 F.2d at 1064.
3731. See United States v. Jones, 490 F.2d 207, 208 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (Rule 35 motions
"are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court" and no hearing is required), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974). See also United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.
1973); United States v. Krueger, 454 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
3732. 704 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
3733. Id.
3734. Id. The court stated that the record appeared to be complete and it did not appear
that additional useful information would have been derived from an oral hearing on the motion. Id.
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ity to reverse is conditional on a showing of abuse by the trial court. 3 7 3 5

Accordingly, although it expressed uneasiness at the lack of a hearing,
the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's order denying the defend3 73 6
ant's motion.

4. Resentencing
a. on remand
In most cases, the original sentencing judge resentences the defendant when resentencing is required.37 3 7 Remanding to a different judge for

resentencing is appropriate only in unusual circumstances.3738 To determine whether a case should be remanded to a different judge for resentencing, the Ninth Circuit uses a three-part test adopted in United States
v. Arnett.3739 The court looks to (1) whether the original judge would
reasonably be expected to approach resentencing with an unbiased atti-

tude, (2) whether reassignment would be advisable in order to preserve
the appearance of justice, and (3) whether any resulting waste or duplication of effort would outweigh the appearance of fairness gained.3 740
In a recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. MedinaCervantes,37 4 ' the defendant requested that the court remand his case to a
different judge for resentencing. 374 2 The original judge had sentenced the
defendant to the maximum statutory penalty under circumstances which
gave rise to an inference of injustice.3 74 3 The Ninth Circuit applied the
Arnett test and concluded that there was no reason to believe that the
3744
original judge would be unable to proceed properly in resentencing.
3735. Id. The court relied on United States v. Krueger, 454 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) (no hearing or oral argument required on Rule 35 motions).
3736. 704 F.2d at 1140. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Holt from United States v. Ginzburg, 398 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,403 U.S. 931 (1971), in which the appellant had
been convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958) (prohibiting distribution of pornography by mail). The interpretation of § 1461 was subsequently altered on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Ginzburg, the Third Circuit found that, in light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the sentencing statute, a hearing was necessary to allow Ginzburg to present any new evidence which
might bear on his sentence. 398 F.2d at 56. No such change in substantive law had occurred
which would require a hearing for Holt. 704 F.2d at 1140.
3737. United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1981) (usually, resentencing is
done by original sentencing judge).
3738. United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1979).
3739. 628 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979).
3740. Id. at 1165.
3741. 690 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1982). See also supra text accompanying notes 3711-13.
3742. 690 F.2d at 717.
3743. See supra text accompanying note 3712.
3744. 690 F.2d at 717.
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The court added, however, that under the circumstances of the case, the
district judge should state the basis for the new sentence he imposed in

order to preserve the appearance of justice.374

Furthermore, the Ninth

Circuit stated that remanding to the same judge would preserve judicial
resources. The court, therefore, denied the defendant's request and remanded to the original judge. 7 46
37 47 the defendant challenged the sentence
In United States v. Hagler,

imposed on him after the Ninth Circuit had remanded for resentencing.
Convicted on thirteen of twenty counts of credit card fraud,37 48 Hagler

was originally sentenced to one year in prison on count fifteen and fined
$1000. He was further ordered to make restitution in the amount of
$77,000. Sentences on the remaining counts were suspended, conditioned on five years probation. 74 9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed five of the counts, including
count fifteen, and remanded for resentencing.375 0 Hagler was then resentenced on count sixteen to the identical sentence he had earlier received

on count fifteen with similar provisions for probation, restitution, and
concurrent sentences on the other counts.37 5 1
On his second appeal, Hagler first argued that the resentencing
amounted to vindictiveness in violation of his due process rights. 375 2 The
court rejected this argument, distinguishing North Carolinav. Pearce.37 53

The court observed that there was no net increase in Hagler's punishment, and found no suggestion of vindictiveness in the record.3 754
3745. Id.
3746. Id. The court also noted that the district judge could refer the case to another judge
for resentencing if he thought it appropriate to do so. Id. at n.5.
3747. 709 F.2d 578 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 282 (1983).
3748. Id. at 579. Hagler was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) which provides in
part: "Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. . . [uses the United
States mails]. . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both."
3749. 709 F.2d at 579.
3750. See United States v. Hagler, 708 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
3751. 709 F.2d at 579.
3752. Id.
3753. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In Pearce, the Court held that there is no absolute bar to an
increase in sentence; however, a harsher sentence may not stand if it is the result of vindictiveness. Id. at 723-24. "[Vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his
first conviction must play not part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. . . . [D]ue
process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation
.... " Id. at 725. In Pearce,a harsher sentence was imposed after retrial, with nothing in the
record to explain the augmentation of sentence. In Hagler,the same sentence was imposed on
remand, with nothing in the record to suggest a vindictive motive.
3754. 709 F.2d at 579. The court stated that the sense of the district judge's order was to
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Hagler next contended that, on the first appeal, the Ninth Circuit

had no right to remand for resentencing on counts which had not been
contested in that appeal.37 55 The court responded that the defendant had
placed the entire judgment in issue when he appealed, and had not objected when the government sought to vacate the entire sentence.37 56
The court held that under 28 U.S.C. section 21061711 the remand was
within the scope of the court's authority.3 75 8
b.

creditingprior time in custody

Section 3568 of 18 U.S.C. contains the federal sentencing policy
with respect to credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing.3 75 9 If

a prisoner has served any prior time in custody in connection with the
offense for which sentence is imposed, that time should be credited by the
Attorney General to the sentence term.3 7 °
In Granger v. United States,37 6 1 the defendant brought a motion
under 28 U.S.C. section 22553762 seeking modification of his sentence be-

cause the Bureau of Prisons had failed to credit him for time previously
served.3 76 3 The defendant had been sentenced to five years for bank rob-

bery, six months of which he was to serve in custody. Execution of the
remaining four and one-half years was suspended beginning the date the

defendant was released from prison. 376 After the defendant had served
create a "balanced package" of measures tailored to the treatment of this particular defendant.
Id.
3755. Id.
3756. Id. The court held that Hagler had "placed the entire judgment in issue by the inclusiveness of his notice of appeal." Id. Furthermore, the government had stated in its brief that
it "sought to have the entire sentence vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing," but
Hagler did not file a reply nor seek a rehearing on the matter. Id.
3757. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976) provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify,
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought
before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may
be just under the circumstances.
3758. 709 F.2d at 579.
3759. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1976) provides in part:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence
to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such
person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.
3760. Id.
3761. 688 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
3762. For a discussion of § 2255 motions, see infra notes 3885-95 and accompanying text.
3763. 688 F.2d at 1296.
3764. Id.
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the six months and had been released on probation, he violated one of the
conditions of his probation. After revoking the defendant's probation,
the district court sentenced him to three years in prison.3 76 5
The Bureau of Prisons failed to credit Granger with the six months
he had served before the probationary period began. The Ninth Circuit
stated that, unless the record indicates otherwise, any time that a convicted defendant has spent in custody on the same charge before sentence
was imposed is presumed to have been credited by the sentencing
judge.37 66 The record in Grangerdid not show that credit was not given.
Thus, the Bureau of Prisons acted properly in presuming that the district
court had already taken the six-month period of custody into account,

since it had sentenced Granger to only three of the remaining four and
one-half years. 376 7 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of Granger's section 2255 motion.3 7 68
5.

Consecutive sentences

Unless otherwise indicated by the language or legislative history of a

statute, imposing multiple punishments for a single illegal act or transaction violates the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.3769
The Supreme Court, in Albernaz v. United States,3770 recently reaffirmed
3 7 71
the Blockburger
test for determining when consecutive sentences for
two statutory offenses are proper. The rule states that when the same act
or transaction violates two distinct statutory provisions, the test for determining whether one or two offenses have been committed is "whether
3765. Id.
3766. Id. at 1297. The court relied on its decision in Myers v. United States, 446 F.2d 232,
234 (9th Cir. 1971), in which the court held that "in any situation where, as a matter of
mechanical calculation, credit could have been given within the terms of the maximum [sentence] possible, the court would conclusively presume that such was done."
3767. 688 F.2d at 1297. When he denied Granger's § 2255 motion, the district court judge
stated that had he known the more lenient three-year sentence he imposed would create confusion under § 3568, he would have specified that Granger was to serve a total of three and onehalf years imprisonment. Id.
3768. Id. The Ninth Circuit suggested that the district court should have explicitly considered the amount of time Granger had previously served. Id.
3769. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) (court, unless authorized by Congress, may not impose multiple punishments); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 42 (2d
Cir.) ("if Congress intended multiple punishments for the same act or transaction, imposition
of such sentences is not a constitutional violation"), cert denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982); United
States v. Sperling, 560 F.2d 1050, 1056 (2d Cir. 1977) (when congressional intent is not explicit, multiple punishments may not be imposed).
3770. 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981).
3771. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The rule will be referred to herein
as the "Blockburger test."
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each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."3 77
In United States v. Goodheim, 3773 the Ninth Circuit applied the
Blockburger test to determine whether the defendant had improperly re-

ceived consecutive sentences. The defendant, an ex-felon, was convicted
of receiving a firearm shipped in interstate commerce 3774 and of making
a
3 775

false statement in connection with the acquisition of that firearm.
Each count concerned the same firearm. 3776 The defendant received sep3777
arate sentences for each violation, the sentences to run consecutively.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the consecutive sentences were

imposed in violation of the double jeopardy clause because his acts constituted only one offense.377 8 Applying the Blockburger test, the court

held that the offenses charged against Goodheim are separate offenses
because each requires proof of a fact not required to establish the other
offense. 3779 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that imposition of consecutive sentences was lawful.3 780
In a recent case of first impression, United States v. Coleman, 3781 the

Ninth Circuit considered whether consecutive sentences may be imposed
for making and transferring a single destructive device in violation of
3772. Id. at 304.
3773. 686 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1982).
3774. Goodheim'was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976), which provides in
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
3775. Goodheim was also convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1976), which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful(6) for any person in connection with the acquisition. . . of any firearm or
ammunition [from a person licensed to deal in firearms]. . . knowingly to make any
false or fictitious oral or written statement . . . intended or likely to deceive.. .
with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale.
3776. 686 F.2d at 780.
3777. Id.
3778. Id. at 779.
3779. Id. at 780. For example, the court noted that the defendant could have received the
firearm without making a false statement about it and he could have made a false statement in
connection with its acquisition without ever receiving it. Id. (quoting United States v. Gardner, 605 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1979)).
3780. Id.
3781. 707 F.2d 374 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 171 (1983).
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sections 5861(e) and (f) of the National Firearms Act.37 2 The defendant
was convicted on nine counts relating to a conspiracy to commit murder

and to recover fraudulently life insurance proceeds.378 3 In furtherance of
the conspiracy, Coleman forged the victim's signature on life insurance

applications and constructed two Molotov cocktail firebombs. He gave
the bombs to two accomplices for use in killing the victim and the victim's business partner.

Coleman was convicted of both making and transferring a bomb
without complying with the provisions of the Act. On appeal, Coleman
claimed that making and transferring the firebombs was a single transaction, for which multiple punishments were impermissible absent specific
378 4
congressional intent.
Relying on decisions in the Fourth37 85 and Eighth 3786 Circuits, the
court held that making and transferring a dangerous device under 26
U.S.C. section 5861 constitute separate acts because neither is incidental
3782. Id. at 378-80. For text of § 5861(e) & (f) of the National Firearms Act, see infra note
3783.
3783. Id. at 375. Five counts were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 for mail fraud with the
remaining four counts relating to various violations of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5801-5872 (1976). Id. at 375-76. Coleman contested his sentences on the four counts
brought under §§ 5861, 5822, 5871 and 5812 of the National Firearms Act. The National
Firearms Act is concerned with the registration and payment of taxes on firearms and other
dangerous devices. The pertinent provisions of § 5861 are: "It shall be unlawful for any person. . . (e) to transfer a firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or (f) to make a
firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter." Section 5822 provides in part:
No person shall make a firearm unless he has (a) filed with the Secretary a written
application, in duplicate, to make and register the firearm. . . ; (b) paid any tax
payable on the making . . . ; (c) identified the firearm to be made ... ;
(d) identified himself. . . ; and (e) obtained the approval of the Secretary to make
and register the firearm and the application form shows such approval.
Section 5871 provides in part: "Any person who violates. . . this chapter shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or be imprisoned not more than ten years, or both
." Section 5812 provides in part:
(a) A firearm shall not be transferred unless (1) the transferor of the firearm has
filed with the Secretary a written application, in duplicate, for the transfer and registration of the firearm. . . ; (2) any tax payable on the transfer is paid. . . ; (3) the
transferee is identified . . . ; (4) the transferor of the firearm is identified . . . ;
(5) the firearm is identified. . . ; and (6) the application form shows that the Secretary has approved the transfer and the registration of the firearm to the transferee.
3784. 707 F.2d at 379.
3785. United States v. Kaplan, 588 F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1978) ("making and transferring an
illegal firearm are separate and independent crimes, not incidental to one another, and permit
separate sentences"), modified on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Seidel, 620 F.2d
1006 (4th Cir. 1980).
3786. United States v. Kiliyan, 504 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1974) ("unlawful making and
unlawful transfer [of a destructive device] are separate, non-merged offenses" for which consecutive sentences are permissible), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 949 (1975).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

to the other. 378 7 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the separate natures of

the two acts posed separate dangers which, when combined, greatly increased the danger to the victims. 3788 Because the acts were separate,

imposition of separate, consecutive sentences was held proper.3789
In United States v. Thornton,37 90 the defendant claimed the district
court had exceeded its authority by ordering that sentences imposed for
violations of the National Firearms Act run consecutively to a state sentence the defendant was then serving. 3791 The court regarded the defendant's argument as an attempt to extend to consecutive sentencing the rule
that a federal court cannot order a federal sentence to run concurrently
with a state sentence. 3792 The court rejected the attempt.
3787. 707 F.2d at 380. As in Goodheim, see supra notes 3773-80 and accompanying text, the
defendant could have done one act without doing the other, i.e., he could have made the
bombs without transferring them or vice-versa.
In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed two Ninth Circuit cases, United States v.
Clements, 471 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1972) and United States v. Edick, 603 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1979), both of which addressed the imposition of multiple sentences for violations of different
provisions of the National Firearms Act. In Clements, the defendant was convicted of the
three separate offenses of making, possessing and failing to pay taxes on an unregistered firearm. The Ninth Circuit held that these acts constituted a single transaction because the maker
of a firearm necessarily possesses it. 471 F.2d at 1254, 1257. The court in Clements stated that
unless the legislative history gave a clear indication that Congress intended to authorize multiple punishments for a single transaction, a sentencing authority would be subject to the tenyear sentence limitation set forth in 26 U.S.C. s 5871 (1976), for any single act or transaction,
even if the offensive behavior violated more than one provision of the Act. 471 F.2d at 1254.
26 U.S.C. § 5871 (1976) provides for a maximum often years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both
for a violation of any provision of the Act.
In Edick, the Ninth Circuit refined the Clements rule, considering whether the rule prohibits consecutive sentences per se for single act violations, or just those consecutive sentences
which in the aggregate exceed the ten-year maximum sentence for each violation of the Act.
603 F.2d at 773-74. The court held that consecutive sentences are prohibited when individual
counts arise from the same act, whether or not the combined length of the consecutive
sentences would exceed ten years. Id. at 775.
The Edick decision has not been the rule in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. See United
States v. Kaplan, 588 F.2d 71, 74-75 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1978); Rollins v. United States, 543 F.2d
574, 575 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (consecutive sentences which together exceed the statutory ten-year maximum violate congressional intent).
The Coleman court distinguished both Clements and Edick because those cases were concerned only with single transaction violations and Coleman's violations were clearly separate
acts. 707 F.2d at 380.
3788. 707 F.2d at 380.
3789. Id.
3790. 710 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1983).
3791. Id. at 515. Thornton was convicted of possessing a firearm without a serial number
and possessing an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and (i). He was
given two five-year concurrent sentences, to run consecutively to an independent state sentence
he was then serving. Id. at 514-15.
3792. Id. at 515-16. The reason for the rule is based on the separation of authority between
the sentencing judge and the Attorney General. It is based on 18 U.S.C. §§ 3568 and 4082 (see
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The court explained that under 18 U.S.C section 3568,
a sentence begins to run at the time the convicted person is received at the
penitentiary or place of confinement.37 94 The Attorney General has the
exclusive authority to select the institution of confinement.37 95 Thus, the
federal judge has no authority to order concurrency of state and federal
sentences because the federal sentence does not begin until the defendant
arrives at the place of confinement selected by the Attorney General.37 96
The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the statutes discussed above
did not restrict a federal court's authority to delay the commencement of

a federal sentence until after completion of a state sentence.37 97 The
infra notes 3793 & 3795) and was relied upon in United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402 (9th Cir.
1972). In Myers, the defendant had pleaded guilty to federal charges and was sentenced at the
same time that he was in state custody awaiting trial on state charges. He was convicted of the
state offenses, served a prison term, and then was paroled into federal custody to begin serving
the federal sentence. At that time, Myers filed a § 2255 motion to vacate his guilty plea on the
ground that it was involuntary since he had not been informed that his federal sentence would
begin to run only after he had served his state sentence. Id. at 403. The court affirmed the
district court's order vacating the guilty plea, id. at 406, and noted in its reasoning that
[u]nder section 3568, the district judge was powerless to impose a federal sentence to
run concurrently with any state confinement. The most the district judge could have
done was to have recommended to the prison authorities that a federal sentence be
made concurrent with or consecutive to state confinement. Prison authorities need
not and do not always follow such recommendations.
Id. at 404 (footnote omitted).
The Thornton court also noted that dictum in United States v. Williams, 651 F.2d 644
(9th Cir. 1981) supported Thornton's attempt to extend the rule. In Williams, the court
stated: "The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a federal judge is powerless to order that a
federal sentence run concurrently with state confinement. This rule would equally seem to
preclude a district court from ordering that a federal sentence run consecutively to a state
sentence." 651 F.2d at 647 n.2 (citations omitted). The Thornton court, however, rejected this
attempt to extrapolate because the Williams court failed to cite any authority for this proposition. 710 F.2d at 516.
3793. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1976) provides in part: "The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence to run from the date on which such person is
received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence."
3794. 710 F.2d at 516.
3795. 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1976) provides in part:
(a) A person convicted of an offense against the United States shall be committed, for such term of imprisonment as the court may direct, to the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States, who shall designate the place of confinement
where the sentence shall be served.
(b) The Attorney General may designate as a place of confinement any available, suitable, and appropriate institution or facility, whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise. . ..
3796. 710 F.2d at 516 (citing United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 197)).
3797. Id. The court explained that such an order does not infringe upon the Attorney General's exercise of authority to designate the institution for service of the sentence. Id. The
court also cited several cases from other circuits in support of this holding. See United States
v. Campisi, 622 F.2d 697, 699 (3d Cir. 1980) (when federal sentence is ordered consecutive to
state sentence, federal sentence begins to run after release from state confinement); Cox v.
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court noted that a prior Ninth Circuit decision had held that the precur-

sor statute to section 3568 did not prohibit the imposition of a federal
sentence consecutive to a state sentence.3 79 8 Consequently, the court af3799
firmed the trial court's order.
In United States v. Jones,3 8 °° the defendants had been convicted of
mail fraud, securities fraud and misapplication of funds in connection
with sale/leaseback transactions.380 1 On appeal, defendant Jamerson
claimed that the sentence imposed upon him was illegal because it required him to serve, on separate counts, a prison term concurrent with a
probation term that carried a restitution provision.38 0 2
Jamerson relied on United States v. Edick,38 °3 arguing that probation and prison terms may not be served concurrently. 38° The Ninth
Circuit noted that the language relied upon by the defendant was
United States ex rel. Arron, 551 F.2d 1096, 1098 (7th Cir. 1977) (when federal sentence ordered consecutive to state sentence, time spent in state custody not credited against federal
term); United States v. Lee, 500 F.2d 586, 587-88 (8th Cir.) (court's discretion to order consecutive state and federal sentences well settled; statement by court that state and federal
sentences to run concurrently recommendation only), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974); Lavoie v. United States, 310 F.2d 117, 118 (Ist Cir. 1962) ("There is no impropriety in the imposition of a [federal] sentence to commence on and after a state court sentence presently being
served.").
3798. 710 F.2d at 516. The Thornton court was referring to Hayden v. Warden, 124 F.2d
514 (9th Cir. 1941), which dealt with the nearly identical precursor statute to not bar the
imposition of a federal sentence consecutive to a state sentence. 124 F.2d at 514-15.
3799. 710 F.2d at 516.
3800. 712 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 434 (1983).
3801. Id. at 1320. Jamerson was one of three defendants in the case. The mail fraud charges
were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), the securities fraud charges were brought under
15 U.S.C. § 77q, and the misapplication of funds charges were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 660
(1976). 712 F.2d at 1319, 1320, 1322. The fraudulent scheme involved a trucking brokerage
company and a trucking company. Jamerson became president of the trucking company and
managed it on a day-to-day basis. Investors were fraudulently induced to buy equipment from
the brokerage company and lease it back to the trucking company. The defendants then looted
the assets of the trucking company to meet the obligations of the brokerage company. As
happens in the classic "Ponzi scheme," the scheme eventually collapsed and the investors lost
their investments. Id. at 1319-20.
3802. Id. at 1323. The court characterized this argument as "novel," noting later that normally a defendant will not be heard to complain of concurrent sentences "because restraints on
liberty will end sooner than if probation were imposed consecutively to the prison term." Id.
3803. 603 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1979). Edick addressed the imposition of consecutive sentences
for multiple violations of the National Firearms Act. See supra note 3787. The language
relied upon by Jamerson is:
[T]he trial court's error was to subject Edick to two punishments when. . . only one
was authorized. Either prison time or probation was valid under the statutory alternatives, but, to avoid an illegal cumulation of punishment, the sentences had to be
imposed concurrently. Manifestly, prison time and probation cannot be served
concurrently.
603 F.2d at 777.
3804. 712 F.2d at 1323.
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"clearly dictum unrelated to the holding or focus of the case. ' 380 5 In
addition, the court noted that in an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Green v.
United States, 380 6 the court held that concurrent probation and prison
terms were permissible. Furthermore, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section
3651,3807 courts have broad discretion in setting probation terms, including requiring restitution as long as the complete sentence is within statutory limits. 380 8 Therefore, Jamerson's contention was held to be without
merit.38 o9
Generally, any change increasing the penalty imposed under a legal
sentence violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.3 8 10
However, an increase in the penalty resulting from the clarification of an
ambiguous sentence does not violate the double
jeopardy clause because
3 811
an ambiguous sentence has no legal effect.
In United States v. Wingender,3 81 2 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the double jeopardy clause prohibits modifying a sentencing order to correct an error when the effect of the correction is to make

sentences run consecutively rather than concurrently, thereby increasing
the penalty.3 8 13 The district court had reinstated Wingender's suspended
sentence.3814 following the defendant's conviction and sentencing for
3805. Id. The court added that "[n]othing in logic or law suggests that a court may not
impose concurrent prison and probation terms." Id. The court pointed out that decisions
requiring concurrent probation and prison terms have been left undisturbed by the Supreme
Court. Id. See Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
3806. 298 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir. 1961).
3807. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides in part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death
or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction. . . when satisfied that the ends
of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served
thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems best.
3808. 712 F.2d at 1323 (citing Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1982)
(sentences requiring both probation and restitution are permissible)).
3809. Id.
3810. See Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26, 27-28 (9th Cir. 1964) (changing concurrent sentences to consecutive sentences "clearly increased petitioner's punishment" and was
invalid).
3811. See United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1982).
3812. 711 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1983).
3813. Id. at 870.
3814. Id. at 869-70. Wingender had been convicted in 1979 of falsifying a loan application in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976), for which he received a suspended sentence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1014 (1976) provides in part:
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or willfully overvalues any
land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of [a
federal credit agency or federally insured lending institution] . . . shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
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counterfeiting in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 472.3815 The sentencing
order provided that the reinstated sentence was to be served consecutively "'to any state sentence for which the defendant now stands com-

mitted.'

"3816

However, Wingender was not then committed under any

state sentence, but only under the federal sentence.38 17
Two days later, the district judge corrected the mistake, modifying
the sentencing order so that the reinstated sentence ran consecutively to
the federal sentence. 31 8 The defendant then moved to correct the sen-

tence, alleging that the resulting increase in penalty violated the double

jeopardy clause.38 19 The district court denied the motion.3 820
382 1
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.

Relying on United States v. Alverson,3822 the Ninth Circuit held that
modification of the reinstated sentence did not violate the double jeopardy clause, although it increased the penalty.382 3 The court reasoned
that although a legal sentence may not be modified so as to increase the

penalty, there is no such bar to increasing an illegal or erroneous sentence because neither is legally effective.38 24 The court concluded that
the original reinstatement order, referring to "any state sentence," was so
ambiguous under the circumstances as to be illegal and thereby ineffec3815. 711 F.2d at 869-70. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976) provides:
Whoever, with intent to defraud, passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts to
pass, utter, publish, or sell, or with like intent brings into the United States or keeps
in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged counterfeited, or altered obligation
or other security of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both.
Wingender was sentenced to two years imprisonment on the counterfeiting conviction. 711
F.2d at 870 n.1.
3816. 711 F.2d at 870.
3817. Id.
3818. Id.
3819. The defendant's motion was brought under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35, which provides in
part: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence."
3820. 711 F.2d at 870.
3821. Id. at 871. The court first noted that sentences generally run concurrently unless the
sentencing order specifies that the sentences are to run consecutively. Id. at 870 (citing
McNealy v. Johnston, 100 F.2d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1938); Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d
433, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916 (1969)).
3822. 666 F.2d 341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1982).
3823. 711 F.2d at 870.
3824. Id See United States v. Carter, 704 F.2d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir. 1983) (correction of an
illegal grant of probation after rape conviction not a double jeopardy violation); United States
v. Henry, 680 F.2d 403, 411 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding lower court's action in vacating illegal
sentence and increasing sentence on unchallenged count in order to fulfill original sentencing
intent); United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 950-51 (3d Cir.) (augmentation of sentence not a
double jeopardy violation), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
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tive.3 5- Therefore, the modification was permissible. 8 2 6
6.

Youth Corrections Act

The Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA) 38 27 provides sentencing
judges with broad and flexible discretion when sentencing youth offenders. The YCA was designed to encourage rehabilitation, rather than
solely to punish youthful offenders.38 z8
Section 5010 of the YCA contains the sentencing options available
to a judge. The judge may place the offender on probation,3 82 9 sentence
the offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and
supervision,38 3 ° sentence the offender to confinement under another appropriate punishment provision,3831 or sentence the offender to the custody of the Attorney General for an initial period of observation to
3825. 711 F.2d at 870. At the time the suspended sentence was reinstated, no state sentence
existed and the defendant had just received a federal sentence. Id.
3826. The Ninth Circuit also stated that no prejudice would result either to the defendant or
to his counsel because the district judge had promptly corrected his mistake. Id. at 870-71.
3827. Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
3828. See United States v. Lane, 284 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 1960) (YCA "permit[s] the
substitution of correctional rehabilitation rather than retributive punishment"); H.R. RElP.
No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). See also Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201 (1981). In
Ralston, the Court reviewed the principles behind the YCA. Id. at 206-10. The Ralston Court
found that the YCA endorses the use of discretion by judges when choosing among sentencing
options, and prescribes basic conditions of treatment for youth offenders. Id. at 206. Citing
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974), the Court stated that "the principal purpose
of the YCA is to rehabilitate persons who, because of their youth, are unusually vulnerable to
the danger of recidivism." 454 U.S. at 206. This purpose is implemented by segregating youth
offenders from adults during the period of treatment. Id. at 207.
3829. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976) provides: "If the court is of the opinion that the youth
offender does not need commitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the youth offender on probation."
3830. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b), (c) (1976) provide:
(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and the offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law other than
this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for
treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter until discharged by the [United
States Parole] Commission as provided in section 5017(c) of this chapter; or
(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum benefit from treatment by the Commission prior to the expiration of six years
from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise
provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General
for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period that
may be authorized by law for the offense or offenses of which he stands convicted or
until discharged by the Commission as provided in section 5017(d) of this chapter.
3831. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976) provides: "If the court shall find that the youth offender
will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence
the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision."
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determine the most appropriate alternative.3" 3 2
In Tuten v. United States, 38 33 the Supreme Court considered

whether a conviction for which probation was imposed under section
5010(a) of the YCA is automatically expunged once the offender is unconditionally discharged after serving his full term of probation.3 8 34 In

1971, nineteen year old Tuten pleaded guilty to a charge of carrying a
pistol without a license and was sentenced to two years probation under

section 5010(a). 3

35

At the end of the probationary period, Tuten was

unconditionally discharged from the YCA program. In 1980, Tuten was
tried and convicted under the same statutory provision he had violated in

1971.3836 As a result of the earlier conviction, the judge sentenced Tuten
as a felon under the District of Columbia recidivist statute.38 37

On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Tuten con38 38

tended that the district court erred in sentencing him as a recidivist.

He claimed that the 1971 conviction could not serve as the basis for
treating him as a recidivist because the record of that conviction had
been expunged, under section 5021(a),3 839 once he had successfully com-

pleted the probationary term.384° Tuten relied on section 5021(b), which
provides that a conviction for which probation was imposed is automatically set aside if the court unconditionally discharges the offender from
probation prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation
3841
originally imposed by the court.
3832. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) (1976) provides:
If the court desires additional information as to whether a youth offender will derive
benefit from treatment under subsections (b) or (c) it may order that he be committed
to the custody of the Attorney General for observation and study at an appropriate
classification center or agency. Within sixty days from the date of the order, or such
additional period as the court may grant, the Commission shall report to the court its
findings.
3833. 460 U.S. 660 (1983).
3834. Id. at 661.
3835. Id. Tuten was charged with carrying a pistol without a license under D.C. CODE § 223204 (1973). Id.
3836. Id.
3837. Id. at 661-62. Tuten's earlier conviction made him subject to the recidivist provision
of D.C. CODE § 22-3204. On the second conviction, Tuten was given an indeterminate sentence of two to six years imprisonment. 460 U.S. at 662.
3838. Tuten v. United States, 440 A.2d 1008, 1010 (1982).
3839. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) (1976) provides:
Where a youth offender has been placed on probation by the court, the court may
thereafter, in its discretion, unconditionally discharge such youth offender from probation prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed
by the court, which discharge shall automatically set aside the conviction, and the
court shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.
3840. 460 U.S. at 662.
3841. Id. In keeping with the YCA's rehabilitative purpose, § 5021 was meant to spare
youth offenders from the social stigma and potentially detrimental economic effect of having a
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The circuit court rejected Tuten's argument, holding that the automatic expunging provision applies only when the youth offender is un384 2
conditionally discharged prior to completing the probationary term.
Since Tuten was discharged only after fully completing probation, the
circuit court held that section 5021(b) did not apply and affirmed Tuten's
sentence on the 1980 conviction.3 84 3
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, agreed with the
circuit court that the plain language of the statute is contrary to the interpretation urged by Tuten.3 84 In addition, the Court noted that the
legislative history of the 1961 amendment to the YCA, which added sec-

tion 5021(b), "echo[es] the language of § 5021(b) limiting the set-aside to
youth offenders discharged before their original probationary terms expire.' ' 384 5 Finally, the Court found that this particular limitation was
consistent with the rehabilitative purposes of the YCA as well as with
congressional intent to provide an incentive for good behavior.3 84 6 The
criminal record, as well as to provide incentive to youth offenders to adhere to the rules and
conditions of probation. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433-35 (1974)
(§ 5021(b) provides judges with a powerful tool in exercising discretion in the treatment of
youth offenders and restoring them to acceptable patterns of behavior); Doe v. Webster, 606
F.2d 1226, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (in keeping with the purposes of the YCA, once set-aside is
granted, conviction records are segregated from other files and ex-offender may legally deny
conviction); Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 854, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("a person sentenced
under the Youth Corrections Act can, by virtue of his own good conduct, be spared the lifelong burden of a criminal record").
3842. Tuten v. United States, 440 A.2d at 1013.
3843. 460 U.S. at 662-63.
3844. Id. at 667. The Court quoted Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 548 (1978) for the
statement: "'[Section 5021(b)] extend[s] the benefit of a certificate [setting aside the conviction] to youths sentenced to probation under § 5010(a) when the court unconditionally discharges the youth prior to expiration of the sentence of probation imposed.'" 460 U.S. at 666
(emphasis added by Tuten Court).
3845. 460 U.S. at 666 (footnote omitted). The Court discussed the fact that prior to the
amendment adding § 5021(b), the set-aside provision was available only to offenders sentenced
to confinement who were unconditionally discharged therefrom prior to completing the maximum sentence imposed. Id. at 665. The Court stated that § 5021(b) was enacted to provide a
similar opportunity to youth offenders sentenced to probation rather than to confinement. Id.
at 665-66. For the legislative history of § 5021(b), see H.R. REP.No. 433 and S. REP. No.
1048, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961).
3846. 460 U.S. at 667. The Court reasoned that the probationer's incentive to be on exemplary behavior might be significantly weakened if the conviction was automatically set aside
upon expiration of the probation term. Id. Furthermore, the Court found that the relief from
the adverse consequences of a criminal record envisioned by § 5021(b) would not necessarily
be frustrated if a court failed to grant an unconditional discharge before the term of probation
ended. The Court pointed to two safeguards against such a possibility: (I) pursuant to United
States Parole Commission procedures, a parole officer is required to file a report prior to the
end of the probationer's term, detailing the probationer's conduct and reminding the court that
an early discharge will set aside conviction (see GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: PROBATION MANUAL § 5011 (1978)), and (2) if the probationer believes the court
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Court thus concluded that the language of the statute, the legislative history and the rehabilitative purposes of the YCA all indicate that a con-

viction must be expunged only when the offender is granted an early
discharge.3847 Accordingly, the
circuit court's judgment upholding
384 8

Tuten's sentence was affirmed.
In United States v. Bell,384 9 the Ninth Circuit considered whether a
district court may impose a fixed term of less than six years for treatment
and supervision under section 5010(b) of the YCA. 385 ° Bell was convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States 3851 and of making a
false claim against the United States.3 852 He was sentenced to a period of
two years for treatment and supervision pursuant to section 5010(b) on

count one, and five years probation pursuant to section 5010(a) on count

two. 3853 On appeal from the district court's denial of its motion to correct the sentence on count one, the government claimed that a court may
not impose a fixed sentence under the YCA. 385 4 Bell, on the other hand,
inadvertently failed to grant an early discharge, he or she may move the sentencing court to
grant an unconditional early discharge nunc pro tunc and set aside the conviction (see FED. R.
CRIM. P. 35). 460 U.S. at 667-68.
3847. 460 U.S. at 668.
3848. Id.
3849. 707 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
3850. Id. at 1080-81. See supra note 3830 for text of § 5010(b).
3851. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
3852. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976) provides:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or
naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim
upon or against the United States, or any department or ageny thereof, knowing such
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
3853. 707 F.2d at 1080.
3854. Id. at 1080-81. The Ninth Circuit stated that the YCA provides essentially three sentencing options: "(1) probation, under § 5010(a); (2) an indeterminate period of confinement
with a maximum of six years, under §§ 5010(b) and 5017(c); and (3) an indeterminate period
of confinement of more than six years with a maximum equal to that authorized by law for the
offender, under §§ 5010(c) and 5017(d)." Id. at 1081 (footnotes omitted).
For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 5010, see supra notes 3829-32. The court's reference to the
six-year dividing line is clearer if§ 5010(b) is read in conjunction with § 5017(c), and § 5010(c)
is read in conjunction with § 5017(d). 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c) (1976) provides:
A youth offender committed under section 5010(b) of this chapter shall be released
conditionally under supervision on or before the expiration of four years from the
date of his conviction and shall be discharged unconditionally on or before six years
from the date of his conviction.
18 U.S.C. § 5017(d) (1976) provides:
A youth offender committed under section 5010(c) of this chapter shall be released
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argued that the sentencing options provided in section 5010 were not
exclusive, so that a district court had discretion to impose a specific sen-

tence of less than six years.3855
Finding in favor of the government, the Ninth Circuit held that
although a district court has discretion to choose among the sentencing
options provided in section 5010, it is limited to imposing one of those
options.38 56 The court reasoned that the rehabilitative purpose underly-

ing the YCA is best served by allowing youth corrections authorities to
determine the exact period of confinement based on each individual offender's needs. 3857 Thus, the court stated that if the youth offender is to
is properly made by
serve less than the statutory six years, that decision
385 8
the parole Commission, not by the district court.
3 859 the defendant contended that the
In United States v. Ballesteros,
3
Federal Magistrate Act of 19 7 9 , 11 prohibiting YCA sentences that are

conditionally under supervision not later than two years before the expiration of the
term imposed by the court. He may be discharged unconditionally at the expiration
of not less than one year from the date of his conditional release. He shall be discharged unconditionally on or before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed, computed uninterruptedly from the date of conviction.
3855. 707 F.2d at 1081. The court distinguished United States v. Amidon, 627 F.2d 1023
(9th Cir. 1980), and United States v. Smith, 683 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 1111 (1983), which Bell relied on for this argument. In Amidon, the court
held that an indeterminate sentence imposed under § 5010(b) cannot exceed the maximum
period of confinement that could be imposed on an adult offender convicted of the same offense. 627 F.2d at 1027. Smith dealt with the application of the split sentence provision of 18
U.S.C. § 3651 to probation terms imposed under § 5010(a) of the YCA. 683 F.2d at 1240-42.
Neither case addressed whether a court may impose indeterminate sentences with fixed maximum terms less than those provided by statute. 707 F.2d at 1081-82.
3856. 707 F.2d at 1082. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit is in agreement with several other
circuits. See Taylor v. Carlson, 671 F.2d 137, 138 (5th Cir. 1982); Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d
1354, 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d 830, 832 (2d Cir. 1977); Bums
v. United States, 552 F.2d 828, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1977).
3857. 707 F.2d at 1082.
3858. Id. Bell also argued that courts should be given broad discretion in sentencing under,
the YCA because the original rehabilitative purpose behind the YCA "has fallen into disfavor,
and. . . the Parole Commission's implementing regulations and administration of the statute
are inconsistent with its original intent." Id. (citing.United States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d 830,
832 (2d Cir. 1977), and Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1372 (10th Cir. 1981)).
Although the Ninth Circuit found this argument persuasive, the court responded that
"[w]hile the underlying predicate of the YCA and the reality of Youth Act treatment may be
incongruent, we agree with the Second Circuit that any changes in the YCA must come from
the Congress, not the courts." 707 F.2d at 1082.
3859. 691 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
3860. Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (1979). The Federal
Magistrate Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3401, the sentencing provisions section applicable when
trial on a misdemeanor offense is heard by a magistrate, by adding a new subsection (g). 93
Stat. at 646. The new subsection (g) provides in part:
The magistrate may, in a case involving a youth offender in which consent to trial
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longer than the maximum adult sentence for the same crime, operated
retroactively to invalidate his sentence. 86 1 In 1977, Ballesteros had
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense.3 862 He was sentenced under
section 5017(c) of the YCA 863 to an indeterminate term of confinement
not to exceed four to six years. An adult sentence for the same offense
would have resulted in a maximum sentence of one year in prison and a
$5000 fine.3 8 4
In rejecting Ballesteros' argument, the Ninth Circuit distinguished
United States v. Amidon, 3861 which held that implicit in the Federal Magistrate Act is the mandate that a youth offender may not be sentenced to
any term of confinement longer than that which could be imposed on an
adult for the same offense. 8 66 The Ballesteros court noted that Amidon's
sentence had not been final on the effective date of the Federal Magistrate
Act, whereas Ballesteros' sentence became final in 1977, two years prior
to adoption of the Act. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit observed that
courts generally do not apply ameliorative legislation to sentences finalized prior to the effective date of that legislation. 8 67
The court then considered Ballesteros' claim that imposing a fourto-six year term on a youth offender for a misdemeanor offense violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 86 8 Rejecting this argument as well, the Ninth Circuit held that when a sentence longer than
that which could be imposed on an adult is imposed on a youth offender
under the YCA, the longer sentence does not violate the equal protection
clause if its purpose is rehabilitative. 86 9 The court therefore affirmed
before a magistrate has been filed.
granted to the district court.

. .

. . impose

sentence and exercise the other powers

except that-

(1) the magistrate may not sentence the youth offender to the custody of the
Attorney General . . . for a period in excess of 1 year for conviction of a misdemeanor or 6 months for conviction of a petty offense ....
18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1976).
3861. 691 F.2d at 870.
3862. Id. Ballesteros pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 844, which prohibits, and contains the penalties for, illegally importing, manufacturing, distributing or storing controlled
substances.
3863. See supra note 3854.
3864. 691 F.2d at 870.
3865. 627 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1980).
3866. Id. at 1027.
3867. 691 F.2d at 870.
3868. Id. Ballesteros' equal protection clause challenge was based on the same discrepancy
as his challenge under Amidon, i.e., he was required to serve a longer sentence than an adult
sentenced for the same crime would have served. Id.
3869. Id. In support of this holding, the Ninth Circuit cited Cunningham v. United States,
256 F.2d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 1958) (if the law in question operates in the same general way on
all members of the class in question (here, youth offenders), no equal protection violation
exists); cf. United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1120 (2d Cir. 1974) (when
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3870

Ballesteros' sentence.
In United States v. Jenkins, 38 7 1 the defendant also claimed that his
sentence was imposed in violation of the equal protection clause. Unlike
Ballesteros, who was a youth offender, Jenkins challenged his sentence as
an adult offender. Jenkins was convicted of simple assault, in violation of
18 U.S.C. section 113(e). 3 872 He was given a suspended sentence of
ninety days in prison and was placed on a two-year probationary
term.

38 73

On appeal, Jenkins argued that the magistrate lacked the statutory
authority to sentence him to a probationary period in excess of six
months for a petty crime. 3 874 He based his argument on section
3401(g)(3) of the Federal Magistrate Act,3 8 75 which provides that a magistrate shall not impose on a youth offender a term of probation greater
than six months for a petty crime. Jenkins further contended that if a
magistrate does have authority to impose a longer term of probation on
an adult offender, that authority violates the equal protection clause.3 87 6
The court rejected both of Jenkins' arguments. First, the court
noted that a magistrate's general power to grant probation is contained in
18 U.S.C. section 3401(d).38 77 The provision for imposing probation on
youth offenders, contained in section 3401(g)(3), is merely an exception
to that general power, and does not affect the general grant of authority
to magistrates.3 87 8 Jenkins was not a youth offender; thus, the section
3401(g)(3) exception did not apply to him.387 9
Examining Jenkins' equal protection argument, the court stated that
youth offenders are treated the same as adults, but are given longer sentences than adults could
receive, there is denial of equal protection), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
3870. 691 F.2d at 870.
3871. 734 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1983).
3872. Id. at 1324. Jenkins was originally charged with "assault by striking, beating or
wounding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1976)." Id. After consenting to be tried by a
magistrate, Jenkins requested and was granted a jury trial on the assault charge. The government then reduced the charge to simple assault, under 18 U.S.C. § 113(e) (1976), a petty offense which carries a maximum punishment of three months in prison, a fine of $300, or both.
The court denied Jenkins' request for a jury trial on the reduced charge. 734 F.2d at 1324.
3873. 734 F.2d at 1324.
3874. Id. at 1327.
3875. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g)(3) (1982) provides: "[T]he magistrate may not suspend the imposition of sentence and place the youth offender on probation for a period in excess of 1 year for
conviction of a misdemeanor or 6 months for conviction of a petty offense."
3876. 734 F.2d at 1327.
3877. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(d) (1976) provides: "The probation laws shall be applicable to
persons tried by a magistrate under this section, and such officer shall have power to grant
probation and to revoke or reinstate the probation of any person granted probation by him."
3878. 734 F.2d at 1327.
3879. Id.
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the classification neither violated a fundamental interest, nor involved a
suspect class. 388 0 The court further found that Congress had limited a
magistrate's power to sentence youth offenders for misdemeanors and
petty offenses because it desired to implement the rehabilitative purposes
of the YCA.3 s1s Citing its decision in Ballesteros,8 8 2 the court reaffirmed
the principle that an equal protection challenge to statutory sentencing

distinctions based on the age of the offender will fail so long as the sen-

tence serves the purpose for which it was designed.3"8 3 Jenkins did not
argue that the YCA failed to serve its rehabilitative purposes. Accordingly, the court held that Jenkins' right to equal protection had not been
infringed, and affirmed his sentence.38 8 a
7.

Section 2255 proceedings

28 U.S.C. section 2255 (1976) provides that after a prisoner is sentenced, he or she may move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or
correct the sentence on the ground that it was improperly imposed. 3885
The general rule is that such motions should be presented to the original
sentencing judge.38 86 It is permissible, however, under Rule 4(a) of the
3880. Id.
3881. Id.
3882. United States v. Ballesteros, 691 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1042 (1983). See supra notes 3859-70 and accompanying text.
3883. 734 F.2d at 1327.
3884. Id.
3885. A sentence was improperly imposed if "the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or. . . the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or. . . the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). A § 2255 motion is also
known as a "writ for error corum nobis."
3886. This posture is a relatively recent one in the Ninth Circuit, having first been stated in
Wilson v. United States, 534 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1976), and reaffirmed in Farrow v. United
States, 580 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1978). The earlier view expressed some uncertainty concerning
the propriety of allowing the original sentencing judge to hear the § 2255 motions, reflecting a
concern that the original judge might bear an inherent prejudice toward the prisoner. See, e.g.,
Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1972) (trial judge can hear and decide
§ 2255 motions); Odom v. United States, 455 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1972) (trial judge not required
to disqualify himself from hearing § 2255 motion); Dukes v. United States, 407 F.2d 863 (9th
Cir.) (there is no wrong, per se, in trial judge hearing § 2255 motion), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
897 (1969).
The present Ninth Circuit view is generally in agreement with most other circuits. See,
e.g., United States v. Delsanter, 433 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d
49 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 916 (1965); Aeby v. United States, 425 F.2d 717 (5th
Cir. 1970); Hoffa v. United States, 471 F.2d 391 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973);
Burris v. United States, 430 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971); Lucero
v. United States, 425 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1970). The First Circuit is in disagreement. See
Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967), afid, 394 F.2d 149 (1968), affid on
other grounds, 394 U.S. 831, reh'g denied, 395 U.S. 971 (1969).
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Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, 3887 to present the motion to
another district court judge if the original sentencing judge is
unavailable.
In Gano v. United States,38 88 the Ninth Circuit addressed the meaning of "unavailability" for purposes of presenting a section 2255 motion
to a judge other than the original sentencing judge. The district judge
who originally sentenced Gano, Judge Ferguson, had been appointed to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals between the time Gano was sentenced and the time Gano's motion was filed. Consequently, the motion
was referred to another judge.
The court held that when a judge is no longer on the district court,
889
he or she is no longer "available" within the meaning of Rule 4(a).3389
0
proper.
therefore
was
judge
Assignment of Gano's motion to another
Circuit Judge Boochever, dissenting, made a persuasive argument
that Gano's motion should at least have been referred to the chief judge
of the Ninth Circuit in order to determine whether it was in the public
interest to temporarily assign Judge Ferguson to the district court.389 1

The dissent noted that in order for Gano to succeed on his motion, he
would have to establish (1) that his convictions were invalid because of
lack of counsel, (2) that the sentencing judge incorrectly believed that
Gano's prior convictions were valid, and (3) that the sentence was enhanced because of the prior convictions. 38 92 Gano had established the
first two elements of his claim; therefore a finding concerning the third
factor would dispose of the claim.3 89 3 However, the dissenting judge was
concerned that the judge to whom the motion was referred would simply
affirm the sentence for lack of information, since the original sentencing
3887. RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS Rule 4(a) (1982) provides:
The original motion shall be presented promptly to the judge of the district court

who presided at the movant's trial and sentenced him, or, if the judge who imposed
sentence was not the trial judge, then it shall go to the judge who was in charge of
that part of the proceedings being attacked by the movant. If the appropriate judge
is unavailable to consider the motion, it shall be presented to another judge of the
district in accordance with the procedure of the court for the assignment of its
business.
3888. 705 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1983).
3889. Id. at 1137.
3890. Id.
3891. Id. at 1138-39 (Boochever, J., dissenting). 28 U.S.C. § 291 (1982) provides in part:
(b) The chief judge of a circuit or the circuit justice may, in the public interest,
designate and assign temporarily any circuit judge within the circuit, including a
judge designated and assigned to temporary duty therein, to hold a district court in
any district within the circuit.
3892. 705 F.2d at 1138 (Boochever, J., dissenting) (citing Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d
1339, 1345 (9th Cir. 1978)).
3893. Id. (Boochever, J., dissenting).
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judge was the only person who could say how much weight was given to
the prior convictions in determining the sentence.38 94 Judge Boochever

concluded that since the interests of judicial efficiency and the prevention
of injustice may have been served by having the original judge hear

Gano's motion, it should at least have been referred to the chief judge for
consideration.3 8 95
8.

Due process at sentencing

The Supreme Court has made it clear that a criminal defendant is
entitled to due process in the sentencing phase of a proceeding as well as
in the trial phase.38 96 Although the extent of a defendant's due process
rights at sentencing is unclear, the scope of these rights is narrower at
sentencing than at trial.389 7
In United States v. Adams, 38 98 defendants Proctor and Mummert

claimed that their due process rights had been violated during their sentencing hearings. 3899 The claim arose after the district court denied the
defendants' motion to strike the previous testimony of a government witness or, in the alternative, to have the witness recalled for crossexamination.3 9 °°
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling.390 1
3894. Id. (Boochever, J., dissenting).
3895. Id. at 1138-39 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
3896. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (defendant has no right to a particular
sentence, but the sentencing process must satisfy due process).
3897. In United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 397-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affid, 603 F.2d
1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980), Judge Weinstein stated that "[t]he
Circuit Courts are in fundamental agreement that: 'Misinformation or misunderstanding that
is materially untrue regarding a prior criminal record, or material false assumptions as to any
facts relevant to sentencing, renders the entire procedure invalid as a violation of due process.'" (emphasis deleted) (quoting United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir.
1970)). While the circuit courts may be thus far in agreement, beyond that there is no clear
indication of how far the sentencing court is required to go to protect the defendant's right to
due process. Each case must be analyzed on its facts, but it appears that the appropriate
standard of due process at sentencing is not as broad as at trial. See Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 358 n.9 (1977) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands")). See
also United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1979) (the standard for presenting
information to the judge prior to sentencing is not as high as the standard for introducing
evidence at trial).
3898. 694 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3085 (1983).
3899. Id. at 202. The defendants were convicted on various charges associated with shipping, receiving and distributing obscene matter involving minors. Id. at 201.
3900. Id. at 202. The appellants presented their motion at a continuance of the sentencing
hearing. The witness who was wanted for cross-examination by the appellants was apparently
not present when the motion was made, having testified before the hearing was continued. Id.
3901. Id. at 203.
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The court noted that, immediately after the witness had testified, the defendants were given an opportunity to cross-examine, which they declined.390 2 Instead, they presented the testimony of their own witness in
rebuttal. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentences holding that under
these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion.3 90 3
9.

Death penalty

In a 1972 decision, Furman v. Georgia,3 9° the Supreme Court held
that a capital sentencing procedure which fails to provide direction to the
sentencer concerning the exercise of its discretion is unconstitutional be-

cause it violates the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the fourteenth amendment guarantees of due

process and equal protection under the law.3 9 °5 In Furman, the Court
found that the Georgia and Texas statutory schemes failed to sufficiently
insulate a defendant from the risk of arbitrary and capricious imposition
of the death penalty.3 90 6
In the years immediately following Furman, approximately thirty-

five states and the United States Congress amended their death penalty
3902. Id.
3903. Id.
3904. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The Furman Court examined the validity of death
sentences imposed on three defendants, two of whom were prosecuted under Georgia law and
one under Texas law. In a 5-4 decision, the Court invalidated virtually every death penalty
statute in the country. Id. at 465-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Brennan would have held that capital punishment is unconstitutional per se; Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White left the question of per se constitutionality open, but agreed with the Court
that the particular state laws at issue were invalid; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist would have held that capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional. Id. at 375, 396-97 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3905. Id. at 239-40. See infra note 274.
3906. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Douglas emphasized the then-prevailing discriminatory application of the death penalty based on the race of the defendant. Id. at
249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Brennan focused on the severity of the punishment.
Id. at 281-91 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White noted the particular infrequency with
which the penalty is imposed. Id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stewart stated:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual . . . . [Tihe Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.
Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Justice Stewart, in an opinion joined by Justices
Powell and Stevens, indicated that since five concurring opinions were filed in Furman, the
holding of the Furman Court should be construed according to the narrowest ground of concurrence, that ground being that the penalty was arbitrary or "wantonly and freakishly imposed." Id. at 169 n.15.
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statutes to comport with the spirit of Furman.3 90 7 In Gregg v. Georgia,3 90 8 the Supreme Court held that imposition of the death penalty for a
murder conviction is not per se unconstitutional, 390 9 and that the revised
Georgia sentencing scheme provides sufficient guidance to the sentencer
to guard against an unlawful sentence.3 910
The Georgia statutory scheme for capital cases includes a bifurcated
trial, in which the determination of guilt is made during the first stage. If
the defendant is found guilty, sentence is determined in the second
stage.3911 Once guilt has been established, the sentencer must find that at
least one of ten statutory aggravating circumstances exists before the
death penalty may be considered.3 9 12 In addition, the sentencer may
consider any relevant nonstatutory mitigating or aggravating circum3907. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1976), for a listing of the states and
statutes.
3908. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3909. Id. at 186-87 (Stewart, J., with Justices Powell and Stevens concurring and the Chief
Justice and Justices White, Rehnquist and Blackmun concurring in the result).
3910. Id. at 198. Justice Stewart wrote:
Georgia's new sentencing procedures require as a prerequisite to the imposition to
the death penalty, specific jury findings as to the circumstances of the crime or the
character of the defendant. Moreover, to guard further against a situation comparable to that presented in Furman, the Supreme Court of Georgia compares each death
sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure that
the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate. On their face these
procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman.
Id.
3911. See GA. CODE § 27-2538 and appendix to GA. CODE ch. 27-25 outlining unified appeal
proceedings.
3912. GA. CODE § 27-2534.1 (1973) provided:
(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft hijacking or
treason, in any case.
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it
to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise
authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances
which may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of
murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive
criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means
of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for
the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
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stances as authorized by law.3913 Finally, the Georgia system calls for
automatic appeal to, and review by, the state supreme court.3 914
In Zant v. Stephens, 39 15 the defendant challenged the Georgia sentencing procedures on eighth amendment grounds, arguing that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it failed to instruct the
sentencer to balance mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances before imposing the death penalty.39 16 In three separate
opinions, a majority of the Court upheld the Georgia procedures as applied to Stephens.39 17
After a state court jury trial, Stephens was convicted of murder and
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of
his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with,
or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself
or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted
by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation.
The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing,
signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances
which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make
such designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one
of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in section 27-2534.1(b) is so
found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
When the Georgia Code was revised in 1981, the portion of subsection (b)(1) providing "or the
offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" was deleted.
3913. Id. at § 27-2534.1(b).
3914. GA. CODE § 27-2537(c) (1983) provides:
(c) With regard to the sentence, the [state supreme] court shall determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
(2) Whether. . . the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory
aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (b) of Code Section [272534.1]; and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
3915. 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983).
3916. Id. at 2741-42.
3917. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and O'Connor. Justice White concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Brennan joined.
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sentenced to death.39 8 The jury specified in writing that it had found
three aggravating circumstances which warranted imposition of the
death penalty: (1) the defendant had previously been convicted of a capital felony; (2) the defendant had a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions"; and (3) the defendant had escaped from a
3 9 19
place of lawful confinement.
While Stephens' appeal was pending in the state system, the Georgia
Supreme Court held in another case 3920 that one of the statutory aggravating circumstances identified by the jury in Zant was "unconstitutionally vague. ' 392 1 However, when Stephens' appeal came before the
Georgia Supreme Court on automatic review, the court affirmed the sentence, holding that the two other aggravating circumstances named by
the jury were sufficient to justify imposing the death penalty.3922
Stephens' case reached the United States Supreme Court after a series of appeals in the federal courts, in which Stephens had instituted
3918. 103 S. Ct. at 2736. After escaping from the Houston County jail, Stephens and an
accomplice embarked on a two-day spree committing various car thefts, burglaries and an
armed robbery, which culminated in the murder. The victim had surprised Stephens and his
accomplice while they were burglarizing a home; they transported the victim away from the
house and shot him. Id.
GA. CODE § 26-1101 (1972) provides that the death penalty may be impoed on one convicted of murder. Stephens was sentenced under GA. CODE § 27-2534.1. See supra note 3912.
3919. 103 S.Ct. at 2737. The jury stated that it had found the statutory aggravating circumstances contained in the judge's instructions designated as "One" and "Three". Id. The
judge's instructions provided in part:
You may consider any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which
you find are supported by the evidence. One, the offense of Murder was committed
by a person with a prior record of conviction for a Capital felony, or the offense of
Murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. Two, the offense of Murder was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. Three, the offense of Murder was committed by a person
who has escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement.
Id. The Court pointed out that because of the two-part nature of circumstance "One" the jury
findings could be considered either as three aggravating circumstances or two statutory circumstances, one having two bases. Id. at 2737-38.
3920. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976).
3921. 103 S.Ct. at 2738. The circumstance that the Georgia Supreme Court held invalid
was the one providing that the defendant had "a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions." Id. (quoting Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 542, 224 S.E.2d 386, 392 (1976)).
The Georgia court held that "the statutory language was too vague and nonspecific to be
applied evenhandedly by ajury." 103 S.Ct. at 2738 n.5 (citingArnold, 236 Ga. at 540-42, 224
S.E.2d at 391-92).
3922. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 263, 227 S.E.2d 261, 263, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986
(1976). The Georgia court upheld this ruling when Stephens appealed the denial of his petition
for state habeas corpus relief. Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S.E.2d 92, cert. denied,
439 U.S. 991 (1978).
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proceedings for habeas corpus relief.392 3 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had invalidated Stephens' sentence on the ground that it could not

determine whether the jury had relied on the unconstitutional aggravating circumstance in deciding to impose the death penalty.39 24 The
Supreme Court therefore certified to the Georgia Supreme Court a question regarding the validity of Stephens' sentence under state law when
one of the aggravating circumstances had been invalidated.392 5
The Georgia court responded at length, explaining the structure of
Georgia sentencing procedures in homicide cases, 3 9 2 6 and concluded that

once a statutory aggravating circumstance is found to exist, "the case
enters the area of the factfinder's discretion, in which all the facts and
3923. 103 S.Ct. at 2738. The federal district court had denied Stephens' petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, invalidated Stephens' sentence
because the Georgia Supreme Court had held that one of the aggravating circumstances found
by Stephens' jury was unconstitutional. Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397, 406 (5th Cir. 1980).
Relying on Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), the Fifth Circuit stated that:
[I]f
the jury has been instructed to consider several grounds for conviction, one of
which proves to be unconstitutional, and the reviewing court is thereafter unable to
determine from the record whether the jury relied on the unconstitutional ground,
the verdict must be set aside ...
It is impossible for a reviewing court to determine satisfactorily that the verdict
in this case was not decisively affected by an unconstitutional statutory aggravating
circumstance.
631 F.2d at 406 (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit also expressed concern that evidence of
the defendant's prior criminal record may have been improperly presented to the jury in connection with proving the unconstitutional circumstance. Id. This statement was later omitted
from the opinion because such evidence would have been admissible under Georgia law
whether or not the aggravating circumstance was in issue. See 648 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1981).
After the Fifth Circuit decision, Warden Zant petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
It was granted in 454 U.S. 814 (1981).
3924. 103 S.Ct. at 2738. See supra note 3923.
3925. The Supreme Court certified the question: "What are the premises of state law that
support the conclusion that the death sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalidity of
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury?" 103 S.Ct. at 2739 n. 11
(quoting Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1982)).
3926. See 103 S.Ct. at 2739-40 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 99-100, 297 S.E.2d 1,
3-4 (1982)). The structure was explained by analogy to a pyramid containing all classes of
homicides in which the severity of punishment grows incrementally the closer one approaches
the apex. The death penalty is at the apex.
Starting from the base of the pyramid, the first line of demarcation separates statutorily
defined murders from lesser homicides. The second line separates those murders for which the
death penalty is a possible consequence from other forms of murder. Both statutory definitions
and aggravating circumstances are elements in determining this class of murders. At least one
statutory aggravating circumstance must be found to exist before the death penalty may be
considered. The third line separates those murders for which the perpetrator may be sentenced to death from those for which he or she shall be sentenced to death. At this level, the
discretion whether or not to impose the death penalty rests solely with the factfinder, who
must consider all the relevant evidence, both as to the defendant and as to the crime, in mitigation or aggravation of the penalty. Should the death penalty be imposed, the case is then
subject to automatic review by the Georgia Supreme Court. Id.
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circumstances of the case determine. . . whether or not the case passes
. . . into the area in which the death penalty is imposed."3 92 7 In Stephens' case, the Georgia court advised, the sentence was valid because

three statutory aggravating circumstances were found and only one was
subsequently invalidated.3 92
The majority of the Supreme Court in Zant narrowed its considera-

tion of the case to three issues: (1) is the jury in a Georgia capital case
allowed too broad an area of discretion by virtue of the fact that specific
statutory guidance ends after one aggravating circumstance is found;
39 2 9
(2) was the rule of Stromberg v. California
violated in determining
Stephens' sentence; and (3) must the sentence be invalidated because the

unconstitutional aggravating circumstance was included in the jury instructions and may have been given undue weight, even though the de3 93
fendant's prior criminal record was admissible? 1
With respect to the first issue, the Court pointed out that Georgia,

unlike many states, does not provide specific direction to the sentencer
regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors once any
aggravating factor has been found.3 93 1 Stephens argued that a capital

sentencing procedure which fails to provide guidance to the sentencer at
the stage of separating cases in which the death penalty may be ordered

from those in which it shall be ordered is unconstitutional under the rule
of Furman v. Georgia.39 32

The court held that such guidance is not necessary so long as discretion is channeled to some extent.39 33 The majority noted that in Gregg v.
3927. 103 S. Ct. at 2740 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 100, 297 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1982)).
3928. 103 S. Ct. at 2740. The Georgia court explained that the function of the aggravating
circumstance is limited to distinguishing those cases in which the death penalty may be imposed from those in which it may not be imposed. It serves no directional purpose thereafter.
Id. at 2741.
3929. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). See discussion supra note 291.
3930. 103 S. Ct. at 2741.
3931. Id. The Court cited, in a footnote, the statutory provisions of Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee and Wyoming which so provide. Id. at n.12. The Model Penal Code
§ 210.6(2) (1980) also recommends specific jury instructions regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.
3932. 103 S. Ct. at 2742. See supra text accompanying notes 3904-06.
3933. 103 S. Ct. at 2742 n.14. See also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980), holding that a state capital sentencing procedure "must channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear
and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance.'" (plurality opinion)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253
(1976)). The Zant Court stated that it could not agree with Stephens' argument without being
forced to overrule Gregg v. Georgia,'in which the Court had approved Georgia's revised capital sentencing procedure even though it lacked the specific instructions argued for by Stephens.
103 S.Ct. at 2742.
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Georgia,3 93 the Georgia sentencing scheme had been held valid primarily because it requires a written finding of at least one valid statutory
aggravating circumstance and requires a mandatory review by the state
supreme court to determine whether the sentence was disproportionate
or arbitrary. The Gregg Court had held that these procedures "adequately protected against the wanton and freakish imposition of the
death penalty., 3935 Since the Georgia scheme guides the jury by use of
statutory aggravating circumstances, allows for consideration of evidence
regarding both the individual characteristics of the defendant and of the
crime, and mandates appellate review, the Court reaffirmed its holding
that the Georgia scheme is constitutional.39 36 Consequently, since Stephens received full benefit of the scheme, his sentence would not be invalidated on this argument.3 93 7
Stephens' second argument was that, under Stromberg v. Califor39 38
nia,
his sentence should be set aside because the jury relied on an
unconstitutional aggravating circumstance in reaching its decision.39 39
The Court stated that two rules may be extracted from Stromberg.394°
First, Stromberg "requires that a general verdict must be set aside if the
jury was instructed that it could rely on any of two or more independent
grounds, and one of those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may
have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground. ' 394 1 This rule, the
Court held, did not aid Stephens because the jury in his case did not
return a general verdict; rather, by specifying exactly which aggravating
circumstances it found to exist, the jury left no uncertainty to confound a
reviewing court.3 942
The second Stromberg rule requires that a general guilty verdict
must be set aside if a single count indictment charges that a defendant
3934. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3935. 103 S. Ct. at 2742 (footnote omitted).
3936. Id. at 2743-44. The Court cautioned, however, that in order for a scheme such as
Georgia's to be constitutional, "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class
of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Id. at 2742-43.
3937. Id. at 2744. The Court noted that Stephens' jury had found two valid aggravating
factors which were rational and objectively determined and had been upheld by the Georgia
Supreme Court on review. Id.
3938. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). In Stromberg, the Supreme Court overturned the verdict against
the defendant because the jury below did not specify which section of a multi-part statute it
relied on in determining guilt, and one applicable section of the statute had been held invalid.
See also discussion of Stromberg supra note 291.
3939. 103 S. Ct. at 2744.
3940. Id.
3941. Id. at 2745.
3942. Id.
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has committed a crime by both constitutionally protected and unprotected conduct, and the record does not negate the possibility that the
verdict was based partially on the protected conduct. 9 43 The Court declined to decide whether this rule would apply to Georgia capital sentencing procedures in general, 3944 holding that it did not apply in Zant
because Stephens was not charged with committing any constitutionally
protected act.3 945 Stephens' challenge to his sentence under Stromberg
thus also failed.
With respect to the third issue, Stephens claimed that his sentence
was invalid because the jury was instructed to consider an invalid aggravating circumstance and such instruction
may have affected their deci3946
sion to impose the death penalty.

The Court rejected this contention,

reasoning that the aggravating circumstance was ruled invalid not because it infringed directly on any constitutional right,3

947

but rather be-

cause it was insufficient as a guideline in separating those murder cases
for which the death penalty may be imposed from those in which it may
not be imposed. 3948 The Court emphasized that the evidence underlying
the finding of the invalid circumstance, that Stephens had a prior criminal record, would have been admissible during the sentencing phase of
3943. Id. at 2745-46 (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588 (1969)). This extension of
Stromberg was first made in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 528-29, 540-41 (1945) (judgment
reversed where single count contempt citation based on both a constitutionally protected and a
nonprotected use of speech). In Street, the Supreme Court overturned the verdict where the
defendant had been convicted on a single count indictment charging that both constitutionally
protected speech and flag burning were unlawful. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588, 594
(1969).
3944. 103 S. Ct. at 2746. In considering this possibility, the Court stated:
The jury's imposition of the death sentence after finding more than one aggravating
circumstance is not precisely the same as the jury's verdict of guilty on a single-count
indictment after finding that the defendant has engaged in more than one type of
conduct encompassed by the same criminal charge, because a wider range of considerations enters into the former determination. On the other hand, it is also not precisely the same as the imposition of a single sentence of imprisonment after guilty
verdicts on each of several separate counts in a multiple-count indictment, because
the qualitatively different sentence of death is imposed only after a channeled sentencing procedure.
Id. (footnote omitted).
3945. Id. at 2746. "In this case, the jury's finding. . . raised none of the concerns underlying the holdings in Stromberg, Thomas, and Street, for it did not treat constitutionally protected conduct as an aggravating circumstance." d.
3946. Id. at 2747.
3947. See supra note 3943 and accompanying text.
3948. 103 S. Ct. at 2747. The Court distinguished several cases in which the invalid aggravating circumstance was also constitutionally protected conduct. Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931) (display of a red flag); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (expression of
political views); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (request for jury trial). 103 S.
Ct. at 2747.
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the proceeding whether or not the invalid aggravating circumstance was
The Court refused to accord the improper instruction the
at issue.
status of a "constitutional defect," holding that the characterization of
the evidence as tending to prove a statutory aggravating circumstance
impact" on the jury when the evidence was
had an "inconsequential
3950
admissible.
otherwise
In closing, the majority made two more remarks. First, it cited the
importance of the mandatory review by the Georgia Supreme Court,39 51

suggesting that if such a review had not taken place it would have
reached a different result in Zant.395 2 Finally, the majority expressly
reserved judgment concerning the effect of consideration of an invalid
statutory circumstance by the sentencer which has been "specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty. ' 395 3 Since
Georgia's capital sentencing scheme does not require such weighing by
the sentencer, the determination of the question was not necessary to the
disposition of Zant.3954 The majority therefore reversed the decision of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and upheld Stephens' sentence.3 95 5
Justice White, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,

disagreed with the majority's treatment of the Stromberg problem. He
cited a line of cases beginning with Claassen v. United States, 3956 which
3949. 103 s. Ct. 2747.
3950. Id. at 2749. The Court noted that a trial judge may properly instruct the jury to
consider the defendant's prior criminal record in reaching the sentencing decision, and suggested that the following instruction would have been proper in Zant:
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a person who has previously been convicted of a capital felony, or that he has escaped from lawful confinement, you will be authorized to impose the death sentence, and in deciding whether
or not that sentence is appropriate you may consider the remainder of his prior criminal record.
Id. This is the "hypothetical instruction" to which Justice Marshall, dissenting, referred. See
infra text accompanying note 3976.
In addition, the Court noted that the Georgia Supreme Court had impliedly approved the
jury instructions as an accurate reflection of state law when it affirmed Stephens' sentence on
direct appeal. 103 S.Ct. at 2749 n.25.
3951. Id. at 2749-50. See also supra note 3914.
3952. 103 S.Ct. at 2749. The Court stated: "Our decision in this case depends in part on the
Id.
existence of an important procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review ......
3953. Id. at 2750. The Court appears to have answered this question in Barclay v. Florida,
103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983), in which it upheld the death penalty imposed under a statutory scheme
in which the judge is instructed to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the
judge had improperly considered a nonstatutory circumstance as an aggravating circumstance.
See discussion of Barclay beginning at text accompanying note 3977 infra.
3954. 103 S.Ct. at 2750.
3955. Id.
3956. 142 U.S. 140 (1891). This line of cases includes Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 584,
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held that if a general verdict is based on more than one count, and the
evidence adduced supports the conviction and sentence on at least one
count, the sufficiency of the evidence on the other counts need not be
inquired into.3 957 In Justice White's view, this rule suggests that even if
the evidence of Stephens' prior criminal record had been constitutionally
inadmissible, there would be no "Stromberg-Thomas-Street" problem because the sentence could be upheld on the valid grounds. 39 "
Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment, stated that he
"[wrote] separately to make clear [his] understanding of the application
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the capital sentencing procedures used in this case."'3959 He characterized the issues to be addressed
in terms nearly identical to those used by the majority. With respect to
the defendant's claim that a constitutionally acceptable capital sentencing procedure must provide instructions for weighing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, Justice Rehnquist said that such a "claim is, in
my opinion, completely foreclosed by this Court's precedents."3 960 Likewise, Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority that the Stromberg and
Street cases were not applicable to Zant.3961 Furthermore, the inclusion
of invalid statutory aggravating circumstances at the point of determining whether to impose the death penalty would have only a "minimar'
effect on the jury's decision.39 62 Similarly, Justice Rehnquist held, as did
the majority, that whatever weight the evidence of Stephens' prior criminal record gained by virtue of being labelled a statutory aggravating circumstance was insignificant.39 63
595 (1894); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S.
431, 438 (1936); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 641 n.1 (1946); and Barenblatt v.

United States, 360 U.S. 109, 115 (1959).
3957. 103 S. Ct. at 2750 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
3958. Id. at 2751 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
3959. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
3960. Id. at 2752 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist cited Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976), and drew a parallel between that case and Zant, concluding with the majority that invalidating Stephens' sentence would require overruling Gregg. 103
S. Ct. at 2752 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
3961. Id. at 2754 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist stated:
The jury [in Zant] received separate instructions as to each of several aggravating
circumstances, and returned a verdict form separately listing three circumstances.
The fact that one of these subsequently proved to be invalid does not affect the valid.
ity of the remaining two jury findings, just as the reversal on appeal of one of several
convictions returned to separate counts does not affect the remaining convictions.
There was "positive evidence" that Stephens' jury considered each aggravating circumstance "on its own merits and separately from the others."
Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
3962. Id. at 2755 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
3963. Id. at 2757 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist stated:
Whatever a defendant must show to set aside a death sentence, the present case in-
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Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented. 3 9 The dissenters primarily objected to the majority's holding that submission of
the unconstitutional aggravating circumstance to the jury was inconsequential.39 65 Justice Marshall maintained that, since Stephens' jury was
given no guidance with respect to determining the actual sentence once it
had found one aggravating circumstance, it was impossible to discern
how much emphasis the jury actually placed upon the forbidden factor.39 66 In such circumstances, Justice Marshall stated, upholding the
death penalty violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments.3 9 67
Justice Marshall regarded the majority opinion as "an absolute
mockery of [the] Court's precedents concerning capital sentencing procedures. ' 3968 The system approved by the majority, Justice Marshall rea-

soned, leaves the decision of whether a defendant is to live or die "to the
unfettered discretion of the jury" if at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance is found to exist.3 969 Such discretionary sentencing, Justice
Marshall noted, was precisely the target of the court in Furman v. Georgia,3970 and was the ill that the Court in Gregg v. Georgia397 1 found to be
cured through revised statutory measures.3 97 2
Furthermore, Justice Marshall noted that Stephens' jury was never
advised that, once one statutory agiravating circumstance was found to
exist, the statutory circumstances were to play no special role in the imposition of a particular sentence.39 73 Justice Marshall thus found that
volved only a remote possibility that the error [of instructing the jury to consider an

invalid statutory circumstance] had any effect on the jury's judgment; the 'Eighth
Amendment did not therefore require that the defendant's sentence be vacated.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
3964. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3965. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3966. Id. at 2763 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
Although the Court labors mightily in an effort to demonstrate that submission of
the unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance did not affect the jury's verdict, there is no escape from the conclusion. . . that respondent was sentenced to
death "under instructions that could have misled the jury." . . . Where a man's life
is at stake, this inconvenient fact should not be simply swept under the rug.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 429 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted)).
dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.47
3967. Id. at 2757 (Marshall, J.,
(1976) (plurality opinion)).
dissenting).
3968. Id. at 2760 (Marshall, J.,
3969. Id. (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
3970. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3971. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3972. 103 S. Ct. at 2760 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3973. Id. at 2761 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall characterized the Georgia sentencing procedures, as approved by the Court, as embodying a "threshold theory," meaning
that once the sentencer has passed the threshold of finding one statutory circumstance which
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the majority made a patently unwarranted assumption that the jury gave
no special weight to the invalid statutory circumstance. 9 74
Finally, Justice Marshall disagreed with the Court's holding that

submission of the invalid instruction to the jury did not reach the status
of a constitutional defect.3 975 He maintained that, even if the jury had
received the majority's "hypothetical instruction," the sentence would

nonetheless fail because of the lack of guidance given to the sentencer.3976
3 97 7
In Barclayv. Florida,
the Supreme Court considered whether imposition of the death penalty was constitutional when the sentence was

based in part on consideration of an aggravating circumstance not included in the Florida death penalty statute.

978

Barclay had been con-

makes a defendant eligible for the death penalty, no more guidance or direction is constitutionally required to be given to the sentencer. Id. at 2760 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall observed:
Under today's decision all the State has to do is require the jury to make some
threshold finding. Once that finding is made, the jurors can be left completely at
large, with nothing to guide them but their whims and prejudices. They need not
even consider any statutory aggravating circumstances that they have found to be
applicable. Their sentencing decision is to be the product of their discretion and of
nothing else.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3974. Id. at 2761 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3975. Id. at 2763-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3976. Id. at 2764 & n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For the text of the "hypothetical instruction," see supra note 3950.
3977. 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (plurality opinion). The Court affirmed the imposition of the
death penalty by a 6-3 vote. Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Powell,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Brennan joined. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissenting opinion.
3978. Id. at 3420. The Florida death penalty procedure, codified in FLA. STAT. § 921.141
(1979), consists of three parts: an initial determination of guilt or innocence, the rendering of
an advisory opinion by the jury, and final determination of the sentence by the judge. Section
921.141 provides:
(I) Separate proceedings on issue of penalty.-Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate
sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment as authorized by s. 775.082. The proceeding shall be
conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable. If, through
impossibility or inability, the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the
issue of penalty, having determined the guilt of the accused, the trial judge may summon a special juror or jurors as provided in chapter 913 to determine the issue of the
imposition of the penalty. If the trial jury has been waived, or if the defendant
pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled
for that purpose, unless waived by the defendant. In the proceeding, evidence may
be presented as to any matter that the court 'deems relevant to the nature of the crime
and the character of the defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6). Any
such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the
defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. However,
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victed of first-degree murder and the jury recommended a sentence of life
this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence
secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of
the State of Florida. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to
present argument for or against sentence of death.
(2) Advisory sentence by the jury.-After hearing all the evidence, the jury
shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced
to life imprisonment or death.
(3) Findings in support of sentence of death.-Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if
the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon
which the sentence of death is based as to the facts:
(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection
(5), and
(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the
court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing
proceedings. If the court does not make the findings requiring the death sentence,
the court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with s. 775.082.
(4) Review of judgment and sentence.-The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida
within sixty (60) days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record,
unless the tiem is extended for an additional period not to exceed thirty (30) days by
the Supreme Court for good cause shown. Such review by the Supreme Court shall
have priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
(5) Aggravating circumstances.-Aggravating circumstances shall be limited
to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or ws
an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
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imprisonment. 3979 The trial judge, after reviewing the presentence report,
sentenced Barclay to death. 3980 As required by Florida law, the judge
made a written account of the statutory aggravating and mitigating fac-

tors which had influenced his decision,398 ' but he also included as an
aggravating factor the fact that Barclay had an "extensive criminal rec-

ord.

' 3982

In addition, in the comments explaining his decision, the trial

aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f)The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise
of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated,
and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
(6) Mitigating circumstances.-Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
3979. 103 S.Ct. at 3421. Barclay and four accomplices, all members of the "Black Liberation Army," "set out in a car armed with a twenty two [sic] caliber pistol and a knife with the
intent to kill . . . any white person that they came upon under such advantageous circumstances that they could murder him, her or them." Id. at 3420 (quoting Barclay v. State, 343
So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 1977)). They picked up a white, eighteen year old, male hitchhiker,
took him to a garbage dump, and brutally murdered him. They finished by attaching a note to
the victim's body which threatened repeated attacks against white people. Later, they sent
tape recordings to the victim's mother, detailing how her son had died and making further
threats against all whites. Id. at 3420-21. The jury performed its sentencing function under
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1979). See supra note 3977. Barclay's jury voted 7-5 to recommend
life imprisonment rather than the death penalty. 103 S.Ct. at 3421.
3980. 103 S.Ct. at 3421. The judge acted under FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3). See supra note
3977.
3981. The trial judge found the following statutory aggravating circumstances to exist:
§ 921.141(5)(c) (creating great risk of death to many); § 921.141(5)(d) (kidnapping);
§ 921.141(5)(g) (endeavoring to disrupt governmental functions and law enforcement); and
§ 921.141(5)(h) (heinous, atrocious or cruel felony). See supra note 3977. No statutory mitigating circumstances were found. 103 S. Ct. at 3421.
3982. Id. Barclay had been convicted previously of breaking and entering with intent to
commit the felony of grand larceny, but the trial judge did not know whether it involved the
use or threat of violence. He pointed out that crimes of this type often involve the use or threat
of violence, and stated that" 'there are more aggravating than mitigating circumstances.'" Id.
at 3421-22.
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judge "discussed the racial motive for the murder and compared it with
his own experiences in the army in World War II, when he saw Nazi
concentration camps and their victims. 3' 983 On appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed, approving both the judge's findings and the
sentence.3 984
Barclay raised several challenges to his sentence before the United
States Supreme Court. First, he argued that the trial judge improperly
considered his prior criminal record as an aggravating circumstance.
Second, he challenged the validity of the trial court's findings with respect to certain of the statutory aggravating circumstances. Finally, Barclay argued that the judge impermissibly considered racial hatred to be
3985
an aggravating circumstance.
The plurality disposed of Barclay's second and third contentions
briefly, holding that the contested findings would be upheld as a matter

of law unless they were "so unprincipled or arbitrary as to somehow violate the United States Constitution. ' 39 86 The plurality thought that they
were not.398 7 With respect to the contention that the judge should not
have introduced his own experiences with Nazi concentration camps into
the defendant's sentencing proceedings, the Court held that such a comparison was "neither irrational nor arbitrary," and would be upheld "[a]s
long as [the judge's] discretion is guided in a constitutionally adequate
way. . . and so long as the decision [was] not so wholly arbitrary as to
3988
offend the Constitution.
3983. Id. at 3423 (footnote omitted). The judge concluded:
To attempt to initiate such a race war in this country is too horrible to contemplate for both our black and white citizens. Such an attempt must be dealt with by
just and swift legal process and when justified by a Jury verdict of guilty-then to
terminate and remove permanently from society those who would choose to initiate
this diabolical course.
Id. at 3423 n.6.
3984. See Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978).
The Florida court later vacated its judgment sua sponte after the Supreme Court handed down
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (defendant was denied due process when, over jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment, trial judge imposed death sentence based in part on
presentence report, the contents of which were not disclosed to defendant and to which defendant was not given an opportunity to respond), and remanded Barclay for further hearings
and resentencing. The trial court again imposed the death penalty, and the Florida Supreme
Court affirmed in Barclay v. State, 411 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981). The Florida Supreme Court
refused, however, to "abrogate the law of the case," as decided on the first appeal, and confined
its review of the second appeal to the proceedings on remand. 103 S. Ct. at 3422.
3985. 103 S. Ct. at 3422-24.
3986. Id. at 3423.
3987. Id. The Court distinguished Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), in which imposition of the death penalty was held to be arbitrary. In Godfrey, the defendant had been sentenced to death on the strength of one unsupported aggravating circumstance. Id. at 3423 n.5.
3988. Id. at 3423-24. The Court further stated: "Such a comparision is not an inappropriate
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The plurality agreed with Barclay that the trial judge's treatment of
Barclay's prior criminal record as an "aggravating circumstance' was
improper. 398 9 However, the Court rejected the suggestion that the error
39 90 the
amounted to a constitutional violation. Citing Proffitt v. Florida,

Court noted that the Florida sentencing procedures have survived constitutional attack. 399 1 Furthermore, the Court observed that, when a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance plays a part in the determination of
sentence and no mitigating factors are present, the Florida Supreme
Court uses a "harmless error analysis. 3 992 In addition, the Court found

that evidence of Barclay's criminal record was properly introduced at the
sentencing phase, and there was no contention that Barclay was impugned for engaging in constitutionally protected activity. 3993 The Court
concluded that, since the Florida Supreme Court has approved of death
sentences where both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating circum-

stances were taken into account, and "mere errors of state law are not the
concern of this Court. . .unless they rise. . . to the level of a denial of
rights protected by the United States Constitution," Barclay's argument
would fail.39 94

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Powell, wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Although he agreed with the plurality's decision,
he wrote separately because "insome of its language the plurality speaks
with unnecessary, and somewhat inappropriate, breadth. ' 399 Referring
way of weighing the 'especially heinous, atrocious and cruel' statutory aggravating circumstance in an attempt to determine whether it warrants imposition of the death penalty." Id. at
3424.
3989. Id. at 3422. The Court noted that Florida conceded this point. Id. (citing Mikenas v.
State, 367 So. 2d 606, 610 (Fla. 1978)).
3990. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
3991. 103 S.Ct. at 3425.
3992. Id. at 3427 (citing Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002-03 (Fla. 1977) (if no harm has
resulted to the defendant, the sentence will be affirmed)). The Court also noted that the Florida court will reverse a death sentence if, after harmless error analysis, only one "relatively
weak aggravating circumstance [is] left standing." Id. (citing Lewis v. State, 398 So. 2d 432
(Fla. 1981)). In addition, a death sentence imposed over the life sentence recommendation by
the jury will not be allowed to stand unless "'the facts suggesting a sentence of death (are] so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.'" Id. (quoting Tedder v.
State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
3993. Id. (citing Zant v. Stephens, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2746-47 (1983)).
3994. Id. at 3428 (citation omitted). The Court emphasized that, as in the Georgia scheme
discussed in Zant v. Stephens, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983), the Florida Supreme Court automatically reviews all death sentences and had, in this case, done so twice. 103 S.Ct. at 3425 n. 10 &
3428. Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court adhered to the rule in Tedder v. State, supra
note 3992, in considering cases in which the trial judge had overriden the jury's life sentence
recommendation,. and would reverse unless " 'virtually no reasonable person could differ.' "Id.
at 3428 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
3995. 103 S.Ct. at 3429 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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to the plurality's statement that "[o]ur review of [the Florida courts']
findings is limited to the question whether they are so unprincipled or
arbitrary as to somehow violate the United States Constitution,"3 996 Justice Stevens emphasized that the Court had never held that such an inquiry is sufficient in a capital case, "[n]or does a majority of the Court
today adopt that standard. ' 3997 Instead, Justice Stevens observed, the
Court has taken an active role in assuring that "the death penalty will be
imposed in a consistent, rational manner." 3998 Accordingly, Justice Stevens stated that he wanted to focus attention on the factors which limit a
sentencer's discretion.

39 99

Justice Stevens went on to concentrate his discussion on the constitutional posture in regard to statutory and nonstatutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. He noted that it is not constitutionally necessary that nonstatutory mitigating circumstances be considered in the senNor is it mandated by the Constitution that only
tencer's balance.'
statutory aggravating circumstances be considered." 1 The Florida
scheme thus provides greater protection to defendants than is constitutionally required." 2
3996. Id. at 3423 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

3997. Id. at 3429 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
3998. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens cited Zant v. Stephens,

103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), as an example of cases in which the court has spoken to the need for
the "limiting factors" of a statutory scheme which defines the class of persons who may be
subject to the death penalty, and which ensures meaningful appellate review. 103 S. Ct. at
3429 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
3999. 103 S. Ct. at 3430 & n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens
stated:
The Constitution does not require that nonstatutory mitigating circumstances be
considered before the legal threshold is crossed and the defendant is found to be
eligible for the death sentence. It is constitutionally acceptable to bring such evidence into the decisionmaking process as part of the discretionary post-threshold
determination. In this case petitioner does not contend that any relevant mitigating
evidence was excluded from his initial sentencing hearing, or that the trial court or
jury was precluded as a matter of law from considering any information or arguments in mitigation.
Id. at 3430 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
4000. At the time Barclay was sentenced, only statutory mitigating circumstances were
weighed in the "threshold" determination of sentence under Florida law. Florida later
amended its statute to allow all mitigating evidence, statutory or nonstatutory, to enter into
the threshold decision. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
4001. Id. at 3432-33 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 164, 196-97, 260 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248, 256-57 n.14 (1976)), to
support the proposition that "as long as [the nonstatutory] information is relevant to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime," it is not constitutionally barred. 103
S. Ct. at 3433 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
4002. 103 S. Ct. at 3432-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). In a footnote, Justice
Stevens acknowledged that the Florida court sometimes confirms convictions when nonstatutory aggravating circumstances have been introduced, but never when no statutory aggravat-
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Furthermore, Justice Stevens wrote, the Florida Supreme Court in
performing automatic appellate reviews of all death penalty cases has not
"become a rubber stamp for lower court death-penalty determina-

tions.""

3

Rather, the Florida court reexamines the aggravating and

mitigating factors in each case and has frequently reversed death
sentences. 4004 In conclusion, Justice Stevens held that Barclay had been
afforded all the constitutional protections due him, and concurred in the
4 5
affirmance. 00

Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in an opinion written by
Justice Marshall.a"°6 After reiterating his opinion that the death penalty
is unconstitutional under all circumstances, Justice Marshall went on to
explain the inadequacies in the plurality opinion.

Justice Marshall's objections to the majority's conclusion pertained
to the sentencing judge's rationale for imposing the death penalty, and
the Florida Supreme Court's cursory review of Barclay's case. 4008 Justice

Marshall reasoned that since the jury had recommended life imprisonment rather than death, it must have found sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating ones. 4° 9 Yet, the trial judge made

no mention of such a finding by the jury, and, in fact, converted the
nonexistence of one of the statutory mitigating circumstances into an aggravating circumstance.

°1 0

Justice Marshall noted that such a conclu-

ing circumstances have been found, and only when no statutory mitigating circumstances
exist. "By definition, one or more statutory aggravating circumstances will always outweigh
the complete absence of statutory mitigating circumstances." Id. at 3432 n.12 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment). In such a situation, Justice Stevens explained, the Florida
Supreme Court considers that inclusion of one or more nonstatutory aggravating factors along
with at least one statutory factor does no harm because there is no possibility that the nonstatutory aggravating factors served to outweigh any mitigating factors. Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
4003. Id. at 3436 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
4004. Id. at 3436-37 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens noted that,
since 1972, the Florida Supreme Court has affirmed only 120 of the 212 death penalty cases it
reviewed. Id. at 3436 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
4005. Id. at 3437 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in thejudgment). Stevens remarked that he did not
"applaud" the cursory nature of the Florida Supreme Court's opinions upholding Barclay's
sentence, but found no reason to reverse in the absence of any constitutional error. Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
4006. Id. at 3437 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
4007. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
4008. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
4009. Id. & n.1 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall's reasoning that the jury's recommendation is based both on a determination of whether sufficient aggravating circumstances
exist to invoke the death penalty and whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances
which outweigh the aggravating factors, is based on FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2). See supra note
3977.
4010. 103 S.Ct. at 3438 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). The trial judge concluded that, since
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sion is clearly contrary to Florida law." 1 1 Furthermore, Justice
Marshall demonstrated that several of the judge's findings with respect to
statutory aggravating circumstances were erroneous or suspect." 12 Because of these factors, and the requirements of State v. Dixon' 3 and
Tedder v. State," 4 "the judge's sentencing order in this case was totally
inadequate."'' 5
Justice Marshall also criticized the Florida Supreme Court's "perfunctory analysis" of Barclay's case on review.' 6 The Florida court
had given some discussion to the situation of Barclay's co-defendant and
indicated that "virtually the same considerations" applied to Barclay, ignoring the problems with the sentencing order and the significant differences between Barclay and his co-defendant. 40 7 Justice Marshall
concluded that Barclay's death sentence should be vacated.1'
Justice Blackmun also dissented in a brief separate opinion. He
stated that "when a State chooses to impose capital punishment. . . it
must be imposed by thet rule of law."'4 9 He concluded that the "errors
Barclay had a prior criminal record, the mitigating circumstances that a defendant "has no
significant history of prior criminal activity" (§ 921.141(6)(a)) did not apply, and the prior
record constituted an aggravating circumstance. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4011. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Mikenas v. State, 367 So. 2d 606, 610 (Fla. 1978)
("substantial history of prior criminal activity is not an aggravating circumstance under the
statute")).
4012. Id. at 3438-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4013. 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973) (all statutory aggravating factors "must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt before being considered by judge or jury"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
4014. 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) (after a jury recommendation of life imprisonment, a
judge may not order death unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and
convincing that no reasonable person could differ").
4015. 103 S. Ct. at 3440 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall went on to point out that
the trial judge's errors were not accidental or unusual for that judge. In the past, the same
judge had sentenced three other defendants to death over the life sentence recommendation of
the jury, finding each time the same aggravating circumstances he found in Barclay's case.
Justice Marshall stated:
The judge has repeatedly found that the felony was committed by a person under a
sentence of imprisonment, that the defendant had previously been convicted of a
violent felony, and that the defendant created a great risk of death to many persons,
even though virtually all of thesefindings had no foundation in Floridalaw. And each
time, Judge Olliff has recounted his experiences during World War II and recited
boiler-plate language to the effect that he was not easily shocked but that the offense
involved shocked him.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
4016. Id. at 3441 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4017. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266, 1271 n.8 (Fla.
1977) (per curiam)). Justice Marshall noted that the Florida court had, in fact, stated: "[the
trial judge's] thorough analysis is precisely the type we would expect from mature, deliberative
judges in this state." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
4018. Id. at 3445 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4019. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and missteps" in this case amounted to a denial of due process, and that

the sentence should not have been upheld.'
E.

2°

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."4 2 1 It serves to confine the states' power of punishment within

civilized standards.4 °22 Both barbarous forms of punishment and grossly
excessive ones are cruel and unusual. A sentence may be excessive if it
serves no appropriate societal interest, or is disproportionate to the offense.4 "2 3 Thus, the eighth amendment has been interpreted as requiring

that a punishment fit the crime. 40 24 This does not imply, however, that
capital punishment will always be struck down under the eighth amend-

ment.40 25 Instead, the question is whether the defendant receives his or
her "just dessert." Thus, "'imprisonment in the State prison for a long
term of years might be so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute

a cruel and unusual punishment.'

"4026

The Supreme Court has on occasion stated that the eighth amendment prohibits a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the
crime.4 "2 7 The Court has used disproportionality of sentence to chal4020. Id. at 3445-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4021. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. For a discussion of the history of the eighth amendment,
see Solem v. Helm, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3006-10 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 287-93
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 319-22 (1972) (per curiam)
(Marshall, J., concurring); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The
OriginalMeaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969).
4022. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
The eighth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
The Ninth Circuit interprets the eighth amendment as a prohibition against punishment
"'so out of proportion to the crime committed that it shocks a balanced sense of justice.'"
United States v. Holman, 436 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir.) (court allowed eight-year prison sentence for narcotics violations) (quoting Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir.
1960)), cerL denied, 402 U.S. 913 (1970).
4023. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 293 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
4024. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
The Supreme Court has interpreted the eighth amendment as a prohibition against any
punishment inconsistent with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
4025. See, eg., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-69 (1973) (death penalty not per se cruel
and unusual); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241-42 (1972) (per curiam) (death penalty is
not cruel, unless manner of execution is inhuman and barbarous).
4026. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
4027. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 367 (1910); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100 (1958)).
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lenge severe forms of punishment for non-capital crimes.4 "2 8 Yet the
Court has ruled that the length of prison sentences in felony cases is

"purely a matter of legislative prerogative."' 422 9 This ruling has resulted

in a drastic reduction of proportionality tests in non-capital cases.4 °30 In
recent years the proportionality analysis has appeared most frequently in
opinions dealing with the death penalty. °31
4028. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
4029. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980). The Court struck down any mandate for
proportionality under the eighth amendment, limiting its use to reviewing sentences for capital
crimes.
In 1964, Rummel was convicted of fraudulently using a credit card; in 1969, he was convicted of passing a forged check; and in 1973, he was charged with obtaining money by false
pretenses. The trial judge imposed a life sentence, relying on Texas' recidivist statute, which
mandates a life sentence upon conviction for a third felony.
The Rummel Court recognized that some disproportionate prison sentences will violate
the eighth amendment: "This is not to say that a proportionality principle would not come
into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent, . . .[for example] if a legislature
made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment." Id. at 274 n.ll. The Court
implied that proportionality was a constitutional requirement in death penalty cases. Id. at
272. The Court stated, however, that the eighth amendment did not require proportionality
for non-capital crimes due to the substantial difference between the death penalty and any
other punishment. Id. The Court quoted Justice Stewart in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (per curiam):
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection
of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is
unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of
humanity.
445 U.S. at 272 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
The Rummel Court distinguished Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), where a
proportionality rationale was used to strike down a non-capital sentence. The distinction between the two cases was based on uniqueness. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272-73. The Rummel
Court emphasized the extreme and dramatic nature of Weems' punishment for falsifying a
public record. The bizarre sentence included 12 years of hard labor and permanent civil disabilities. Id. at 273 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 366). See also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371
(1982) (per curiam), where the defendant asserted that a 40-year sentence was so grossly disproportionate to the crime of possessing fewer than nine ounces of marijuana that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Hutto Court relied on Rummel as its sole authority:
"[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this
Court must be followed by the lower federal courts. . . ." Id. at 375.
4030. In United States v. Valenzuela, 646 F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir. 1980), for example, the
Ninth Circuit struck down a disproportionality challenge, ruling that life imprisonment without possibility of parole was not sufficiently analogous to capital punishment to warrant disproportionality review. The Ninth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court has regarded life
imprisonment without possibility of parole as similar to other prison sentences. Id. at 354
(citing Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 & n.7 (1974)).
4031. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1973); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 458 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
Except for cases involving capital punishment, few challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences have been successful. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
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In Solem v. Helm,4 03 2 the Supreme Court held that the eighth

amendment prohibited a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
recidivist convicted of a seventh, nonviolent felony. The life sentence

was deemed disproportionate to his crime of passing a bad check.
By 1975, the State of South Dakota had convicted defendant Helm
of six felonies: he had three convictions for third-degree burglary, and

one conviction each for obtaining money under false pretenses, grand
larceny, and third-offense driving while intoxicated. In 1979, Helm was
charged with passing a "no account" check for one hundred dollars. 40 3
The maximum punishment for that crime would normally have been five
years imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a $5000 fine. Because of
his criminal record, however, Helm was sentenced to life imprisonment

without possibility of parole under South Dakota's recidivist statute. 40 34
In a five-to-four decision, Justice Powell reasoned that the propor-

tionality principle should apply, thus invalidating the criminal sentence.
The analysis relied on historical and Supreme Court precedent. 40 35 The
4032. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
4033. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-41-1.2 (1979) provides in pertinent part:
- Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another for present
consideration with intent to defraud, passes a chik drawn on a financial institution
knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account
with such financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony.
4034. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (Supp. 1981) provides: "When a defendant has
been convicted of at least three prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, the
sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony."
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment and a $25,000 fine.
South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. CODIFIED
LAWs ANN. § 24-154 (1979). The Governor may pardon prisoners or commute their
sentences, S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 3, but no other relief from sentence is available.
In the present case, the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. The Governor denied Helm's request for commutation. Helm then sought habeas corpus relief in the
United States District Court, arguing that the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The district court denied relief, but the
court of appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
eighth amendment question and affirmed.
4035. 103 S. Ct. at 3006-10. The Court observed that the belief that punishment should be
proportionate to the crime is deeply embedded in common law. Id. at 3006. This belief was
expressed in the Magna Carta, applied by English courts for centuries, and manifested in the
English Bill of Rights in language that was used in the eighth amendment. Id. at 3007.
The constitutional concept of proportionality has been followed explicitly in the Supreme
Court for almost a century. Id. at 3007-08. The Court has applied the principle to invalidate
criminal sentences. Id. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910), for example, the
Court noted that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to the offense." See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (statute making it a misdemeanor to be addicted to narcotics violates eighth and fourteenth amendments).
The Court has recently used proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in cer-
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Court observed that when sentences are reviewed under the eighth
amendment, the proportionality analysis should be guided by objective
criteria that prior Court cases have recognized."' 36 Such criteria include:
(1) gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty;"' 3 7 (2) sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;' 3 8 and (3) sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. 4 3 9 The
tain situations. 103 S. Ct. at 3008. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)
(death penalty disproportionate to felony murder where defendant did not kill or intend to
kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (death sentence held grossly disproportionate
to rape).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the principle of proportionality applies to felony
prison sentences. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3009 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 377). Cf.
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) ("[c]onfinement in a prison. . . is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards"). Moreover, no penalty is per
se constitutional; the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 667, that even a single
day in prison may be unconstitutional under certain circumstances. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct.
at 3009-10.
4036. 103 S. Ct. at 3010-11. The Court reiterated the objective factors that prior Court cases
have used. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Proportionality was the
ground for striking down a death penalty for rape in Coker. The Coker Court stated that a
punishment is unconstitutionally excessive "if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain or suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."
Id. at 592.
4037. 103 S. Ct. at 3010 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982) (Court compared robbery to murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (Court considered
gravity of rape and compared it to other crimes such as murder); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (Court weighed nature of crime of drug addiction); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 363, 365 (1910) (Court commented on pettiness of offense)).
4038. Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 795-96 (1982) (Court noted that all other
felony murderers on death row were more culpable than defendant); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910) (Court enumerated more serious crimes that were subject to less
severe penalties)).
4039. Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982) ("only about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant . . . [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to
die"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) (Court observed that Georgia was only
state authorizing death penalty for rape of adult female); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 380 (1910) (Court considered that under federal law, a similar offense was punishable by
only a fine and two years imprisonment)). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80
(1976) (Court considered that many states enacted statutes authorizing death penalty).
The Court in Helm first proceeded on the assumption that courts are competent to weigh
the relative severity of crimes. 103 S. Ct. at 3011. Comparisons can be drawn with respect to
the harm to the victim or society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. Id.
(citing Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168, 169-70 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (assault with intent to
murder deemed more serious than simple assault), cert. denied,430 U.S. 973 (1977); Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery held more serious
than robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P.2d 233, 235 (1955) (rape considered more serious than assault with intent to rape)).
The Helm court noted that the guilt of the offender is also an accepted criterion for comparing the gravity of offenses. 103 S. Ct. at 3011 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798
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Court considered the defendant's sentence without possibility of parole,
and whether the chance of commutation was adequate to sustain an
otherwise unconstitutional punishment.
In reviewing the defendant's sentence, the Court first considered the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. The Court noted

that the offense of uttering a "no account" check for one hundred dollars
is regarded by society as among the less serious crimes. 40 40 The defendant's crime involved no violence or threat of violence, and the value of

the check was relatively low.
The Court observed that the defendant's prior felonies were rela-

tively minor; they were nonviolent and not directed against a person.
The sentence was the most severe that the state could have given any
criminal for any crime.4

In considering the second criterion, sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction, the Court observed that the defendant

was treated in the same manner as, or more harshly than, other criminals
in the state who committed far more serious crimes.4 42 The Court concluded that their crimes were more serious than uttering a "no account"

check, even though the check writer had already committed six minor
(1982) (defendant's conduct was not as culpable as his accomplices', because of defendant's
lack of intent to kill)).
The Court's analysis next proceeded on the assumption that courts can compare different
sentences. Id. The Court observed that comparisons can be drawn between capital and noncapital punishment, and between sentences of imprisonment and sentences with no deprivation
of freedom. Id. at 3011-12. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver, defendant has right to representation at trial whenever imprisonment is involved). The Court noted that for sentences of imprisonment, the issue is where to
draw the line. 103 S. Ct. at 3012. While recognizing that such decisions are problematic, the
Court still acknowledged that the courts are constantly saddled with the responsibility of
drawing similar distinctions in a variety of situations. Id. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 522 (1972) ("any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the
right in the particular context of the case"); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970)
(defendant has right to jury trial "where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized"). In citing these cases where the Court had distinguished between prison sentences, the
Court implied that it was competent to draw similar lines in the present case.
4040. 103 S. Ct. at 3012-13.
4041. Id. at 3013.
4042. Id. at 3014. The Court noted that there was a handful of crimes that required punishment by life imprisonment: murder, and on a second or third offense, treason, first-degree
manslaughter, first-degree arson, and kidnapping. There was a second group of crimes for
which life imprisonment could be imposed at the judge's discretion. These crimes included:
on a first offense, treason, first-degree manslaughter, first-degree arson, and kidnapping; on a
second or third offense, attempted murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and firstdegree rape; and any felony after three prior offenses. Id. There was a third group of very
serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of
heroin dealing or aggravated assault. Id.
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felonies.0 43
In considering the final criterion, sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions, the Court observed that such a

strict sentence could not have been imposed in forty-eight of the fifty
states.4 '" Nevada is the only state other than South Dakota that authorizes life imprisonment without possibility of parole under the facts of
this case." 5 The Court observed that there was no indication that any
defendant whose prior offenses were as minor as Helm's had received the

maximum penalty in Nevada. Thus, the Court concluded that Helm's
sentence was harsher than it would have been in any other state. 4° 46
The Court considered whether the possibility of commutation was

adequate to sustain an otherwise unconstitutional punishment.

The

Court disagreed with the state's argument that this possibility matched
the possibility of parole.' 7 The Court's analysis emphasized the distinctions between parole and commutation. 4" " Parole, an established area in

the rehabilitative system, is normally anticipated in the overwhelming
number of cases, assuming good behavior. Parole is governed by specified legal standards." 9 Commutation, however, is an ad hoc use of executive clemency, that may occur at any time for any reason, without
adherence to any standards. °5 ° The Court distinguished Rummel v. Es-

telle,40 51 which held that a life sentence imposed after even a third nonvi4043. Id. at 3014.
4044. Id.
4045. Id.
4046. Id. at 3015.
4047. Id. The state reasoned that the governor could commute the defendant's sentence to a
term of years. Id. Relying on Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the state argued that
the possibility of parole in Rummel corresponded to the chance of executive clemency in the
present case. 103 S. Ct. at 3015.
4048. 103 S. Ct. at 3015-16.
4049. Id. at 3015 (citing Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1979)
(Court described Nebraska parole system); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)
("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their sentences has become an
integral part of the penological system")).
4050. Id. (citing Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463-65 (1981)). In
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981), the Court held that the
Board's consistent practice of granting commutation to most life inmates did not create a
protected constitutional entitlement. The Court held that no explanation of the Board's reasons for denial of a commutation request was necessary. Id.
The court in Helm observed that prior Supreme Court cases have distinguished between
parole and commutation. 103 S. Ct. at 3015 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477
(1972) ("[r]ather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation
on imprisonment of convicted criminals"); ConnecticutBd. of Pardons,452 U.S. at 466 ("there
is a vast difference between a denial of parole. . . and a state's refusal to commute a lawful
sentence")).
4051. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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olent felony conviction did not violate the eighth amendment.4 5 2 Here
the Court concluded that the South Dakota commutation system was
53
different from the parole system presented in Rummel. 40
In distinguishing Rummel, the Court noted that Rummel did not
rely merely on the existence of a parole system.40 5 4 The Rummel decision considered that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting
'good time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed
a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as little
as 12 years."' '~SS In contrast, the Helm Court noted that no life sentence
in South Dakota had been commuted in over eight years, while parole,
when authorized, was granted regularly during that period.40 5 6 Even if
Helm's sentence was commuted, he would be eligible to be considered
only for parole, the terms of which are more stringent in South Dakota
than in Texas."' 57 Thus, the Court concluded that a life sentence imposed after a seventh felony conviction was significantly disproportionate
to the offense and violated the eighth amendment. 4 58
The dissent emphatically asserted the importance of attention to recent precedent, especially Rummel. The dissent argued: "[T]oday the
Court blithely discards any concept of stare decisis, trespasses gravely on
the authority of the States, and distorts the concept of proportionality of
punishment by tearing it from its moorings in capital cases. ' 4° 59 Moreover, the dissent rejected the argument that all of the defendant's crimes
were relatively minor, and argued that by comparison Rummel was less
culpable.' 6 ° The dissent set out to prove that the differences between the
instant case and Rummel were insubstantial, that Helm's argument paled
alongside Rummel's, and that Helm deserved his sentence, since even the
Rummel Court imposed life imprisonment.
4052. Id. at 285. See supra note 4029.
4053. 103 S. Ct. at 3015-16.
4054. Id. at 3015.
4055. Id. (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280 (1980)). Rummel could have been
eligible for parole in as few as 10 years. Id. at 3016. "[A] proper assessment of Texas' treatment of Rummel could hardly ignore the possibility that he will not actually be imprisoned for
the rest of his life." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 280-81.
4056. 103 S. Ct. at 3016.
4057. Id.
4058. Id.
4059. Id. at 3017 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). "While the doctrine of stare decisis does not
absolutely bind the Court to its prior opinions, a decent regard for the orderly development of
the law and the administration of justice requires that directly controlling cases be either followed or candidly overruled." Id. at 3020-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In response, the majority asserted that its decision was completely consistent with prior
Court cases, including Rummel. Id. at 3008 n.13, 3016 n.32 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4060. Id. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The dissent argued that although the majority holding could not be

reconciled with Rummel, the majority did not overrule that case. Helm
advanced the same argument as Rummel; the Court rejected Rummel's
arguments, even though his case was stronger.' 6 The Rummel Court
declined to ascertain, using a moral scale, whether Rummel had received
a fair sentence. 4°62 Thus, the Rummel Court's approach conflicted with

that of the majority in the present case, which stressed the importance of
judging the proportional gravity of an offense. 4° 63 The dissent argued, in
contrast, that proportionality review has never been applied to a case
involving solely a sentence of imprisonment. 4 64 The dissent cited Rummel for the proposition that the eighth amendment does not empower
courts to review a sentence of imprisonment to determine its proportionality to the offense.4 6 5 The Rummel Court emphasized that the Court

may not usurp legislative discretion by drawing lines between different
sentences of imprisonment. 4 6 6

The dissent argued that the majority's three objective criteria for
determining proportionality were completely at odds with the reasoning
in Rummel. 41 67 The Rummel Court disagreed with precisely the same
4061. Id. at 3018 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
4062. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4063. Id. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4064. Id. at 3018 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Rummel Court similarly said that proportionality analysis generally applied only to capital punishment cases because of the "unique
nature of the death penalty." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
The Rummel Court likewise rejected the importance of determining whether Rummel's
punishment was disproportionate to his offense. Id. at 273. Such a determination was salient
in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), where an extreme, painful penalty had been
imposed. The Rummel Court distinguished. Weems on the basis of the severity of the
punishment.
4065. "'Given the unique nature of the punishments considered in Weems ... one could
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly
classified and classifiable as felonies,. . . the length of the sentence actually imposed ispurely a
matter of legislativeprerogative.'" Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3018 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (emphasis in original)).
4066. Id. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275
(1980)). The Rummel decision was followed in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1981) (per
curiam), where the Court condemned judicial intrusions into the line-drawing process that is
the responsibility of the legislature.
This same philosophy had appeared 70 years earlier in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 353 (1910) (citing In re Bayard, 63 How. Pr. 73, 78 (1882)), which asserted that "[c]ourts
would not be justified in interfering with the discretion and judgment of the legislature, except
in very extreme cases."
4067. 103 S. Ct. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). First, the Rummel Court rejected Rummel's suggestion to consider the gravity of the offense, holding that the absence of violence
does not necessarily decrease societal interest in the punishment for a particular crime. Id.
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980)).
Next, the Court denied Rummel's argument to consider the sentences imposed for coin-
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68

The dissent asserted that the eighth amendment does not prohibit
imprisonment disproportionate to the crime. It argued that the Court

has applied a proportionality analysis only in extreme cases, such as capital punishment."' 6 9 The dissent feared that the Court's holding would

inundate the appellate courts with cases in which guiding standards
would be lacking: "By asserting the power to review sentences of imprisonment for excessiveness the Court launches into uncharted and unchartable waters." 7 0
Addressing the specific facts of the present case, the dissent rejected

the notion that Helm's sentence was disproportionate to his crime. The
dissent argued that Helm's crimes, including burglary and drunk driving,
had potential for violence, whereas Rummel committed "three truly non-

violent felonies."' 4° 7 Thus, the dissent disagreed with the majority holding that Helm's sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment,

while Rummel's did not.
The dissent rejected the majority opinion that a life sentence with

possibility of commutation is excessive, in contrast to a life sentence with
possibility of parole."' 72 The dissent rebutted the majority's holding by

asserting that a well-behaved "lifer" in Helm's position would most
likely not serve for life."' 73 In concluding, the dissent again emphasized
the defendant's seven felony convictions, 74 the importance of adherence
to recent precedent,'"' and the Court's inability to eclipse the power of
4 76
the legislature. 0
mission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Rummel Court noted that recidivist laws
vary widely among states, only some states have comprehensive provisions for parole, and such
comparisons invade concepts of federalism. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Rummel, 445
U.S. at 280-82). Finally, the Court rejected Rummel's suggestion to consider sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, holding that consideration of the severity of
punishment is within the province of the legislature. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282-83 n.27).
4068. Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
4069. Id. at 3021 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4070. Id. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4071. Id. at 3023 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4072. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4073. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "Only a fraction of 'lifers' are not released within a
relatively few years. . . . [There is a significant probability that respondent will experience
what so many 'lifers' experience." Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4074. "Surely seven felony convictions warrant the conclusion that respondent is incorrigible." Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4075. "It is even more curious that the Court should brush aside controlling precedents that
are barely in the bound volumes of United States Reports." Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4076. "The Court would do well to heed Justice Black's comments about judges overruling
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Probation

1. Restitution
Restitution, as a condition of parole, is limited to the amounts for
which a defendant is actually convicted. 7 7
In United States v. Orr,' 78 defendant Orr was charged with nine

counts of embezzling'

79

$3715 from two banks at which she had been

employed. Orr plea bargained with the prosecution and agreed to plead
guilty to a superseding indictment charging two misdemeanor counts of

embezzling $100 from each bank. The prosecution, in return, agreed to
drop the other charges and make no sentencing recommendations. The
agreement did not make reference to restitution. In the presentence report, Orr admitted that she had taken $3815. According to the
presentence interview, it was her belief that she could be made to repay
only the amount that she was charged with in the indictment against
her.4°8 Nothing in the record indicated that Orr agreed to make total

restitution as a condition of her probation.
On the first count, Orr was sentenced to ninety days imprisonment
and on the second count she received a suspended sentence with five
years probation. 4° 81 The probation was made conditional on Orr making
restitution of $3815. 082
On appeal, Orr argued that she could not, as a condition of probation, be made to pay restitution in excess of the amount for which she
the considered actions of legislatures under the guise of constitutional interpretation." Id.
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4077. United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431, 433-34 (9th Cir. 1982). This is the rule in the
majority ofjurisdictions. See United States v. Tyler, 602 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1979) (restitution
exacted for customs fraud violations); United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1008 (3d Cir.
1977) (trial court exceeded its authority by imposing a restitution order in excess of amount
specified in the plea bargain); United States v. Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14, 22-23 (7th Cir.) (where
actual damages were not determined as to the amount and identity of aggrieved party, $10,000
restitution ordered to Illinois Director of Insurance was an abuse of authority), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 958 (1969); United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 1952) (probation
conditioned on payment of all income tax due; condition would become inoperative if by the
time of prisoner's release, no determination of prisoner's tax liability could be made).
4078. 691 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1982).
4079. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee of, or connected in any
capacity with any Federal Reserve bank, member bank, national bank or insured
bank. . . embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully misapplies any of the moneys,
funds or credits of such bank. . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. . ..
4080. 691 F.2d at 432.
4081. Id.
4082. Id.
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was convicted. °83 She also contended that restitution could not be ordered to the bank involved in count one, because it was not the count for
which she received conditional probation.' 84
The requirement of restitution as a condition of probation is authorized by 18 U.S.C. section 3651.4085 In Karrel v. United States,40 8 6 the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the statute to mean that restitution could be
ordered only for amounts for which a defendant was convicted and not

for counts which had been dismissed.4" 87 Narrow exceptions have devel-

oped to this interpretation but, in general, this rule is applied.40 88 The
Ninth Circuit in Orr held that the order for restitution of $3815 could

not stand because the plea agreement did not specifically call for restitution. Also, the record made no indication that Orr had plea bargained

for, or consented to, an amount in excess of the counts for which she was
convicted as a condition of probation.40 89 Therefore, the sentencing court
was limited to imposing restitution only on the counts for which Orr was
convicted. 40 90
Orr's second contention was that she should not be required to re-

pay the bank involved in the first count because probation was conditioned on the second count. 40 91 The court found nothing in 18 U.S.C.

4083. Id.
4084. Id.
4085. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides that a defendant "[m]ay be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for
which conviction was had."
4086. 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1950).
4087. Id. at 987. The court's reasoning was that it was unfair to make a defendant pay for
something for which he could not be convicted.
4088. 691 F.2d at 433. See Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1982). In Phillips, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of a multicount indictment but no specific
amount was mentioned in any of the counts. The defendant agreed to make restitution of a
certain sum during plea bargaining. Because no restitution was ordered for dismissed counts,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the order to make restitution for the agreed upon amount. The court
explained that the plea bargain had been "fully explored in open court" and the defendant
subsequently signed a stipulation that he would make restitution. Id. at 194.
4089. 691 F.2d at 433-34. In United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1975), a bank
obtained a civil consent judgment against a defendant before he had pled. The defendant
agreed that he would allow the civil judgment to be incorporated into the conditions of his
probation. The amount that the defendant was obliged to pay was in excess of the amount
covered by the counts for which he was convicted. The court nevertheless upheld the order to
make restitution because the defendant freely admitted that he owed the bank exactly the
amount the bank claimed. Id. at 308.
The prosecution in Orrmade a Landay argument, but the Ninth Circuit held that Orrwas
distinguishable because Orr's "private agreement was not incorporated by her agreement in the
order for restitution as part of the plea agreement." 691 F.2d at 433-34 n.3.
4090. 691 F.2d at 433-34.
4091. Id. at 434.
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section 3651 to support that interpretation and cited case law involving

similar sentences in multicount indictments. 4 92
2.

Revocation of probation

Although the district court has broad discretion to revoke probation
when its conditions are violated, 4 0 93 that discretion is subject to appellate
review for abuse or fundamental unfairness. 4 9 4 It is an abuse of discretion to revoke probation after an unreasonable delay or under circumstances that are "inherently misleading to the probationer.'4 91
In United States v. Hamilton,4 9 6 probationer Hamilton appealed an
order revoking his probation. 9 7 In 1976, Hamilton was convicted of

conspiring to possess and sell checks stolen from a bank. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment. The sentence was suspended on the
condition that he complete five years of probation and spend 120 days in
jail. Hamilton was allowed to serve the 120 days on weekends, and had
completed forty-nine of the sixty weekends when he stopped reporting to
4092. Id. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1982) (none of
conviction counts stated a specific amount, yet $6,000 restitution order upheld); United States
v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1979) (amount of actual damages caused by defendant
sufficient for trial judge to order restitution); United States v. Runck, 601 F.2d 968, 969 (8th
Cir. 1979) (where judge imposed restitution as a condition of probation, not requested by the
government attorneys, condition was not within locus of plea bargain), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1015 (1980).
4093. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1980) (probation revoked where
probationer did not meet his charitable work requirement).
4094. United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
959 (1978). The Dane court cited Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932), for the proposition that the main issue in probation revocation is serving justice with a proper regard for the
best interests of the public and those of the defendant. Within those broad parameters, the
sentencing court has broad discretion to revoke probation, subject to due process rights. The
decision of a sentencing court will not be overturned short of a finding of an abuse of discretion. Dane, 570 F.2d at 843. The court stated that the focus of review is not whether probation conditions have been violated, but whether an abuse of discretion has occurred. The court
also noted that even though no condition may have been violated, probation can be revoked if
the probationer's acts warrant such a treatment because probation is a privilege, not a right.
Id. at 843 n.4. See Trueblood Longknife v. United States, 381 F.2d 17, 19-20 (9th Cir.) (nowhere in Burns does it say that discretion to revoke may only be exercised where conditions of
probation have been violated), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 926 (1967).
4095. United States v. Hamilton, 708 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1983). See United States v. Tyler,
605 F.2d 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1979) (probation system imposes a duty not to delay unreasonably
in bringing charges of probation violations); Greene v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 315
F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1963) (authorities must use reasonable diligence to issue and execute warrant for arrest of parolee after a violation or waiver of violation and loss of jurisdiction may
result).
4096. 708 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1983).
4097. Id. at 1413.
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jail."' 98 The record did not show that. his probation officer reprimanded
him; rather it indicated that the probation officer did not consider the
breach to be either "notable or serious. "4099 Subsequently, Hamilton informed the district court on June 22, 1978 of his failure to complete his
jail term, and petitioned that court in an effort to reschedule the remaining eleven weekends. Again, on August 23, 1978, the district court had
notice of Hamilton's breach when he petitioned the district court for partial return of his probation bond. The court took no action, either to
reschedule the eleven weekends or to revoke probation.
From the record, it was determined that Hamilton had a casual relationship with his probation officer. They did not meet regularly,
although Hamilton made known his activities and whereabouts which
evidently was acceptable to the probation officer.
Hamilton had completed over four of his five years of probation
when he was assigned a new probation officer. The new officer mailed
Hamilton directions to meet him on May 14, 1981, and an order to appear in district court on May 18, 1981. When Hamilton failed to appear
on either date, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On July 13,
1981, a hearing to revoke his probation was held and Hamilton was
charged with four probation violations: (1) failure to complete his 120
days in jail; (2) failure to report for his meeting with the new probation
officer on May 14, 1981; (3) failure to appear in district court on January
14, and May 18, 1981; and (4) failure to work at a lawful occupation.
The district court then revoked his probation and reinstated his five-year
sentence. 4 1o
410
Hamilton contended that the district court abused its discretion. 1
At the probation revocation hearing, he admitted that he failed to finish
out his 120 days, but he claimed he did not receive notice of the May 14
and May 18, 1981 dates until after May 18th. Hamilton also testified
that the reason he received notice late was because he had moved to a
new location, a fact he had made known to his former probation officer.
The government introduced no evidence to rebut Hamilton's testimony.
As for missing the January 14, 1981 appearance, Hamilton testified that
he had appeared in court but found the courtroom closed. He also stated
that his probation officer had told him that the judge was in Arizona. As
to the government's contention that he was unemployed, Hamilton introduced "substantial, corroborated, and uncontradicted testimony that he
4098.
4099.
4100.
4101.

Id.
Id. at 1413-14.

Id.
Id.
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was gainfully involved in personal business affairs."""0 2
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had committed an
abuse of discretion by revoking Hamilton's probation.4 10 3 The court
pointed out that the district court had notice three years prior to the
revocation hearing that Hamilton had not finished his 120-day jail
term.4 104 The court reasoned that since Hamilton had affirmatively
made the default known and neither the district court nor the probation
officer had taken action, failure to complete the jail term was not an adequate basis for revocation.4 1 °5
The district court also based its revocation on Hamilton's failure to
keep scheduled appointments, and to make written reports of his employment and whereabouts. 410 6 The Ninth Circuit noted the laxity of the first
probation officer in overlooking Hamilton's failure to complete eleven
weekends, allowing sporadic oral progress reports to substitute for timely
written reports, contacting the probationer infrequently, and letting
Hamilton live in Newport Beach without giving a specific address.41 0 7
The court found that this laxity, when contrasted with the rigid expectations of the second probation officer, created an inconsistent standard.4 0 8
The court held that Hamilton could not be expected to adhere to the
second officer's stricter standards without adequate notice. 4 10 9 Therefore, the court stated that it would be unfair to penalize Hamilton for his
failure to anticipate a varying standard. 41 10 The court indicated that if a
new probation officer wants to enforce stricter standards than his predecessor, then the probationer must be so advised before a violation can
become the basis of revocation. 1 1
4102. Id.
4103. Id.
4104. Id.
4105. Id.at 1415.
4106. Id.
4107. Id.
4108. Id.
4109. Id.
4110. Id.
4111. The Ninth Circuit chose to steer a middle ground. It did not want to strip a probation
officer or district court of the discretion to wait and "assess the cumulative effect of several
violations." Id. See, "eg., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1972) (question of
whether to recommit parolee is complex and it is important to know gravity and number of
infractions to make that evaluation); United States v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1969).
In Johnson, the defendant was given probation for dispensing narcotics. One year later, Johnson pled guilty to burglary and the judge who had granted Johnson probation in the drug case
wrote him a warning that any new violation would result in his probation being revoked.
Subsequently, Johnson pled guilty to traffic violations and the judge revoked his probation.
The Ninth Circuit also did not want automatic revocation for minor or technical violations. 708 F.2d at 1415. See United States v. Tyler, 605 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1979) (no sugges-
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The Ninth Circuit also found that Hamilton was gainfully employed.4 1 12 The court stated that activities that are related to starting or
winding up a legitimate business enterprise constitute gainful employment.4 113 Thus, the district court's revocation order was vacated and
Hamilton's probation was reinstated.4 14
G.

Parole

Parole is a conditional and revocable release of a prisoner serving a
sentence. Federal adult prisoners serving a maximum term or terms of
more than one year may apply for parole and may be released into a
parole program according to the discretion of the Parole Commission.
After an inmate arrives at a federal prison, an initial hearing is held
tion that revocation proceedings should be instituted automatically for minor infractions);
United States v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 1978) (revocation should be instituted
only when probationer's behavior shows that he cannot be trusted to avoid antisocial activity).
The court in Hamilton stated, however, that there is a point at which a claim becomes stale.
When the district court has learned of the situation and the probationer has sought to rectify
that situation, revocation of probation on those grounds is inappropriate. 708 F.2d at 1415.
4112. 708 F.2d at 1416.
4113. Id. Hamilton testified that he had been repossessing cars for Crocker Bank in satisfaction of a business debt, and was also operating a furniture business that he had recently
purchased. Two witnesses testified that he had been engaged in those activities during the
period in question. The government did not contest that evidence but contended that those
activities were not gainful employment. The Ninth Circuit stated that even if no profit is
shown during a certain business cycle, that does not invalidate an activity for purposes of
probation.
4114. Id. Judge Poole, in his dissent, argued that no abuse of discretion had taken place.
His view of the record considered Hamilton's failure to complete a sentence, failure to inform a
probation officer of probationer's address, a missed appearance in district court, and failure to
maintain lawful employment. Judge Poole characterized these transgressions as "serious and
continuing," not mere technical violations, and indicative that Hamilton was not adjusting
properly and could not be counted on to avoid antisocial activity. The judge also took issue
with the majority's stand that revocation of probation after a three-year interval was fundamentally unfair and stated that Hamilton had suffered no prejudice. The judge explained that
for Hamilton to have been prejudiced after a three year delay, the delay would have had to
impair Hamilton's ability to contest the allegations of his violations, hamper his ability to
produce witnesses, or cause difficulty in presenting mitigating circumstances that would undercut revocation. Thejudge asserted that Hamilton presented witnesses and had the opportunity
to introduce mitigating circumstances. Further, the judge cited United States v. Bonanno, 452
F. Supp. 743, 761-62 (N.D. Cal. 1978), afid, 595 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1979), where revocation
proceedings had occurred four years after the probation violation had been committed. Judge
Poole stated that a district judge has to be only "reasonably satisfied" that the probationer's
conduct has not met the requirements of the conditions of probation. 708 F.2d at 1417 (Poole,
J., dissenting). He reminded the majority that the government was the prevailing party in the
proceeding below and that on an appeal from a criminal conviction, evidence must be construed favorably to the government. The judge chided the majority for not adhering to that
principle and concluded that the record did not support a finding that the trial court abused its
discretion. Id. (Poole, J., dissenting).
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to determine a parole release date. At this hearing, which is generally
held within 120 days of the prisoner's incarceration, two examiners interview the prisoner and, in conjunction with parole guidelines set forth in
28 Code of Federal Regulations section 2.20, make recommendations to
the Parole Commission. The Commission can take one of three actions
in response to these recommendations: (1) set a presumptive parole date
for release within ten years of the hearing; (2) set an effective date of
parole; or (3) continue the inmate to a ten year reconsideration hearing.
The presumptive parole date is a release date contingent upon the good
conduct of the inmate, any new adverse information concerning the inmate and any other relevant matters. The Commission will only advance
a presumptive parole date for superior conduct or exceptional
circumstances.
An effective parole date is a release date approved after a hearing
held within six months of the potential parole date or following a prerelease review of the inmate's record. A pre-release review is held to
determine whether the presumptive parole date conditions have been
met.
A ten-year reconsideration hearing is a review of the inmate's record
after ten years. After holding a ten-year reconsideration hearing, the
Commission may take one of the three steps outlined above: (1) set a
presumptive parole date; (2) set an effective parole date; or (3) again continue the inmate for another ten-year reconsideration hearing. The tenyear reconsideration hearing may, like the presumptive parole date, be
advanced for superior conduct or under exceptional circumstances.
In the case of prisoners having a minimum parole ineligibility in
excess of ten years, an initial hearing is held approximately ninety days
prior to the completion of that term.
1. Parole boards' discretion
The parole guidelines adopted by the United States Parole Commission establish suggested prison terms to be served before parole should be
granted. 4 1 1 5 The ranges are determined by the severity of the crime committed and the characteristics of the individual defendant.4 1 16
The initial recommendation for a parole date is made by a panel of
examiners after a parole hearing.4 11 7 The recommendation is subse4115. United States Parole Commission guidelines are contained in 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.61
(1983).
4116. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1983). For the text of this section, see infra note 4147.
4117. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.13, 2.23 (1983). Section 2.13 provides in part: "An initial hearing shall
be conducted by a panel of two hearing examiners. The examiners shall discuss with the pris-
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quently reviewed by an administrative examiner. The administrative examiner then makes a recommendation to the Regional Commissioner,

who may modify the recommendation.4118 If the Regional Commissioner modifies the suggested parole date by more than six months, the
matter is referred to the National Commissioners for consideration.4 119

The prisoner must be given written notice of this referral within twentyone days of the original parole hearing, and the National Commissioners
are obliged to act within thirty days after the referral.41 20

After the Regional or National Commissioners have established a
parole date, the prisoner may file a regional appeal within thirty days.41 21
The decision on the regional appeal may then be appealed to the National Appeals Board, which makes a final decision.41 2 2 The Ninth Circuit has held that it will not reverse the Parole Commission's decision
setting a parole date unless the Commission has abused its discretion.4 2 3
oner his offense severity rating and salient factor score as described in § 2.20, his institutional
conduct and, in addition, any other matter the panel may deem relevant." Section 2.23 provides in part: "There is hereby delegated to hearing examiners the authority necessary to
conduct hearings and make recommendations relative to the grant or denial of parole or
reparole, revocation or reinstatement of parole or mandatory release, and conditions of
parole."
4118. 28 C.F.R. § 2.24(b)(2) (1983) provides in pertinent part: "[A] Regional Commissioner
may . . .[o]n his own motion, modify the recommendation of a hearing examiner panel to
bring the decision to a date not to exceed six months from the date recommended by the
examiner panel." See also Hatton v. Keohane, 693 F.2d 88, 89 (9th Cir. 1982) (Regional
Commissioner may modify any sentence by up to six months, including one involving a reduced recommendation because of good behavior).
4119. 28 C.F.R. § 2.24 (1983).
4120. 28 C.F.R. § 2.24(a) (1983) provides:
A Regional Commissioner may review the recommendation of any examiner panel
and refer this recommendation, prior to written notification to the prisoner, with his
recommendation and vote to the National Commissioners for consideration and any
action deemed appropriate. Written notice of this referral action shall be mailed or
transmitted to the prisoner within twenty-one days of the hearing . . . . Action
shall be taken by the National Commissioners within thirty days of the date of referral action by the Regional Commissioner, except in emergencies.
4121. 28 C.F.R. § 2.25(a) (1983) provides: "A prisoner or parolee may submit to the responsible Regional Commissioner a written appeal of any decision to grant. . . .rescind, deny or
revoke parole . . . . This appeal must be filed on a form provided for that purpose within
thirty days from the date of entry of such decision."
4122. 28 C.F.R. § 2.26 (1983) provides in part:
(a) Within 30 days of entry of a Regional Commissioner's decision under § 2.25, a
prisoner or parolee may appeal to the National Appeals Board on a form provided
for that purpose. . . . The National Appeals Board may, upon the concurrence of
two members, affirm, modify, or reverse the decision, or order a rehearing . . ..
(b) The National Appeals Board shall act within 60 days of receipt of the appellant's papers, to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision.
(c) Decisions of the National Appeals Board shall be final.
4123. See Hatton v. Keohane, 693 F.2d 88, 89 (9th Cir. 1982); O'Brien v. Putnam, 591 F.2d
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In Reynolds v. McCall,4 12 4 the defendant pleaded guilty to armed
bank robbery involving a kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. section

2113(a), (d) and (e), and was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment.4125
After a parole hearing, the examiner panel placed the defendant in the
"Greatest II" offense severity category. However, based on the defendant's youth and favorable prognosis for rehabilitation, the panel recommended that Reynolds be released on parole after serving only forty-eight
4 126
months in prison.
Nevertheless, the administrative hearing examiner recommended

parole only after sixty months imprisonment, due to the severity of the
crime.4 127 The Regional Commissioner agreed and referred the matter to

the National Commissioners, 4128 but did not notify Reynolds of the referral until 131 days later.4 29 During this time, the National Commissioners notified Reynolds that they had affirmed the sixty month
recommendation. 4 130 Reynolds then instituted a series of appeals which
ultimately brought him before the Ninth Circuit.4 31
53, 55 (9th Cir. 1979) (Commission's decision to consider the offense for which the prisoner
was convicted was not an abuse of discretion).
4124. 701 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1982).
4125. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1982) provides in part:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of
value belonging to, or in the care. . . of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and
loan association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and
loan association, . . . with intent to commit. . . any felony. . . or any larcenyShall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both.
(d) *Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in
.. . this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the
use of a dangerous weapon or device, should be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
(e) Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section. . . kills any person
or forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person, should
be imprisoned not less than ten years, or punished by death if the verdict of the jury
shall so direct.
Reynolds was twenty-two years old at the time of sentencing, and could have been sentenced as a youth offender. However, he was sentenced as an adult offender. 701 F.2d at 811.
4126. 701 F.2d at 811. Reynolds was placed in the "Greatest II" category because the bank
robbery involved a firearm and a kidnapping. Id.
4127. Id.
4128. Id.
4129. Id. The Regional Commissioner's failure to notify the defendant of the referral within
twenty-one days contravened 28 C.F.R. § 2.24(a). See supra note 4120.
4130. 701 F.2d at 811.
4131. Id. at 811-12. On December 16, 1979, Reynolds filed a regional appeal, in which the
Regional Commissioner upheld the previous sixty month recommendation. Reynolds then
filed a national appeal, in response to which the National Appeals Board affirmed the Regi6nal
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On appeal, the defendant challenged the sixty month parole date

recommendation on three grounds. He contended that: (1) the failure of
the Regional Commissioner to give him timely notice of the referral to

the National Commissioners was a violation of his due process rights;
(2) the National Commissioners' extension of his parole term beyond
that recommended by the examiner panel was an abuse of discretion; and

(3) the placing of the defendant in the "Greatest II" severity category
violated his due process rights. 4 13 2 The Ninth Circuit addressed each
contention and affirmed the denial of Reynold's habeas corpus
petition.4 13 3
With respect to his first claim, Reynolds argued that the Regional

Commissioner's failure to give him timely notice of the referral to the
National Commissioners impaired his ability to present additional information and arguments in his regional appeal.4 134 Relying on Greenholtz
v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,

135

the Ninth

Circuit rejected this claim. The court held that Reynolds had adequate
notice of the issues to be raised in his regional appeal because he was
notified of the changed parole recommendation and the reasons for the
change more than three weeks before he filed his regional appeal.4 136

Furthermore, even if Reynolds was confused by the defect in notification,
he had ample opportunity to raise, and did raise, additional arguments
4 137
before the National Appeals Board and the Ninth Circuit.

Commissioner's decision. Reynolds then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1976), which the district court denied. Finally, he appealed the district court's
decision to the Ninth Circuit. 701 F.2d at 811.
4132. 701 F.2d at 811.
4133. Id.
4134. Id.at 812.
4135. 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court rejected the argument of state
prison inmates that the parole board procedures denied them due process. The Court stated,
however, that the "Nebraska inmates had an expectation of parole that should not be denied
without an opportunity to be heard and notification of the parole board's reasons for denial of
parole." Reynolds, 701 F.2d at 812 (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). The Ninth Circuit has
also held that the hearing and notification requirements established in Greenholtz adequately
protect a defendant's due process rights. See Bowles v. Tennant, 613 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir.
1980) (defendant had adequate notice to challenge parole revocation in a regional appeal). The
Ninth Circuit distinguished Grattan v. Sigler, 525 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1975), on the grounds
that Grattan involved a situation where the defendant was not notified of the reasons for parole
denial until after all his appeals were completed, whereas Reynolds was notified of the reasons
for his increased parole term before he initiated his regional appeal. 701 F.2d at 812.
4136. 701 F.2d at 812.
4137. Id.at 813. The court noted that, in all, Reynolds had received six reviews of his parole
application, "more than his 'day in court.'" Id. Reynolds contended that had he been apprised of the Regional Commissioner's referral in a timely fashion, he would have raised the
issues that he should have been placed in the "Greatest I" category and that the extension of
his parole date to sixty months was not warranted by the circumstances of his crime. He also
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Reynolds presented two arguments in support of his second contention. Reynolds first argued that the Commissioners were precluded from
reconsidering the severity of the offense in determining the parole term
because this factor had already been considered in placing Reynolds in
the "Greatest II" severity category. 1 3 8 The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument outright, relying on O'Brien v. Putnam.4 139
Second, Reynolds argued that the decision to extend his parole term

was unjustified."' n The court also rejected this argument, holding that a
sixty month parole term for a crime that fell in the "Greatest II" category and involved such aggravating circumstances as use of a firearm,
kidnapping, and a large ransom demand did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.4 41
Finally, Reynolds contended that placing him in the "Greatesst Ir'
category violated due process. 41 42 He claimed that the "Greatest I" cate-

gory was more appropriate in his case because the kidnapping lasted only
a short time and resulted in no harm to the hostage.4 43 The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the "Greatest II" category
expressly includes the offense of holding a kidnap victim for ransom, an
offense expressly excluded from the "Greatest I" category. 4 14 Second,
claimed that the notice given by the National Commissioners was inadequate to apprise him of
the appealable issues and to whom he should appeal. Id.
4138. Id. Reynolds contended that the proper procedure was for the severity of the crime to
be considered only at the time of category selection. Id.
4139. 591 F.2d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1055
(5th Cir. 1976) (when prisoner was given opportunity to rebut information at hearing in which
"very high" severity rating was imposed, use of such information by national board to affirm
denial of parole was permissible).
4140. 701 F.2d at 814. The Commissioners justified the imposition of the longer parole term
by the seriousness of the offense and the large ransom demanded in return for the hostage. Id.
In their statement of reasons for affirming the sixty month term, the Commissioners stated that
releasing Reynolds at that time would "depreciate the seriousness of [the] offense behavior."
Id. at 813.
4141. Id. at 813. The Commissioners also stated that the decision in Reynolds' case was
"based in part upon a comparison of the relative severity of [the] offense behavior with the
offense behavior and time ranges specified in the Greatest I severity category." Id. The court
stated that, because the "Greatest Ir" category does not specify a maximum term, the Commissioners must exercise their discretion to set a term by relying primarily on the seriousness
of the offense. Use of the "Greatest I" maximum terms for comparison is permissible in this
context. Id. at 814. In a footnote, the court stated that the failure of the parole guidelines to
specify an upper limit for parole dates for prisoners assigned to the "Greatest II" category does
not violate due process. Id. at 814 n.4.
4142. Id. at 814.
4143. Id. The "Greatest I" category applies to kidnappings other than those listed in
"Greatest II," with a limited duration and no harm to the victim. Id.
4144. The "Greatest II" category includes kidnapping for ransom or terrorism, hostage situations, or kidnapping which results in harm to the victim. Id.
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in the event that an offense may be classified in more then one category,
the most serious category must be used.a14" Reynolds' offense was thus
clearly a "Greatest II" offense. 14 6
2.

Due process in revocation proceedings

147
The discretion vested in parole boards is generally quite broad.
Parole may be revoked if, at a statutorily mandated hearing, 4 14 8 the
board finds that the parolee has committed a parole violation.4 4 9 In
Morrissey v. Brewer,4" 5" the Supreme Court expanded the scope of due
process requirements for parolees by ruling that a parolee is entitled to
two hearings before parole may be revoked: a preliminary hearing at the
time of arrest to determine whether there was probable cause to believe a
parole violation had occurred; and a later, more thorough, hearing to
make the final revocation decision.4 5 1
4145. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 note (c) (1983)).
4146. Id.
4147. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1983), containing the Rules of the United States Parole
Commission respecting parole guidelines and the statement of the Parole Commission's general policy with respect to granting parole. Section 2.20 provides in part:
(a) To establish a national parole policy, promote a more consistent exercise of
discretion, and enable fairer and more equitable decision-making without removing
individual case consideration, the United States Parole Commission has adopted
guidelines for parole release consideration.
(b) These guidelines indicate the customary range of time to be served before release for various combinations of offense (severity) and offender (parole prognosis)
characteristics ....
(c) These time ranges are merely guidelines. Where the circumstances warrant,
decisions outside of the guidelines (either above or below) may be rendered.
See also Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, Board Rule 2.2 10 (parole board has full
discretion in setting the minimum term of confinement except when otherwise mandated by
law); CAL. PENAL CODE § 5077 (Deering 1980) (board of prison terms has authority to set
parole length and conditions, modify decisions of Department of Corrections and revoke
parole).
4148. A parole revocation hearing is required by 18 U.S.C. § 4214 (1976), which provides for
a preliminary hearing as well as for a final parole revocation hearing whenever a parolee has
allegedly violated parole. Section 4214(d) provides in part:
Whenever a parolee is summoned or retaken. . . and the Commisson finds pursuant
to the procedures of this section and by a preponderance of the evidence that the
parolee has violated a condition of his parole the Commission may...
(5) formally revoke parole.
18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(1)(B) provides that the revocation hearing must be held within sixty days
of determining whether probable cause exists to believe that the parolee has violated a condition of parole.
4149. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(d) (1976).
4150. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
4151. Id. at 485-89. In Morrissey, two prisoners argued that they had been denied due process because their paroles were revoked on the basis of parole officers' reports without a hearing. On the facts of Morrissey, the Court held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings before
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In Pierrev. Washington State Board of Prison Terms andParoles,4 1 52
the defendant claimed that his due process rights had been violated be-

cause the Parole Board relied on incorrect information and failed to follow its guidelines in setting his minimum term.4 153 Pierre argued that

the Parole Board had improperly added twenty-four months to his minimum term because the Board had relied on an FBI record that showed
two previous convictions which were later reversed on appeal.4 154 Addition of the twenty-four months resulted in a guideline term of imprisonment of 132 months, which exceeded the guideline range of 92-123

months for a defendant with Pierre's characteristics convicted of the
same crime.4 15 5

The Ninth Circuit found Pierre's contentions to be without merit.
The record showed that after the 132 month term was calculated, Pierre
had informed the Parole Board that the prior convictions had been reversed. The Board subsequently reduced the guideline term to 108
months before the final decision was made.4 156 The court thus held that
parole is revoked as protection against an unjust deprivation of liberty. Id. at 482. The Court
reasoned that a preliminary hearing, as well as a formal revocation hearing, is a necessary due
process requirement because (1) there is often a significant delay between arrest and the date of
the formal hearing, and (2) since the arrest often occurs at a place distant from the institution
where the parolee will await the formal hearing, there should be a prompt preliminary hearing
before transporting and detaining the parolee. Id. at 485.
4152. 699 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1983). The defendant had been convicted in 1974 on two
counts of robbery and was paroled in February, 1979. He allegedly participated in a robbery
in June, 1979. On July 23, 1979, his parole was suspended. The Washington State Board of
Prison Terms and Paroles conducted an administrative review on August 1, 1979 to determine
whether probable cause existed to believe that Pierre had violated parole. The defendant was
not present at this review.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the Board held a formal hearing on August 13, 1979 at
which the defendant and his counsel were present and participated. After the August 13 hearing, the Board found that the defendant had violated the terms of his parole and revoked it.
Id. at 471-72.
4153. Id. at 472. The court discussed the Washington State procedures for sentencing when
the defendant is convicted of a felony offense, and the parole board guidelines for setting minimum parole terms. Id. According to a Washington statute, the court is required to sentence a
person convicted of a felony to the maximum statutory term. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.95.010 (West 1977)). The Parole Board establishes the minimum term using guidelines
similar to the United States Parole Commission guidelines. See 28 C.F.R. 2.20 (1982), supra
note 4147 and WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.040 (West 1977). So long as the term is within the
guidelines range, the term is presumed valid. If the term is set outside the guidelines range, the
Board must provide written reasons for the aberration. 699 F.2d at 472.
The WASH. REV. CODE sections cited above have been amended to provide that they will
no longer apply to convictions after July 1, 1984. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.900 (West Supp.
1983-84).
4154. 699 F.2d at 472.
4155. Id.
4156. Id.
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the Board was well within its discretion in imposing the 108 month mini41 5 7
mum term without providing a written explanation for its decision.
The court then addressed the constitutionality of the Parole Board's
revocation procedures. The court addressed the issue with reference to
the Morrissey two hearing requirement, questioning whether both a preliminary hearing and a formal hearing are constitutionally required in

every parole revocation case.4158 The court held that when an administrative review is conducted shortly after arrest, as was the case in Pierre,
there is no need for a Morrissey style preliminary hearing, so long as the
formal revocation hearing is held promptly thereafter.4 15 9
In Hopper v. United States Parole Commission,416 the Ninth Circuit
considered whether the defendant was entitled to habeas corpus relief as
a result of the Parole Commission's failure to provide him with a timely

revocation hearing.4 161 Hopper had been convicted on various charges in
a Nevada federal court in 1976.4162 He was paroled in May, 1979. While

still on parole, he was arrested in California for armed robbery. Unable
to post bail, Hopper remained in state custody until he was brought to

trial six months later. He was convicted in state court and sentenced to
4157. Id.

4158. Id. at 472-73. In discussing the Morrissey guidelines, the Ninth Circuit characterized
them as "general framework to guide future parole revocation proceedings in order to guarantee that parolees are not deprived of procedural due process. . .[with the] themes of flexibility
and informality [running] throughout. . . . [T]he two-hearing requirement was just one way
to satisfy minimum due process; it is not the only way in every case." Id. at 473.
One statutory exception to the two hearing requirement is contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 4214(b)(1) (1982), which states that no preliminary hearing is required when a parolee has
been convicted of an offense between release on parole and the formal hearing, the conviction
constituting probable cause per se.
4159. 699 F.2d at 473. In Pierre,the final revocation hearing was held 121 days after parole
was suspended and thirteen days after the determination of probable cause, well within the
sixty day requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(1)(B). The court distinguished Morrissey on its
facts, holding that Morrissey does not absolutely require two hearings. Rather, it requires that
due process be satisfied in every case. 699 F.2d at 473. The Court quoted Morrissey, stating
that: "'[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands . . . . [N]ot all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the
same kind of procedure.'" Id. (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481).
The California Supreme Court applied this principle in In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d 21, 27
(1973), holding that a preliminary hearing on a new charge held after suspension of parole may
satisfy the pre-revocation hearing requirement.
4160. 702 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1983).
4161. Id. at 845. Hopper also argued that the Parole Commission should have credited the
time remaining on his federal sentence with time he spent in state custody, and that he received
consecutive sentences in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 844. The Ninth Circuit, however, did not reach these claims, finding them to be premature. Id.
4162. Id. at 844. Hopper was convicted of "possessing stolen bank funds, conspiracy, aiding
and abetting escape, and false statements before a grand jury." Id.
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4163
seven years in state prison on the robbery charge.
Soon after Hopper was arrested in California, the United States Parole Commission issued a parole violator warrant for his arrest, which
was subsequntly lodged as a detainer with the California state police.
In November, 1981, after he had been in state prison for seven months,
Hopper wrote to the Parole Commission to protest the delay in holding a
parole revocation hearing.41 6 5 In December, 1981, he filed a habeas
corpus petition which the district court denied.
In appealing the denial of his habeas petition, Hopper advanced
three arguments in support of his contention that he had been denied a
timely revocation hearing. First, he claimed that the failure to hold a
timely hearing amounted to a denial of his due process rights.4 16 6 Relying on United States v. Wickham,4 1 67 the Ninth Circuit held that Hopper
failed to state a constitutional claim.4 168 Under Wickham, Hopper was
required to show that the delay was both unreasonable and prejudicial. 41 69 The court found that Hopper had failed to make such a showing, and thus declined to reach the issue.41 70
Second, Hopper argued that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Act (IADA)4 171 required dismissal of the federal parole revocation

4163. Id.
4164. Id. The legislative history of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Acts defines "detainer" as a "notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence,
advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction." See H.R.
REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) and S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1970), reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4864.
4165. 702 F.2d at 845. While in state prison, Hopper had requested to be transferred to
federal custody. The California Corrections Department agreed to transfer him if the United
States Regional Parole Commissioner approved. In June, 1981, Hopper's case was reviewed
and the case analyst recommended that Hopper remain in state custody with the detainer
intact. Id. at 844.
4166. Id. at 845.
4167. 618 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1979).
4168. 702 F.2d at 845.
4169. 618 F.2d at 1311. The court also cited Reese v. United States Board of Parole, 530
F.2d 231, 235 (9th Cir.) (delay in holding parole revocation hearing not violative of due process when petitioner did not show prejudice resulted from delay), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999
(1976).
4170. 702 F.2d at 845. The court found that Hopper had failed to show that the delay had or
would cause him any harm. Hopper generally alleged that the failure to hold a federal revocation hearing had adversely affected his eligibility for rehabilitation and parole in the state
prison system. The court suggested, however, that Hopper should bring any such claims in
state court. Id.
4171. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. (1982), contains the procedures for extradition of prisoners among the signatory states. Both California and the United
States are parties to the IADA.
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charge.4 17 2 Article V(c) of the IADA provides that a failure to bring a
prisoner to trial within the statutory period on the charge for which the

detainer was lodged results in dismissal of that charge.4 17 3 In discussing
Hopper's argument, the Ninth Circuit noted that only untried com-

plaints, indictments and informations are covered by the IADA. An
unadjudicated parole violator warrant, the court held, is not a complaint
within the meaning of the IADA.41 74 Therefore, Hopper's second con-

tention was also rejected.
Finally, Hopper argued that he was entitled, under 18 U.S.C. sections 4213 and 4214, 4 175 to a revocation hearing within sixty days of the
issuance of the parole violator warrant. 41 76 Hopper claimed that the Pa-

role Commission acted improperly by placing the warrant as a detainer
before he was convicted of the state offense or before a hearing to determine probable cause was held.4 17 7 The court did not expressly decide
whether Hopper was entitled to a hearing under those statutes.4 178 In-

stead, the Ninth Circuit held that even if a hearing had been required,
4172. 702 F.2d at 845.
4173. 18 U.S.C. app. (1982).
4174. 702 F.2d at 846. The court distinguished United States v. Dobson, 585 F.2d 55 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 899 (1979), and United States v. Reed, 620 F.2d 709 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880 (1980), relied upon by the Government "for the proposition that the
IADA does not apply to an unfadjudicated] parole violator warrant." 702 F.2d at846. Instead, the court found that the legislative history of the IADA indicates that Congress intended the IADA to apply only to outstanding criminal complaints, not to warrants.
The court also distinguished Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976), which held that when
a parolee is serving an intervening sentence, no hearing is required if his parole is revoked by
the same sovereign which handed down the intervening sentence. 702 F.2d at 846. In Hopper,
the defendant was being held by California while on parole from United States custody.
Therefore, the IADA provisions applied. Id. at 846-47.
4175. 18 U.S.C. § 4213 (1982) authorizes the issuance of a summons or warrant as soon as
practicable after discovery of an alleged parole violation. 18 U.S.C. § 4214 (1982) provides
that a parole revocation hearing be held within sixty days after the determination of probable
cause to believe the existence of a parole violation, except when the parolee has been convicted
of a crime after release on parole. In the latter case the conviction itself constitutes probable
cause and a detainer may issue without a preliminary hearing. Id.
4176. 702 F.2d at 847.
4177. Id. Hopper claimed that the Parole Commission's acts affected certain state pretrial
release rights, thereby triggering the sixty day hearing provisions. Id. The Ninth Circuit
agreed that if unauthorized, the United States Parole Commission's acts would have entitled
Hopper to both a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable cause and a final revocation
hearing within sixty days thereafter. Id.
4178. Id. at 847-48. The court did hold that, to the extent Hopper claimed a right to a
hearing merely because there was a detainer in place, his claim would fail. Id. at 848. The
court reasoned that the latest date for a timely revocation hearing is calculated from the date
the warrant is executed. Id. However, "[a] warrant is not considered 'executed' where a parolee has been arrested on an independent intervening charge, and a detainer is placed at the
institution with custody." Id. (citing Cook v. United States Attorney General, 488 F.2d 667,
671 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974); Wickham, 618 F.2d at 1309 n.3). Further-
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Hopper nevertheless failed to state a claim for habeas relief because he
had not shown that the delay between the time the warrant was issued
and the time of conviction was unreasonable and prejudicial.4 17 9 The
court also rejected Hopper's claim that placing the detainer constituted a

"retaking" under section 4214(c), 41 80 thereby entitling him to a hearing

within ninety days of the placing of the detainer. 4 18 The Ninth Circuit
41 8 2
thus affirmed the order denying Hopper's petition for habeas corpus.
3.

Special parole terms

21 U.S.C. section 960 (1982) provides that if a term of imprisonment
is imposed, a special parole term must also be imposed.4 1 83 In United
States v. Faherty,4 84 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the imposition of a special parole term is permissible when a defendant is given a
suspended sentence conditioned on successfully completing a probationary period.4 185
more, Hopper's warrant did not have to be executed until he was released from state custody.
702 F.2d at 848.
4179. Id. The court reasoned that Hopper would have to show that he was prejudiced by the
delay from the time the warrant was issued to the time he was convicted on the state charge.
Once he was convicted, the Parole Commission had express authority, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4214(b)(1), to lodge the detainer because the conviction provided the necessary probable
cause. See supra note 4158. The court found no prejudice to Hopper from the existence of the
detainer. Hopper was held in state custody before his trial because he could not afford to post
bail, and the fact that the detainer was in place did not prevent him from presenting favorable
evidence to the parole board. 702 F.2d at 848.
4180. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(c) (1982) provides:
(c) Any alleged parole violator who is summoned or retaken by warrant under
section 4213 who knowingly and intelligently waives his right to a hearing under
subsection (a) of this section, or who knowingly and intelligently admits violation at
a preliminary hearing held pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section, or who is
retaken pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, shall receive a revocation hearing
within ninety days of the date of retaking. The Commission may conduct such hearing at the institution to which he has been returned, and the alleged parole violator
shall have notice of such hearing, be allowed to appear and testify on his own behalf,
and, unless waived, shall have counsel or another representative as provided in subsection (a)(2)(B) of this section.
4181. 702 F.2d at 848. The court held that the mere placing of a detainer does not constitute
a "retaking" when the parolee has been arrested on an intervening charge. Id. (citing Doyle v.
Elsea, 658 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1981)).
4182. Id.
4183. 21 U.S.C. § 960 (1982) provides:
Any person who(1) . . . knowingly or intentionally imports or exports a controlled substance,
(2) . . . knowingly or intentionally brings or possesses on board a vessel, aircraft or
vehicle a controlled substance, or
(3)

. . . manufactures or distributes a controlled substance,

shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
4184. 692 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1982).
4185. Id. at 1261.
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Faherty had been convicted of importing and possessing heroin.4 18 6
She was sentenced to five years imprisonment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. sec-

tion 960 (1982).4187 Faherty's sentence was suspended on condition that
she spend 120 days in a jail-like facility and three years on probation.4 188
On appeal, Faherty claimed that she should not have received a special parole term because her sentence of imprisonment was never exe-

cuted.

189

The Ninth Circuit summarily concluded that suspension of

the five year prison term did not eliminate the statutory requirement for

a special parole term because Congress had specifically mandated its imposition. 4 190 The court therefore affirmed the district court's
sentence.4191
In a concurring opinion, Judge Burns made some additional comments on the application of special parole terms. He noted that when a
defendant receives a split sentence, 41 92 the special parole term will never
take effect unless the defendant violates probation.4 93 In fact, unless
probation was revoked, the defendant would never come to the attention

of the Parole Commission because the Commission only reviews cases
where the defendant has served more than one year in prison.4 19 4 In
addition, even if the defendant had violated probation and served out her

five year term, it was highly unlikely that she would ever serve the special
parole term.4 195
4186. Id. at 1259. Faherty was convicted of importing heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 952(a) (1982), and of possessing heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1982). 692 F.2d at
1259.
4187. See supra note 4183.
4188. 692 F.2d at 1259.
4189. Id. at 1261.
4190. Id. The court also reasoned that if Faherty successfully served her three years of probation, the special parole term would no longer apply. If she did not satisfactorily complete
her probationary period, Faherty would be required to serve the five years in prison after
which the special parole term would begin. Id.
4191. Id.
4192. Faherty's sentence was "split" in that the five year prison term was suspended on
condition that she spend 120 days in jail and three years on probation. Id. at 1262 (Bums, J.,
concurring).
4193. Id.
4194. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976) only grants the Parole Commission jurisdiction over prisioners serving terms of one year or more. Since Faherty was to serve only four months in jail,
unless she violated probation her case would never come before the Parole Commission and
the special parole term would never attach. 692 F.2d at 1262 (Bums, J.,
concurring).
4195. 692 F.2d at 1262 (Bums, J.,
concurring). Judge Bums pointed out that Faherty would
probably never serve the special parole term because she would be eligible for "regular" parole
as well as the early termination provisions for both the "regular" and "special" parole terms.
Id. The early termination provisions are contained in 18 U.S.C. § 421 1(c)(1) (1982), which
provides in part: "Five years after each parolee's release on parole, the Commission shall
terminate supervision over such parolee unless it is determined, after a hearing. . . , that such
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4. Revocation of special parole terms
18 U.S.C. section 4164,4196 which removes the Parole Commission's
jurisdiction over a released prisoner during the last 180 days of his maximum term, does not apply to mandatory special parole terms4 197 imposed after a conviction for manufacturing,
possessing, or distributing
19 8
controlled or counterfeit substances.
In Russie v. United States Departmentof Justice,4 1 99 the Ninth Cir-

cuit held that the Parole Commission retained jurisdiction over a defendant who violated his special parole term seventy-seven days before

completion of that term.42 ° Defendant Russie had been convicted of distributing cocaine and was sentenced to one year in jail and a mandatory
special parole term of three years. He completed his prison term and
began serving his special parole term. Eleven weeks prior to completion
of the special parole term, Russie was charged by a state court with dis-

tributing cocaine. A federal parole violation warrant went out the same
day but was stayed until the state made a determination of Russie's guilt
or innocence. To complicate matters, eleven weeks later Russie's parole
officer gave Russie a notice of discharge signifying that he had completed
his special parole term and was no longer under federal supervision.42 0 1
supervision should not be terminated because there is a likelihood that the parolee will engaged
[sic] in conduct violating any criminal law." Under 28 C.F.R. 2.57(e) (1983), the early termination provisions apply to special parole terms as well as to ordinary parole. 692 F.2d at 1262
(Bums, J., concurring).
4196. 18 U.S.C. § 4164 (1982) provides: "A prisoner having served his term or terms less
good-time deductions shall, upon release, be deemed as if released on parole until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced less one hundred and eighty
days."
4197. Special parole terms differ from traditional parole in that special parole is in addition
to traditional parole and is not a substitute for it. Bunker v. Wise, 500 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th
Cir. 1977) (nature of special parole terms are so different that when court failed to inform
petitioner of nature and operation of mandatory special parole term, motion to withdraw
guilty plea was erroneously denied).
4198. Russie v. United States Dep't of Justice, 708 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1983). 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) (1976) makes a special parole term mandatory whenever a defendant is convicted
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976) and sent to prison. The minimum special parole term is
controlled by (1) whether or not there has been a prior conviction and (2) the classification into
which the controlled substance falls. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976) makes it "unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a
counterfeit substance."
4199. 708 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1983).
4200. Id. at 1446.
4201. Id. Apparently the parole officer thought that the federal parole violation warrant had
been dismissed.
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Three weeks later, Russie pleaded guilty to the state charge of distributing cocaine. He received a suspended ten year sentence on condition that he serve one year in county jail, complete six years of probation,
make restitution, and pay a fine. He was also required to participate in a
mental health counseling program. Russie was then informed that his
parole officer had made a mistake and that he was still under the Parole
Commission's authority. After finishing his state jail term,4 2 0 2 Russie
was transferred to federal custody and imprisoned. At a parole revocation hearing, his special parole term was revoked and Russie was required to spend two more years in federal prison.4 20 3
Russie then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition
was denied by a federal magistrate on the grounds that the 180 day limitation of 18 U.S.C. section 4164424 did not apply to special parole terms
and that, in spite of erroneous information given to Russie by his parole
officer, he was still under Federal Parole Commission authority. 420 5 The
district court affirmed the magistrate's decision.4 20 6
On appeal, Russie contended that 18 U.S.C. section 4164 applied in
his case and that the Commission had no power over him because it did
not act prior to the 180 days before his maximum term had expired.420 7
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that Russie was on special parole
and was not shielded by the 180 day limitation of section 4164.4208 The
court pointed out that special parole operates differently from traditional
parole in that it is imposed in addition to any other applicable parole
terms. 420 9 The court noted that to apply section 4164 to a case such as
Russie's would contravene the purposes of the penalty structure of the
4202. Shortly after being apprised that he was still subject to Federal Parole Commission
Authority, Russie began serving his state term. He was enrolled in a work release program
which allowed him to keep his job as a printer and report back to jail at night. After twelve
days in the program, a federal detainer was filed with the jail and Russie was confined to
county jail for nine months. He was then released. Id. at 1446-47.
4203. Id. Russie was given credit for the nine months he had served in county jail; so, in
fact, his federal term was fifteen months, not two years. Special parole violators do not receive
credit for the time spent on parole and they can be reincarcerated for the full special parole
term. Bunker v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1977).
4204. See supra note 4196.
4205. 708 F.2d at 1447.
4206. Id.
4207. Id.
4208. Id. at 1448.
4209. Id. at 1447. If the special parole term is revoked, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c) (1982), the
term is added to the original sentence. A parolee might be forced to serve all or part of that
additional term (three years in Russie's case) without being credited for the time served on
special parole. After coming within 77 days of completing his special parole term, Russie lost
all credit and was met by the Parole Commission with a two-year sentence that at its maximum could have been a three-year sentence.
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Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and
thereby nullify "an additional period of supervision Congress considered
important enough to require by statute."4 2' 1
Russie then argued that the Federal Parole Commission had no

power to detain him since he had received his notice of discharge and
was therefore no longer under federal supervision.42 1 1 The Parole Com-

mission, however, had issued a parole violation warrant prior to the expiration of Russie's special parole term.42 12 Therefore, the Commission
still retained jurisdiction over Russie and the power to enforce the warrant even after Russie's special parole term was scheduled to expire.42 13
Finally, Russie contended that even if the Commission still retained

jurisdiction over him, it should be estopped from acting on the parole
violation warrant. Russie claimed that he had relied on the Commis-

sion's notice of discharge and alleged that he would not have pled guilty
to the state cocaine charge if he had known that he was still on federal

parole.4214 The Ninth Circuit held that Russie did not make a sufficient
showing of affirmative misconduct on the government's part to warrant
an application of estoppel. 421 5 The court thus declined to view the mis-

take as reaching the necessary level of governmental misconduct to warrant judicial interference. 21 6 Furthermore, the court concluded that
revocation of Russie's special parole term and the two years prospective
imprisonment did not "constitute a prejudicial change of position caused
by the parole officer's mistake.""4 2 7
4210. 708 F.2d at 1448. See Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir. 1975) (18
U.S.C. § 1464 (1982) applies generally to parole rather than to special parole).
4211. 708 F.2d at 1448. Russie objected to the federal detainer that the Parole Commission
had filed with the state jail.
4212. Id.
4213. Id. See Barr v. Parker, 453 F.2d 865, 866-67 (9th Cir. 1971). A federal parole violation warrant acts as a freeze on the expiration of a parolee's sentence. The Parole Commission
still retains jurisdiction over the parolee even after the presumptive expiration date of the
parolee's sentence has come and gone. 28 C.F.R. § 2.44(d) (1982).
4214. 708 F.2d at 1448. Russie's parole officer admitted that he had mistakenly issued a
notice of discharge to Russie. Russie also argued that the Commission discovered the error
prior to his sentencing in state court, and failed to inform him that a federal parole violation
warrant awaited him.
4215. Id. See Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1981) (government not guilty of
affirmative misconduct and therefore not estopped by Army recruiter's misrepresentations because people who deal with the government must assume risk that misinformation may have
been disseminated and should take proper procedures to confirm information); United States v.
Harvey, 661 F.2d 767, 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1981) (in land dispute with government, mere negligence will not constitute affirmative misconduct; government must intentionally or actively
conceal), cerL denied, 103 S. Ct. 74 (1982).
4216. 708 F.2d at 1449-50.
4217. Id. The court based its conclusion on Russie's failure to produce evidence of prejudice.
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5. Reconsideration of presumptive parole dates
Presumptive parole dates are conditional 4218 and subject to being
reopened.42 1 9 When a Regional Commissioner of the Federal Parole
Commission receives any new and significant adverse information, he
may recommend to the National Commissioners that a special hearing be
held to reconsider a presumptive parole date.42 2
In Williams v. United States Parole Commission,4 22 the Ninth Circuit held that defendant Williams' presumptive parole date could be reopened, and, after a special reconsideration hearing, could be extended
more than five years. While incarcerated in a federal prison in Atlanta,
Williams participated in the murder of an inmate. His murder charge

was reduced to one count of accessory after the fact in return for his
testimony at the trial of Leonard, the other participant in the murder.

Williams pleaded guilty to the accessory count and was sentenced to
eight years imprisonment, to be served consecutively with the sentence
4 222
he was serving.
The sentencing judge filled out the standard parole comment form
and indicated, by checking the appropriate box, that parole should be
decided by the Parole Board. In a space reserved for comments, the
judge remarked that Williams was a danger to society and had cooperated with the federal authorities only to avoid a murder charge. 4223 WilThe court noted that "Russie does not suggest that the government's error in any way affected
the underlying offenses, commission of which violated the terms of his special parole even
though those offenses also led to his arrest and conviction in state court." Id. The court
appears to be saying that the parole officer's mistake had no impact on Russie's committing the
crimes with which the state charged him. Russie's argument, which the court does not address
here, was that he would not have pled guilty had he known he was subject to a retaking by the
Parole Commission.
4218. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(b) (1982). The rule makes a presumptive parole date contingent
upon, among other provisions, 28 C.F.R. § 2.28(0 (1982). See infra note 4220.
4219. 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (1982).
4220. 28 C.F.R. § 2.28(0 (1982). Section 2.28(0 provides that: "Upon receipt of new and
significant adverse information . . .. the Regional Commissioner may refer the case to the
National Commissioner with his recommendation and vote to schedule the case for a special
reconsideration hearing." The definition of "new and significant" information is not contained
in the regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.1(i) (1981).
4221. 707 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1983).
4222. Id. at 1065, 1061.
4223. Id. at 1061. The judge's remarks were as follows:
This man cooperated and was a government witness; however, the court is of the
opinion his cooperation was to save himself from a prosecution for murder. He was
given consideration for this by being prosecuted for accessory rather than the crime
of murder. The record is of [sic] such that the court is of the opinion that at present
time he would be a danger to the society.
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liams was transferred to the California State Prison at San Quentin
because of threats to his life.
The Bureau of Prisons aggregated Williams' sentences in an effort to
determine his eligibility for parole.4 " 4 On March 15, 1979, the Parole
Commission in Burlingame, California convened. Based largely on Williams' own report and a prosecutor's letter that dealt with the Atlanta
killing in a very general manner, the Commission recommended that
Williams' presumptive parole date be scheduled for late 1980, or early
1981. The prosecutor's letter contained only a broad reference to a plea
4225
bargain and Williams' cooperation in the matter.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the hearing examiners did not have
the judge's parole comment form before them at the time they scheduled
the presumptive parole date. Neither was the court certain whether the
presentence report had been present or what the contents of that report
were because no mention of the report was found in the record of the
examiners' hearing.4226 The hearing examiners had concluded that Williams had been forced, by a threat to his life, to witness and assist Leonard in committing the murder. The examiners had also cited the
United States Attorney's belief that the Government's case could not
have proceeded successfully without Williams' cooperation.4227
Williams had also made a pro se request to the sentencing judge for
reduction of sentence, in which he mentioned his presumptive parole
date. The judge not only denied the request, but also ordered United
States Probation Officer Salter to communicate the judge's dissatisfaction
to the Parole Commission. Salter wrote a letter to the Commission on
April 26, 1979 enclosing copies of the judge's parole comment and
presentence report. The letter urged review of the presumptive parole
date, characterizing Williams as violent and sociopathic. 4228
4224. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.2, 2.5 (1982); 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161, 4205(a) (1982).
4225. 707 F.2d at 1061. While noting that the specifics of the plea bargain had been omitted
in the prosecutor's letter, the court did indicate that it might be inferred from the fact there
was a plea bargain that Williams had pled guilty to avoid prosecution for murder.
4226. Id. Circuit Judge Skopil, in his concurrence stated that "[t]he majority is more willing
than I to accept the assertion of the Regional Commissioner and to infer from hearing reports
that the parole comment form and pre-sentence reports were not available or not considered."
Id. at 1067.
4227. Id. at 1062-63. Circuit Judge Duniway found a considerable discrepancy between the
findings of the Parole Commission and the trial judge's view. Judge Duniway cited at length
the conclusions of the hearing examiners. The hearing examiners repeatedly mentioned the
threat of force that was exerted on Williams and also emphasized as an example of such coercion the fact that Williams had been forced by Leonard to become homosexual. Overall, the
hearing examiners' conclusions depict a man deeply in fear of his life and cooperating with the
prosecution to make an "unmakeable" case.
4228. Id. The letter stated:
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Salter's letter resulted in an inquiry into the hearing examiners' decision. The inquiry revealed that "the only information. . . regarding the
circumstances of the offense [provided to the hearing examiners] appear[ed] to be information which was provided by Williams. ' 4229 On
May 23, 1979, Williams' case was reopened. The following day, Salter
wrote the Commission again, detailing the prison killing and admitting
the great difficulty the United States Government had encountered in
convicting anyone of murder in Atlanta federal prison. Salter empha-

sized that Williams had assessed the mounting evidence against him and,
in response, turned government witness. The Government, according to
Salter, felt tremendous pressure to obtain a conviction in the case. Not

only had two weapons been used in the killing, 4230 but at trial Leonard
testified that Williams had also assaulted the murdered inmate. Salter
also indicated that, after sentencing, Leonard confessed to a United
States Marshall that the Government's depiction of the case was almost

entirely accurate.4 231 Finally, Salter pointed out that Williams had prior

knowledge of the intended killing and was not in "a situation which he

suddenly found himself present in, with his much more powerful4 homo23 2
sexual partner committing a killing he was bound to engage in.

On July 2, 1979, the examiners held a special reconsideration hearing. They considered the parole comment form and Salter's first letter as
well as the information received after the reopening, including Salter's

second letter. The hearing examiners again recommended the same presumptive parole date, concluding that there was insufficient new information on which to change their original decision.42 33
The Regional Commissioner reviewed that ruling and, unhappy
with the outcome, referred the case to the National Commissioners.

Although the Regional Commission recommended April 15, 1989, the
Let me point out to you that Williams pled guilty to a lesser offense to save himself
from prosecution for murder ....
I urge you to review the presentence report which I prepared for our Court
....
The pattern of violent, antisocial behavior is clear. I do not see how this man
can be considered ready to live a law abiding life in society after being involved in
such a violent offense. I will point out to you that at the age of 31 Williams has been
involved in numerous burglaries, armed robberies, kidnappings, escapes, conveyance
of contraband materials in prison, threats on correctional workers and now murder.
Id. at 1062.
4229. Id. A case analyst for the Parole Commission spoke with one of the hearing examiners
and provided the Commissioner with the recollection of one of the hearing examiners.
4230. A hatchet and a knife were used in the murder. Id. at 1061, 1063.
4231. Leonard told the United States Marshall that the only exception to the government's
depiction was that Williams had bludgeoned the victim but was doing such a bad job of it that
Leonard had to take the hatchet away and do it himself. Id. at 1063.
4232. Id.
4233. Id.
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National Commissioners decided on April 14, 1986 as Williams' presumptive parole date.42 34
Williams then exhausted his administrative remedies and filed a petition for habeas corpus.42 3 The district court made two findings in dismissing the petition: (1) "that the sentencing judge's opinion as to the
early parole date was new adverse information"; and (2) "that the reopening was 6valid on the basis of information received after the
reopening.

' 423

The Ninth Circuit has held that a court should not overturn a Parole Commission decision unless the Commission has abused its discretion.42 37 The Commission has broad powers to effectuate the statutory
provisions of parole, 4238 and the Commission's interpretation of its regulations4 2 39 will control unless that interpretation is demonstrated to be in

conflict with the regulation or plainly erroneous. 42
In Williams, the Ninth Circuit found that the sentencing judge's
opinion as to the new parole date was not new and significant information. 424 1 The court, however, noted the statutory4 24 2 and regulatory 4243
requirements that the hearing examiners consider the sentencing judge's
parole comment form. 4 2 4 The court held that the parole comment form
was new adverse information because it was not considered by the hearing examiners. 4245 Therefore, the Regional Commissioner was justified
4234. Id.
4235. Id.
4236. Id.
4237. Id. See O'Brien v. Putnam, 591 F.2d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1979) (no abuse of discretion
merely because guidelines for parole were not adhered to).
4238. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)(1) (1976).
4239. 707 F.2d at 1063. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.60 (1981).
4240. 707 F.2d at 1063. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (court should show
deference to the construction of the regulation given to it by the agency administering the
regulation).
4241. 707 F.2d at 1064. See Izsak v. Sigler, 604 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1979) (claim that denial
of parole frustrated the sentencing judge's intention invalid); United States v. Addonizio, 442
U.S. 178 (1979). In Addonizio, the Court noted that any enforcement ofjudicial expectations
would frustrate the legislative decision to place parole release determination with the Parole
Commission and not the courts. 442 U.S. at 190.
4242. 18 U.S.C. § 4207(4) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "In making a determination
under this chapter [18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218] (relating to release on parole) the Commission
shall consider, if available and relevant. . . recommendations regarding the prisoner's parole
made at the time of sentencing by the sentencing judge .. "
4243. 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(a)(4) (1984) provides in pertinent part: "In making a determination
under this chapter (relating to release on parole) the Commission shall consider, if available
and relevant. . . recommendations regarding the prisoner's parole made at the time of sentencing by the sentencing judge and prosecuting attorney ..
4244. 707 F.2d at 1064.
4245. Id. at 1065. In a lengthy discussion, the majority denied two arguments. The first
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in reopening Williams' case in order to consider the sentencing recommendations.4 2 46 After the case was reopened, the Parole Commission
had authorization to consider any further information under 28 Code of
Federal Regulations section 2.19.4247 The Commission was then empowered to extend the presumptive parole date. 24 The Ninth Circuit held
that the Commission neither misconstrued the regulation nor abused its
discretion.4 24 9
H.

Habeas Corpus

1. Certificate of probable cause
A state prisoner must obtain from the district court a "certificate of
probable cause" before appealing a habeas petition to the circuit
court.42 50 The district court generally grants a certificate when there is a
"substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right. ' 425 1 If the petiargument was that the examiners had the same information before them as was contained in
the parole comment form. The court dismissed this contention by saying that even if the
hearing examiners did have the same information, and it was not clear that they did, they did
not follow the statutory and regulatory requirement to consider the sentencing judge's recommendations. The second argument was that since Williams' parole comment form and presentence report were in the Bureau of Prisons' possession, the Commission's failure to consider
those documents was their own fault. In response to this argument, the Ninth Circuit declined
to adopt a rule that precludes the reopening of a case because a document is misplaced while in
the possession of the prison system. The court stated that the Parole Commission has national
jurisdiction and is not a court, and should not be required to comport itself as such. The court
explained that Williams was sent to San Quentin to protect him from being killed, and that the
documents should not be presumed to be in the constructive possession of the Regional Commission in California and therefore before the hearing examiners. Id.
4246. Id.
4247. Id. at 1066.
4248. Id.
4249. Id. In his concurrence, Circuit Judge Skopil agreed with the majority that a sentenc.
ing judge's parole comment form or a presentence report is new adverse information if it has
not previously been considered, even if not considered due to inadvertence. Judge Skopil objected to the insufficient record compiled by the Parole Commission, thus making it difficult
for the district court to determine what was available and considered by the hearing examiners.
The judge observed that such omissions make the Parole Commission "practically unaccountable for its methods" and that such practice undermines appellate review of Commission decisions. Id. The judge noted the potential for arbitrariness when the Parole Commission does
not compile a thorough record of what information the hearing examiners had before them.
That arbitrariness, the judge concluded, is antithetical to the legislative intent of providing
equitable parole proceedings.
4250. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a
habeas corpus proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of process
issued by a State court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit
justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause.
4251. Harris v. Ellis, 204 F.2d 685, 686 (5th Cir. 1953). See also Gordon v. Willis, 516 F.
Supp. 911, 913 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (a "substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right" does
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tioner shows probable cause for appeal, the appellate court must afford
the parties an opportunity to address the underlying merits.4 25 2
In Barefoot v. Estelle,4 25 3 the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit's refusal to stay the petitioner's death sentence pending appeal was

proper. Although the circuit court made its decision six days after Barefoot's appeal and five days before his execution date, the Supreme Court
held that the use of summary procedure was proper.4 2 54 The Court further held that the circuit court reached the merits even though it did not
expressly affirm the judgment of the district court.4 2 5

Barefoot was convicted in a Texas court of murdering a police officer and was sentenced to death. The state appellate court affirmed his
conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted a stay of execution
pending disposition of an appeal for writ of certiorari. The Court subsequently denied certiorari and the state rescheduled Barefoot's execution.
He then applied unsuccessfully for habeas corpus in state court. Barefoot next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, and
the district court granted him a stay of execution. After an evidentiary
hearing the district court rejected Barefoot's claims and vacated the stay,
but granted him a certificate of probable cause to appeal to the Fifth
Circuit. The date of execution was set for January 25, 1983.4256
On January 14, 1983, Barefoot moved to have the Fifth Circuit stay

his execution pending his appeal from the denial of his habeas corpus
petition. On January 19, the parties presented briefs and arguments to
not mean petitioner must show he or she should prevail on the merits but that: (1) the issues
are debatable among reasonable judges; (2) another court could reasonably resolve the issues
differently; or (3) the questions are adequate to proceed to appeal). Cf. Ramsey v. Hand, 309
F.2d 947, 948 (10th Cir. 1962) (certificate of probable cause should not have been issued where
claim was based on state court holding on state law); Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941, 942
(1 lth Cir. 1982) (appeal to circuit court not frivolous since substantial issues on due process
were raised); Blackmun, Allowance of In FormaPauperisAppeals in § 2255 andHabeas Corpus
Cases,43 F.R.D. 343, 352 (8th Cir. 1967) (standard for granting certificate of probable cause is
greater than the absence of frivolity or "good faith").
4252. Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (per curiam). Garrisonbased its holding on Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542 (1967) (per curiam), which ruled that when a
certificate of probable cause is granted the court of appeals must "proceed to a disposition of
the appeal in accord with its ordinary procedure." Id. at 543 (emphasis added). But cf.
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), which interpreted Nowakowski as not necessarily
requiring a "full opportunity to submit briefs and argument." The Court in Carafas stated
that if an appeal is frivolous despite the issuance of probable cause, the court may take summary action. Id. at 242.
4253. 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
4254. Id. at 3392.
4255. Id. at 3393.
4256. Id. at 3390.
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the court. On January 20, the court issued an opinion and judgment
denying Barefoot's stay.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion 4257 stated that the court had studied the

briefs and records filed. The court believed it met the requirements established for habeas corpus appeals because it had given "an unlimited
opportunity" to argue the merits. 4258 The court concluded that the peti425 9
tion lacked substantial merit and, consequently, denied the stay.
On January 24, the Supreme Court stayed the petitioner's execution
and, treating the application for the stay as a petition for certiorari,
granted certiorari.4 26
Barefoot claimed that unless the circuit court believes a case to be
frivolous, it should decide the appeal on its merits and stay the execution
pending disposition. The state argued that the merits were decided and
that Barefoot had ample time to present the merits of his case. The
Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's procedure and decision.426 '
The Supreme Court ruled that a petitioner who has probable cause
4262
for appeal must be afforded an opportunity to address the merits.
The Court further ruled that a court of appeals which is unable to resolve
the merits of an appeal before the scheduled execution date must stay the
execution. The Court held that summary procedures may be adopted to
dispose of such cases.4 263

The Fifth Circuit presently requires a showing of some prospect of
success on the merits before issuing a stay of execution. 4 264 The Court
observed that "it is not clear" that this practice comports with the requirements that the petitioner be given the opportunity to present the
merits and that the court address the merits of the petition. 42 6 The
4257. Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
4258. Id. at 597.
4259. Id. at 600.
4260. 103 S. Ct. at 3390.
4261. Id.
4262. See supra note 4252.
4263. 103 S. Ct. at 3392 (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)). The Court in
Carafasstated that the requirement of a decision on the merits "does not prevent the court of
appeals from adopting appropriate summary procedures for final disposition of such cases."
391 U.S. at 242. The Court in Garrison v. Patterson stated that "if a summary procedure is
adopted the appellant must be informed, by rule or otherwise, that his opportunity will or may
be limited." 391 U.S. at 466-67.
4264. 103 S. Ct. at 3392 (citing O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (stay granted since challenge to exclusion of certain jurors presented a "substantial
question"); Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (stay denied since challenge
to sentence, to exclusion of certain jurors, and to adequacy of trial counsel presented "no
substantial question"), stay and cerL denied, 103 S. Ct. 1490 (1982)).
4265. 103 S. Ct. at 3392.
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Court held, nevertheless, that the circuit court's practice of deciding the
merits of an appeal together with the application for a stay is consistent
with the general rule.4 26 6 Although the Fifth Circuit did not formally
affirm the judgment of the district court, the Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Circuit had ruled on the merits of the appeal.4 267 The Court observed that the Fifth Circuit's swift disposition of the stay did not mean
4268
that its treatment of the merits was inadequate or cursory.
The Court concluded that the circuit court's handling of the case
was "tolerable" under its precedent but should not be accepted as the

preferred procedure.42 69 The Court set forth five guidelines for establish-

ing procedures to handle applications for stays of execution. First, the

district court should separate the meritorious appeals from the frivolous
ones, primarily by granting or withholding a certificate of probable
cause.4 270 Second, when a certificate of probable cause is granted, the
court of appeal should grant a stay of execution pending disposition of
the appeal.4 27 1 Third, an appellate court may adopt expedited procedures in resolving the merits of habeas appeals. The circuit court may
promulgate rules which describe the manner in which such cases will be

handled and inform counsel that the court may decide the merits of the
case and the motion for a stay in a single opinion. 4 272 Fourth, second

and successive habeas petitions should be dismissed if they fail to allege
new grounds for relief or constitute an abuse of the writ.427 3 Fifth, stays
of execution are not automatic pending decision on a petition for writ of
certiorari.4 27 4
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the Fifth Circuit's proce4266. Id.
4267. Id. at 3393.
4268. Id.
4269. Id.
4270. Id. at 3393-94. The Court agreed with the weight of opinion in the appellate courts
that the prisioner must make a" 'substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right."' Id. at
3394 (quoting Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 925
(1972)). See also Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941, 942 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (stay granted since
appeal not frivolous); Ramsey v. Hand, 309 F.2d 947, 949 (10th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (certificate of probable cause denied because no deprivation of fundamental right).
4271. 103 S. Ct. at 3394.
4272. Id. at 3394-95.
4273. Id. at 3395 (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963) (dictum stating
denial of successive applications is left to discretion of federal judge)).
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 Cases states: "A second or
successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different
grounds for relief. . . [or if] the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior
petition constituted an abuse of the writ." Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C. following § 2254 (Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts) (1982).
4274. 103 S. Ct. at 3395 (citing White v. Florida, 458 U.S. 1301 (1982) (Powell, J., in cham-
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dure did not give the petitioner an opportunity to address the underlying
merits42 75 in accord with the court's "ordinary procedure. ' 4276 He disagreed with the view that it would be proper for a court of appeals to
adopt summary proceedings for capital cases.4 27 7 He argued that appellate courts have consistently required that a stay of execution be granted
unless the appeal is entirely frivolous.4 27 8
Justice Marshall also argued that the circuit court failed to decide
the case on its merits since it neither dismissed the appeal as frivolous
nor expressly affirmed the judgment of the district court. 4 2 7 9 According
to Justice Marshall, the circuit court merely decided that the likelihood

of Barefoot's succeeding on the 0merits was insufficient to justify the delay
42
of a stay pending an appeal.

1

Justice Marshall characterized the majority's approval of summary
procedures in capital cases as a way of allowing fewer procedural safeguards of defendant's rights which is contrary to the trend of the law. 42 81
bers)). A grant of stay pending appeal on a writ of certiorari is based on the following
standard:
"[T]here must be a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would
consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the
notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a significant possibility of reversal of
the lower court's decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will
result if that decision is not stayed."
White, 458 U.S. at 1302 (quoting Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S.
1301, 1305 (1974)).
4275. 103 S.Ct. at 3401 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4276. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S.
542, 543 (1967)).
4277. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Fifth Circuit recently denied a stay in a summary
proceeding in Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.), stay and cert. denied 459 U.S. 1061,
1063 (1982). Justice Marshall argued that the denial of the stay in Brooks has no precedential
value since the order did not discuss a standard to be applied in passing on applications for a
stay pending appeal. 103 S.Ct. at 3401 n.5.
4278. 103 S.Ct. at 3401 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d
941, 942 (11th Cir. 1982) (stay granted since appeal not frivolous); Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d
487, 493 (4th Cir. 1980) (stay granted); United States ex rel. De Vita v. McCorkle, 214 F.2d
823, 823 (3d Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (stay granted pending disposition of appeal); Fouquette v.
Bernard, 198 F.2d 96, 97 (9th Cir. 1952) (stay granted). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 38(a)(1)
which states: "A sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal is taken."
In Shaw v. Martin, the Fourth Circuit recognized that "[iln the very nature of proceedings
on a motion for a stay of execution, the limited record coupled with the time constraints...
preclude any fine-tuned inquiry into the actual merits." 613 F.2d at 492. Until recently the
Fifth Circuit also followed this approach. See United States ex rel. Goins v. Sigler, 250 F.2d
128, 129 (5th Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (stay granted pending disposition of appeal).
4279. 103 S.Ct. at 3402 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4280. Id. at 3402-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall characterized the majority's
opinion as an "egregious misreading of Garrison v. Patterson." Id. at 3403 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
4281. Id. at 3404-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited a series of capital cases
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He urged circuit judges not to adopt such procedures.428 2
2.

Requirement of constitutional claim

Section 2254 requires that a federal habeas petition involve either a
question of constitutional dimension or a violation of federal law or
United States treaty.42 83 Mere technical violations of rules do not rise to
the level of a constitutional claim. In Wayne v. Raines,4 28 4 the Ninth
Circuit overturned the district court's grant of habeas relief because the
petitioner failed to show more than a mere technical violation of a state
rule of criminal procedure.4 2 5
In 1975, Wayne was charged with four separate armed robbery offenses. Before Wayne entered his guilty plea the trial judge advised him
of the minimum and maximum sentences but failed to inform him of the
applicable parole limitations, as required by the state rule of criminal
procedure.428 6 Wayne entered pleas of guilty and the trial court convicted him on all four offenses. He subsequently filed a habeas corpus
petition alleging that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily or intelligently
made and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.42 87
The circuit court held that Wayne had to show that he was
in which greater procedural safeguards are accorded. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430
(1981) (double jeopardy bars against resentencing from life imprisonment to death); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (must have consideration of lesser included offense); Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam) (remand to allow hearsay evidence of an admission
of another); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (when sentencing, eighth
and fourteenth amendments require consideration of mitigating factors of defendant's character and record); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (remand because defendant had no
opportunity to explain or deny information in presentence report); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory death sentence statute constituted
violation of eighth and fourteenth amendments); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73 (1932)
(reversed due to failure to give reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel).
4282. 103 S. Ct. at 3406 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing In re Burwell, 350 U.S. 521, 522
(1956) (per curiam) (holding that appellate courts determine procedure for application for
certificate of probable cause)).
4283. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
4284. 690 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 275 (1983).
4285. Id. at 686. The district court held that Wayne's guilty pleas were obtained in violation
of due process because at the time of his pleas he was not aware of the parole limitations
applicable to the robbery charge. Id.
4286. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2(b) (1983) provides that before the accused enters a guilty plea,
the court must explain " [t]he nature and range of possible sentence[s] for the offense to which
the plea is offered, including any special conditions regarding sentence, parole, or commutation
imposed by statute."
4287. 690 F.2d at 686.
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prejudiced or that his rights were affected by the trial judge's omis-

sion. 4288 Wayne not only failed to show prejudice but also failed to allege

that he was "actualy unaware" of the parole limitations.4 2 89 The court

ruled that he had in fact been adequately warned. Accordingly, the court
vacated the grant of habeas corpus.4 29 °
In Locks v. Sumner, 2 91 the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's

denial of Locks' habeas corpus petition on the ground that he failed to
show a constitutional claim cognizable under habeas corpus.4292 Locks
was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder in a California state
court.4 29 3 He asserted that three constitutional violations tainted his

convictions: an inquiry by the judge into the numerical division of the
4288. Id. at 687. See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 782-85 (1979) (failure to
inform defendant represented by counsel that his guilty plea involved a mandatory special
parole term is not constitutional violation); Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir.
1979) (failure of trial judge to inform defendant of ineligibility for parole is not constitutional
violation).
4289. 690 F.2d at 687. In a dialogue between the trial court and Wayne, the judge asked
Wayne if he understood that the minimum sentence was five years and the maximum was life,
and that the sentences could be concurrent. Wayne repeatedly answered "yes." the trial record reflected that Wayne's attorney said: "Your Honor. . . I have explained to the defendant
that, as the law stands now, he does face a minimum of five years without probation. There
would be no probationary term until after that." Id. at 687. The circuit court held that the
attorney used the words "probationary term" when he meant parole. 690 F,2d at 687 & n.1.
The court distinguished Timmreck and Wacht on the ground that there the petitioners
were actually unaware of the parole limitations. 690 F.2d 687.
4290. Id. at 687-88. See Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d at 1247 (defendant failed to claim he
was unaware of ineligibility for parole); United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th
Cir.) (per curiam) (clear from record defendant understood consequences of his plea), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978). See also United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 785 (no relief
since all defendant showed was failure to comply with formal requirements of rule); Hill v.
United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 (1962) (no claim where defendant was denied opportunity to
speak in his own behalf before sentence was imposed).
The court in Wayne reserved the question of whether there would be a violation of due
process if the trial court had not advised him that he would be ineligible for parole even under
the minimum sentence. 690 F.2d at 688 n.3. The court nevertheless cited one Ninth Circuit
case which held that a defendant who entered a guilty plea without being aware that he would
not be eligible for parole does not plead with an "understanding of the consequences," Id.
(citing Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1964), overruled on othergrounds,
Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1966)). This requirement that the defendant
understand the consequences of pleading guilty to the charges was codified in the 1966 amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, in 1974, Rule 11 was
amended to eliminate the requirement that the accused be advised of parole eligibility. See id.
4291. 703 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 338 (1983).
4292. Id. at 408.
4293. Id. at 405. Locks' conviction was affirmed; his petition for rehearing before the California Supreme Court and his petition for certiorari before the United States Supreme Court
were both denied. His original petition for habeas corpus in federal court was dismissed for
failure to exhaust state remedies on the jury inquiry issue. Locks' subsequent requests for
review were rejected by the California courts and he returned to the federal courts. Id.
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jury;4 2 9 4

the court's denial of his request for advisory counsel; 4 2 9 5 and the
court's failure to give him a full and fair suppression hearing on an alleg42 96
edly illegal search.
The first claim arose when the judge asked the foreman for the numerical division of the jury at the end of trial, before excusing the jury for
the weekend. The judge also asked not to be told how many were for
what side. Although the Supreme Court has held such an inquiry to be
per se prejudicial in federaltrials, 42 97 the Ninth Circuit held that this rule
is not applicable to state courts. 4 2 98 Therefore, the Locks court held the
issue did not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. 4299
Locks' second claim arose when he waived his right to counsel
before trial because he was dissatisfied with his court appointed counsel.
The trial court refused his request to have substitute counsel appointed,
or to allow him to proceed in propria persona with his court appointed
counsel as co-counsel. Just before the trial, Locks renewed his request
for co-counsel, or, in the alternative, for advisory counsel. On appeal,
Locks claimed he made errors during his self-representation. The Ninth
Circuit held that although the trial court has the discretion to appoint cocounsel,4 3° there is no constitutional right to co-counsel. Therefore, the
issue did not constitute a claim of constitutional dimension.4 30 1
Locks' third claim was that evidence used against him at trial was
seized in an illegal search of his car. The general rule is that fourth
430 2
amendment claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings.
Locks claimed that an exception applied because he did not receive a full
and fair hearing on his fourth amendment claim.4 30 3 He asserted that the
exception applied because the California Court of Appeal considered evi-

4294. Id. at 405-07.
4295. Id. at 407-08.
4296. Id. at 408.
4297. Id. at 405 (citing Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926) (inquiry into division
of jury is prejudicial per se and ground for reversal because of general tendency to be coercive)). For further discussion on the inquiry issue, see Part IV, § H. Judicial Misconduct,
supra notes 3433-50 and accompanying text.
4298. 703 F.2d at 405-06.
4299. Id. at 406.
4300. Id. at 407 (citing United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (although no absolute right to both self-representation and assistance of counsel, hybrid representation is within discretion of trial judge)).
4301. Id. at 408 (citing United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)).
The court in Trapnell stated: "A defendant representing himself cannot be heard to complain
that his Sixth Amendment rights have been violated." 512 F.2d at 12.
4302. 703 F.2d at 408 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (fourth amendment claims
not cognizable in habeas proceedings)).
4303. Id.
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dence not offered at the suppression hearing."' However, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that a state court's improper consideration of facts is not

sufficient to establish that the defendant's claims were not fully and fairly
considered. 430 5 The court concluded that Locks had full and fair consideration before the state courts. Since he failed to make any claims of a
constitutional
dimension, the circuit court denied his petition for habeas
306
4

corpus.

In Carlson v. Hong,4 30 7 the petitioner alleged that he was in state
custody in violation of article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on De-

tainers Act. 430 8 The Ninth Circuit in a per curiam decision affirmed the

district court's denial of habeas relief 30 9 on the ground that a claim
based on a violation of article IV(e) does not rise to the "required level of

seriousness.,

4310

The court stated that a claim is cognizable under sec-

tion 2254 only when error constitutes "'a fundamental defect which in-

herently results in a complete miscarriage of justice'" and presents

"'exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by
the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.' ",4311 The court distinguished

Carlson's claim from one arising under article IV(c) of the same act because that section requires that the detainee be brought to trial within

120 days and has its roots in the constitutional provision for speedy tri-

als.43 12 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's petition for
habeas corpus.

4304. Id.
4305. Id. (citing Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1977) (even if state court improperly considered facts not in the record, claim cannot be raised in habeas appeal)).
4306. Id.
4307. 707 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
4308. Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1982)
states:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, of complaint contemplated hereby
prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment. . . such
indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
4309. Carlson v. Hong, 545 F. Supp. 352 (D. Hawaii 1982).
4310. 707 F.2d at 368 (citing Hitchcock v. United States, 580 F.2d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 1978)
(violation of article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act falls short of a "fundamental defect" causing a "complete miscarriage of justice" to require relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1982))).
4311. Id. (citing Davis v. Untied States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962))). In Davis, the court held that a conviction based on an
already invalid military induction was a sufficient claim. 417 U.S. at 346.
4312. 707 F.2d at 368 (citing Cody v. Morris, 623 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1980) (claim under
section IV(c) of Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act constitutes cognizable constitutional
claim)).

1985]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

3.

Summary dismissal of claims without merit

Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a habeas
petition that lacks merit as a matter of law may be summarily
dismissed.4 3 13
In Gutierrez v. Griggs,4314 the Ninth Circuit held that if the petition
lacks merit on its face, the district court may summarily dismiss the petition without resolving the question of whether the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.4315 Gutierrez was convicted of firstdegree murder in a California state court. 43 16 At trial the court gave the
jury one instruction defining duress as "imminent and immediate danger" but rejected Gutierrez's request for four additional duress instructions.4 3 17 A California court of appeal upheld his conviction. Gutierrez
then filed a habeas petition on the ground that his fourteenth amendment
right to due process had been violated.
The Ninth Circuit stated that for his due process claim to be valid
Gutierrez had to allege a valid duress defense.431 8 Because the trial court
found that the threat to Gutierrez was not imminent and immediate as
required by California law,4 319 the Ninth Circuit held that Gutierrez's
claim lacked merit and, therefore, dismissed the appeal. 432 0 Accordingly,
4313. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
states in pertinent part: "If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits
annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall
make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified." Rule 4, 28
U.S.C. following § 2254 (1982) (Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts).
4314. 695 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1983).
4315. Id. at 1198.
4316. Id. at 1196. Gutierrez and a co-defendant, both members of the Nuestra Familia gang,
killed another member of the gang. The victim was on the gang's "hit list" because he had
refused to kill someone else. Id.
4317. The four additional instructions would have negated elements of first and second-degree murder. The first two provided that duress could negate the deliberation and premeditation required for first-degree murder. The second two provided that duress could negate the
malice aforethought required for first or second-degree murder. Id. at 1197 n.I. Gutierrez
claimed that if he had not killed the victim, he too would have been marked for execution by
the gang. Id. at 1196.
4318. Id. at 1199.
4319. The jury instruction on duress, CALJIC 4.40, defines duress as "threats and menaces"
that "would cause a reasonable person to fear that his life would be in immediate danger if he
did not engage in the conduct charged." I CAL. JURY INST. CRIM. § 4.40(1) (West 1979).
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court finding that there was no duress. Gutierrez
was armed at the time of the killing and presumably able to defend himself against immediate
retribution. He could have asked for protection from the policeman who witnessed the murder. 695 F.2d at 1199.
4320. 695 F.2d at 1199. The court reasoned that it would be wasteful to make an exhaustion
inquiry if the petition, on its face, lacks merit as a matter of law. By summarily dismissing the
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the Ninth Circuit did not decide the exhaustion question.
4.

Exhaustion of state remedies

State prisoners are required to present all claims in state court
before their petition for a writ of habeas corpus can be reviewed by a
federal court. 4321 The principle of exhaustion requires that the convicted
prisoner make all possible appeals in the state system before beginning
the collateral habeas proceeding in the federal courts. In Rose v.
Lundy,4 32 2 the Supreme Court ruled that requiring total exhaustion of all
4323
claims best serves the policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine.
The Court enunciated these policies as follows: (1) to give state courts
the first opportunity of review as required by principles of comity; (2) to
generate a complete factual record which would aid federal courts in
their review; (3) to require dismissal of mixed petitions containing both
exhausted and unexhausted claims; and (4) to reduce piecemeal
litigation.43 2 4
In Pappageorge v. Sumner,3 2 5 the Ninth Circuit dismissed the
habeas appeal because the petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies when he alleged an additional claim outside the record. On appeal,
Pappageorge claimed for the first time that his state trial counsel failed to
cross-examine prosecution witnesses properly. This claim was added to
support his allegation of ineffective assistance of state trial counsel.4 32 6
petition on the merits, the district court in effect upheld the state court conviction. There
would be no disruption of state court proceedings, and, therefore, comity would not be adversely affected. Id. at 1198.
4321. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982) states in part:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of
circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
4322. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
4323. Id. at 522. Although section 2254(c) states that a remedy is not exhausted if there
exists a state procedure for the "question presented," the Court in Rose stated that the statute
does not expressly require total exhaustion of each and every claim. Because the legislative
history contains no reference to the problem of mixed petitions of exhausted and unexhausted
questions, the Court concluded that Congress probably never thought of the problem. Id. at
516-17.
4324. Id. at 518-20. The Court requires dismissal of mixed petitions because of the difficulty
in separating exhausted and unexhausted claims and because of the danger of deciding
unexhausted claims. Id. at 519.
4325. 688 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983).
4326. Id. at 1294. The first of the four claims which Pappageorge raised on appeal was
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In a concurring opinion,43 27 Judge Ely noted that the Ninth Circuit
has determined that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the claims
in the federal habeas petition are the "substantial equivalent" of those
presented to the state court.43 28 Judge Ely stated that since Pappageorge
asserted a cross-examination deficiency which had not before been part of
the state court record, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
" 'wholly transformed by other factual assertions.' ,4329 Therefore, the
claim could not be called "substantially equivalent" to that raised before
the state court and the exhaustion requirement had not been met.4 33 °
A different question arises when, rather than asserting new factual
ineffective assistance of state trial counsel. In support of this claim, Pappageorge alleged that
his attorney failed to make a motion to dismiss based on a pre-arrest delay. Pappageorge also
alleged that his attorney failed to object to the admission of a handcuffs invoice and to crossexamine prosecution witnesses properly. Id.
4327. Id. at 1294 (Ely, J., concurring).
4328. Id. at 1295 (Ely, J., concurring) (citing Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173, 174 (9th
Cir. 1964)). In Schiers, the question was whether any of the eleven contentions made in the
habeas petition were the "substantial equivalent" of contentions presented in the direct appeal
of the conviction. The court held that the appellant did not exhaust state remedies on any of
the claims since most of the claims had never been raised before the state courts. The second
and third claims had been raised before the state courts but were remanded because new factual allegations "wholly transformed" the claims. Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173, 175 (9th
Cir. 1964).
Schiers' second claim, which he had raised before the state court, alleged that his case was
prejudiced by the introduction of testimony about a lie-detector test. Before the Ninth Circuit,
he also asserted that he had been coerced into taking the test, that the introduction of the
testimony was willful, and that the prosecutor, knowing the testimony would be forthcoming,
pre-arranged its introduction with the witness. Id.
Schiers' third claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Before the Ninth Circuit he
asserted that his counsel did not go to the initial arraignment proceedings, that he was not
advised of his legal rights before police detention, that his counsel never raised an objection to
the allegedly illegal detention, and that his counsel failed to introduce certain evidence in
Schiers' defense. Since these facts were never alleged before the state court, the third claim
was also remanded. Id. at 176.
4329. 688 F.2d at 1295 (Ely, J., concurring). Courts have held that the exhaustion requirement is not met when a prisoner adds new facts to support a claim in the petition even though
the claim remains the same. See Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1982) (eight
new gruonds added to claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); Domaingue v. Butterworth,
641 F.2d 8, 12 (Ist Cir. 1981) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel enlarged from single
act of failure to object to jury instruction to "materially broader" claim alleging numerous
instances of incompetence during and before trial); United States v. Herold, 349 F.2d 372, 373
(2d Cir. 1965) (state appellate courts not given opportunity to pass on claim of denial of counsel in light of opportunity to examine record of arraignment proceedings); cf.Nelson v. Moore,
470 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1st Cir. 1972) (new factual allegations were only "bits of evidence"
insufficient to cast petitioner's case in "a significantly different [legal] posture"), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 951 (1973). But see Austin v. Swenson, 522 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (exhaustion met
although new evidence on identification issue was discovered when defendant was permitted to
examine police report).
4330. 688 F.2d at 1295 (Ely, J., concurring).
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allegations, the prisoner uses different legal authority to support existing
claims. In Hudson v. Rushen,4 33 1 the Ninth Circuit rejected the view that
the exhaustion doctrine requires the state court to pass on the constitutional claim under the particular legal authority advanced in federal
court.4332 The court distinguished the Hudson case from cases in which
the exhaustion requirement had not been met because new factual allegations were raised before the federal court 4333 and from cases in which a
new rule
of federal law cast the legal issue in a fundamentally different
4334
light.

Hudson petitioned for habeas corpus relief on the ground that the
state trial court violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. At
the close of the prosecution's case, Hudson made a motion for substitution of counsel which the trial court rejected.4 33 5 In the California
courts, Hudson's claim was decided under the rule articulated in People
v. Marsden.4 3 36 In federal court, Hudson based his claim on authorities
from the Ninth Circuit. 433 7 The court concluded that the California authority substantially paralleled the Ninth Circuit authority. 4 338 The
court went on to state that since the underlying legal question remained
the same, the state courts had a fair opportunity to pass upon it.4 339 Ac-

cordingly, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exhaustion requirement was
satisfied. 4 34
4331. 686 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1983).
4332. Id. at 830.
4333. Id. (citing Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1964)). See supra note 4328 for
a discussion of Schiers.
4334. 686 F.2d at 830 n.2 (citing Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965)). In Blair,
an intervening change in federal law cast the case in a different light. At first, a California
district court decision denied the habeas petitioner's request for appointment of counsel on
appeal. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1965), accorded a constitutional right to counsel on appeal from a state conviction. Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit held that the prisoner had not exhausted state remedies. Blair v. California, 340
F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1965).
4335. 686 F.2d at 828.
4336. Id. at 829. The court in People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr.
156 (1970), held that when a defendant moves for substitution of attorney after the commencement of the prosecution's case, the trial court must permit the defendant to specify the reasons
for the request. If the reasons present substantial grounds or call for further inquiry by the
court, then the trial court must initiate a further hearing. Id. at 123-24, 65 P.2d at 47-48, 84
Cal. Rptr. at 159-60..
4337. 686 F.2d at 829. Specifically, Hudson asserted that United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d
693 (9th Cir. 1979) and Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), supported his contention that his sixth amendment right to counsel had been denied.
4338. 686 F.2d at 830. The Ninth Circuit authority merely offered an "alternative formulation" of the standards governing the trial court's inquiry into motions for new counsel. Id.
4339. Id.
4340. Id.
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In Ruviwat v. Smith,4 34 1 the Ninth Circuit held that available state
administrative remedies must be exhausted before a habeas corpus petition is made.4 34 2 The question of exhaustion of state administrative remedies was one of first impression before the Ninth Circuit. On three

occasions, in 1976, 1979, and 1981, Ruviwat failed to appeal administrative parole decisions to the Regional Commissioner.4 3 43 Instead,
Ruviwat petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.4 3 44
The court reasoned that the adoption of administrative exhaustion
would aid judicial review by the development of a factual record, conserve the court's time since relief could be granted on an administrative
level, and allow the administrative agency an opportunity to correct its

own errors. 4345 By requiring the exhaustion of state administrative remedies the Ninth Circuit concurred with the Second, Third, Eighth and
Tenth Circuits.43 46
Ruviwat alternatively argued that even if he had not exhausted administrative remedies, the case involved "extraordinary circumstances"

requiring equitable consideration. He claimed that his case was extraordinary because the Parole Commissioner had acted arbitrarily and

he had.already made unsuccessful appeals. He also claimed that the appeals process was too lengthy, and that the district court failed to direct
the Parole Commission on the proper parole formula.4 34 7 The court held
that there were no extraordinary circumstances because the alleged arbitrary action could be cured by administrative appeal. It held further that
there was no evidence to show the appeals process was too lengthy and
4341. 701 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
4342. Id. at 845. The Ninth Circuit previously had reserved the question in Brady v. Smith,
656 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1981). 701 F.2d at 845 n.l.
4343. In 1976, Ruviwat failed to appeal a Parole Commission decision extending the usual
confinement period beyond the guideline period. 701 F.2d at 844. In 1979, Ruviwat again
failed to appeal the decision in a second parole hearing before the Hearing Examiner Panel in
which the panel determined Ruviwat should continue in confinement until a ten-year reconsideration hearing in August, 1989. Id. at 844-45. Finally, in 1981, Ruviwat did not appeal the
panel recommendation, which was made in an interim hearing, that there be no change in the
ten-year reconsideration hearing. Id.
4344. Id. at 845.
4345. Id.
4346. At least four circuit courts have held that the exhaustion requirement is not met when
an administrative remedy is still available. See, e.g., Arias v. United States Parole Comm'n,
648 F.2d 196 (3rd Cir. 1981) (administrative hearing still pending where Commission made
good faith decision to reopen case); Clonce v. Presley, 640 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (prisoner failed to appeal authority of federal parole violation warrant to federal administrative agencies); Guida v. Nelson, 603 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (prisoner
failed to appeal parole board's parole revocation); Pope v. Sigler, 542 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam) (prisoner failed to show he had appealed parole board's decision).
4347. 701 F.2d at 845.
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also held that the Parole Commission acted within the scope of its
4348
authority.
In addition to exhausting all state administrative remedies, the
habeas petitioner must exhaust all judicial remedies. In Ventura v.
Cupp, 4349 the habeas petitoner failed to exhaust his judicial remedies because the issues did not remain constant at each level of review. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
determine any unexhausted or forfeited claims.4 3 "
Ventura first appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals, which affirmed his convictions, but he did not seek review by the Oregon
Supreme Court. He then sought post-conviction relief in an Oregon trial
court. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief and
the Supreme Court of Oregon denied review. The United States Supreme
Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.4 3 5'
The Ninth Circuit ruled that Ventura failed to obtain complete judicial review of several questions by not presenting them to all appropriate
appellate courts. 4 3 52 He raised his claim of a violation of rights under
Miranda v. Arizona4 35 3 before the Oregon Court of Appeals but not
before the Supreme Court of Oregon. He raised his double jeopardy
claim with regard to consecutive sentences only in a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Finally, he raised his claim of deprivation of
435 4
right to counsel only in his habeas corpus petition.
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether all state remedies had been exhausted. The district court
was also instructed to determine whether any failure to exhaust remedies
constituted either a "deliberate bypass ' 435 5 or a situation in which there
4348. Id. Although 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1982) establishes guidelines for determining parole,
18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1982) states that "[t]he Commission may grant or deny release on parole
notwithstanding the guidelines referred to in subsection (a) of this section if it determines there
is good cause for so doing."
4349. 690 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
4350. Id. at 742.
4351. Id.at 741.
4352. Ventura was convicted of three counts of first degree robbery, two counts of first degree assault, and one count of being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm. Id.
4353. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Ventura claimed that evidence of statements he made to the
police after his arrest should have been suppressed under his right against self-incrimination
and under the Miranda protections. 690 F.2d at 741-42.
4354. 690 F.2d at 741-42.
4355. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In Fay, the Court held that federal judges may deny
habeas petitions if the prisoner "deliberately bypassed" state court procedures. The Court
stressed that it must be the prisoner who makes "'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" Id. at 438-39 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
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was cause for, and actual prejudice from,4 35 6 the failure to raise objections at trial.4 357

In Szeto v. Rushen,4358 the Ninth Circuit held that if a habeas petitioner files a "mixed petition" consisting of exhausted as well as
unexhausted claims, then the rule of Rose v. Lundy4 359 requires dismissal
of the entire petition without reaching the merits.4 360 The court thus
remanded the case so that Szeto could amend his original petition, submit a new petition, or have the action dismissed without prejudice.4 36 1
Szeto was convicted in a California state court of being an accessory
to a felony and of possession of a sawed-off shotgun.43 62 He then filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus on four claims.43 63 On one of the

claims he failed to seek state habeas relief or other state judicial relief
and, therefore, failed to exhaust all remedies for all claims in his
petition.4 3 "
The court remanded the case to the district court on the grounds of
comity and orderly procedure.4 36 5 The court held that the petitioner

who abandons claims in the federal habeas forum which were not
presented to the state courts runs the risk of forfeiting later consideration
of the claims. 4 366 The court concluded that the district court should
have the first opportunity to consider these unexhausted claims.4 367
464 (1938)). A unilateral decision made by the prisoner's counsel does not automatically bar
relief. Id. at 439.
4356. Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). In Wainright, the Court held that a state
prisoner is barred from federal habeas relief unless the prisoner shows cause for failure to
object at trial and actual prejudice against the prisoner's case. The Court applied the test to
bar relief because of a failure to object to the admission of a confession at trial. The Court
rejected Fay's "sweeping language" establishing the "deliberate bypass" standard, especially
because the state contemporaneous objection rules deserved greater respect than Fay gave
them. Id. at 87-91.
4357. 690 F.2d at 742.
4358. 709 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1983).
4359. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
4360. 709 F.2d at 1341.
4361. Id.
4362. The charges against Szeto arose from Chinese gang warfare in which five bystanders
and eleven others were injured. Szeto was convicted of aiding the perpetrators by disposing of
their weapons, including a sawed-off shoftgun, in San Francisco Bay. Id. at 1340.
4363. The four claims were: (1) he had been prejudiced by hearsay evidence; (2) his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination had been violated; (3) the prosecution had concealed the fact that a chief witness committed perjury; and (4) accomplice testimony had not
been sufficiently corroborated as required by California law. Id. at 1340-41.
4364. Id. at 1341.
4365. Id.
4366. Id.
4367. Id. (citing Gulliver v. Dalshiem, 687 F.2d 655, 657-58 (2d Cir. 1982) (although Gul-

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

In Duckworth v. Serrano,4 36 the Supreme Court held that an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies if either the state courts fail to
provide any opportunity for redress or the process for correcting the ex-

haustion problem is "so clearly deficient" that seeking relief would be
futile.4 3 69

InAldan v. Salas, 37° the Ninth Circuit held that a four to six month
delay in appellate review from the Superior Court of Guam to the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam did not fall within the scope
of the exception to the exhaustion requirement. 371 Although Guam is a
territory rather than a state, the court found it preferable to require the

exhaustion of all local remedies before permitting federal habeas
72
review.

43

Aldan was convicted on three counts of burglary after he entered a
guilty plea in the Superior Court of Guam. He escaped custody before

his sentencing and was sentenced in absentia in violation of Guam
law.437 3 Shortly afterwards he was apprehended and the prosecution
moved for a resentencing. The superior court denied the motion and

Aldan did not appeal his conviction.

374

He then filed a petition for

habeas corpus with the superior court on the ground that the sentence
liver's counsel stipulated to abandon unexhausted claims, case was remanded because there
was no showing Gulliver amended his habeas petition to delete unexhausted claims)).
4368. 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam) (exception to exhaustion requirement did not apply to
ineffective assistance of counsel claim first raised in habeas appeal to Sixth Circuit where prosecution witness at petitioner's murder trial had retained defense attorney for representation in
unrelated criminal charge).
4369. Id. at 3.
4370. 718 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1983).
4371. Id. at 891.
4372. Id. (citing Pador v. Matanane, 653 F.2d 1277, 1279 (9th Cir. 1981) (denial of habeas
petition affirmed where habeas petitioner first alleged denial of effective assistance of counsel
on habeas appeal)). In Aldan, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case with directions to dismiss
without prejudice. Id.
4373. Id. at 890. The court cited § 1.13 of the Guam Code of Criminal Procedure, which
provides in pertinent part:
(a) The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at
every stage of the trial . . . and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise
provided by this section.
(b) The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict shall
not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived his right to be
present whenever he, initially present
(1) voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced (whether or not
he has been informed by the court of his obligation to remain during the trial). ...
GUAM CRIM. PRO. CODE § 1.13 (1980).
4374. 718 F.2d at 890. The Guam Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant
may appeal "[flrom any order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." GUAM CRIM. PRO. CODE § 130.15(c) (1980).
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was illegally imposed.43 75 The petition was denied. 4376
Aldan did not appeal to the Appellate Division of the District Court
of Guam. Instead, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court of Guam.43 77 The district court denied the petition
on the merits but held that the exhaustion requirement was discretionary 4 3 7 8 The court stated that an extenuating circumstance existed in this
case such that the exhaustion policy should be disregarded. The extenuating circumstance so described was a four to six month delay until the
next three-judge panel convened to sit as the Appellate Division of the
District Court of Guam.43 79
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred because the delay did not meet the criteria of Duckworth.4 38 The court stated that the
district court judge may have reasoned that he was conserving judicial
resources by rendering a decision since he would sit on the three-judge
panel. 438 1 The Ninth Circuit observed, however, that the district court
decides habeas petitions under the federal law while the appellate division decides appeals on the basis of territorial law. 4382 Therefore, the
defendant failed to exhaust territorial remedies and, accordingly, the
court remanded the case.4 383
The scope of the exhaustion requirement may be limited when considerations of double jeopardy arise. In Hartley v. Neely,43 84 the Ninth
Circuit held that the exhaustion requirement may be satisfied prior to
final judgment in state court where a habeas appeal is based on a double
jeopardy claim.43 85
Hartley was released from custody after being granted a motion for
mistrial resulting from prosecutorial misconduct. A second trial was
brought on the same charges and he brought a motion to dismiss on a
double jeopardy claim. He lost the motion but pursued his claim
through the state court system; finally, he filed a petition for a writ of
4375. 718 F.2d at 890.
4376. Id.
4377. Id.
4378. Id. at 890-91. Although the territorial prosecutor conceded that a sentence imposed in
absentia is contrary to § 1.13 of the Guam Code of Criminal Procedure, the district court
disagreed. Id. at 891.
4379. Id.
4380. Id. at 891.
4381. Id.
4382. Id.
4383. Id.
4384. 701 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
4385. Id. at 781.
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habeas corpus.43 86

The Ninth Circuit joined the First, Second and Fifth Circuits in
holding that pretrial habeas review is appropriate with respect to double

jeopardy claims if all other state remedies are exhausted.4387 The court
reasoned that a habeas petitioner can be assured freedom from double

jeopardy only if his petition is heard before the second trial because the
guarantee against double jeopardy includes not being "twice put to trial
43 88
for the same offense.

However, since Hartley's mistrial was based on his own motion, the
court concluded that a second trial would not be barred.

The court

stated that the double jeopardy exception would apply only if he could
show that the prosecution provoked his mistrial motion at the first
trial.43 89 Therefore, the circuit court affirmed the district court's denial
of the habeas corpus petition. 390
5.

Presumption of correctness accorded state court findings

The rule on habeas corpus petitions, set forth in 28 U.S.C. section
2254(d), states that the judgment of the state trial court is presumed to be
correct subject to eight exceptions. One exception applies when the fed-

eral court concludes, after considering the record as a whole,'4 39that the
'
factual determination is "not fairly supported by the record.
4
39
In Marshall v. Lonberger, 1 the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth

Circuit's grant of a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it errone4386. Id.
4387. Id. (citing Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 303 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (exhaustion question is limited to remedies available before commencement of criminal proceedings because
double jeopardy cannot be adequately cured by post conviction relief); Benson v. Superior
Court, 663 F.2d 355, 359 (lst Cir. 1981) (federal court's only way of preventing double jeopardy is to consider habeas corpus petition before trial); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 120
(2d Cir. 1979) (deference to state judicial system required by doctrine of comity met even
though habeas corpus petition heard before second trial)).
4388. Id. (quoting Abnedy v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) (right not to be tried
twice for same offense would be significantly undermined if appellate review were postponed
until after conviction and sentence)).
4389. Id. (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1979) (second trial not barred on
double jeopardy grounds where initial mistrial was declared on defendant's own motion)).
4390. Id.
4391. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) states in pertinent part:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a [state prisoner], a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual
issue, made by a State court. . . in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ
and the State. . . were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or
other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct . . . (8)
. . . unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made. . . is not fairly supported by the record.
4392. 459 U.S. 422 (1983).
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ously applied the "fairly supported by the record" standard.4 39 3
Lonberger was convicted in 1975 in an Ohio court for murder while committing rape. He was sentenced to death. He had been indicted by a
state grand jury on two counts of "aggravated murder. 4 394 The first
' 4395
count charged him with murder with "prior calculation and design." 4396
The second count charged him with murder while committing rape.
Both counts included a "specification" which required that he had previously been convicted of an "offense of43which
the gist was the purposeful
97
another.
kill
to
attempt
or
killing of
The State of Ohio sought to prove the specification of prior conviction for attempt to kill by introducing into evidence the record of a 1972
Illinois conviction. The Supreme Court observed that the parties had
never agreed as to the "historical facts" surrounding Lonberger's guilty
plea. 43 98 Lonberger was indicted in 1971 in Illinois for three counts of
aggravated battery and one count of attempted murder. 3 99 The conviction statement stated that Lonberger was indicted for "aggravated battery, etc."'
and that he pleaded guilty to the indictment. The
transcript of the hearing at which Lonberger pleaded guilty showed that
the sentencing judge referred to both aggravated battery and attempted
murder. However, the judge referred only to "attempt" and failed to
explicitly say "attempt to kill" or "attempted murder.""'
4393. Id. at 436-38.
4394. Id. at 425. Ohio's aggravated murder statute states in pertinent part: "(A) No person
shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another. (B) No
person shall purposely cause the death of another while committing. . . rape .
OHIO
REV. CODE § 2903.01 (Page 1975).
4395. 459 U.S. at 425 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2903.01(A) (Page 1975)).
4396. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2903.01(B) (Page 1975)).
4397. Id. at 425-26 & n.2 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.04(A)(5) (Page 1975). The death
sentence could be imposed only in cases of aggravated murder where the specification was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Ohio statute states in pertinent part: "[I]f the offender
is found guilty of both the charge and one or more of the specifications, the penalty to be
imposed on the offender shall be death [or life imprisonment] ...
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.03(C) (Page 1982).
In determining whether to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment, the court is
required to hold a presentence hearing to consider possible mitigating circumstances. OHIO
REV. CODE §§ 2929.03(D), 2929.04 (Page 1975).
4398. 459 U.S. at 426. The State of Ohio offered into evidence three documents with respect
to the Illinois trial: a copy of the grand jury indictment, a certified copy of an Illinois record
called a "conviction statement," and the transcript of the 1972 Illinois hearing at which
Lonberger pleaded guilty. Id.
4399. Id. at 427.
4400. Id.
4401. Id. at 427-28. The Illinois judge stated in part: "Understand by pleading guilty I
could sentence you from one to ten on the aggravated battery, and attempt one to twenty." Id.
at 428.
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Before the Ohio trial, the court conducted an in limine hearing to
determine whether the Illinois guilty plea was voluntary. The Ohio court
found that Lonberger "intelligently and voluntarily" entered his plea of
guilty." 2 The evidence was admitted in the Ohio trial with an instruction that it be considered only with respect to the required specification
of a previous conviction and not the underlying murder count. 440 3
Lonberger was convicted of murder while committing rape and sentenced to death.' 4° The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the admission
of Lonberger's guilty plea into evidence and held that it was "voluntarily
and knowingly" made." 5
In the federal habeas proceeding, the district court denied relief and
found that an "ordinary person would have understood the nature of the
charges to which [Lonberger] was pleading guilty."" 6 The Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and granted the habeas petition. 40 7 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded" 8 in light of Sumner v.
Mata.44 9 The Sixth Circuit affirmed its original decision," 4 0 and the
Supreme Court again granted certiorari. 44"
The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the standard

for voluntariness of a guilty plea is a question of federal law. 44 1'2 However, the Court characterized the issue as one of "historical fact" as to
what the Illinois records showed about the guilty plea."' 3 Therefore, the
Court applied the presumption of correctness to state court findings re4402. Id. at 428-29.
4403. Id. at 429.
4404. Id.
4405. Id. at 429-30.
4406. Id. at 430.
4407. Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated sub. nom. Marshall v.
Lonberger, 451 U.S. 902 (1981).
4408. Marshall v. Lonberger, 451 U.S. 902 (1981).
4409. 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981) (court must expressly apply one of exceptions listed in section
2254 if it fails to accord presumption of correctness to state trial court findings).
4410. In Lonberger v. Jago, 655 F.2d 447, 449 (1981), the court held that Lonberger's 1972
guilty plea was "not demonstrably an intelligent one." The court found that the Ohio courts
made incorrect factual determinations that were not "fairly supported by the records" as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1976). Id. at 449.
4411. Marshall v. Lonberger, 454 U.S. 1141 (1982).
4412. 459 U.S. at 431 (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976) (guilty
pleas not voluntary if defendant has "such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his
plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt"); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243
(1969) (issue of effective waiver of federal constitutional right is governed by federal standards)). See also Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (defendant denied any "real notice"
of true nature of charges against him).
4413. 459 U.S. at 431-32.
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quired by section 2254(d)(8). 4
The Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit failed to accord a
"high measure of deference" to state court findings, particularly with re-

spect to Lonberger's credibility."

5

The rationale for the "high measure

of deference" standard is that the state trial court observes the witnesses
and has the best opportunity to judge them. 4 16 The Court based its conclusion that the guilty plea had been knowingly and intelligently made on
the presumption that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain to
the accused the charges against him."' 7 Therefore, the Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit's judgment.
6.

Exception to state contemporaneous objection statutes

A federal court will not review a state court decision addressing
both federal and state claims if the decision is based on adequate and
independent state grounds. 441 8 The state ground must be independent of
the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment by itself so that
a different ruling on the federal question would not change the outcome
of the case. The question of adequacy frequently arises when a litigant
fails to meet a state procedural ground and thereby forfeits raising constitutional claims on appeal."' 9
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 4 2 ° the Supreme Court held that failure to
make constitutional objections before or at trial, in violation of state contemporaneous objection statutes, constitutes an independent and ade4414. Id. at 432-38.
4415. Id. at 432 (citing Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) ("high measure of deference"
standard applied to hold that state court findings not "fairly supported" by the record)). The
Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio courts failed to make "explicit findings . . . concerning
Lonberger's credibility." 651 F.2d at 448. In LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690 (1973), the
Supreme Court held that a state court's failure to make explicit findings with respect to credibility did not defeat the state court decisions. Id. at 694 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 314-15 (1963)). Therefore, the Supreme Court in Lonberger held that by allowing the
Illinois conviction into evidence, the Ohio court tacitly refused to believe Lonberger's testimony. 459 U.S. at 433-34.
The Sixth Circuit also relied on the fact that "the state produced no contrary evidence."
Id. at 851. But the Supreme Court held that this standard goes beyond the high measure of
deference required. Id.
4416. 459 U.S. at 434 (citing United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 339
(1952) (deference with respect to witnesses should go to trial judge because "'[i]n doubtful
cases. . . his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the
truth. . . .'" (quoting Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N.Y. 422, 429, 169 N.E. 632, 634 (1930)))).
4417. 459 U.S. at 436 (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976)).
4418. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120-21 (1978).
4419. See generally id. at 122-23.
4420. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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quate state ground barring federal habeas review.44 2 1 An exception to
this rule applies only when the petitioner can show both cause for noncompliance with the state procedural rule and actual prejudice arising
from an alleged constitutional violation. 44"2 2 The Court left the precise
44 23
definition of "cause" and "prejudice" open for future determination.
In two recent decisions, the Court gave some definition to these
terms. In Engle v. Isaac,4 2 4 the Court examined the "cause for noncompliance" prong of the Sykes test and announced two holdings. First, an
argument of alleged "futility" of a constitutional objection does not establish cause." 25 Second, a prisoner's contention that he could not have
known of the constitutional claim does not meet the cause for noncompliance requirement where the tools to construct the constitutional claim
existed." 26 In United States v. Frady,44"2 7 the Court specified that "actual
prejudice," as distinguished from a mere "possibility of prejudice," must
44 28
be shown to establish the prejudice prong of the Sykes test.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded a related case, Myers v.
Washington," 2 9 to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of
Isaac and Frady. On remand, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Isaac and
Frady and held that the state contemporaneous objection rule did not bar
federal habeas review."' 3 The court reasoned that Myers did not have
4421. Id. at 81-82.
4422. Id. at 87.
4423. Id. at 91.
4424. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
4425. Id. at 130. The Court noted that a defendant who perceives a constitutional claim may
not "bypass" raising the claim in state courts even if the state court has previously rejected the
constitutional argument. Id.
4426. Id. at 131-33. In Isaac, three state criminal defendants in unrelated Ohio trials were
convicted of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated murder, and felonious assault. All three had
alleged self-defense. Id. at 112-14. They claimed that the state court unconstitutionally shifted
the burden of proof with respect to their assertion that they acted in self-defense. Id. The
defendants failed to raise this claim at their trials. Id. The Court held that In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), which required the prosecution to prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, provided the tool for their claim. 456 U.S. at 131-33.
4427. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
4428. Id. at 170. At his trial Frady argued that he had nothing whatsoever to do with the
murder at issue. Id. at 156. On appeal he abandoned that theory and asserted that the jury
instructions on malice were erroneous and did not give the jury an opportunity to consider a
manslaughter verdict: Id. at 157-58. The Court held, however, that Frady's claim had validity
only if an error in instruction amounted to prejudice per se and worked to his "actual and
substantial disadvantage." Id. at 170. The Court found that Frady failed to show actual prejudice because, at his original trial, he made no argument for a reduced manslaughter verdict,
he never presented "colorable evidence" that would reduce his crime from murder to manslaughter, and the evidence in the record showed "'malice aplenty.'" Id. at 171.
4429. 646 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 921 (1982).
4430. 702 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1983).
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the constitutional tool to make his claim at the time of his trial and,
therefore, he had cause for failure to make an objection at trial."'43 1 Secondly, the court found that Myers suffered actual prejudice." 3 2
In 1977, Myers filed a petition for release from personal restraint
which was denied by the Washington Supreme Court. 44 33 Before the
state supreme court, Myers for the first time challenged a jury instruction
from his 1957 murder trial. He contended that the instruction unconstitutionally shifted, to the defendant, the burden of persuasion with respect
to the intent element. 44 34 The trial judge instructed the jury that they
were to presume that the killing was without excuse or justification and
that the death of the deceased was designed by the defendant." 35 Myers
was convicted of second-degree murder.
In 1979, he filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, but the court granted the state's motion for summary judgment against Myers.44 36 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court decision." 37 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the Ninth Circuit decision." 38
The controlling case law establishing the unconstitutionality of such
jury instructions was not decided until more than a decade after Myers'
trial. 4 4 39 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit on remand found that at the time
of his trial, in 1957, Myers did not have the proper authority to support
his claim. Without this authority he "could not know" of his constitutional claim and, therefore, had "cause" for failure to meet the state contemporaneous objection rule. Thus, the court held Isaac to be inapposite
to Myers' case. 444 °
The Ninth Circuit also found that Myers suffered "actual prejudice"
since there was conflicting evidence at trial on the question of design, and
since Myers introduced evidence from which lack of intent could have
4431. Id. at 768.
4432. Id. at 768-69.
4433. In re Myers, 91 Wash. 2d 120, 587 P.2d 532 (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912
(1979).
4434. 702 F.2d at 766.
4435. 646 F.2d at 361 (emphasis added).
4436. Id. at 357.
4437. Id. at 363.
4438. 456 U.S. 921 (1982).
4439. 702 F.2d at 766. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the Supreme Court
established the unconstitutionality of shifting the burden of proof of an element of a crime. In
Mullaney, a state statute required the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation in order to reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter. Id. at
684-85. The Court held that the statute violated due process by unconstitutionally shifting to
the defendant the burden of proof. Id. at 704.
4440. 702 F.2d at 767-68.
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been inferred."4 The court therefore held Frady to be inapposite. Thus,
for the second time, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the lower
court's denial of habeas corpus. 4 42
The question of "actual prejudice" also arose in Leiterman v.
Rushen.4 3 In Leiterman, the Ninth Circuit held that no "actual prejudice" resulted because the allegedly illegal conduct of the arresting officers had no causal relationship to either the evidence used to convict the
petitioner or the decision to prosecute him.""
Leiterman and two co-defendants were suspected of dealing in marijuana."4 5 Police observed them transferring large packages from one car
to the trunk of another."4 6 Two armed police officers in plainclothes
approached the defendants, identified themselves, and ordered them to
halt.4 7 The defendants fled and the officers opened fire, killing one man
and wounding another."4 8 At trial the defendants made a motion to
suppress the evidence, asserting only that the police lacked probable
cause to seize it."4 9 However, they failed to bring a pretrial motion to
suppress the evidence." 5 0 They also failed to address the issue of excessive violence."' 5 The defendants were convicted of possession of
marijuana. 4 5 2
On appeal, the defendants claimed that their fourteenth amendment
due process rights were violated by the arresting officer's use of excessive
violence." 53 They also claimed that their sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because this claim was not
raised at the trial and pretrial stages.4 54 The California Court of Appeal
did not discuss the issue of incompetent counsel and declined to reach
the due process issue because it had not been raised at trial. 445 5
The district court found that, although the police use of violence
4441. Id. at 768-69. Myers' trial transcript suggested that he acted out of fear and anger in
response to the victim's homosexual advance. 646 F.2d at 361.
4442. 702 F.2d at 769.
4443. 704 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1983).
4444. Id. at 444.
4445. Id. at 442.
4446. Id.
4447. Id.
4448. Id.
4449. Id.
4450. Id. at 442-43.
4451. Id.
4452. Id.
4453. Id. at 443.
4454. Id.
4455. Id.
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was excessive, it did not render the conviction unconstitutional. 445 6 The
district court reasoned that the police conduct did not affect the fairness
of the trial and that the police had probable cause, before the shooting

occurred, to believe that a crime was being committed." 57 Finally, the
to
the level of outradistrict court found that the conduct did not "rise
s
''
geousness necessary to overturn the conviction. 44
The Ninth Circuit stated that habeas corpus usually requires some
causal nexus between the government action which violates the constitutional right and the conviction."4 59 Though the court found some authority that outrageous conduct by a federal official might warrant the

it found no cases in which the mis-

overturn of a federal conviction,"

conduct committed by local officers led to a reversal. More importantly,

the Ninth Circuit found that any misconduct in this case had nothing to

do with the production of evidence or the decision to prosecute." 6 ' The
court concluded no "actual prejudice" existed and, therefore, that the
did not apply." 62
Sykes exception to the contemporaneous objection rule
4463
relief.
corpus
Accordingly, it did not grant habeas

In Kreck v. Spaulding,

64 the

court held that Washington's contem-

poraneous objection rule in effect at the time of Kreck's trial allowed

claims of constitutional dimension to be raised on appeal even though
they had not been raised at trial." 65

4456. Id.
4457. Id.
4458. Id.
4459. Id.
4460. Id. (citing United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1974)). In Toscanino, the defendant appealed, on due process grounds, a conviction for counterfeiting. He
alleged he had been kidnapped, tortured, and illegally extradited from Uruguay. United States
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 269-70 (2d Cir. 1974). The court remanded for an evidentiary
hearing. Id. at 281. On remand, the lower court held there was no participation by United
States officials. United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). The
Toscanino ruling was cited in United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 1981). In
Fielding,the court held that since there was no showing that the United States participated in
Fielding's torture and kidnappng in Peru, the indictment need not be dismissed. Id. at 723-24.
4461. 704 F.2d at 443. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcible stomach
pumping to retrieve morphine tablets later admitted in evidence constituted "brutal conduct"
and violation of due process).
4462. 704 F.2d at 444.
4463. Id.
4464. 721 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1983) (amended opinion).
The amended opinion added the Washington State Supreme Court and Washington Court
of Appeals opinions in its appendix. Judge Schroeder concurred in the original opinion, but
joined the majority in the amended opinion. The major changes were a shortened discussion of
the procedural default and an additional discussion of the issue of exhaustion which Judge
Alarcon raised in his dissent.
4465. Id. at 1233-35. The court further held that Kreck had challenged the sufficiency of the

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Kreck was convicted of second-degree felony murder under Wash44 67
ington law. 44 66 The underlying felony was second-degree assault.

The Washington assault statute set forth seven situations which constituted second-degree assault. Only the first two were at issue in the Kreck
case. In the first, a person is guilty of second-degree assault if that person, "with the intent to injure" another, unlawfully administers a "drug

• . . which is dangerous to life or health."" 68 In the second situation, a
person is guilty of second-degree assault if that person "[w]ith intent...
to enable or assist himself or any other person to commit any crime...
administer[s] . . . chloroform ...
4469

The indictment charged Kreck with second-degree murder while
committing a second-degree assault by using chloroform on his estranged
wife after he had broken into his wife's home to retrieve furniture."4 0

However, the indictment did not specify under which section of the assault statute the charge was made. Nor did it specify any crime Kreck
sought to further by committing assault." 7 Kreck did not object to the
information of the indictment in the state courts and, therefore, there was no exhaustion problem. Id. at 1234.
4466. Id. at 1230. The Washington second-degree murder statute in effect at the time of
Kreck's trial provided in pertinent part:
The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the
second degree...
(2) When perpetrated by a person engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt
to commit, or in withdrawing from the scene of, a felony ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.040 (1974). Subsequent to Kreck's trial, Washington adopted a new
code of criminal law, effective July 1, 1976.
4467. 721 F.2d at 1231. The second-degree assault statute in effect at the time of Kreck's
trial provided in pertinent part:
Every person who, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first
degree(1)

With intent to injure, shall unlawfully administer.

. .

any drug.

. .

the use of

which is dangerous to life or health; or
(2) With intent thereby to enable or assist himself or any other person to commit
any crime, shall administer to, or cause to be taken by, another, chloroform ...
Shall be guilty of assault in the second degree. ...
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.020 (1974).
4468. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.020(1) (1974).
4469. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.020(2) (1974).

4470. 721 F.2d at 1231 n.5. Kreck's indictment for second-degree murder stated in pertinent
part:
That the defendant, Charles Kreck. . . engaged in the commission of the crime of
Assault in the Second Degree. . . upon Jacosa Kreck, and did administer to
Jacosa Kreck, chloroform, and as a result. . . Jacosa Kreck. . . die[d].

. ..

Id.
4471. The state argued that, by using the word "chloroform" in the indictment, it had supplied the information required by subsection 2 of the assault code. Subsection 2 also required
that the defendant administer chloroform with the intent to assist himself in committing "any
crime." The indictment failed to identify an underlying crime. The state argued that identify-
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sufficiency of the record at trial. He was convicted of second-degree
murder while committing a felony." 72
Kreck made a direct appeal to the state court claiming that the indictment was insufficient and that he was denied due process because the

charges failed to give him adequate notice to prepare his defense. The
state supreme court rejected this claim." 73

habeas corpus in federal

He then sought a writ of

court." 74

The State of Washington argued that the state contemporaneous objection rule barred relief because Kreck did not object to the indictment

at the time of his trial. 4 7 5 The Ninth Circuit held that where there is no
clear state policy barring review of constitutional claims not asserted at

trial, the policies of comity and finality are fostered by federal nonintervention, and a federal court may review the claim." 7 6 The court found
ing an underlying crime was not required and that burglary was proven by the facts at trial.
Id. at 1232.
4472. Id. at 1230-31.
4473. Id. at 1234. Kreck also raised the issue in his petition for collateral review to the state
court of appeals. Judge Alarcon disagreed with the majority's characterization of Kreck's
claim before the state courts. In his dissent, he argued that Kreck challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence and not the sufficiency of the indictment before the state courts. Id. at 1237
(Alarcon, J., dissenting). He therefore concluded that Kreck had not exhausted his state remedies. Id. at 1239-40 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). This disagreement between the majority and the
dissent is probably the reason the court included the state court opinions as appendices.
The Washington Court of Appeals stated that Kreck argued that the state "failed to prove
the crime of second-degree assault as defined in RCW 9.11.020(2)." State v. Kreck, 12 Wash.
App. 748, 754, 532 P.2d 285, 289 (1975) (footnote omitted). That court reversed the conviction and remanded for retrial, urging the trial court "to specify which section or sections of
RCW 9.11.020, if any, it finds the defendant violated." Id. at 755, 532 P.2d at 289 (footnote
omitted).
The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding there was substantial evidence that the
defendant administered chloroform to enable himself to commit burglary. 86 Wash. 2d 112,
122, 542 P.2d 782, 788 (1975) (en banc).
4474. 721 F.2d at 1234. The district court held that Kreck had exhausted all state remedies;
the circuit court did not disturb this holding. Id. at 1234-35. Both parties submitted stipulations to the Ninth Circuit stating that Kreck had challenged the sufficiency of the indictment
in every available state forum. Id. at 1234. The court observed that the state cannot concede
exhaustion. Id. (citing Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 868 (9th Cir. 1982)). The court distinguished Jackson on the ground that the record in Kreck showed that the state had a fair
opportunity to review Kreck's claim. Id.
4475. Id. at 1234 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (state contemporaneous objection rule bars review because it is an independent and adequate state ground)).
4476. Id. (citing Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979)). In Ulster, the Court
stated that "if neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for
the State by entertaining the claim." 442 U.S. at 154 (footnote omitted). See also Maxwell v.
Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
Judge Alarcon in his dissent argued that Kreck's counsel deliberately failed to raise the
objection to the indictment in state court as part of his trial strategy to convince the judge that
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that Washington has no clear contemporaneous exception policy that
would qualify as an independent and adequate state ground barring fed-

eral habeas review. 4 77 The Ninth Circuit thus reviewed the matter and
held that at the time of Kreck's trial Washington law allowed claims of
constitutional error to be raised for the first time on appeal. 4478 Therefore, the circuit court upheld the grant of habeas corpus." 7 9
7.

Requirement of specific factual allegations for federal petitioners

A prisoner in federal custody who files a habeas corpus petition is
not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. section 2255. 4480 The petitioner seeking a hearing must support his claim
Kreck was not guilty by virtue of insanity. 721 F.2d at 1238 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) (purpose of honoring state contemporaneous
objection rules is to prevent "sandbagging" where defense lawyers take their chances on obtaining not guilty verdict with intent of saving constitutional claims in event of appeal)).
4477. 721 F.2d at 1234-35. The Ninth Circuit has on two previous occasions held that state
procedural policy did not bar habeas review. See Maxwell v. Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031, 1034
(9th Cir.) (no independent and adequate state ground because state courts denied Maxwell's
federal claim on the merits rather than on state procedural grounds), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976
(1982); Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1111 n.4 (9th Cir.) (Montana's contemporaneous objection procedure at time of trial allowed claims of constitutional dimension to be raised for the
first time on appeal), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980).
4478. 721 F.2d at 1235. The court cited several authorities for this proposition. First, it
cited a Washington statute describing the issues reviewable in habeas corpus proceedings. The
Washington statute permits inquiry "where it is alleged in the petition that the rights guaranteed the petitioner by the Constitution of the State of Washington or of the United States have
been violated." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.36.130(1) (1961).
Second, the court cited Rule 2.5(a)(3) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for the State of
Washington which allows a party to raise for the first time on review a "manifest error affecting a constitutional right."
See also State v. Ruzicka, 89 Wash. 2d 217, 220-21, 570 P.2d 1208, 1209-10 (1977) (claim
raised first time on appeal generally will not be reviewed, but when claims go to issue of fair
trial they are properly before court); State v. Peterson, 73 Wash. 2d 303, 306, 438 P.2d 183,
185 (1968) (footnote omitted) (failure to object at trial generally bars review on appeal, but
where instruction invades a constitutional right, review is proper).
Judge Alarcon argued that a challenge to the sufficiency of the information cannot be
raised on appeal. 721 F.2d at 1238 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Piper, 194 Wash.
194, 77 P.2d 779 (1938) (sufficiency of the information could not be raised for the first time in
Washington Supreme Court)). However, since Piper referred to the Washington Supreme
Court, it may not bar a challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment on appeal so long as the
claim is raised in the Washington Court of Appeals as well as the Washington Supreme Court.
4479. 721 F.2d at 1235.
4480. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) provides in pertinent part: "Unless the motion and the files
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court
shall. . . grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect thereto."
See Hodges v. United States, 368 U.S. 139, 140 (1961) (per curiam) (no hearing required
when records of case conclusively show that petitioner was not entitled to relief); Coco v.
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with specific factual allegations" 8 1 which are not so patently frivolous as

to warrant a summary dismissal." 82 When there is no manifest factual
or legal invalidity to the petitioner's claims, the court must grant a hearing on the merits." 8 3
In Baumann v. United States," 84 the Ninth Circuit remanded two of
Baumann's claims for an evidentiary hearing because they were sup-

ported by specific factual allegations. 8The court dismissed two other
claims on the basis of legal invalidity."
Baumann was the president of a brokerage company which marketed land sale contracts held by a land sales company. The brokerage
company collected periodic contract payments from lot buyers and forwarded them to investors who had purchased the contracts." 86 When
financing problems occurred, the land sales company began writing
spurious land sale contracts." 87 Finally, when legitimate sales failed to
support the fraudulent sales, the operation collapsed." 8 8 Baumann was
charged with conduct knowingly in furtherance of the fraudulent
scheme, and aiding and abetting the fraudulent conduct. 4489
United States, 569 F.2d 367, 369-71 (5th Cir. 1978) (no § 2255 hearing where defendant forfeited claims by choosing strategy of not raising claims at trial).
4481. "Specific factual allegations" are to be distinguished from "merely conclusionary statements." See Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1969) (claim of suppression
of exculpatory evidence supported by specific factual allegation where a potential identification
witness was instructed to avoid testifying). The "specific factual allegations" requirement does
not require the prisoner to set forth the evidence in detail. The petitioner need only make
factual allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief. United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d
1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618, 621 (1969)), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).
4482. When specific factual allegations are made, the claim is not frivolous. See Blackledge
v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 77-78 (1977) (allegation of an allegedly unkept plea bargain not patently frivolous since petitioner indicated terms of promise as well as identity of witness);
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) (government claim that petitioner's allegations were improbable due to lack of witnesses could not warrant court's denial of petitioner's
opportunity to support his claim of alleged plea bargain). Cf. United States v. Malcolm, 432
F.2d 809, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1970) (claim that guilty plea was invalid due to incompetency was
without merit since, immediately after making plea, petitioner had denied recent use of drugs
and confirmed freedom from narcotics by certification of his physician); Choy v. United States,
344 F.2d 126, 127-28 (9th Cir.) (allegation of incompetency is frivolous when undocumented
and unsupported by allegations of previous or subsequent history of incompetency, mental
deficiency, or treatment), cerL denied, 382 U.S. 871 (1965).
4483. See Sosa v. United States, 550 F.2d 244, 250 (5th Cir. 1977) (literal language of § 2255
mandates a hearing if record does not show manifest invalidity of claim).
4484. 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982).
4485. Id. at 581.
4486. Id. at 569.
4487. Id.
4488. Id. at 569-70.
4489. Two counts charged Baumann with mailing checks to investors in furtherance of the
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Baumann was convicted on four counts of mail fraud." 9° He raised
four claims in his habeas corpus petition. First, he alleged that the indictment was invalid because it was improperly drawn."49 1 Second, he
argued that the government failed to disclose exculpatory evidence." 9932
Third, he raised several claims with respect to sentencing errors."
Fourth, he claimed that in light of "newly discovered evidence," he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing." 94 The district court held that the
indictment was valid, summarily dismissed the exculpatory evidence and
sentencing claims, and held the fourth claim not cognizable in a habeas
corpus proceeding." 95
With respect to Baumann's first claim, the Ninth Circuit stated that
an attack on the validity of an indictment generally is not reviewable
without showing cause for failure to raise the claim before the trial
court." 9 6 However, the court ruled that such cause may be demonstrated if the petitioner can show that he failed to raise the claim before
trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel." 9 7 The court stated that
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must rest on a showing of
prejudice."498 It went on to conclude that Baumann could not have suffered any prejudice by his counsel's failure to move for dismissal of the
indictment because the indictment was not defective as a matter of
law." 99 The Ninth Circuit therefore held that the record demonstrated
conclusively that Baumann failed to state a claim for relief and was not
entitled to a section 2255 evidentiary hearing. 4 °
Secondly, Baumann argued that the prosecution unconstitutionally
land sales company's scheme. The third and fourth counts charged him with mailing certain
letters in furtherance of the scheme. Id. at 570.
4490. Id. at 569.
4491. Id. at 571.
4492. Id. at 572.
4493. Id. at 573-74.
4494. Id. at 578.
4495. Id. at 568.
4496. Id. at 572 (citing United States v. Zazzara, 626 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1980) (denial of
motion for new trial pursuant to § 2255 upheld because no cause shown for petitioner's failure
to raise claim prior to trial that indictment was obtained on perjured testimony, where trial
attorney knew information relevant to claim)).
4497. Id. (citing Zazzara, 626 F.2d at 137). Cf Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 378
(9th Cir. 1981) (no cause shown where there was no showing that failure to object was anything other than tactical decision).
4498. 692 F.2d at 572 (citing Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978) (en
banc) (prisoner must show that omission constituted error that "reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent conscientious advocate would not have made"), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
974 (1979)).
4499. Id.
4500. Id.
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suppressed evidence which would show that the charges against him
were based on contracts that were actually valid.450 1 Proof of this allegation could establish a violation of due process which would justify relief
under section 2255.4502 Baumann claimed that the prosecutor failed to
disclose to the jury that investors who had testified against Baumann had
actually received legitimate contract payments from the buyers themselves rather than fraudulent payments supplied by the land sales company.4 5 °3 the court rejected the government's claim that Baumann failed
45°4

to make a sufficient affirmative showing to justify section 2255 relief.

The Ninth Circuit held that Baumann did not have to show that exculpatory material was in fact intentionally suppressed.4 50 5 The court further

held that Baumann's claim was not so patently frivolous as to warrant
the case was remanded for an evidensummary dismissal.450 6 Therefore,
450 7
claim.
this
on
hearing
tiary
Baumann also claimed several errors with respect to his sentencing.
He claimed that, contrary to the law of criminal procedure, the court
failed to disclose a presentence report to him. 450 However, the Ninth

Circuit held that the document in issue did not qualify as a presentence
report.45 0 9 Consequently, the court ruled that Baumann was not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on this issue.4 5 10

Baumann also challenged a presentencing interview with his probation officer, arguing that it violated his sixth amendment right to counsel
4501. Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence constitutes violation of due process clause of fourteenth amendment)).
4502. Id. (citing Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
4503. Id.
4504. Id. at 573. The court found that the government misplaced its reliance on United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) because of its claim that Baumann failed to make a sufficient showing to justify § 2255 relief. 692 F.2d at 572. According to the court, Agurs addressed only the question of the materiality of undisclosed exculpatory evidence and not the
question of the defendant's burden of production. Id.
4505. 692 F.2d at 572-73.
4506. Id. at 573 (citing United States v. Donn, 661 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (evidentiary hearing required since prisoner produced documents allegedly refuting
presentence report)).
4507. Id. The court refused to address the argument with respect to letters which Baumann
did not include in his § 2255 petition. See Marshall v. United States, 465 F.2d 966, 967-68
(9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). However, the court held that on remand Baumann should be
allowed to raise the issue of prosecutorial suppression with respect to these letters. 692 F.2d at
573.
4508. 692 F.2d at 573. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) requires disclosure of presentence
reports if the defendant requests it.
4509. 692 F.2d at 574.
4510. Id.
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and constituted custodial interrogation.4 5 1' The Ninth Circuit concluded
that there was no custody and therefore the meeting with the probation
officer did not constitute a "critical stage" of the proceeding requiring
presence of counsel.45 12 Therefore, the court upheld the district court's
summary dismissal of this claim.45 1 3

Finally, Baumann claimed that certain additional evidence constituted "newly discovered evidence" which could be a basis for a new
trial.4 51 4 In one letter the president of the land sales company said that
the contracts purchased by Baumann's brokerage company were valid,
45 15
and that Baumann could not have had any knowledge of the scheme.

The magistrate concluded that claims of new evidence are not cognizable
under section 2255 and recommended that the petition be denied.4 516
The district court accepted the magistrate's recommendation and denied
the petition.4 51 7 In doing so, the district court stated that section 2255

does not allow relitigation of questions of guilt or innocence.4518 The dis4511. Id.
4512. Id.at 574-78. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981),
on the ground that the presentence interview is a "critical stage" in capitalcases. 692 F.2d at
576.
4513. 692 F.2d at 578.
4514. Id.
4515. Id.
4516. Id. at 578-79 & n.6. Baumann objected to the magistrate's recommendation and cited
contrary authority from other circuits. See, e.g., Lindhorst v. United States, 585 F.2d 361, 365
& n.8 (8th Cir. 1978) (newly discovered evidence raised in § 2255 motion is admissible subject
to same test governing motions for new trial); Anderson v. United States, 443 F.2d 1226, 1227
(10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (case remanded for evidentiary hearing on newly discovered
evidence of confession by prisoner's fellow inmate). See also Silverman v. United States, 556
F.2d 655 (2d Cir.) (no evidentiary hearing required since client knew of attorney's alteration of
evidence and failed to object at trial and, therefore, by implication, evidence was not newly
discovered), cert. denied,434 U.S. 956 (1977); Morgan v. United States, 438 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.
1971) (per curiam) (no evidentiary hearing required because alleged newly discovered evidence
was known to petitioner and his attorney).
4517. 692 F.2d at 579.
4518. Id. at 579 & n.7. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the district court authority, Hill v.
United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), on the ground that Hill held that nonconstitutional claims
are cognizable only if there is a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice." Id. at 428.
For further discussion of the proposition that a petitioner's guilt or innocence should not
be relitigated in a collateral proceeding, see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (no
evidentiary hearing required where newly discovered evidence relevant only to the guilt of the
prisoner rather than constitutionality of his detention). See also Anderson v. Maggio, 555 F.2d
447, 451 (5th Cir. 1977) (no evidentiary hearing required despite evidence of retracted confession); Clark v. Untied States, 370 F. Supp. 92, 95 (W.D. Pa.) (appeal to executive clemency
and not evidentiary hearing is recourse for relief because of newly discovered evidence), affid
mem., 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 265-66 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring) (habeas corpus review should occur only if there is a "colorable claim
of innocence"). But see Anderson v. United States, 443 F.2d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1971) (per
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trict court further held that even if it did, the newly discovered evidence
an acquittal, and therefore, did not justify
would probably not produce
45 19
post-conviction relief.
The Ninth Circuit held that, because the evidence could have been
discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence, it was not newly
discovered. 5 z" Therefore, it declined to decide the correctness of the district court holding that claims of newly discovered evidence were proper
held that Baumann
under section 2255.4521 Instead, the Ninth Circuit
4 522
counsel.
of
assistance
ineffective
of
claim
had a
In summary, Baumann was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
the indictment and sentencing issues since they failed on questions of
law. However, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the questions
of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence since these claims were based on sufficient factual
allegations.45 23
In Morgan v. United States,45 24 the Ninth Circuit remanded the case
for a section 2255 evidentiary hearing because Morgan's discrimination
claim was based on sufficient factual allegations. Morgan, a black man,
was convicted in a Washington state court of various narcotics offenses. 45 25 He filed a habeas petition to have his judgment vacated on the
ground that no blacks had been on his grand or petit jury panels or on
the master jury wheel during the three-year period when the criminal
proceedings against him were pending.45 26 The district court summarily
dismissed the motion on the ground that it stated only a legal conclusion
unsupported by factual allegations.4 5 27 The Ninth Circuit affirmed because Morgan failed to alleged any information regarding the black population in the division or district in which he was indicted.4 52 8
Morgan then filed a second section 2255 motion alleging no blacks
had served on a federal jury in the district for more than twenty
curiam) (remand for evidentiary hearing required because of newly discovered evidence of
confession).
4519. 692 F.2d at 579.
4520. Id. at 579-80.
4521. Id. at 580.
4522. Id.

4523. Id. at 581.
4524. 696 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1983).
4525. The conviction was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Morgan,-565
F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 924 & 974 (1978).
4526. 696 F.2d at 1239-40.
4527. Id. at 1240.
4528. Id. (citing Morgan v. United States, 622 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1980) (unpublished memorandum opinion)).
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years. 45 2 9 The district court summarily dismissed the second motion on
the grounds that it failed to allege new or different grounds for relief and

that the prior determination was on the merits.4" 3" The Ninth Circuit
reversed and held that the rule against successive motions did not bar

review of Morgan's second motion.4

31

The court concluded that sum-

mary dismissal was improper because the district court had not decided
the earlier motion on the merits.4 53 2
The Ninth Circuit went on to affirm the district court finding that
Morgan failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
sixth amendment. 533 The court ruled that Morgan nonetheless had an
equal protection claim since he was allegedly indicted by a grand jury
from which members of his race had been purposefully excluded. 534 The
court held that an evidentiary hearing is needed where the exclusion has
occurred over a period of time, especially where there has been complete
exclusion from all of the juries.4 535 Therefore, the case was remanded for
an evidentiary hearing.45 36
4529. Id.
4530. Id.
4531. Id. Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C. following § 2255 (1982), states:
A second or successive motion may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the
merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of
the movant to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the
procedure governed by these rules.
4532. 696 F.2d at 1240. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 19 (1963) (review of second habeas motion not barred if the first motion was not decided on the merits). A federal
court can deny a motion without a hearing only if the record "conclusively showed the motion
to be without merit." United States v. Donn, 661 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1981).
4533. 696 F.2d at 1240 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)). Duren established a
three-part test for determining a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment requirement
that the jury system reflect a fair cross-section of the community. First, the group alleged to be
excluded must be a "distinctive" group in the community. Second, the group's representation
on the list from which jurors are selected must be unfair and unreasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community. Third, the underrepresentation must be the result
of systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. 439 U.S. at 364. Morgan
failed to meet the latter two prongs of the test. 696 F.2d at 1240.
4534. 696 F.2d at 1240 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)). The Court in
Castaneda established a three-part test for determining a prima facie case of discriminatory
purpose. First, there must be discrimination against a distinct class. Second, there must be a
degree of underrepresentation proven by comparing the proportion of the group in the total
population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors. Third, there must be a selection
procedure that is susceptible of abuse or that is not racially neutral. 430 U.S. at 494.
4535. 696 F.2d at 1241 (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (claim that no blacks
had ever served as grand jury foremen rejected because discrimination not established at the
evidentiary hearings); Guice v. Fortenberry, 661 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (claim that
no blacks had served as jury foremen for the past 15 years was cause for evidentiary hearing)).
The court considered Morgan's claim even more serious than those in Guice and Rose. Id.
4536. Id.
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Ex Post Facto Clause

The ex post factor clause45 37 forbids Congress and the state legislatures from enacting statutes which impose or increase criminal punishment for penal acts committed prior to the statutes enactment.4 5 38 The
ex post facto clause limits the power of the legislature but does not, on its
face, apply to judicial decisions. 4 539 The due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, however, prohibit the courts from extending existing law to punish an act not considered unlawful when committed unless the extension was foreseeable.4 5 °
In Holguin v. Raines,4 541 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the propriety of
extending the defendant's minimum time of imprisonment by retroactively applying a new judicial and administrative interpretation of the
Arizona parole statute. 454 2 The defendant, Holguin, had been convicted
of two separate crimes 45 43 and had received consecutive sentences. At
the time of Holguin's sentencing, the Arizona Department of Corrections
relied on an unpublished opinion of the Arizona Attorney General and
determined Holguin's parole eligibility from his consecutive sentences
"by taking one-third of the total minimum terms of [his]
' 4
imprisonment. 11
Subsequently, the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted the parole
statute to mean that a criminal defendant convicted of two crimes and
given consecutive sentences is not eligible for parole until he serves the
complete sentence for the first crime and then serves one-third of the
sentence for the second crime.4 55 Thereafter, the Arizona Attorney Gen4537. U.S. CONsT. art. I,
"
Law ....

§ 10, cl.
1 states:

"No State shall.

. .

pass any.

. .

ex post facto

4538. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981).
4539. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915).
4540. Bouje v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). The Bouie Court reversed trespass
convictions, holding that an unforeseeable judicial extension of the state's trespass statute by
the state supreme court violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
353-54. In Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), the Supreme Court held that retroactive application of the definition of obscenity announced in a recent Supreme Court decision,
which made certain formerly lawful activity illegal, was a violation of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. Id. at 196.
4541. 695 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1982).
4542. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-411(A)(1) (1974) states in pertinent part: "Every
[p]risoner who has served one-third of the minimum sentence. . . shall be given an opportunity to appear before the board an apply for release upon parole."
4543. 695 F.2d at 372. In 1972, Holguin began serving three concurrent sentences for assault with a deadly weapon. In 1973, Holguin received an additional sentence for kidnapping,

to run consecutively with the earlier sentences for assault. Id.
4544. Id. at 372-73. The Arizona Supreme Court's unpublished opinion determined parole
eligibility by taking one-third of the total minimum terms of the consecutive sentences. Id.
4545. Id. at 373. In Mileham v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 110 Ariz. 470, 520
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eral issued a new opinion on the parole statute's application to consecutive sentences that was consistent with the Arizona Supreme Court
decision. 4 6 Consequently, Holguin's parole eligibility date was extended to conform with these judicial and administrative changes.4 54 7

Holguin petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a United States
district court. The district court denied the petition on the ground that
the Attorney General's new opinion did not violate the ex post facto
clause because the changes merely reflected the interpretation of the parole statute made by the Arizona Supreme Court. 45 4' The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.4 54 9
The Ninth Circuit equated administrative changes with legislative
4550

changes and, thus, subjected them to the same ex post facto scrutiny.

The court held, however, that retroactive changes in the law do not vio-

late the ex post facto clause if made in conformity with judicial interpretation of existing law. 4551 The Ninth Circuit relied on the rule that the ex
P.2d 840 (1974), the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted the Arizona parole statute to mean
that "a prisoner serving a sentence for escape made consecutive to a robbery sentence
bec[omes] eligible for parole only after serving the complete sentence on the robbery conviction
and one-third of the escape sentence." 695 F.2d at 373.
4546. The Arizona Attorney General's new opinion announced that "any prisoner sentenced
to consecutive sentences would have to complete the first sentence and one-third of the second
sentence before being eligible for parole." 695 F.2d at 373.
4547. Id. Under the prior Arizona Attorney General's opinion, Holguin was eligible for
parole on November 8, 1979. Under the holding in Mileham, see supra note 4545, and pursuant to the Attorney General's new opinion, Holguin would not become eligible for parole until
September 9, 1985.
4548. 695 F.2d at 373.
4549. Id. at 375.
4550. Id. at 374 (citing Love v. Fitzharris, 460 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409
U.S. 1100 (1973)). In Love, the California Department of Corrections changed its interpretation of the California parole statute to increase the minimum number of terms for prisoners
serving consecutive sentences prior to eligibility for parole. The court found that the change
violated the ex post facto clause, holding that the clause applies to retroactive administrative
interpretations as well as to legislative enactments. Love v. Fitzharris, 460 F.2d 382, 385 (9th
Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 1100 (1973).
4551. 695 F.2d at 374 (citing Milehan v. Simmons, 588 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1979)). In
Simmons, the Ninth Circuit held that the Arizona Supreme Court did not violate ex post facto
principles when it recalculated parole eligibility in Mileham v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and
Paroles, 110 Ariz. 470, 520 P.2d 840 (1974). Mileham v. Simmons, 588 F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th
Cir. 1979). The Holguin court noted that to the extent the Simmons decision applies to
Holguin it is bound by the Simmons result. The outcome of Holguin's ex post facto appeal,
then, turned on whether the Arizona Attorney General's new opinion was consistent with the
Arizona Supreme Court decision in Mileham v. Arizona. The Ninth Circuit then construed
Mileham v. Arizona as applying to all consecutive sentencing situations and held that the Attorney General's new opinion was consistent with that decision. 695 F.2d at 375. See supra
note 4545. The dissent, relying on Love v. Fitzharris,see supra note 4550, was not persuaded
that the Attorney General's new opinion fell within the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court
in Mileham v. Arizona. The dissent argued that the Attorney General's new opinion operated
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clause does not apply to a court decision construing state
post facto
2
law.

4 55

Nevertheless, the court recognized that implicit in the ex post facto
clause was the requirement that the judicial interpretations of existing
laws be foreseeable.45 53 The court then determined that, under the controlling due process principles, the change in the interpretation of the
parole statute was foreseeable.4 55 4
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Holguin underscores the need to
make a threshold analysis of whether the imposition or increase of criminal punishment occurred because of changes in the law caused by administrative review, legislative enactment, or judicial decision, since their
respective standards of ex post facto scrutiny are not uniform. The ex
post facto clause is an absolute bar on retroactive legislative or administrative acts that impose or increase criminal punishment for prior acts,
whereas the due process protection against retroactive application of judicial decisions is set at the lower standard of foreseeability.
The Ninth Circuit dealt with the issue of foreseeability in Camitsch
as a substantial disadvantage to prisoners already incarcerated, and that the new opinion was
much broader than the narrow holding of the Arizona Supreme Court in Mileham v. Arizona.
The dissent, therefore, contended that the new opinion should be treated as an act of law
applied retroactively, in violation of the ex post facto clause. 695 F.2d at 375-77 (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
4552. 695 F.2d at 374. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) (the ex post
facto clause "does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch").
4553. 695 F.2d at 374. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1977) (the right of
fair warning is protected against judicial action by the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1964) (if the ex
post facto clause bars the state from enacting and retroactively applying a criminal statute, it
must follow that the due process clause bars the state court from achieving the same result by
judicial construction); Forman v. Wolff, 590 F.2d 283, 284 (9th Cir. 1978) (the principle of fair
warning underlying the ex post facto clause limits the retroactive application of judicial decisions), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979).
4554. 695 F.2d at 375. The Ninth Circuit has only summarily addressed the foreseeability
issue. See, e.g., Mileham v. Simmons, 588 F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979) (state court's opinion affecting the application of parole statute to consecutive sentences was held foreseeable);
Forman v. Wolff, 590 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1978) (state court ruling adding the element of
alleging and proving the accused's age to crime of illegal sale of cocaine was held foreseeable).
The most definitive analysis was made by the Supreme Court in Bouie v. City of Columbia, see
supra note 4540 and accompanying text. The Bouie Court reasoned that "[i]f a judicial construction of a criminal statute is 'unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which
had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,' it must not be given retroactive effect." 378
U.S. 317, 354 (1964) (citation omitted).
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court appear to differ as to the constitutional basis of the foreseeability requirement. In Marks, see supra notes 4540 & 4553, and
Bouie, see supra note 4540, the Supreme Court placed the foreseeability requirement within the
purview of the due process clause; however, in Forman,see supra note 4553, the Ninth Circuit
held that fair warning regarding judicial decisions is implicit in the ex post facto clause.
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v. Risley.45 5 In this case, the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus
after the Montana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on counts of
sexual assault and non-consensual intercourse with four minor girls, ages
twelve to fourteen.4 55 6 The defendant sought a new trial on the ground
that the Montana Supreme Court improperly applied case law that had
been decided subsequent to his trial with respect to a jury instruction.4 5 7
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the writ on
the ground that the retroactive application of state decisional law did not
violate due process because the change in the use of the jury instruction
was foreseeable.4 55 8 The court reasoned that disapproval of the jury instruction in other Ninth Circuit state jurisdictions in the decade prior to
the defendant's trial put him on notice of its eventual disfavor by the
courts of Montana. 5 9
The Ninth Circuit in Camitsch has established an affirmative obligation on criminal defendants and their counsel to research changes in substantive law that occur in other jurisdictions within the circuit and to
anticipate that the same change may occur in their own state between the
time of trial and appeal. The defendant who fails to do so may be precluded from appealing the trial court's decision not to give a jury instruction that is subsequently changed by decisional law, if the change was
foreseeable.
4555. 705 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1983).
4556. Id. at 352-53. The defendant had requested a "charge easily made-difficult to disprove" instruction. This instruction states that the charge against the defendant is difficult to
defend against, even if the accused is innocent; therefore, the testimony of the complaining
witnesses must be examined with caution. The state decisional law in effect at the time of the
defendant's trial limited the instruction to instances where the veracity of the complaining
witness had been shown to be suspect. An unrelated subsequent appellate court decision further narrowed the use of the instruction to instances of both personal enmity and lack of
corroboration. Due to the facts of the defendant's case, the intervening change in the law
made his appeal for error of the trial court's refusal to offer the instruction moot. Id. at 353.
4557. Id.
4558. Id.
4559. Id. See, e.g., State v. Settle, 111 Ariz. 394, 531 P.2d 151 (1975) (instruction held to
violate state constitution); People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119 (1975) (instruction found to be obsolete).
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